State v. Tyson , 2012 Ohio 712 ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Tyson, 2012-Ohio-712.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J.
-vs-
Case No. 2011CA00177
FRANK E. TYSON
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Stark County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 2000-CR-0849
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: February 21, 2012
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JOHN D. FERRERO, FRANK E. TYSON, PRO SE
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY, Inmate No. 397-251
STARK COUNTY, OHIO Mansfield Correction Institution
P.O. Box 788
By: RENEE M. WATSON Mansfield, Ohio 44901
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
Appellate Section
110 Central Plaza, South – Suite 510
Canton, Ohio 44702-1413
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00177 2
Hoffman, J.
(¶1) Defendant-appellant Frank E. Tyson appeals the July 11, 2011 Judgment
Entry entered by the Stark County Court of Common Pleas denying his motion for de
novo resentencing. Plaintiff-appellee is the state of Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
(¶2) On July 28, 2000, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on one
count of kidnapping, in violation of R.C. 2905.01, a felony of the second degree; one
count of burglary, in violation of R.C 2911.12, a felony of the second degree; one count
of failure to comply with the order or signal of a police officer, in violation of R.C.
2921.331, a felony of the third degree; one count of receiving stolen property, in
violation of R.C. 2913.51, a felony of the fourth degree; and one count of grand theft of
a motor vehicle, in violation of R.C 2913.02, a felony of the fourth degree. Appellant
appeared for arraignment on August 4, 2000, and entered a plea of not guilty to the
charges.
(¶3) The matter proceeded to jury trial on October 26, 2000.1 After hearing all
the evidence and deliberations, the jury found Appellant guilty of all of the charges
contained in the Indictment. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate prison
term of twenty-four (24) years. The trial court memorialized Appellant's convictions and
sentence via Judgment Entry filed November 6, 2000. Appellant appealed his
convictions and sentence to this Court. This Court affirmed Appellant's convictions and
sentence. State v. Tyson, Stark App. No.2000CA00361, 2001-Ohio-1382.
1
For a complete recitation of the facts underlying Appellant's convictions, see State v.
Tyson, Stark App. No.2000CA00361, 2001-Ohio-1382; and State v. Tyson, Stark App.
No.2008CA00068, 2009-Ohio-104.
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00177 3
(¶4) On November 26, 2007, Appellant filed a “Motion for Criminal Rule 33(B)
‘Unavoidably Prevented’ Findings and for New Trial.” Therein, Appellant claimed he was
unavoidably prevented from timely filing his motion for a new trial, and also was
unavoidably prevented from discovering the newly discovered evidence upon which he
based such motion. Via Judgment Entry filed on March 11, 2008, the trial court denied
Appellant's motion, finding Appellant failed to show by clear and convincing evidence
any valid reason for the extensive delay in filing his motion for new trial. The trial court
also found Appellant had not timely presented the issue of the videotape and the
affidavit, and failed to meet his burden of proving he was unavoidably prevented from
timely discovering this evidence. Appellant appealed the trial court's decision to this
Court. This Court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding “appellant failed to show by
clear and convincing evidence that he was unavoidably prevented from timely discovery
of the ‘newly discovered’ evidence”. State v. Tyson, supra.(¶5) On June 17, 2008, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief.
Therein, Appellant fully incorporated his motion for new trial. Via Judgment Entry filed
October 17, 2008, the trial court overruled the petition, finding Appellant “failed to meet
all of the jurisdictional requirements set forth in R.C. 2953.23(A) and, therefore, this
Court is without jurisdiction to consider Tyson's untimely petition for post-conviction
relief.” October 17, 2008 Judgment Entry at 5. This Court affirmed the denial of the
petition for post-conviction relief via Opinion and Judgment Entry of January 26, 2009.
State v. Tyson Stark App. No. 2008 CA 00253.
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00177 4
(¶6) On August 11, 2010, Appellant filed a motion for resentencing with proper
post-release control notification. On October 5, 2010, the trial court scheduled the
matter for a hearing on post-release control.
(¶7) On May 20, 2011, the trial court conducted a limited resentencing hearing
on the issue of post-release control. At the hearing, Appellant was notified of the term
of post-release control, to wit: Upon release from prison, Appellant was advised he is
ordered to serve a mandatory period of three years of post-release control on each
counts one, two and three, pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(B) and an optional period of up to
three years of post-release control at the discretion of the Parole Board on counts four
and five, pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(B). This period of post-release control was imposed
as part of Appellant’s criminal sentence at the sentencing hearing, pursuant to R.C.
2929.19. Appellant was notified the terms of post-release control imposed in the
sentence should be served concurrently, as required by R.C. 2967.28(F)(4)(c), and if he
commits another felony while subject to this period of control or supervision he may be
subject to an additional prison term consisting of the maximum period of unserved time
remaining on post-release control.
(¶8) Appellant filed a motion for resentencing de novo on May 20, 2011. The
trial court denied the motion via Judgment Entry of July 11, 2011. Appellant now
appeals, assigning as error:
(¶9) “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION
FOR A FULL DE NOVO RESENTENCING HEARING, UNDER STATE V. SINGLETON
124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434-920 N.E.2d 958.”
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00177 5
(¶10) In the sole assignment of error, Appellant asserts the trial court erred in
not conducting a de novo sentencing hearing in light of the trial court’s failure to properly
impose post-release control. Specifically, Appellant asserts the trial court failed to
properly advise him of the consequences of violating his post-release control during his
original sentencing hearing.
(¶11) In State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, the Ohio
Supreme Court held
(¶12) “We similarly hold that when a judge fails to impose statutorily mandated
post-release control as part of a defendant's sentence, that part of the sentence is void
and must be set aside. [Footnote omitted.] Neither the Constitution nor common sense
commands anything more.
(¶13) “This principle is an important part of the analysis of void sentences that
we have not focused upon in prior cases involving post-release control, including Bezak,
114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961. Thus, we reaffirm the portion of
the syllabus in Bezak that states ‘[w]hen a defendant is convicted of or pleads guilty to
one or more offenses and post-release control is not properly included in a sentence for
a particular offense, the sentence for that offense is void,’ but with the added proviso
that only the offending portion of the sentence is subject to review and correction.
(¶14) “However, we now modify the second sentence in the Bezak syllabus as
ill-considered. That sentence states that the offender is entitled to a new sentencing
hearing for the offense for which post-release control was not imposed properly. 114
Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961. It does not recognize a principle that
we overlooked in Bezak: when an appellate court concludes that a sentence imposed
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00177 6
by a trial court is in part void, only the portion that is void may be vacated or otherwise
amended.
(¶15) “Therefore, we hold that the new sentencing hearing to which an offender
is entitled under Bezak is limited to proper imposition of post-release control. In so
holding, we come more into line with legislative provisions concerning appellate review
of criminal sentences.***”
(¶16) Pursuant to Fischer, supra, Appellant was entitled to a hearing limited to
the correction of the imposition of post-release control. Appellant was convicted of a
felony of the second degree, a felony of the third degree and two felonies of the fourth
degree; therefore, subject to both a discretionary period of post-release control and a
mandatory period of post-release control, each for a period of three years. On May 20,
2011, the trial court properly conducted a hearing limited to the proper imposition of
post-release control.2
2
Appellant’s claim he was not properly advised of the consequences of violating the
terms of PRC at his original sentencing hearing is barred from review herein by res
judicata.
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00177 7
(¶17) Appellant’s sentence in the Stark County Court of Common Pleas is
affirmed.
By: Hoffman, J.
Gwin, P.J. and
Edwards, J. concur s/ William B. Hoffman _________________
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
s/ W. Scott Gwin _____________________
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
s/ Julie A. Edwards___________________
HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS
Stark County, Case No. 2011CA00177 8
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
FRANK E. TYSON :
:
Defendant-Appellant : Case No. 2011CA00177
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, Appellant’s sentence in the
Stark County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to Appellant.
s/ William B. Hoffman _________________
HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
s/ W. Scott Gwin _____________________
HON. W. SCOTT GWIN
s/ Julie A. Edwards___________________
HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS