State v. Williams , 2015 Ohio 3932 ( 2015 )

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2015-Ohio-3932.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 14CA010641
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
JOHN L. WILLIAMS COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 14CR089566
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 28, 2015
SCHAFER, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, John L. Williams, appeals from his convictions in the
Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.
I.
{¶2} John L. Williams was indicted by a Lorain County Grand Jury with two counts of
rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), a first degree felony. Mr. Williams pled not guilty
and filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of venue. The trial court held a hearing on
the matter and summarily denied Mr. Williams’ motion. The case then proceeded to a two-day
jury trial.
{¶3} The testimony at trial established that in February of 2014, John L. Williams, age
47, met 11-year-old A.S. on a social media website. The two sent messages to each other online
and talked on the phone. That same day, A.S. called Mr. Williams and asked if he wanted to
“chill.” He said yes and the two made plans to meet. That afternoon, Mr. Williams met A.S. at a
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gas station near her home in Lorain County. Mr. Williams then drove A.S. to a motel located in
Cuyahoga County where they engaged in sexual intercourse twice. Mr. Williams later drove
A.S. to a hotel in Cleveland and dropped her off there. A.S. then called her aunt to pick her up
and take her home.
{¶4} At the conclusion of the State’s case-in-chief, Mr. Williams renewed his objection
concerning lack of venue and made a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. The trial court
respectively overruled and denied Mr. Williams’ objection and motion. The defense rested
without calling any witnesses.
{¶5} On July 25, 2014, a jury found Mr. Williams guilty of both counts in the
indictment. The trial court sentenced Mr. Williams to serve 10 years to life in prison on each
count and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. The trial court also labeled Mr.
Williams as a Tier III sexual offender.
{¶6} Mr. Williams now appeals and raises six assignments of error for this Court’s
review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF ALLEGED
OFFENSES THAT WERE COMMITTED OUTSIDE THE COUNTY WHERE
THE TRIAL WAS HELD.
{¶7} In his first assignment of error, Mr. Williams argues that the trial court erred in
overruling his motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29 because the State failed to present sufficient
evidence establishing venue for the two rape charges. Specifically, Mr. Williams contends that
because he was tried and convicted in Lorain County for offenses that were committed in
Cuyahoga County, his rape convictions must be vacated. We agree.
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{¶8} Under Crim.R. 29(A), a defendant is entitled to acquittal on a charge against him
“if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction * * *.” Whether a conviction is supported
by sufficient evidence is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo. State v. Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997); State v. West, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 04CA008554, 2005–Ohio–
990, ¶ 33. This Court must determine whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, it would have convinced an average juror of Mr. Williams’ guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶9} Venue is proper in any county where the offense, or any element of the offense,
was committed. R.C. 2901.12(A). While venue is not a material element of an offense, the State
must prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt unless it is waived by the defendant. State v.
Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 477 (1983), citing State v. Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d 88, 90 (1981).
“Express evidence establishing venue is not necessary as long as the facts and circumstances of
the case show beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed in the county and state
named in the indictment.” State v. Simpson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21475, 2004-Ohio-602, ¶ 72,
citing State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34 (1907), paragraph one of the syllabus; Headley at 477.
{¶10} When the parties addressed this matter in the trial court, the State relied on R.C.
2901.12(C) and (H) in arguing that venue was proper in Lorain County. R.C. 2901.12(C)
provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen the offense involved the * * * unlawful taking or enticing
of another, the offender may be tried in any jurisdiction from which or into which * * * the
victim was taken * * * or enticed.” However, it appears that the State abandoned its theory that
venue was proper under subsection (C), as the State did not request the trial court to instruct the
jury on that subsection, and the only reference to that subsection within its appellate brief is a
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quote of the subsection with no analysis as to whether subsection (C) applies to the facts of this
case.
{¶11} With respect to R.C. 2901.12(H), that subsection provides, in part:
When an offender, as part of a course of criminal conduct, commits offenses in
different jurisdictions, the offender may be tried for all of those offenses in any
jurisdiction in which one of those offenses or any element of one of those offenses
occurred. Without limitation on the evidence that may be used to establish the
course of criminal conduct, any of the following is prima-facie evidence of a
course of criminal conduct:
(1) The offenses involved the same victim, or victims of the same type or from
the same group.
(2) The offenses were committed by the offender in the offender's same
employment, or capacity, or relationship to another.
(3) The offenses were committed as part of the same transaction or chain of
events, or in furtherance of the same purpose or objective.
(4) The offenses were committed in furtherance of the same conspiracy.
(5) The offenses involved the same or a similar modus operandi.
(6) The offenses were committed along the offender's line of travel in this state,
regardless of the offender's point of origin or destination.
(Emphasis added.) The State contends that Mr. Williams’ offenses were committed as part of the
same transaction or chain of events, or in furtherance of the same purpose or objective under
R.C. 2901.12(H)(3). Specifically, the State argues that Mr. Williams’ conduct of picking up A.S.
in Lorain County and driving her to Cuyahoga County to have sexual intercourse constituted a
continuous course of conduct that allows him to be both indicted and tried in either Lorain or
Cuyahoga County. But, a plain reading of R.C. 2901.12(H) forecloses such a view.
{¶12} It is well-established that if the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous,
there is no need for a court to apply further rules of statutory interpretation. State v. Siferd, 151
Ohio App.3d 103, 2002–Ohio–6801, ¶ 33 (3d Dist.). Words and phrases must be read in context
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and given their usual, normal, and customary meanings. R.C. 1.42; Proctor v. Kardassilaris, 115
Ohio St.3d 71, 2007–Ohio–4838, ¶ 12.
{¶13} As stated above, the State misapprehends the proper scope of R.C. 2901.12(H). A
review of R.C. 2901.12(H), particularly the language that a defendant “may be tried for all of
those offenses” in any county in which an element of any of the offenses occurred, leads us to
conclude that unindicted offenses cannot serve as a basis for venue under the statute. As such,
we are restrained, by the plain terms of R.C. 2901.12(H), to only considering the offenses that
are charged in a criminal matter. Accordingly, although Williams may have engaged in criminal
activity in Lorain County,1 we may not consider any such uncharged conduct when deciding
whether venue exists in this matter. See State v. Hatfield, 4th Dist. Athens No. 1413, 1990 WL
54884, * 7 (Apr. 19, 1990) (“There is no provision in R.C. 2901.12(H) that allows a trial court to
assert venue where the defendant is being tried only on one offense, for which venue cannot be
proven under R.C. 2901.12(A), by alluding to criminal conduct that remains uncharged,
regardless of its similar nature or connection to the offense with which the defendant is
charged.”). Here, Mr. Williams was charged with two counts of rape in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b), which proscribes “engag[ing] in sexual conduct with another [when] * * *
[t]he other person is less than thirteen years of age, whether or not the offender knows the age of
the other person.” The elements of this offense are only satisfied when a person engages in
sexual conduct. According to the testimony elicited at trial, Mr. Williams had vaginal intercourse
1
The result of this matter could very well have been different had Mr. Williams been
indicted for his activities in Lorain County. For instance, his action of picking up a child in
Lorain County and driving her to a motel in Cuyahoga County could produce criminal liability
for a variety of offenses, including kidnapping, R.C. 2905.01(A)(2), criminal child enticement,
R.C. 2905.05(B), and interference with custody, R.C. 2919.23(A)(1), (B). Absent some other
charge arising from Mr. Williams’ conduct in Lorain County, we are unable to find that the
venue statute is satisfied.
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with 11-year-old A.S. on two different occasions while at a motel in Cuyahoga County, so the
elements of the charged offenses in this case were only satisfied there. There is no evidence in
the record showing or suggesting that Mr. Williams engaged in any sexual conduct with A.S.
either in Lorain County or while in transit to Cuyahoga County, which is fatal to the State’s
argument. The mere fact that A.S. was picked up in Lorain County is immaterial to the elements
outlined in R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b).
{¶14} The State cites to three cases within its brief in support of the proposition that
Lorain County was the proper venue to try Mr. Williams simply by virtue of him picking up a
child and transporting her across county lines to have sexual intercourse. However, those cases
are all distinguishable from the present case.
{¶15} For example, in State v. Rhodes, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 42404, 1980 WL 355523(Dec. 11, 1980), the defendant broke into a home in Cuyahoga County and proceeded to
handcuff the victim, steal money and items from the home, and abduct the victim at gunpoint.
When the victim attempted to escape, the defendant hit the victim twice on the head with his gun
and shot him in the leg. The defendant then placed the victim into his vehicle and drove to a
house located in Lake County. There, the defendant handcuffed the victim to a tree in a wooded
area behind the house and raped the victim. The defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted in
Cuyahoga County on two counts of felonious assault, one count of aggravated burglary, and one
count of rape. The Eighth District Court of Appeals rejected the defendant’s challenge to the
rape conviction based upon venue because the “transporting and confinement of the victim [from
Cuyahoga County to Lake County] were acts in furtherance of one of the necessary elements
through which the rape was to be accomplished in Lake County.” Id. at * 2.
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{¶16} This matter implicates an entirely different factual scenario. Unlike the defendant
in Rhodes, Mr. Williams did not commit any of the elements of rape under R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b), or any other charged criminal conduct, in Lorain County. Therefore, the
State’s reliance upon Rhodes is misplaced. The State’s other authority is equally inapplicable.
See State v. Meridy, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2003-11-091, 2005-Ohio-241 (determining
venue to be proper in Clermont County where defendant was charged and convicted of
trafficking drugs in Hamilton County, but planned and agreed to the sale during telephone
conversations in Clermont County); State v. Forster, 2d Dist. Greene No. 1133, 1980 WL
352395 (Nov. 6, 1980) (concluding venue was proper in Greene County where defendant was
convicted of contributing to the unruliness of a minor in violation of former R.C. 2151.41 and
one of the elements of the offense was committed in Greene County).
{¶17} Accordingly, Mr. Williams’ first assignment of error is sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS MUST BE VACATED BECAUSE THE
GRAND JURY LACKED JURISDICTION TO INDICT APPELLANT FOR
OFFENSES COMMITTED OUTSIDE OF THE COUNTY WHERE THE
GRAND JURY WAS IMPANELED AND SWORN.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR AND VIOLATED
APPELLANT’S RIGHTS UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10,
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF OHIO, BY INTERFERING WITH AND
LIMITING DEFENSE COUNSEL’S CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE
INVESTIGATING OFFICER.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR BY REFUSING
TO GIVE AN INSTRUCTION OF THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF
GROSS SEXUAL IMPOSITION.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V
APPELLANT’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR VI
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND DENIED
APPELLANT HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND TO A
JURY TRIAL BY BARRING DEFENSE FROM COMMENTING ON THE
CREDIBILITY OF THE ALLEGED VICTIM DURING CLOSING
ARGUMENT.
{¶18} Our resolution of Mr. Williams’ first assignment of error renders his remaining
assignments of error moot and we decline to address them. See App.R. 12(A)(1)(c).
III.
{¶19} Mr. Williams’ first assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Lorain
County Court of Common Pleas is reversed and this matter is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
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Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
JULIE A. SCHAFER
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
MOORE, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JONATHAN GARVER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL Prosecuting Attorney, and MARY R. SLANCZKA, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.