State v. Fisher , 2019 Ohio 3925 ( 2019 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Fisher, 
    2019-Ohio-3925
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    LUCAS COUNTY
    State of Ohio                                    Court of Appeals No. L-18-1162
    Appellee                                 Trial Court No. CR0201702729
    v.
    David Zacharius Fisher                           DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                Decided: September 27, 2019
    *****
    Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
    Lauren Carpenter, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
    Sarah Haberland, for appellant.
    *****
    PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
    {¶ 1} Appellant, David Fisher appeals from the June 27, 2018 judgment of the
    Lucas County Court of Common Pleas convicting him, following acceptance of his guilty
    plea, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 
    400 U.S. 25
    , 
    91 S.Ct. 160
    , 
    27 L.Ed.2d 162
    (1970), to a reduced charge of sexual battery, a violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(1) and (B).
    Appellant was sentenced to a six-year prison term. For the reasons which follow, we
    affirm.
    {¶ 2} On appeal, appellant asserts the following assignments of error:
    I. The Trial Court erred when is [sic] found victim competent to
    testify.
    II. The Trial Court erred when it accepted an Alford plea that was
    not made voluntarily by Defendant.
    III. The Trial Court erred when it failed to allow Defendant to
    withdraw his Alford Plea.
    {¶ 3} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred
    when it found the six-year-old victim was competent to testify at trial. Appellant does
    not assert on appeal that the ruling on the competency issue affected the voluntariness of
    his Alford plea. Because appellant entered an Alford plea, he has waived any error
    related to the trial court’s determination of the competency of a child witness. State v.
    Turski, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-18-1217, 
    2019-Ohio-3604
    , ¶ 6. Therefore, we find
    appellant’s first assignment of error not well-taken.
    {¶ 4} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court erred when
    it accepted an Alford plea to the charge of sexual battery that was not voluntary because
    appellant had only 24 minutes to discuss the plea with counsel after the court ruled that
    the child was competent to testify.
    2.
    {¶ 5} The record does not support appellant’s assertion. After consulting with
    counsel, appellant indicated on the record that he had reviewed the plea and had enough
    time to discuss his defense with counsel and was satisfied with his attorney’s advice.
    Therefore, we find the trial court did not err by accepting the plea.
    {¶ 6} Appellant’s second assignment of error is found not well-taken.
    {¶ 7} In his third assignment of error, appellant argues the trial court abused its
    discretion when it denied appellant’s motion to withdraw his Alford plea. Prior to
    sentencing, appellant moved to withdraw his plea on the grounds that his counsel failed
    to provide him with or explain a defense to the charges. He asserted that his counsel
    appeared to work with the prosecutor to obtain a plea.
    {¶ 8} There is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after conviction, but
    prior to sentencing, and the matter is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. State v.
    Xie, 
    62 Ohio St.3d 521
    , 
    584 N.E.2d 715
     (1992), paragraphs one and two of the syllabus.
    We will not reverse the trial court’s denial of the motion unless the defendant can
    establish that the trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 525.
    {¶ 9} While Crim.R. 32.1 does not give criteria for determining when withdrawal
    of a plea is justified, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that “a presentence motion to
    withdraw a guilty plea should be freely and liberally granted.” Xie at 526. The Ohio
    Supreme that has held the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not an abuse of
    discretion:
    3.
    [w]here the record affirmatively discloses that: (1) defendant’s guilty plea
    was not the result of coercion, deception or intimidation; (2) counsel was
    present at the time of the plea; (3) counsel’s advice was competent in light
    of the circumstances surrounding the indictment; (4) the plea was made
    with the understanding of the nature of the charges; and, (5) defendant was
    motivated either by a desire to seek a lesser penalty or a fear of the
    consequences of a jury trial, or both, the guilty plea has been voluntarily
    and intelligently made.
    State v. Piacella, 
    27 Ohio St.2d 92
    , 92, 
    271 N.E.2d 852
     (1971), syllabus. We have
    previously identified the key factual considerations a trial court should make prior to
    ruling on a motion to withdraw a plea:
    (1) whether the state will be prejudiced by withdrawal; (2) the
    representation afforded to the defendant by counsel; (3) the extent of the
    Crim.R. 11 plea hearing; (4) the extent of the hearing on the motion to
    withdraw; (5) whether the trial court gave full and fair consideration to the
    motion; (6) whether the timing of the motion was reasonable; (7) the
    reasons for the motion; (8) whether the defendant understood the nature of
    the charges and potential sentences; and (9) whether the accused was
    perhaps not guilty or had a complete defense to the charge.
    State v. Murphy, 
    176 Ohio App.3d 345
    , 
    2008-Ohio-2382
    , 
    891 N.E.2d 1255
    , ¶ 39 (6th
    Dist.), citing State v. Griffin, 
    141 Ohio App.3d 551
    , 554, 
    752 N.E.2d 310
     (7th Dist.2001).
    4.
    A change of heart is an insufficient reason to permit withdrawal of the plea. State v.
    Williams, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-15-1259, 
    2016-Ohio-4905
    , ¶ 13.
    {¶ 10} When the motion for withdrawal of the plea was asserted in the case, the
    trial court questioned appellant’s appointed counsel. Counsel indicated that he had
    explored appellant’s potential legal defenses and determined the only viable action was to
    file a motion regarding the competency of the child. Counsel provided copies of all
    documents to appellant which the state had provided to counsel. Counsel discussed the
    state’s evidence with appellant and the pros and cons of the case. Appellant
    acknowledged he had a change of heart because he did not want to serve a prison term.
    Appellant was unable to provide any explanation for the evidence against him in this
    case. The trial court continued the matter for further hearing.
    {¶ 11} At a follow-up hearing, appellant indicated that he desired to have the
    motion granted so that he could enter a plea which would result in probation because he
    pled guilty to an offense which would result in a mandatory prison sentence. The state
    responded that a therapist working with the child was concerned that allowing a change
    in plea could disrupt the healing process which began after the conviction and the child
    knew she would not have to testify. The child had developed serious sleeping disorders
    which started to be resolved after the conviction. The therapist is also concerned that
    appellant would become involved in the child’s life again before her healing is complete
    because he is the father of her half-sibling. Furthermore, the state indicated that even if
    the plea was withdrawn, there would not be any offer that would result in an offer to
    5.
    plead to an offense which would lead to probation. The current plea was the state’s best
    and final way to resolve this case short of a trial.
    {¶ 12} At a third hearing, the state indicated that if the plea was withdrawn, the
    state would proceed to trial. Appellant then discuss the matter for ten minutes with his
    counsel. Afterward, appellant at first indicated that he did not want to withdraw his plea
    although he reasserted his claim of innocence. When questioned further by the judge,
    appellant again requested that the trial court rule on his motion to withdraw his plea.
    {¶ 13} Applying the nine considerations noted above, the trial court found: 1) the
    state has indicated this young victim was greatly relieved when the plea had been entered
    and that her mental health recovery would be negatively affected by allowing appellant to
    withdraw his plea; 2) appellant’s counsel is highly competent and was chosen because of
    the serious nature of the charge; 3) appellant was given a full Crim.R. 11 hearing before
    entering his plea; 4) a full hearing was given on the motion to withdraw the plea; 5) the
    trial court gave full and fair consideration of the motion to withdraw the plea; 6) the
    motion was made within a reasonable time; 7) the motion set forth the specific reasons
    for withdrawing the plea; 8) appellant had understood the nature of the charges and
    possible penalties before entering the plea; 9) while appellant asserts that he is innocent,
    he has not presented any evidence of that fact in light of the compelling evidence of the
    state. Furthermore, the court found that a change of heart is not a legitimate basis for
    granting a motion to withdraw a plea.
    6.
    {¶ 14} On appeal, appellant argues that the state would not have been prejudiced
    by a withdrawal of the plea. Appellant asserts it was improper in this case to deny the
    motion because of the impact it would have upon the victim.
    {¶ 15} Upon a review of the record, and the trial court’s analysis, we find that the
    trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw. We find the
    trial court considered all nine factors. The victim’s mental health in this case was a
    relevant fact regarding the issue of whether there would be prejudice to the state because
    the victim’s mental health could affect her ability to testify. Therefore, we find
    appellant’s third assignment of error not well-taken.
    {¶ 16} Having found that the trial court did not commit error prejudicial to
    appellant and that substantial justice has been done, the judgment of the Lucas County
    Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal
    pursuant to App.R. 24.
    Judgment affirmed.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    7.
    State v. Fisher
    C.A. No. L-18-1162
    Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.                      _______________________________
    JUDGE
    Arlene Singer, J.
    _______________________________
    Gene A. Zmuda, J.                                         JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    _______________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
    8.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: L-18-1162

Citation Numbers: 2019 Ohio 3925

Judges: Pietrykowski

Filed Date: 9/27/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/27/2019