Sceptre, Inc. v. Big Sandy Distrib. Inc. , 2018 Ohio 2612 ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as Sceptre, Inc. v. Big Sandy Distrib. Inc., 2018-Ohio-2612.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    SCIOTO COUNTY
    Sceptre, Inc.,                                       :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                          :       Case No. 18CA3831
    :
    v.                                           :
    :
    Big Sandy Distribution Inc.,                         :       DECISION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    Defendant-Appellant.                         :        RELEASED: 06/11/2018
    :
    HARSHA, J.,
    Appellant Big Sandy Distribution appealed a trial court order denying its motion for
    summary judgment. Appellee Sceptre moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that an
    order denying a summary judgment motion is not a final appealable order. Big Sandy
    opposed the motion contending that the trial court included Civ.R. 54(B) “no just reason
    for delay” language. However, here the order is a nonfinal order under R.C. 2505.02 and
    a Civ.R. 54(B) certification cannot transform the nonfinal order into a final appealable
    order. Because the trial court order is not a final appealable order, we GRANT Sceptre’s
    motion and DISMISS this appeal.
    I. Procedural History
    Sceptre sued Big Sandy for monies Sceptre alleged it is owed on a credit
    agreement. Big Sandy filed a counterclaim alleging that Sceptre defaulted on the terms
    of the agreement by failing to deliver conforming goods. Big Sandy alleged that it gave
    Sceptre proper notice of the defective shipment and Sceptre has been unjustly enriched
    by receiving payment and/or assessing indebtedness without providing conforming
    goods.
    Scioto App. No. 18CA3831                                                                     2
    Big Sandy filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to have Sceptre’s
    complaint dismissed. The motion did not seek judgment on Big Sandy’s counterclaim.
    Sceptre opposed the motion. The trial court denied the motion, finding:
    This matter alleges a breach of contract which involves disputes
    about TVs purchased and TVs sent back. The Plaintiff believes they paid
    the right amount and the Defendant believes they owe less than the amount
    of $20,689.00 with interest at 3% from April 19th, 2013.
    The Court having reviewed the entire briefs herein and this file finds
    this is a mathematical formula subject to all kinds of issues and facts.
    Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant’s Motion for
    Summary Judgment to be not well taken and therefore overruled. There
    being no just reason for delay, this is a final appealable order.
    Big Sandy appealed.
    II. Legal Analysis
    Appellate courts “have such jurisdiction as may be provided by law to review and
    affirm, modify, or reverse judgments or final orders of the courts of record inferior to the
    court of appeals within the district.” Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution; see also
    R.C. 2505.03(A). If a court's order is not final and appealable, we have no jurisdiction to
    review the matter and must dismiss the appeal. Eddie v. Saunders, 4th Dist. No. 07CA7,
    2008–Ohio–4755, ¶ 11.
    An order must meet the requirements of both R.C. 2505.02 and Civ.R. 54(B), if
    applicable, to constitute a final, appealable order. Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State Univ.,
    
    44 Ohio St. 3d 86
    , 88, 
    541 N.E.2d 64
    (1989). Under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1), an order is a final
    order if it “affects a substantial right in an action that in effect determines the action and
    prevents a judgment.” To determine the action and prevent a judgment for the party
    Scioto App. No. 18CA3831                                                                     3
    appealing, the order “must dispose of the whole merits of the cause or some separate
    and distinct branch thereof and leave nothing for the determination of the court.” Hamilton
    Cty. Bd. of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities v. Professionals Guild of Ohio, 46 Ohio
    St.3d 147, 153, 
    545 N.E.2d 1260
    (1989).
    Additionally, if the case involves multiple parties or multiple claims, the court's
    order must meet the requirements of Civ.R. 54(B) to qualify as a final, appealable order.
    Under Civ.R. 54(B), “[w]hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action
    whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, * * * or when multiple
    parties are involved, the court may enter final judgment as to one or more but fewer than
    all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason
    for delay.” Absent the mandatory language that “there is no just reason for delay,” an
    order that does not dispose of all claims is subject to modification and is not final and
    appealable. Noble v. Colwell, 
    44 Ohio St. 3d 92
    , 96, 
    540 N.E.2d 1381
    (1989); see Civ.R.
    54(B). The purpose of Civ.R. 54(B) is “ ‘to make a reasonable accommodation of the
    policy against piecemeal appeals with the possible injustice sometimes created by the
    delay of appeals[,]’ as well as to insure that parties to such actions may know when an
    order or decree has become final for purposes of appeal.” Pokorny v. Tilby Dev. Co., 
    52 Ohio St. 2d 183
    , 186, 
    370 N.E.2d 738
    (1977) (citations omitted); see also Turner v.
    Robinson, 4th Dist. Highland No. 15CA11, 2016-Ohio-2981, ¶ 29.
    To determine whether a judgment is final, an appellate court must employ a two-
    step analysis:
    First, it must determine if the order is final within the requirements of R.C.
    2505.02. If the court finds that the order complies with R.C. 2505.02 and is
    in fact final, then the court must take a second step to decide if Civ.R. 54(B)
    Scioto App. No. 18CA3831                                                                     4
    language is required.
    Gen. Acc. Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 
    44 Ohio St. 3d 17
    , 21, 
    540 N.E.2d 266
    (1989);
    see also CitiMortgage v. Roznowski, 
    139 Ohio St. 3d 299
    , 2014-Ohio-1984, 
    11 N.E.3d 1140
    , ¶ 10; Walburn v. Dunlap, 
    121 Ohio St. 3d 373
    , 
    904 N.E.2d 863
    , 2009-Ohio-1221, ¶
    13.
    Here the order is not final under R.C. 2505.02. “The denial of a motion for
    summary judgment generally is considered an interlocutory order not subject to
    immediate appeal.” Stevens v. Ackman, 
    91 Ohio St. 3d 182
    , 186, 2001-Ohio-249, 
    743 N.E.2d 901
    , 904. “A denial of summary judgment is not generally a final appealable
    order ‘because the denial of the motion does not determine the outcome of the case. The
    parties both still have the opportunity to prove their case at trial and a judgment in either
    party's favor is not precluded.’ ” Darrow v. Zigan, 4th Dist. Hocking Nos. 07CA25,
    07AP25, 2009-Ohio-2205, ¶ 27 (Harsha, J., concurring on the issue of the lack of final
    appealable order) quoting International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union
    No. 8 v. Vaughn Industries, 6th Dist. No. WD-05-091, 2006-Ohio-475, ¶ 21.
    The trial court’s order denying summary judgment does not make a final
    determination of Scepter’s claim. Big Sandy’s motion sought to have Scepter’s claim
    dismissed, but the trial court determined that the claim was subject to a mathematical
    formula with “all kinds of issues and facts.” Thus, the trial court could not make a final
    determination – it could not grant Big Sandy a summary judgment and dismiss Sceptre’s
    claim.
    Because the order is a nonfinal order, Civ.R. 54(B) language cannot transform it
    into a final appealable order. Wisintainer held:
    Scioto App. No. 18CA3831                                                                    5
    [T]he phrase “no just reason for delay” is not a mystical incantation which
    transforms a nonfinal order into a final appealable order. Chef Italiano Corp.
    v. Kent State Univ. (1989), 
    44 Ohio St. 3d 86
    , 
    541 N.E.2d 64
    . Such
    language can, however, through Civ.R. 54(B), transform a final order into a
    final appealable order.
    
    Wisintainer, 67 Ohio St. 3d at 354
    . This analysis is consistent with the well-settled
    principle that “ ‘Civ.R. 54(B) does not alter the requirement that an order must be final
    before it is appealable.’ ” Gen. Acc. Ins . at 21, quoting Douhitt v. Garrison, 3 Ohio
    App.3d 254, 255, 
    444 N.E.2d 1068
    (1981); Fertec v. BBC&M Engineering, 10th Dist.
    Franklin No. 08AP-998, 2009-Ohio-5246, ¶ 16.
    Because the trial court’s order was not a final, appealable order, we lack
    jurisdiction to consider the matter. We grant Sceptre’s motion and dismiss this appeal.
    The clerk shall serve a copy of this order on all counsel of record and
    unrepresented parties at their last known addresses by ordinary mail.
    MOTION GRANTED. APPEAL DISMISSED. COSTS TO APPELLANT. SO
    ORDERED.
    Abele, J. & McFarland, J.: Concur.
    FOR THE COURT
    _____________________________
    William H. Harsha
    Judge
    NOTICE TO COUNSEL
    Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
    entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with
    the clerk.
    Scioto App. No. 18CA3831   6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18CA3831

Citation Numbers: 2018 Ohio 2612

Judges: Harsha

Filed Date: 6/11/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/29/2018