Calvary S.P v. I., L.L.C. v. Krantz , 2012 Ohio 2202 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as Calvary S.P.V. I., L.L.C. v. Krantz, 
    2012-Ohio-2202
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 97422
    CAVALRY SPV I, LLC
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    MARC K. KRANTZ
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-734879
    BEFORE: Kilbane, J., Jones, P.J., and Cooney, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                            May 17, 2012
    APPELLANT
    Marc K. Krantz, pro se
    24877 Letchworth Road
    Beachwood, Ohio 44122
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    Cliff G. Linn
    Immerman & Tobin Co., LPA
    10810 Indeco Drive
    Cincinnati, Ohio 45241
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J.:
    {¶1} Pro se defendant-appellant, Mark K. Krantz, appeals from the order of the
    trial court that denied his motion for summary judgment in a collection action brought by
    plaintiff-appellee, Cavalry SPV I, LLC (“Cavalry”), assignee of Citibank (South Dakota)
    N.A. (“Citibank”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
    {¶2} On August 23, 2010, Cavalry filed this action for collection on an account,
    alleging that defendant owes $16,255.36 on a credit card issued by Citibank, and that
    Cavalry is the purchaser and assignee of this debt. Cavalry also sought prejudgment
    interest in the amount of $19,613.03, the accumulated interest allegedly incurred due to
    nonpayment of the debt.
    {¶3} Krantz denied liability.      On July 27, 2011, he moved for summary
    judgment, asserting that the account belonged to Citibank, Cavalry lacked standing,
    Cavalry failed to provide a detailed accounting of the fees and charges and had not
    disclosed the material terms of the agreement, and the complaint was generally
    insufficient. In support of his motion for summary judgment, defendant submitted a
    “Citibank Credit Card Insurance Trust” that described certain Class A Notes underwritten
    by Citigroup, Lehman Brothers, and RBS Greenwich Capital, in connection with a
    Prospectus Supplement dated June 20, 2005. This document was not authenticated, and
    defendant did not establish that his debt is part of the Class A Notes from Citibank’s
    Credit Card Insurance Trust.
    {¶4} In opposition, Cavalry presented evidence that on February 27, 2008, it
    entered into a Bill of Sale, Assignment and Assumption Agreement with Citibank,
    through which it purchased various credit card accounts, including defendant’s Citibank
    account. Based upon the last statement that Citibank issued to defendant on July 19,
    2006, defendant owes $16,255.36 on the account and it is subject to a 24 percent annual
    rate of interest.   Cavalry also presented evidence that defendant’s account “became
    delinquent and was charged off on 7/19/06.” As of that date, defendant owed $19,613.03
    in accumulated interest on the account.
    {¶5} On August 17, 2011, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary
    judgment. The matter proceeded to a bench trial on Cavalry’s complaint on September
    19, 2011. At trial, Cavalry presented the testimony of John Spruill of Cavalry’s accounts
    department. Spruill testified that Cavalry purchased defendant’s account from Citibank
    on February 27, 2008.         Cavalry’s business records, as authenticated by Spruill,
    established that the present balance due on Krantz’s account is $35,868.39, and this
    amount reflects $16,255.36 in principal charges and $19,613.03 in accumulated interest.
    {¶6} Defendant did not cross-examine Cavalry’s witness and did not present
    witnesses or documentary evidence.
    {¶7} On September 20, 2011, the trial court entered judgment for Cavalry in the
    amount of $16,255.36, plus prejudgment interest in the amount of $19,613.03, in addition
    to statutory interest from the date of the court’s order.
    {¶8} Defendant now appeals, assigning the following error for our review:
    The trial court erred to the prejudice of Defendant-Appellant, Marc K.
    Krantz when it denied his motion for summary judgment of July 27, 2011,
    where it was clearly shown that an incorrect plaintiff brought suit in this
    case.
    {¶9} As an initial matter, we note that in Ortiz v. Jordan, 
    526 U.S. 1
    , 
    131 S.Ct. 884
    , 888-89, 
    178 L.Ed.2d 703
     (2011), the Supreme Court held that a party may not
    “appeal an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits” because that
    “order retains its interlocutory character as simply a step along the route to final
    judgment.” The court reasoned that “[o]nce the case proceeds to trial, the full record
    developed in court supersedes the record existing at the time of the summary judgment
    motion.” 
    Id. at 889
    .
    {¶10} Herein, following the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for summary
    judgment on August 17, 2011, the matter proceeded to a bench trial on the merits on
    September 19, 2011. Cavalry demonstrated that $16,255.36 in principal charges and
    $19,613.03 in accumulated interest is due and owing on defendant’s account. Defendant
    presented no evidence to refute the debt, and final judgment was rendered for Cavalry.
    Therefore, the record produced at trial supersedes the record produced on summary
    judgment and establishes the basis of the court’s judgment.
    {¶11} In any event, it is well settled that once a moving party meets the initial
    burden of providing specific facts that demonstrate its entitlement to summary judgment,
    the nonmoving party must produce competent evidence to establish the existence of a
    genuine issue for trial. Dresher v. Burt, 
    75 Ohio St.3d 280
    , 292, 
    1996-Ohio-107
    , 
    662 N.E.2d 264
    . The nonmoving party may not rely upon unsupported allegations. Civ.R.
    56(E).
    {¶12} In this matter, defendant moved for summary judgment, but Cavalry
    provided specific facts that demonstrated that it purchased defendant’s Citibank account
    on February 27, 2008, the account is delinquent, and $16,255.36 in principal charges and
    $19,613.03 in accumulated interest are due.      Defendant alleged that Cavalry lacked
    standing and also presented a Citibank Credit Card Issuance Trust describing certain
    Class A Notes contained within a Prospectus Supplement.               This evidence was
    insufficient to defeat Cavalry’s standing in this matter because it was unauthenticated,
    failed to establish that his debt is part of the Class A Notes from Citibank’s Credit Card
    Insurance Trust, and failed to establish that defendant was entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law.
    {¶13} Moreover, insofar as defendant asserted that his account is a note and
    therefore actually part of the Citibank Credit Card Issuance Trust rather than Cavalry’s
    February 27, 2008, Bill of Sale, Assignment and Assumption Agreement with Citibank,
    we note that the Bill of Sale specifically lists defendant’s account as one of the accounts
    purchased by Cavalry. Further, there is no basis for the contention that defendant’s
    credit card account is the equivalent of a promissory note. See Smith v. Palasades
    Collection, LLC, N.D.Ohio No. 1:07 CV 176, 
    2007 WL 1039198
     (Apr. 3, 2007). In that
    case, the court rejected a debtor’s claim that the credit card company could not collect on
    his debt because it failed to establish that it was a cosigner of the note and a holder in due
    course. The court stated:
    [The debtor’s claim] is based upon the flawed premise that a credit card
    agreement is equivalent to a promissory note. The credit card relationship
    is an offer by the issuer for a series of unilateral contracts which are actually
    formed when the holder uses the credit card to buy goods or services or to
    obtain cash. In re Ward, 
    857 F.2d 1082
    , 1086-87 (6th Cir.1988) ( citing
    Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 31 (1981)). The rights and
    obligations of the parties to the contracts, including the rights to assign a
    debt for collection, are governed by the terms of the agreement. See Id. A
    negotiable instrument, such as a promissory note, however, is a writing
    signed by the maker, containing an unconditional promise to pay a sum
    certain in money, on demand or at a definite time, to the order of a
    particular person or entity or to the bearer. U.C.C. § 3-104 (1972); Fed.
    Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Wood, 
    758 F.2d 156
    , 160 (6th Cir.1985).
    {¶14} In accordance with the foregoing, defendant was not entitled to summary
    judgment. This assignment of error is without merit.
    {¶15} Moreover, because Cavalry established at trial that defendant owed
    $16,255.36 in principal charges, $19,613.03 in accumulated interest, and defendant
    presented no evidence to refute this debt, the trial court properly awarded judgment to
    Cavalry herein.
    {¶16} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
    execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, JUDGE
    LARRY A. JONES, SR., P.J., and
    COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97422

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 2202

Judges: Kilbane

Filed Date: 5/17/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014