State v. Pruitt , 2012 Ohio 3986 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Pruitt, 
    2012-Ohio-3986
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                 :       JUDGES:
    :       Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee                    :       Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
    :       Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
    -vs-                                          :
    :
    SHUN BREE PRUITT                              :       Case Nos. 11CA96 & 11CA97
    :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant                   :       OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                              Appeal from the Court of Common
    Pleas, Case Nos. 2011CR168 and
    2011CR371
    JUDGMENT:                                             Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT:                                     August 31, 2012
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                                For Defendant-Appellant
    JOHN C. NEIFT                                         RANDALL E. FRY
    38 South Park Street                                  10 West Newlon Place
    Mansfield, OH 44902                                   Mansfield, OH 44902
    Farmer, J.
    {¶1}   On March 23, 2011, the Richland County Grand Jury indicted appellant,
    Shun Bree Pruitt, on seventeen counts of aiding and abetting: three counts of
    aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01, two counts of murder in violation of
    R.C. 2903.02, two counts of aggravated burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.11, two
    counts of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01, three counts of burglary in
    violation of R.C. 2911.12, one count of robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.02, two counts
    of felonious assault in violation of R.C. 2903.11, one count of tampering with evidence
    in violation of R.C. 2921.12, and one count of possession of criminal tools in violation of
    R.C. 2923.24 (Case No. 2011CR168). Fifteen of the charges arose from incidents
    which occurred on November 7, 2010 and February 13, 2011, involving the home and
    death of Jason Kirst. The remaining two counts (burglary) involved the home of Cindy
    Wolfe which occurred on January 29, 2011 and between February 12 and 15, 2011.
    {¶2}   On June 10, 2011, the Richland County Grand Jury indicted appellant on
    one count of burglary in violation of R.C. 2911.12 (Case No. 2011CR371). Said charge
    arose from an incident which occurred between January 24 and 27, 2011, involving the
    home of Cindy Wolfe.
    {¶3}   On June 15, 2011, the state filed a motion to consolidate the cases. A
    hearing was held on June 27, 2011. By judgment entries filed June 29, and July 8,
    2011, the trial court granted the motion.
    {¶4}   A jury trial commenced on September 1, 2011. The counts involving the
    November 7, 2010 dates were dismissed: one burglary count and one robbery count,
    both involving the home of Mr. Kirst. The jury found appellant guilty of all other charges
    except for one of the murder counts. The murder count was subsequently dismissed on
    September 15, 2011, as the jury was unable to reach a verdict on said count. By
    sentencing entries filed September 12 and 15, 2011, the trial court sentenced appellant
    to an aggregate term of life in prison without parole.
    {¶5}      On October 13, 2011, appellant filed an appeal in Case No. 2011CR168
    (Case No. 2011CA0096) and a separate appeal in Case No. 2011CR371 (Case No.
    2011CA0097). On March 13, 2012, this court consolidated the two appeals.
    {¶6}      This matter is now before this court for consideration. Assignment of error
    is as follows:
    I
    {¶7}      "THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL AS A
    RESULT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO GRANT THE DEFENDANT-
    APPELLANT'S         OBJECTION       TO    THE       PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S     MOTION     TO
    CONSOLIDATE."
    I
    {¶8}      Appellant claims the trial court erred in granting the state's motion to
    consolidate the cases for trial as the consolidation denied him a fair trial. We disagree.
    {¶9}      Pursuant to Crim.R. 13, "[t]he court may order two or more indictments or
    informations or both to be tried together, if the offenses or the defendants could have
    been joined in a single indictment or information."
    {¶10} Crim.R. 8(A) governs joinder of offenses and states the following:
    {¶11} "Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment,
    information or complaint in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged,
    whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character, or are
    based on the same act or transaction, or are based on two or more acts or transactions
    connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan, or are part of a
    course of criminal conduct."
    {¶12} Crim.R. 14 governs relief from prejudicial joinder and states the following:
    {¶13} "If it appears that a defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of
    offenses or of defendants in an indictment, information, or complaint, or by such joinder
    for trial together of indictments, informations or complaints, the court shall order an
    election or separate trial of counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide such
    other relief as justice requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance, the
    court shall order the prosecuting attorney to deliver to the court for inspection pursuant
    to Rule 16(B)(1) any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the state
    intends to introduce in evidence at the trial."
    {¶14} The standard of review on this issue is set forth in State v. Torres (1981),
    
    66 Ohio St.2d 340
    , syllabus:
    {¶15} "A defendant claiming error in the trial court's refusal to allow separate
    trials of multiple charges under Crim.R. 14 has the burden of affirmatively showing that
    his rights were prejudiced; he must furnish the trial court with sufficient information so
    that it can weigh the considerations favoring joinder against the defendant's right to a
    fair trial, and he must demonstrate that the court abused its discretion in refusing to
    separate the charges for trial."
    {¶16} In its June 15, 2011 motion to consolidate, the state asserted "both cases
    are connected as part of a criminal course of conduct." In response, appellant argued
    the crimes charged were not part of a criminal course of conduct, as the two cases
    involved different victims, dates, and evidence.     Appellant argued "to try the two
    separate cases together would be too cumbersome for the jury to evaluate and thus be
    highly prejudicial to the defense." Objection to Motion to Consolidate filed June 27,
    2011. After holding a hearing, the trial court found "the offenses in both cases are
    connected as part of a criminal course of conduct" and consolidated the cases. See,
    Judgment Entry filed June 29, 2011. In a second judgment entry filed July 8, 2011,
    again granting the motion to consolidate, the trial court found "that evidence presented
    in each case would be admissible in the other even if the trials were separated. The
    Court further finds that evidence related to these two cases is simple and direct such
    that the jury will not become confused by presenting such evidence at one trial."
    {¶17} A review of the indictments, the bill of particulars, and the jury verdicts in
    each case establishes appellant was charged with and convicted of the following
    offenses:
    {¶18} Case No. 2011CR168 (all aiding and abetting):
    {¶19} Count 1:     Aggravated Murder (Prior Calculation)              No Verdict
    of Jason Kirst, February 13, 2011                  Dismissed
    {¶20} Count 2:     Aggravated Murder (During a Robbery)              Guilty
    of Jason Kirst, February 13, 2011
    {¶21} Count 3:     Aggravated Murder (During a Burglary)              Guilty
    of Jason Kirst, February 13, 2011
    {¶22} Count 4:     Murder of Jason Kirst                              Guilty
    February 13, 2011
    {¶23} Count 5:     Murder (During a Felonious Assault)                Guilty
    of Jason Kirst, February 13, 2011
    {¶24} Count 6:    Aggravated Burglary (Physical Harm)             Guilty
    of Jason Kirst, February 13, 2011
    {¶25} Count 7:    Aggravated Burglary (Deadly Weapon)             Guilty
    of Jason Kirst, February 13, 2011
    {¶26} Count 8:    Aggravated Robbery (Deadly Weapon)              Guilty
    of Jason Kirst, February 13, 2011
    {¶27} Count 9:    Aggravated Robbery (Physical Harm)              Guilty
    of Jason Kirst, February 13, 2011
    {¶28} Count 10: Felonious Assault (Serious Physical Harm)         Guilty
    of Jason Kirst, February 13, 2011
    {¶29} Count 11: Felonious Assault (Deadly Weapon)                 Guilty
    of Jason Kirst, February 13, 2011
    {¶30} Count 12: Tampering with Evidence                           Guilty
    on February 13-15, 2011
    {¶31} Count 13: Possession of Criminal Tools                      Guilty
    on February 12-15, 2011
    {¶32} Count 14: Robbery of Jason Kirst                            Dismissed
    November 7, 2010                                  Prior to Trial
    {¶33} Count 15: Burglary of Jason Kirst                           Dismissed
    November 7, 2010                                  Prior to Trial
    {¶34} Count 16: Burglary of Cindy Wolfe                           Guilty
    January 29, 2011
    {¶35} Count 17: Burglary of Cindy Wolfe                           Guilty
    February 12-15, 2011
    {¶36} Case No. 2011CR371:
    {¶37} Count 1:    Burglary of Cindy Wolfe                         Guilty
    January 24-27, 2011
    {¶38} In support of his arguments, appellant cites the case of State v. Clements
    (1994), 
    98 Ohio App.3d 797
    . In Clements, the defendant was charged with aggravated
    robbery and burglary. The evidence regarding the burglary included the defendant's act
    of kicking down the door to his girlfriend's residence. Our brethren from the Second
    District found the specific evidence of the defendant's violent nature in kicking down the
    door created an image of "one who was irresponsibly disposed" to violence and "such
    evidence would be difficult to isolate and shake while deciding the more serious charge
    of aggravated robbery." Clements, at 799.
    {¶39} The arguments in this assignment require a review of the offenses and
    whether they were "part of a course of criminal conduct," and whether appellant met his
    "burden of affirmatively showing that his rights were prejudiced."
    {¶40} The state's position was best summarized during the consolidation hearing
    as follows:
    {¶41} "So the State's position would be that the initial robbery of Mr. Kirst was
    part of a criminal course of conduct, and from that robbery we get the ultimate murder
    because he had robbed him one time, saw this property, goes back, and they had been
    using this Cindy Wolfe's home as a staging area. They returned to that residence after
    the murder, because they had nowhere else to stay. Basically Eboney and Shun Bree
    were homeless. They were staying at Cindy Wolfe's home without her permission, and
    even though she was living somewhere else she would call the police after they broke
    in, she would try to have the residence locked back up, they would go back and break in
    again because they had no other place to go." June 27, 2011 T. at 4.
    {¶42} Defense counsel explained appellant's position as follows:
    {¶43} "Thank you, Your Honor. If it please the Court it would be our contention
    that they are not connected because you do have, as you've heard, different players
    involved in the entire situation.
    {¶44} "In addition to that, what the prosecutor did not tell you is that there was
    an extended period of time in which all of the people mentioned, Shun Bree, Eboney,
    and Justin had permission to be in this residence owned by Cindy Wolfe.
    {¶45} "***
    {¶46} "I don't think the evidence is going to show that there was any type of
    common plan or scheme or evidence to support any type of conspiracy along those
    lines that involve those properties. In fact, I think the burglary charge as it relates to
    Cindy Wolfe in Shun Bree's original indictment should be separated out, and those two
    cases could be tried separately, apart from the murder charges. So we would ask the
    Court to separate those out." Id. at 6-7.
    {¶47} During the voir dire process, the trial court explained the allegations
    contained in the two indictments as follows:
    {¶48} "The prosecutor alleges, and, remember, all this remains to be proved by
    evidence, but these are the allegations of the prosecutor, that between January 24th
    and January 27th of this year, Shun Bree Pruitt, also known as Shun Bree Ginn, broke
    into a house at 20 Antibus Place here in Mansfield, Ohio, the home of Cindy Wolfe, and
    caused damage to the residence and stole food items from her. That Mr. Pruitt did not
    have her permission - - at the time Mr. Pruitt did not have permission to be inside her
    residence. At that time the owner of that house, Cindy Wolfe, was in the process of
    moving from 20 Antibus Place, where the break-in was, to a new residence.
    {¶49} "The State further alleges that on January 29th, which would be after that
    period of January 24th to the 27th, that Shun Bree Pruitt and Eboney Ward broke into
    Cindy Wolfe's residence located at 20 Antibus Place in Mansfield, Ohio, and stole some
    of her personal property including her jewelry and DVD movies. Cindy Wolfe caught
    them, caught Mr. Pruitt and Ms. Ward, in the act of stealing her property.
    {¶50} "The State further alleges that in the evening hours of February 13th of
    this year, Shun Bree Pruitt and Eboney Ward went to 91 Greenwood Avenue here in
    Mansfield, which is the home of Jason Kirst, to rob him of his big screen TV. Once
    inside the residence Shun Bree Pruitt and Eboney Ward, while aiding and abetting each
    other, used a billy club to knock Jason Kirst unconscious, and used two different knives
    to stab him to death.
    {¶51} "After stabbing Jason Kirst to death, Mr. Pruitt and Ms. Ward stole the big
    screen TV and other property belonging to Jason Kirst, and then took the items back to
    20 Antibus Place, the now vacant residence of Cindy Wolfe, in order to hide the stolen
    property. Mr. Pruitt and Ms. Ward did not have Ms. Wolfe's permission to enter or hide
    the stolen property from the Jason Kirst residence inside of her residence.
    {¶52} "The State further alleges Shun Bree Pruitt and Eboney Ward then hid two
    pieces of the billy club and the two knives along with the rubber gloves and the shoes
    they wore while committing the murder of Jason Kirst above a ceiling tile inside the
    residence of 20 Antibus Place in Mansfield, in hopes that those items would not be
    found.
    {¶53} "Once again, Ms. Wolfe did not give permission to Mr. Pruitt or Ms. Ward
    to enter her residence or to hide the evidence from the murder in the ceiling of her
    residence at 20 Antibus Place." T. at 21-23.
    {¶54} The theory of the state's case was that appellant and his girlfriend, Eboney
    Ward, were transients and broke into Ms. Wolfe's residence for food on January 27th
    and again on January 29, 2011. T. at 178-180. During the latter date, Ms. Wolfe
    arrived at the residence and confronted the pair while they were stealing her property.
    T. at 180.    A large billy club came up missing which was eventually used in the
    robbery/murder of Mr. Kirst. T. at 180, 183-184. Ms. Ward gained access to Mr. Kirst's
    residence by claiming she needed to make a telephone call. T. at 181-182. Once
    inside, the plan was for Ms. Ward to unlock the back door so appellant could enter and
    steal the big screen TV. T. at 182. The plan went astray and through a bathroom
    window, Ms. Ward warned appellant that Mr. Kirst had a gun and " 'we can't do this.' "
    T. at 183. At the time, Ms. Ward was not wearing her shirt or bra. Id. Appellant refused
    to believe Ms. Ward, went to the front of the house, banged on the front door in a rage,
    and accused Mr. Kirst of fooling around with his girlfriend. Id. Once inside, appellant
    chased Mr. Kirst and eventually struck him with the billy club until Mr. Kirst was
    unconscious, breaking the billy club into three pieces. T. at 183-184. Ms. Ward took a
    little steak knife and stabbed Mr. Kirst in the throat, snapping the knife in half. T. at 184.
    Appellant retrieved a bigger knife from the kitchen and repeatedly stabbed Mr. Kirst. T.
    at 184-185. Mr. Kirst suffered over fifty stab wounds. T. at 185. The pair stole the big
    screen TV and other items and secured them in Ms. Wolfe's residence after breaking
    into her garage. T. at 185-186. The pair also hid the knives, billy club, bloody gloves,
    and their bloody tennis shoes in a ceiling tile in Ms. Wolfe's residence. T. at 186-187.
    {¶55} In defense, appellant claimed the plan was to rob Mr. Kirst, not kill him,
    that he did strike Mr. Kirst with the billy club, and then Ms. Ward "went crazy" and
    stabbed Mr. Kirst repeatedly. T. at 188. During his taped statement, appellant admitted
    to entering the Wolfe residence at times as he had no other place to stay and "it was
    somewhere warm," and that's where he and Ms. Ward hid various items following the
    incident with Mr. Kirst. State's Exhibit 26b.
    {¶56} From a review of the facts, we find the burglaries of the Wolfe residence
    would have been presented even if the motion to consolidate had been denied. From
    the burglaries of the Wolfe residence of food and the billy club to the robbery/murder of
    Mr. Kirst, there was a logical continuous course of criminal conduct that did not unduly
    prejudice appellant.
    {¶57} The trial court specifically cautioned the jury that each charge "constitutes
    a separate and distant matter.      You must consider each charge and the evidence
    applicable to it separately, and you must state your findings as to each charge
    uninfluenced by your verdict as to the other charges."          T. at 1088.    Further, as
    demonstrated in defense counsel's opening statement and closing argument, the
    strategy was not to deny the burglaries and robberies, but to place the blame for Mr.
    Kirst's murder on Ms. Ward.        T. at 188-189, 1117-1118, 1125-1126.         Appellant's
    admission to the police was consistent with this theory. T. at 847.
    {¶58} The entire trial on the two indictments centered upon Mr. Kirst's murder,
    the events leading up to it, and the disposal of the evidence. Upon review, we conclude
    the trial court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating the two cases, and we find no
    undue prejudice to appellant given the trial strategies of the state and appellant.
    {¶59} The sole assignment of error is denied.
    {¶60} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is
    hereby affirmed.
    By Farmer, J.
    Hoffman, P.J. and
    Edwards, J. concur.
    s/ Sheila G. Farmer_______________
    s/ William B. Hoffman_____________
    s/ Julie A. Edwards ______________
    JUDGES
    SGF/sg 720IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                           :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                :
    :
    -vs-                                     :         JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    SHUN BREE PRUITT                         :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant               :         CASE NOS. 11CA96
    :
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
    judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to
    appellant.
    s/ Sheila G. Farmer_______________
    s/ William B. Hoffman_____________
    s/ Julie A. Edwards ______________
    JUDGES
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                            :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee                :
    :
    -vs-                                     :         JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    SHUN BREE PRUITT                         :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant               :         CASE NOS. 11CA97
    :
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
    judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Richland County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to
    appellant.
    s/ Sheila G. Farmer_______________
    s/ William B. Hoffman_____________
    s/ Julie A. Edwards ______________
    JUDGES
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11CA96, 11CA97

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 3986

Judges: Farmer

Filed Date: 8/31/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014