State v. Anderson , 2012 Ohio 1491 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as State v. Anderson, 
    2012-Ohio-1491
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    MORROW COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    THE STATE OF OHIO
    Plaintiff-Appellee
    -vs-
    RONALD ANDERSON
    Defendant-Appellant
    :      JUDGES:
    :      Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
    :      Sheila G. Farmer, J.
    :      Julie A. Edwards, J.
    :
    :      Case No. 2011CA0006
    :
    :
    :      OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                           Criminal Appeal from Morrow County
    Court of Common Pleas Case No.
    2011-CR-0007
    JUDGMENT:                                          Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                            March 29, 2012
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                             For Defendant-Appellant
    CHARLES HOWLAND                                     WILLIAM T. CRAMER
    Morrow County Prosecutor                            470 Olde Washington Road
    Suite 200
    BY: JOCELYN STEFANCIN                               Westerville, Ohio 43082
    Assistant Prosecutor
    60 East High Street
    Mt. Gilead, Ohio 43338
    Edwards, J.
    {¶1}   Defendant-appellant, Ronald Anderson, appeals his conviction and
    sentence from the Morrow County Court of Common Pleas on one count of having
    weapons while under disability. Plaintiff-appellee is the State of Ohio.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶2}   On January 31, 2011, the Morrow County Grand Jury indicted appellant
    on one count of having weapons while under disability in violation of R.C. 2923.13, a
    felony of the third degree, one count of domestic violence in violation of R.C. 2919.25, a
    misdemeanor of the first degree, and one count of assault in violation of R.C.
    2903.13(A), a misdemeanor of the first degree.        The basis for the weapons under
    disability charge was a prior 1990 murder conviction for which appellant served 18
    years in prison. On February 2, 2011, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the
    charges.
    {¶3}   Subsequently, a jury trial commenced on March 14, 2011. The following
    testimony was adduced at trial.
    {¶4}   Tina Stolpa is appellant’s younger half-sister. At the time of the trial, she
    was in the process of getting a divorce. In 2010, Kara Kassler, appellant’s girlfriend,
    moved in with Stolpa and, approximately a month or so later, appellant also moved into
    Stolpa’s house. Stolpa testified that she owned a gun that was kept in the garage in a
    case and that the bullets were kept in their own bag.
    {¶5}   Stolpa testified that in December of 2010, appellant’s truck was involved in
    an accident. At the time of the accident, Kassler was driving and Stolpa’s oldest child
    was in the truck. According to Stolpa, there was tension between appellant and Kassler
    after the accident.
    {¶6}   Stolpa testified that on New Year’s Eve, appellant, Kassler, Stolpa’s
    mother, Deborah Myer and Stolpa’s children were all at Stolpa’s house. She further
    testified that she was in and out of her garage with Kassler, Myer and appellant drinking
    beer, smoking and listening to music. While they were in the garage, Stolpa told Kassler
    that, by the same time next year, she would be divorced and would be able to go out
    with friends to a bar and shoot pool. According to Stolpa, after Kassler indicated that
    she could go with Stolpa, appellant said that he did not want Kassler going out to a bar
    and the two got into an argument. Stolpa then went back into the house. When
    appellant came into the house shortly thereafter, his tongue was bleeding. After
    appellant fell asleep on the couch, Kassler told Stolpa that she should wake appellant
    up because appellant wanted to shoot Stolpa’s gun off at midnight. According to Stolpa,
    the gun was in appellant’s pants underneath his shirt.
    {¶7}   After appellant woke up, he put the gun back in the garage after Stolpa
    told him that she did not want an accident to happen and her neighbors did not like loud
    noises. Once Stolpa’s children went to bed, all of the adults had a shot of alcohol and
    went out to the garage to smoke. After returning to the house, appellant and Kassler got
    into an argument over whether or not to pull out the sofa bed. According to Stolpa,
    Kassler was swearing and yelling at appellant and told him that she would not lay with
    him. Stolpa testified that, in response, appellant told Kassler that she was drunk and did
    not know what she was saying. They all then went to sleep.
    {¶8}   At trial, Stolpa testified that the next day, New Year’s Day, Kassler
    announced that she was going to walk into town, which was three miles away, to get
    some cigarettes and to clear her head. After Kassler returned, she sat on the couch
    opposite from appellant and the two hardly spoke to each other. According to Stolpa, at
    approximately 8:00 p.m., Kassler, who had been smoking in the garage, came into the
    house and told appellant that they were through. Stolpa testified that appellant agreed
    and that after Kassler whispered something to appellant, appellant smacked Kassler in
    the face and the two began yelling at each other. After Kassler indicated that she was
    going to leave, appellant told her that she was not going anywhere and the two
    continued arguing loudly until Stolpa told them to leave. Appellant and Kassler then left
    Stolpa’s house.
    {¶9}   Stolpa testified that she was in the garage smoking with her mother when
    appellant came into the garage and went to get the gun, which was stored in a case in
    her husband’s Firebird. When Stolpa told appellant that the gun was hers and that he
    could not take it, appellant threatened to knock her out. Appellant then took the gun out
    of the car into the house, sat down at the kitchen table and started putting the bullets in
    the clips. The following is an excerpt from Stolpa’s testimony at trial:
    {¶10} “Q. Did he load one clip or both clips?
    {¶11} “A. He loaded both of them. So he sat down to put his boots on and he
    said, well, he stood up after he got done tying his boots, put his boots on. He stood up
    and stood by my front door. He turned around and looked at me and said, well - -
    excuse me. He said, ‘Well, the next time that you see Kara or me we are both going to
    be dead, because when I find her it is going to be over, because she is going to be
    dead. I’m going to kill her. I’m going to kill myself. So the next time you see us just
    make sure you bring a rose to her grave and you can piss on my grave for all I care
    because I’m done. I can’t take this. I can’t take it out here no more. This is - -
    everything is just too much.’ And she is just, ‘I can’t live without her and I’m not going to
    let her live without me.’ And all this crazy stuff.
    {¶12} “And I’m - - I’m still trying to talk him down at the same time. I’m like,
    ‘dude, she is not worth it. Just let her go.’ I’m like, ‘You don’t’ have to do this.’ And he
    told me - - at the kitchen table I was trying to take the gun from him. I mean I put - - I
    put one hand on, I put my one hand on his arm. I’m like, ‘You don’t need to do this.
    Just let me have my gun back.’ He is like, ‘At this point now, sis, if you get in my way
    I’m going to kill you, too.’ I mean just the look, the look in his eyes there is - - it is like he
    was not even him any more (sic). It was like my brother was gone. There was so much
    anger and hate and rage in there. I don’t even know.” Transcript at 250-251.
    {¶13} When Stolpa told appellant that the neighbors might see the gun and call
    the police, appellant told her that he would shoot them also. After appellant left, Stolpa
    locked the door and sat down on the couch with her mother.
    {¶14} Approximately fifteen or twenty minutes after appellant left, Stolpa and
    Myer heard a knock on the door and found Kassler outside shaking and crying. Kassler
    told Stolpa that appellant had passed her on the road and that she had heard and seen
    a gun. Stolpa then dialed 9-1-1.
    {¶15} Stolpa testified that before calling the police, she called Bruce Campbell
    after appellant left her house with the gun. She testified that she believed that Campbell,
    who was appellant’s best friend, could talk some sense into appellant. Stolpa further
    testified that after appellant was in police custody, she found the gun and bullets in a
    sack on her front porch on January 2, 2011. She turned the gun over to the Sheriff’s
    Department. Stolpa denied receiving a telephone call from Campbell, on January 2,
    2011 or that she had called Campbell after appellant was taken into custody. She
    further testified that she did not talk to Campbell the day appellant was arrested, or the
    next day or the day after that about the gun. She testified that the only communication
    that she had with Campbell was the night on which the incident occurred.
    {¶16} During trial, Stolpa indicated that appellant knew where the gun was kept
    in the garage because appellant was friends with her husband and had seen him put
    away the gun. She testified that appellant had used the gun for target shooting.
    {¶17} On cross-examination, Stolpa testified that she owned a van that had
    been broken for over a year. She testified that it would cost between $300.00 and
    $400.00 to fix. When asked, Stolpa denied that she ever discussed selling the gun to
    Bruce Campbell or having him sell the same in order to raise money to fix the van. She
    testified that Campbell was an acquaintance of hers and that appellant had given her
    Campbell’s telephone number in case something happened when she was driving down
    to Tennessee for Christmas. Stolpa also testified that Campbell came to her house
    after appellant was arrested to pick-up appellant’s clothes.
    {¶18} Stolpa further testified that she did not visit Campbell’s house on New
    Year’s Eve with appellant and Kassler and that appellant and Kassler had gone to
    Campbell’s house the day before New Year’s Eve. Stolpa also denied that, after New
    Year’s Day, she sent a text message to Kassler saying that she would not let her
    brother go down for this. She testified that she spoke with Kassler and told her that she
    did not want to see appellant go down and that he needed help with rage, anger and
    self-control.
    {¶19} At trial, Bruce Campbell testified that shortly before New Year’s, appellant
    and Kassler came down to see him. He testified that on January 1, 2011 in the evening,
    appellant called him and asked him to come pick him up because he had had a fight
    with his girlfriend. Campbell said no. Later at approximately midnight appellant showed
    up at Campbell’s door after riding his bike to Campbell’s house. Campbell testified that
    appellant was not carrying anything. Appellant spent the night at Campbell’s house and
    was arrested there the next morning. Campbell testified that when he spoke with Stolpa
    after appellant’s arrest, she asked him about the gun and Campbell indicated that there
    was no gun. However, when Campbell went out later, he noticed that appellant’s bike
    was leaning up against Campbell’s privacy fence just outside his garage door.
    Campbell testified that when he brought the bike into the garage, he observed the gun
    six inches under the door. There was a three or four inch gap between the door and the
    ground. The ammunition was next to the gun and there was a magazine in the gun. A
    second magazine was in a plastic bag with other ammunition. Campbell testified that he
    then unloaded the gun and called Stolpa who said that the gun was hers. He then
    returned the gun to Stolpa in a paper bag along with two empty magazines and a bag of
    bullets.
    {¶20} Campbell testified that on approximately February 7, 2011, he received an
    unsigned letter. He testified that he recognized the handwriting on the letter and that it
    was appellant’s handwriting. Stolpa also indentified the handwriting as appellant’s.
    According to Campbell, the letter, which was admitted as Exhibit 14 at trial, asked
    Campbell not to say anything that was going to damage appellant’s case.1 Campbell
    further testified that he received a phone call from appellant after he was arrested. The
    call was recorded and was marked as Exhibit 16 and was played for the jury. During
    the conversation, appellant made several comments about selling the gun or that Stolpa
    had sold the gun. Campbell denied knowing anything about that. Appellant also asked
    Campbell not to turn on him.
    {¶21} On cross-examination, Campbell denied that Stolpa called him at 10:00 or
    11:00 on New Year’s Day and asked him to come get appellant and to talk him out of
    whatever he was going to do. He further testified that his garage/barn was locked the
    night of January 1, 2011, because he was security conscious due to incidents of
    vandalism. Campbell testified that he had video cameras outside his house, but that
    they were not running on the night in question. Campbell also testified that he collected
    guns, that he had approximately 45 guns, and that he occasionally participated in the
    sale or trading of guns. He testified that appellant did not have a gun on him when
    appellant showed up at his door. The following testimony was adduced when he was
    questioned about the telephone conversation:
    {¶22} “Q. You heard the phone conversation. When you said I ain’t going down,
    were those your words, sir?
    1
    Appellant, in such letter, indicated that things were not going “to [sic] good for me at the moment but
    depending on you things could get a lot better for me.”
    {¶23} “A. Yes, they were.
    {¶24} “Q. What did you mean by that, sir?
    {¶25} “A. Well, I figured since I didn’t call the police when I found the gun and I
    took it to Tina’s house, that I put myself in some sort of jeopardy.
    {¶26} “Q. When Mr. Anderson asked you, there was a question in there where
    he said something about Tina selling the gun. You answered, no, I don’t believe she
    sold it. What did you mean by that, sir?
    {¶27} “A. Well, when I called her after they arrested him, she said, ‘Where is my
    gun?’ So if she had sold it - -“ Transcript at 424.
    {¶28} On cross-examination, Campbell testified that Stolpa, appellant and
    Kassler all came to his house on New Year’s Eve and that he gave a partial bottle of
    Wild Turkey to appellant to celebrate the new year. He denied that Stolpa asked him to
    sell the gun so that she could raise money to fix her van. He testified that when the
    officers who arrested appellant asked him where the gun was, he indicated that there
    was no gun.
    {¶29} On redirect, Campbell testified that appellant and Kassler had spent the
    night at his house not very long before the incident in this case. He was unable to recall
    the specific date. Campbell also testified that he did not call the police once he found
    the gun because he suspected that it was placed where it was by appellant.
    {¶30} Kassler was declared to be a court’s witness and was cross-examined by
    both parties. She testified that she was residing in Cleveland with appellant’s mother
    and stepfather as of the time of trial. Kassler testified that she had known appellant
    since she was 14 and that they had a daughter together. She testified that she moved in
    with Stolpa, Stolpa’s husband and their three children in November of 2010.
    {¶31} According to Kassler, on December 30, 2010, Stolpa dropped appellant
    and Kassler off at Bruce Campbell’s house, but did not spend the night there with them.
    She testified that they went back to Stolpa’s the next day and that when Stolpa talked
    about going to a bar and playing pool with Kassler, appellant was not happy. Kassler
    testified that she accidentally bit appellant’s tongue while they were kissing, causing it to
    bleed. At trial, Kassler further testified that she and appellant had a fight and that there
    was tension between them. According to Kassler, at approximately 8:00 p.m. on
    December 31, 2010, appellant said that he was done with her and hit her on the side of
    her face with his hand. She then told appellant that she was going to leave. The
    following is an excerpt from her testimony at trial:
    {¶32} “Q. And what was the defendant’s response to that?
    {¶33} “A. I don’t think he really cared. He was kind of, you know, he was upset.
    {¶34} “Q. Do you recall the defendant saying anything to you about you weren’t
    going anywhere until you go to Court for wrecking his truck?
    {¶35} “A. We were arguing and he made the statement he was afraid I wasn’t
    going to go to Court, that I was going to take off, which I wouldn’t do that.
    {¶36} “Q. Do you recall arguing about the truck? Did the defendant ever say to
    you, that about this business about Court and that you would be lucky if the defendant
    didn’t kill you before then?
    {¶37} “A. Could you please repeat that question, sorry?
    {¶38} “Q. The defendant said, you are not going anywhere until after you go to
    Court for wrecking this truck and that you would be lucky if the defendant didn’t kill you
    before then. Do you remember saying anything to that effect?
    {¶39} “A. I think I wrote that out in my statement.
    {¶40} “Q. Is that in your statement?
    {¶41} “A. I’m pretty certain.
    {¶42} “A. So that’s what you wrote out in your statement; is that correct?
    {¶43} “A. I’m pretty certain that is.” Transcript at 473.
    {¶44} Kassler testified that she did not recall appellant threatening to kill her if
    she left, although such statement was in her written statement to police. She testified
    that she was pretty upset when she wrote out her statement to police.
    {¶45} Although, in her written statement to police, Kassler had indicated that
    Stolpa would not drop her off anywhere because she was afraid, Kassler testified that
    such statement was inaccurate and indicated that Stolpa could not take her anywhere
    because the car belonged to Deborah Myers and Myers told Stolpa that she could not
    use the car. When questioned whether she recalled telling Stolpa’s mother that
    appellant was going to kill her if she did not get out, Kassler testified that while she
    wrote such statement in her written statement, she exaggerated because she was
    upset.
    {¶46} Kassler, in her written statement to police, stated that appellant threw her
    on the ground, grabbed her by the hair and told her to get the “FF in the house.”
    Transcript at 481. She also stated that when they went back into the house, appellant
    hit her again. However, at trial, she testified that appellant did not hit her again, but
    rather that appellant had raised his hands to protect himself because she was angry.
    {¶47} Testimony was adduced that after Stolpa told appellant and Kassler to
    leave, Kassler went about three houses away and hid in the trees behind a house for
    approximately 15 minutes. In her statement to police, she stated that after she started
    walking toward the road, she heard appellant talking on his phone and heard a clicking
    sound which she thought was a gun. She testified that she never saw a gun, but that
    after going back to Stolpa’s house and hearing what had happened, she thought that
    the clicking sound must have come from a gun.
    {¶48} Kassler admitted that, in her written statement to police, she stated that
    she wanted Stolpa to call the police so that appellant would not come back and kill her.
    She also admitted writing that appellant was very dangerous and had threatened to kill
    her the whole evening.
    {¶49} According to Kassler, she witnessed Bruce Campbell come to Stolpa’s
    house on January 2, 2011 and hand the gun over to Stolpa. She further testified that
    after moving out of Stolpa’s house on February 3rd or 4th of 2011, she received a text
    message from Stolpa.
    {¶50} Deborah Myers, Stolpa’s mother, testified that appellant was her stepson
    at one time. She testified that she came to visit her daughter in December of 2010.
    According to Myers, Stolpa took appellant and Kassler to Bruce Campbell’s on
    December 30, 2010 and dropped them off there. After the two returned on New Year’s
    Eve, all four adults had shots of Wild Turkey and were going in and out of Stolpa’s
    garage smoking. When asked if, at some point in time on the evening of December 31,
    2010, she saw a gun, Myers testified that she saw a gun down appellant’s pants while
    appellant was sitting on the sofa. Appellant appeared to be asleep. After Stolpa woke
    appellant up, he went into the garage for approximately twenty minutes to half an hour.
    {¶51} Myers testified that, on January 1, 2011, appellant and Kassler were not
    talking to one another, but that later in the evening, she heard their voices raised. She
    testified that her 13 year old granddaughter told her that she had seen appellant hit
    Kassler. Later, when Myers was out in the garage with Stolpa, appellant came into the
    garage and took a black bag out of a Trans Am parked in the garage. Myers testified
    that appellant then went into the house and that she observed him loading a gun at the
    kitchen table. According to Myers, appellant said that he was going to find Kassler and
    shoot her and then himself. She testified that he also said that he was not going to go
    back to prison.
    {¶52} At the conclusion of the evidence and the end of deliberations, the jury, on
    March 17, 2011, found appellant not guilty of domestic violence, but guilty of having a
    weapon while under disability.     The charge of assault had been dismissed upon
    appellee’s motion due to lack of evidence. Pursuant to a Judgment Entry filed on May 5,
    2011, appellant was sentenced to five years in prison.
    {¶53} Appellant now raises the following assignments of error on appeal:
    {¶54} “I. APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONFRONTATION RIGHTS
    UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT (AS APPLIED THROUGH THE FOURTEENTH
    AMENDMENT) AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION WHEN
    THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE
    SHOWING THAT THE PROSECUTION’S PRIMARY WITNESS WAS BIASED,
    PREJUDICED, AND HAD A MOTIVE TO LIE.
    {¶55} “II. APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS CONFRONTATION RIGHTS
    UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT (AS APPLIED THROUGH THE FOURTEENTH
    AMENDMENT) AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE I OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION WHEN
    THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
    OF INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS BY THE PROSECUTION’S MAIN WITNESSES IN
    REGARD TO A MATERIAL ISSUE GOING TO BIAS.
    {¶56} “III. APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED OF HIS STATE AND FEDERAL DUE
    PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO
    ELICIT PREJUDICIAL INFORMATION ABOUT APPELLANT’S PRIOR MURDER
    CONVICTION IN VIOLATION OF EVID.R. 403(B).
    {¶57} “IV.   APPELLANT      WAS     DENIED     HIS   STATE     AND    FEDERAL
    CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY
    COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO PROPERLY OBJECT TO INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE.
    {¶58} “V.    APPELLANT      WAS     DENIED    HIS    STATE     AND    FEDERAL
    CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL BY THE
    CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THESE ERRORS.”
    I
    {¶59} Appellant, in his first assignment of error, argues that he was deprived of
    his confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment and Section 10, Article 1 of the
    Ohio Constitution when he was not permitted to show that Tina Stolpa, his half-sister,
    was biased against him and had a motive to lie.
    {¶60} Trial courts are granted broad discretion with respect to the admission or
    exclusion of evidence at trial. State v. Sage, 
    31 Ohio St.3d 173
    , 180, 
    510 N.E.2d 343
    ,
    348, (1987). Thus, an appellate court will not reverse a trial court's ruling absent an
    abuse of discretion. State v. Myers, 
    97 Ohio St.3d 335
    , 348, 
    2002-Ohio-6658
    , 
    780 N.E.2d 186
    , ¶ 75. “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ connotes more than an error of law or
    judgment;    it   implies   that   the   court's   attitude   is   unreasonable,   arbitrary   or
    unconscionable.” Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    , 219, 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
    ,
    (1983). Absent an abuse of discretion resulting in material prejudice to the defendant, a
    reviewing court should be reluctant to interfere with a trial court's decision in this regard.
    State v. Hymore, 
    9 Ohio St.2d 122
    , 
    224 N.E.2d 126
    , (1967).
    {¶61} Cross-examination is the primary means by which the credibility of a
    witness is tested. Davis v. Alaska, 
    415 U.S. 308
    , 316, 
    94 S.Ct. 1105
    , 
    39 L.Ed.2d 347
    ,
    (1974). Exposing a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of
    the right of cross-examination. Greene v. McElroy, 
    360 U.S. 474
    , 496, 
    79 S.Ct. 1400
    ,
    1413, 
    3 L.Ed.2d 1377
     (1959).
    {¶62} Evid. R. 403(A) provides as follows:
    {¶63} “[a]lthough relevant, evidence is not admissible if its probative value is
    substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or
    of misleading the jury.”
    {¶64} In the case sub judice, appellant sought to cross-examine Tina Stolpa to
    show that she was biased against him because he was planning to testify at her divorce
    proceedings that she had falsely accused her husband of domestic violence against
    their daughter. Appellant sought to introduce such evidence to show that Stolpa was
    biased against him and had a motivation to lie about appellant being in possession of
    the gun. The trial court refused to let appellant cross-examine Stolpa about the divorce
    proceedings finding that the same was not relevant.
    {¶65} At trial, appellant proffered Stolpa’s testimony.      We note that Stolpa,
    during voir dire outside the presence of the jury, testified that she was unaware that
    appellant had been subpoenaed to testify against her in court in the domestic matter.
    Thus, appellant failed to show that Stolpa was biased and was trying to get back at
    appellant by testifying against him. We also concur with appellee that whether or not
    domestic violence occurred within Stolpa’s home was not relevant to the issues in this
    case. Finally, we find that, assuming, arguendo, that the trial court erred in not admitting
    the proffered evidence, such error was harmless based on the evidence. Stolpa, Bruce
    Campbell and Deborah Myers all connected appellant to the gun. Moreover, Kassler, in
    her written statement to police, stated that she heard clicking sounds and knew that
    appellant had a gun. As is stated above. Campbell testified that on approximately
    February 7, 2011, he received an unsigned letter with appellant’s handwriting. The
    letter, which was marked as an Exhibit, asked Campbell not to say anything that was
    going to damage appellant’s case. Finally, during trial, a recorded telephone call from
    the jail from appellant to Campbell was admitted.       During the call, appellant asked
    Campbell about the gun and sighed when told that Campbell had returned the same to
    Stolpa. Appellant, during the call, told Campbell not to let them talk him into testifying
    and asked Campbell not to put the gun in appellant’s hands. Appellate also asked
    Campbell not to turn on him and Campbell replied that he would do what he could, but
    that he wans’t going down.
    {¶66} Appellant’s first assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
    II
    {¶67} Appellant, in his second assignment of error, argues that he was deprived
    of his right to confrontation when the trial court limited his right to cross-examine Kassler
    about a conversation she allegedly overheard between Stolpa and Bruce Campbell.
    {¶68} During trial, Kassler was asked whether or not she had witnessed any
    conversation between Stolpa and Bruce Campbell involving a gun. Both Stolpa and
    Campbell denied having any discussions about selling the gun. After she testified that
    she heard Stolpa talk about selling her gun after appellant was arrested, appellee
    objected on the basis of hearsay and the objection was sustained. The trial court
    ordered the jury to disregard such statement. Kassler was later asked whether she
    witnessed Stolpa and Campbell discussing the gun on January 2, 2011. After appellee
    objected on the basis of hearsay, the court sustained the objection.
    {¶69} Kassler then testified that, on January 2, 2011, and then about a week
    after that, she witnessed a conversation between Campbell and Stolpa about a gun.
    The conversation on January 2, 2011, occurred while she was at Campbell’s house.
    She testified that after she heard the conversation, she “[a]bout had a stroke” and
    moved out of Stolpa’s house. Transcript at 512.
    {¶70} Subsequently, the following discussion took place on the record:
    {¶71} “MR. DESMOND: Did I say that Kara Kassler would testify that she heard
    Tina Stolpa and Bruce Campbell talking about the sale of this gun? Did I say that?
    {¶72} “MS. STEFANCIN: I thought she testified to that.
    {¶73} “THE COURT: She started to.
    {¶74} “MR. DESMOND: Then you stopped her.
    {¶75} “THE COURT: Yeah.
    {¶76} “MS. STEFANCIN: We had a bunch of side bars up here yesterday. I’m
    trying to remember.
    {¶77} “MR. DESMOND: Let me try to clear it up. She would have testified, had
    she been allowed to, that she witnessed - -
    {¶78} “THE COURT: It was a relevancy issue because it took - - the
    conversation took place from what I understand substantially later.
    {¶79} “MS. STEFANCIN: Much later.
    {¶80} “THE COURT: After the incident.
    {¶81} “MS. STEFANCIN: She said it was after a week or so.
    {¶82} “THE COURT: After the 1st.
    {¶83} “MS. STEFANCIN: Yeah, she said she heard the conversation a week or
    so after and that’s why you weren’t allowed to get into the details.
    {¶84} “MR. DESMOND: Did I say that she heard them talking about the sale of
    this gun?
    {¶85} “THE COURT: Yes.
    {¶86} “MR. DESMOND: Okay. Then I don’t have any proffer.
    {¶87} “THE COURT: Right.” Transcript at 635-636.
    {¶88} Appellant now maintains that he was denied his right to confrontation
    when the trial court refused to permit him to question Kassler about the specific details
    of the conversation that she overheard. Appellant notes that both Campbell and Stolpa
    denied that they discussed selling the gun and argues that the issue of how and when
    Campbell came to possess the gun was germane to the case.
    {¶89} We note that such conversation allegedly occurred approximately a week
    after the incident in this case. There was no proffer as to what Kassler’s testimony
    would have been had appellant been permitted to cross-examine Kassler in greater
    detail about the conversation. Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, that the trial court
    should have allowed Kassler to testify about the specific details of the conversation, we
    find such error harmless based on the overwhelming evidence of appellant’s guilt.
    {¶90} Appellant’s second assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
    III
    {¶91} Appellant, in his third assignment of error, argues that he was denied of
    his right to a fair trial when appellee was able to elicit information about appellant’s prior
    murder conviction. Appellant’s murder conviction was the basis for the weapon under
    disability charge.
    {¶92} In the case sub judice, appellant offered to stipulate to having a prior
    offense of violence, but appellee indicated that it had a right to refuse such stipulation
    because the prior conviction was an element of the offense of having a weapon while
    under disability. Appellee sought to prove appellant’s prior conviction through testimony
    about the nature of appellant’s prior conviction and a certified copy of the record of
    appellant’s prior murder conviction. Appellee further argued that appellant’s criminal
    history was relevant because it revealed why the witnesses in this case were afraid of
    him and that, because of appellant’s prior murder conviction, the victims took appellant’s
    threats seriously.
    {¶93} The trial court found that the probative value of appellant’s murder
    conviction was outweighed by the prejudicial value and advised the parties that the prior
    conviction could not be referred to as a murder conviction.          The trial court further
    advised the parties that it was not prohibiting appellee from delving into the details of
    the murder conviction “if it is necessary, under 404(B) for the jury to understand what
    was going on in the minds of those folks back at that time.” Transcript at 184. The trial
    court went on to indicate that if appellee felt that it needed to get into the details of the
    murder conviction at trial, it could request admission under Evid.R. 404(B) and the
    court would make a ruling. Although the trial court ruled that appellee could not talk
    about murder during opening statements, when asked by appellee, the trial court stated
    that appellee could indicate that the act of violence occurred in 1990. Appellant did not
    object.
    {¶94} Appellant now maintains that “[d]espite the trial court’s ruling, and without
    first requesting admission under Evid.R. 404(B), the prosecution, managed to
    emphasize the severity of [appellant’s] prior conviction on multiple occasions.” Appellant
    notes that, during opening statements, the prosecution stated that the offense of
    violence occurred in 1990 and that appellant had spent 18 years in prison for the prior
    offense before being paroled. Appellant further notes that, during two other occasions
    during trial, the prosecution reminded the jury that appellant had spent 18 years in
    prison.
    {¶95} While appellant, in his assignment of error, argues that he was denied his
    right to a fair trial when the prosecution was able to elicit prejudicial information about
    his prior murder conviction, we note that the prior conviction was never referred to
    during trial as a murder conviction. We further note that appellant did not object when
    the trial court ruled that the prosecution could indicate that the act of violence occurred
    in 1990, so a plain error analysis applies. In order to prevail under a plain error analysis,
    appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the outcome of the trial clearly would
    have been different but for the error. State v. Long, 
    53 Ohio St.2d 91
    , 
    372 N.E.2d 804
    ,
    (1978). Notice of plain error “is to be taken with the utmost caution, under exceptional
    circumstances and only to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.” 
    Id.
     ¶ three of the
    syllabus.
    {¶96} As is discussed above, there was overwhelming evidence of appellant’s
    guilt. Because there was overwhelming evidence, any reference to appellant’s prior 18
    year prison term did not violate appellant’s right to a fair trial.
    {¶97} Appellant’s third assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
    IV
    {¶98} Appellant, in his fourth assignment of error, contends that he was denied
    the effective assistance of trial counsel due to counsel’s failure to object when the
    prosecution informed the jury that appellant had spent 18 years in prison for his prior
    conviction.
    {¶99} To show ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must satisfy a two-
    prong test. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 669, 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
     (1984). First,
    he must show that his trial counsel engaged in a substantial violation of any essential
    duty to his client. State v. Bradley, 
    42 Ohio St.3d 136
    , 141, 
    538 N.E.2d 373
     (1989),
    quoting State v. Lytle, 
    48 Ohio St.2d 391
    , 396, 
    358 N.E.2d 623
     (1976). Second, he must
    show that his trial counsel's ineffectiveness resulted in prejudice. Bradley, at 141–142,
    quoting Lytle, at 396–397. “Prejudice exists where there is a reasonable probability that
    the trial result would have been different but for the alleged deficiencies of counsel.”
    Bradley, ¶ three of the syllabus.
    {¶100} Having overruled appellant’s third assignment of error, we find that
    defense counsel's performance was not deficient.
    {¶101} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
    V
    {¶102} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant argues that, in light of the
    foregoing assignments of error, the cumulative effect of those errors denied him due
    process. Because we find no error with respect to assignments I through IV, we find no
    cumulative error.
    {¶103} Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is, therefore, overruled.
    {¶104} Accordingly, the judgment of the Morrow County Court of Common Pleas
    is affirmed.
    By: Edwards, J.
    Delaney, P.J. and
    Farmer, J. concur
    ______________________________
    ______________________________
    ______________________________
    JUDGES
    JAE/d0119
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR MORROW COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    THE STATE OF OHIO                           :
    :
    Plaintiff-Appellee   :
    :
    :
    -vs-                                        :       JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    RONALD ANDERSON                             :
    :
    Defendant-Appellant     :       CASE NO. 2011CA0006
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the
    judgment of the Morrow County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs assessed to
    appellant.
    _________________________________
    _________________________________
    _________________________________
    JUDGES
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2011CA0006

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 1491

Judges: Edwards

Filed Date: 3/29/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021