State v. Whaley , 2019 Ohio 3933 ( 2019 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Whaley, 
    2019-Ohio-3933
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    WILLIAMS COUNTY
    State of Ohio                                    Court of Appeals No. WM-18-009
    Appellee                                 Trial Court No. 18CR000123
    v.
    Travis T. Whaley                                 DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                Decided: September 27, 2019
    *****
    Katherine J. Zartman, Williams County Prosecuting Attorney, and
    Stacey S. Stiriz, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
    Abigail L. Wurm, for appellant.
    *****
    ZMUDA, J.
    {¶ 1} This is an appeal from the Williams County Court of Common Pleas, which
    denied the motion to withdraw guilty plea of appellant Travis Whaley, and sentenced him
    to a five-year prison term for felonious assault, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)(D)(a),
    a felony of the second degree. Finding no error in the trial court’s decision, we affirm.
    A. Background
    {¶ 2} On April 27, 2018, Whaley traveled to Toledo to purchase drugs,
    accompanied by Troy Smith, Vicky Sauceda, and Vicky’s boyfriend, June. Vicky drove
    the group in her car. On the drive back, Whaley injected himself with drugs, and by his
    own admission, forced the drugs on Troy. When Troy exhibited signs of overdose,
    Whaley performed CPR in the car for 45 minutes, until they reached Whaley’s home.
    Whaley and Vicky then placed Troy in a bathtub, and Whaley’s father called 911.
    Whaley and Vicky fled the house before police and EMS arrived. Troy was revived, and
    survived.
    {¶ 3} The next day, Whaley discussed the incident in a phone call with his
    girlfriend, Jessica Conrad. The call was recorded, because Jessica was an inmate at
    CCNO at the time. Whaley told Jessica that “Troy tried snitching on me and I found the
    thing on him.” He also admitted, “I took him to Toledo and I came out with the dope.
    With a ball of heroin and he wouldn’t get high. He won’t do it Jess so I made him do it
    and when I made him do it, he OD’d and died.”
    {¶ 4} Troy also discussed the incident in a phone call with a third party, days later.
    That phone call was also recorded, because Troy was an inmate at CCNO.1 Troy stated
    he fell asleep in the car, and Whaley injected him with the drugs and took his money and
    phone. When asked whether the drug used was fentanyl, Troy responded, “Yes. That’s
    1
    The record does not indicate why Troy was in custody.
    2.
    what the dumbass is doing when I fell asleep. I didn’t know it.” Troy’s account in the
    phone call matched his subsequent statement to police.
    {¶ 5} On June 19, 2018, the Williams County Grand Jury indicted Whaley,
    charging him in Count 1, corrupting another with drugs, a felony of the second degree,
    and in Count 2, of felonious assault, a felony of the second degree. The charges arose
    from the forced injection of Troy, resulting in his overdose and near death. Whaley was
    arraigned, and remained free on bond.
    {¶ 6} Whaley received pretrial discovery, including the recorded phone calls and
    statements. Prior to the scheduled October 1, 2018 trial date, Whaley agreed to a
    negotiated plea to avoid the mandatory prison term that he would face for conviction on
    Count 1, corrupting another with drugs. On September 19, 2018, in exchange for the
    prosecution dismissing Count 1, which carried a mandatory prison term if convicted,
    Whaley entered a guilty plea to Count 2, felonious assault.2
    {¶ 7} Prior to accepting the plea, the trial court conducted extensive inquiry of
    Whaley to ensure he entered his plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. As part of
    the colloquy between Whaley and the trial court, Whaley acknowledged he was satisfied
    with his counsel’s work on the case and with his advice, and understood the guilty plea
    2
    At the plea hearing, the state also indicated it would argue in favor of a prison term, but
    would not pursue a specific prison term. The written plea agreement, journalized by the
    trial court, contained no such provision, and at sentencing, the state argued in favor of a
    six-year prison term. Whaley asserts no error based on any breach of the plea agreement
    by the state, and regardless, the trial court did not follow the state’s recommendation, as
    evidenced by the record.
    3.
    was a complete admission of the facts and allegations regarding the charge of felonious
    assault. The trial court accepted the plea and found Whaley guilty of felonious assault, in
    violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (D)(1)(a), a felony of the second degree. The trial
    court continued sentencing to October 22, 2018, and ordered Whlaley to report for a
    presentence investigation interview.
    {¶ 8} On September 26, 2018, the trial court revoked Whaley’s bond after he
    failed to appear for a presentence investigation interview. A bench warrant issued, and
    Whaley was taken into custody on October 2, 2018.
    {¶ 9} On October 19, 2018, Whaley filed a motion, seeking to withdraw his guilty
    plea and requesting a hearing to demonstrate the basis for the motion. The trial court
    vacated the sentencing hearing, and granted Whaley additional time to file a
    memorandum in support of his motion. On October 29, 2018, Whaley filed his
    memorandum in support, arguing his counsel was unable to interview the victim, Troy,
    prior to entering his plea, but subsequently learned that Troy “did not remember” who
    administered the drugs to him, and despite other evidence of his guilt, Whaley maintained
    his innocence. Therefore, Whaley argued, there was a reasonable and legitimate basis to
    permit him to withdraw his guilty plea.
    {¶ 10} On November 5, 2018, the state filed an objection to Whaley’s motion,
    arguing Whaley fully understood the charges and potential sentence, and despite claims
    of innocence, entered a guilty plea rather than an Alford plea. As to the evidence, the
    4.
    state noted that Whaley failed to acknowledge his own incriminating statements that
    amounted to a confession.
    {¶ 11} On November 8, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on the motion.
    Whaley, through his counsel, argued a change in evidence from the date he entered his
    plea until the date of his motion, based on a statement attributed to Troy that he did not
    remember who injected him. Whaley testified at hearing, asserting, “what is said ain’t
    really what happened.” Despite incriminating recordings received by Whaley in
    discovery, prior to his plea, Whaley argued that a potential change in Troy’s testimony,
    and potential testimony by the driver of the vehicle, Vicky, provided a complete and total
    defense to the charges. The state opposed the motion, and argued that Whaley’s recorded
    confession negated any claim of a complete defense.
    {¶ 12} The trial court reviewed a transcript of the recorded statements, submitted
    by stipulation of the parties as a joint exhibit. After considering the motion and
    objection, the testimony, the joint exhibit, and applicable law, the trial court denied the
    motion by written opinion, concluding Whaley failed to establish “that he is ‘perhaps’ not
    guilty or that he has a complete defense to the charge. His own words tell us otherwise.”
    {¶ 13} On November 14, 2018, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The state
    argued in favor of a six-year prison term. Whaley’s counsel acknowledged the
    presumption for a prison term and Whaley’s criminal history, but requested community
    control and drug treatment instead of prison. Whaley spoke on his own behalf, and
    continued to claim Troy injected himself with the drugs. Whaley also argued in favor of
    5.
    drug treatment rather than prison. The trial court engaged in the following exchange with
    Whaley:
    THE COURT: So I’m pleased to hear maybe you’ve reached the
    point in your life where there’s no place to go but up. But that doesn’t
    minimize what you’ve been convicted of. I feel like we’re dancing. You
    said you didn’t inject the victim of this offense. You’ve injected others in
    the past but that’s not what you’re charged with here. But you still have
    entered a knowing and voluntary plea to felonious assault.
    So my difficulty right now is selecting the appropriate term of your
    period of imprisonment because you’ve not overcome the presumption of
    prison. So the Court must decide whether to impose a maximum period of
    imprisonment of eight (8) years or the minimum or something in between.
    And an important factor in my mind is to look at remorse. So I want you to
    give it some thought. You might want to talk with [your attorney]. I want
    you to tell me exactly what happened that particular night. If it’s the same
    stories you just told me, that’s fine but I want to hear it again. What exactly
    happened?
    WHALEY: Your Honor, on that night, Troy had texted me and was
    asking about going to Toledo. Your Honor, I didn’t have no money. No
    one, no one had no money. The driver didn’t have no money. Troy said
    that he would pay for gas if we went. By no means I’m not blaming him,
    6.
    by no means whatsoever. He was my friend. He was walking from
    McDonald to Aces Corners in which that night, he said when we had
    picked him up, he had food and wanted to be taken to a friend’s house first.
    THE COURT: My question for you, I understand the preliminaries.
    My question is, did you administer the heroin to your friend or not?
    WHALEY: No, I did not Your Honor.
    THE COURT: Alright, have a seat.
    {¶ 14} The trial court plainly indicated to Whaley that remorse was an important
    consideration, and Whaley continued to blame the victim without confronting his own,
    recorded statement, confessing to the assault. After articulating consideration of the
    factors under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, the trial court found Whaley not amenable to
    community control and imposed a five-year prison term for Count 2 of the indictment,
    felonious assault. The state dismissed Count 1 pursuant to the plea agreement. Whaley
    then filed the present appeal, challenging the trial court’s decision in denying his motion
    to withdraw his guilty plea, and asserting the following assignments of error:
    I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE
    APPELLANT’S PRESENTENCE MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
    GUILTY PLEA.
    II. APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE THE EFFECTIVE
    ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN HIS REQUEST TO WITHDRAW
    GUILTY PLEA.
    7.
    B. Analysis
    {¶ 15} In his first assignment of error, Whaley challenges the trial court’s denial of
    his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A motion to withdraw a plea of
    guilty “may be made only before sentence is imposed” and, generally, is to “be freely and
    liberally granted.” State x. Xie, 
    62 Ohio St.3d 521
    , 526-527, 
    584 N.E.2d 715
     (1992);
    Crim.R. 32.1. “Nevertheless, it must be recognized that a defendant does not have an
    absolute right to withdraw a plea prior to sentencing.” Id. at 527. We review a trial
    court’s decision regarding withdrawal of a plea for an abuse of discretion, and will affirm
    unless we find the trial court’s ruling was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Id.,
    citing State v. Adams, 
    62 Ohio St.2d 151
    , 157, 
    404 N.E.2d 144
     (1980).
    {¶ 16} To prevail on a Crim. R. 32.1 motion to withdraw a guilty plea, a criminal
    defendant must demonstrate a “reasonable and legitimate basis.” Xie at 527. A trial
    court must conduct a hearing, prior to ruling, to decide whether such basis exists. 
    Id.
    Some of the factors a trial court considers, relative to a presentence motion, are as
    follows:
    (1) whether the state will be prejudiced by withdrawal; (2) the
    representation afforded to the defendant by counsel; (3) the extent of the
    Crim.R. 11 plea hearing; (4) the extent of the hearing on the motion to
    withdraw; (5) whether the trial court gave full and fair consideration to the
    motion; (6) whether the timing of the motion was reasonable; (7) the
    reasons for the motion; (8) whether the defendant understood the nature of
    8.
    the charges and potential sentences; and (9) whether the accused was
    perhaps not guilty or had a complete defense to the charge.
    State v. Griffin, 
    141 Ohio App.3d 551
    , 554, 
    752 N.E.2d 310
     (7th Dist.2001).
    {¶ 17} Whaley acknowledges the fact that the trial court held a proper Crim.R.11
    hearing, and at the time of plea, he believed a guilty plea to be in his best interest.
    Whaley also acknowledges the trial court held a hearing on his motion. He argues his
    motion was timely and presented no prejudice to the state, and stated reasons for
    withdrawal. As to his representation, Whaley argues that his trial counsel failed to
    provide effective assistance in pursuing his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and failed
    to explore all possible defenses in counseling Whaley to enter into the plea.3
    {¶ 18} As to the final factor, Whaley argues that he agreed to plead guilty based
    on Troy’s statement that Whaley injected him, and with Troy no longer certain who
    injected him, Whaley was “perhaps not guilty or had a complete defense to the charge.”
    Whaley also argues that other occupants of the car might have testified in his favor. In
    denying his motion, however, the trial court focused on evidence Whaley completely
    ignored in his argument in support of his motion, his taped conversation with his
    girlfriend in which he admitted he forced Troy to take the drugs.
    3
    Whaley did not address whether he “understood the nature of the charge and potential
    sentences” in this appeal, and the record demonstrates Whaley understood that, by
    entering a guilty plea to felonious assault, the state would dismiss the charge carrying a
    mandatory prison term.
    9.
    {¶ 19} This is not a case in which Whaley argued he did not knowingly enter his
    plea because he should have been charged with a lesser offense based on his taped
    confession. See, e.g., State v. Simpson, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24266, 2011-Ohio-
    6181, ¶ 13-14 (defendant wanted to withdraw plea to murder in order to seek a voluntary
    manslaughter instruction at trial, based on taped statement that he “snapped” when
    girlfriend said she was leaving him). This is also not a case in which Whaley recanted or
    even disputed his taped confession. See, e.g., State v. Mhoon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
    98832, 
    2013-Ohio-2090
    , ¶ 40 (defendant argued he falsely confessed in a letter to the
    juvenile court, but failed to raise claims of innocence prior to plea hearing). Instead, this
    is a case in which Whaley pretended—and continues to pretend—his taped statements do
    not exist.
    {¶ 20} The trial court noted the main issue raised by Whaley in his motion, his
    complete defense to the charge, and carefully considered this issue along with the
    statements submitted within the parties’ joint exhibit. The trial court concluded that a
    change of heart provided the true basis for Whaley’s motion, and therefore, Whaley
    failed to demonstrate a reasonable basis or that he had a complete defense. It is well-
    settled law that a change of heart is not a reasonable basis for permitting a defendant to
    withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Kimpel, 6th Dist. Williams No. WM-07-008, 2007-Ohio-
    6129, ¶ 20, quoting State v. Green, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-03-020, 
    2005-Ohio-5256
    , ¶ 17,
    quoting State v. Lambros, 
    44 Ohio App.3d 102
    , 103, 
    541 N.E.2d 632
     (8th Dist.1988).
    10.
    {¶ 21} In reviewing the trial court’s determination regarding a change of heart, we
    find this ruling was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Therefore, we find
    no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying Whaley’s motion. Whaley’s first
    assignment of error, accordingly, is not well-taken.
    {¶ 22} In his second assignment of error, Whaley argues that his counsel provided
    ineffective assistance relative to his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The right to
    effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to
    the United States Constitution, as well as the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 10.
    {¶ 23} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Whaley must
    demonstrate that his trial counsel’s conduct “fell below an objective standard of
    reasonableness,” based on “prevailing professional norms.” State v. Belton, 
    149 Ohio St.3d 165
    , 
    2016-Ohio-1581
    , 
    74 N.E.3d 319
    , ¶ 132, quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 694, 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
     (1984). “A defendant arguing that he
    should be allowed to withdraw a guilty plea due to the ineffective assistance of counsel
    must show that the alleged ineffective assistance precluded the defendant from entering a
    knowing and voluntary plea.” State v. Strong, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-08-009, 2009-
    Ohio-1528, ¶ 33, citing State v. Doak, 7th Dist. Columbiana Nos. 
    03 CO 15
    , 
    03 CO 31
    ,
    
    2004-Ohio-1548
    , ¶ 54-55. In other words, Whaley must show that, but for his counsel’s
    errors, he would not have agreed to plead guilty. State v. Kimpel, 6th Dist. Williams No.
    WM-07-008, 
    2007-Ohio-6129
    , ¶ 14, quoting Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d at 524, 
    584 N.E.2d 715
    (additional citations omitted).
    11.
    {¶ 24} Whaley argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to secure testimony
    prior to the plea, and again in failing to secure testimony for hearing on his motion to
    withdraw the guilty plea. In support, Whaley relies on claims he learned of new
    witnesses after he entered his guilty plea. These “new” witnesses, however, included
    Vicky and Troy, individuals known to Whaley prior to the plea. In its colloquy with
    Whaley at the plea hearing, the trial court specifically addressed the possibility of calling
    supporting witnesses or cross-examining the state’s witnesses.
    THE COURT: At a trial, [your attorney] would have the
    opportunity to subpoena witnesses to come into this Courtroom to testify
    for you. But because of your plea today, you’re waiving your right to
    compulsory process of witnesses. * * *
    Also at a trial [your attorney] would have the opportunity to cross-
    examine all of the State’s witnesses called into this Courtroom to testify
    against you. But because of your plea today, you’re waiving your right to
    cross examination of witnesses. Do you understand that?
    WHALEY: Yes, Your Honor.
    {¶ 25} The record indicates Whaley knew of all potential witnesses, prior to his
    plea, and he agreed to plead guilty to felonious assault in exchange for the state
    dismissing the charge for corrupting another with drugs, which carried a mandatory
    prison term upon conviction. Furthermore, in claiming that “new” witness testimony,
    previously unknown, would have changed his decision to enter a guilty plea, Whaley
    12.
    once more ignores his own, recorded statements, in which he admitted to forcing the
    drugs on Troy.
    {¶ 26} Despite this recorded admission by Whaley, his counsel negotiated a plea
    that halved Whaley’s charges, and secured dismissal of the charge that carried a
    mandatory prison sentence. Furthermore, while Whaley characterizes Troy’s subsequent
    memory lapse as “recanting” his prior statement, even without Troy’s testimony
    identifying Whaley as his assailant, the state possessed Whaley’s own, recorded
    statement admitting to the assault. Significantly, Whaley fails to demonstrate that any
    potential witness, unexplored by his trial counsel, could provide testimony that would
    have neutralized his admission of guilt.
    {¶ 27} Considering the record, Whaley’s trial counsel made substantial efforts on
    his behalf, both before his guilty plea and after the plea in raising the issue of Troy’s
    potential changed recollection. While not successful, trial counsel was nonetheless
    effective. Accordingly, Whaley failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel provided
    ineffective assistance, either prior to plea or in seeking to withdraw the plea. Whaley’s
    second assignment of error, therefore, is not well-taken.
    C. Conclusion
    {¶ 28} Finding no error, the judgment of the Williams County Court of Common
    Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R.
    24.
    Judgment affirmed.
    13.
    State v. Whaley
    C.A. No. WM-18-009
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Arlene Singer, J.                              _______________________________
    JUDGE
    Thomas J. Osowik, J.
    _______________________________
    Gene A. Zmuda, J.                                          JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    _______________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
    14.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: WM-18-009

Citation Numbers: 2019 Ohio 3933

Judges: Zmuda

Filed Date: 9/27/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/27/2019