Bank of Am., N.A. v. Jimenez. , 2011 Ohio 5606 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Bank of Am., N.A. v. Jimenez., 
    2011-Ohio-5606
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    BANK OF AMERICA,                                      Case No. 2011CAE050046
    NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
    Appellee,
    v.
    EZEKIEL JIMENEZ ET AL.,                               OPINION
    Appellants.
    JUDGES:
    :   Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
    :   Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
    :   Hon. John W. Wise, J.
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                              Civil appeal from the Delaware County
    Court of Common Pleas, Case No.
    10CVE04573
    JUDGMENT:                                             Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                                October 31, 2011
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                                For Defendants-Appellants
    NICHOLAS W. MYLES                                     BRIAN K. DUNCAN
    SCOTT A. KING                                         ELLIOT B. GARVEY
    2000 Courthouse Plaza N.E.                            155 East Broad Street, Ste. 2200
    10 W. Second Street                                   Columbus, OH 43215
    Dayton, OH 45402
    Hoffman, P.J.
    {¶ 1} Defendants-appellants Ezekiel Jimenez and Azar Sarikhani appeal the
    April 12, 2011 Judgment Entry entered by the Delaware County Court of Common
    Pleas rendering judgment in favor of Plaintiff-appellee Bank of America, National
    Association.
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    {¶ 2} On April 12, 2010, Appellee Bank of America filed a complaint in
    foreclosure against Appellants Ezekiel Jimenez and Azar Sarikhani seeking judgment
    for the balance due on a note and to foreclose on the associated mortgage. Appellants
    did not file an answer to the complaint.
    {¶ 3} On May 17, 2010, Appellee moved for default judgment against
    Appellants. Appellee then dismissed the motion. On June 25, 2010, Appellee filed a
    second motion for default judgment. Via Judgment Entry, the trial court granted the
    motion for default judgment on July 1, 2010.
    {¶ 4} Appellants claim they had been involved in good faith negotiations with
    Wells Fargo Home Mortgage regarding potential resolution options, an entity who is not
    a party to this action, during the pendency of the foreclosure proceedings. On January
    11, 2011, Appellants retained counsel to pursue debt relief options, including
    bankruptcy.
    {¶ 5} On January 11, 2011, on the eve of the scheduled Sheriff’s sale,
    Appellants filed a motion to vacate the July 1, 2010 Judgment Entry along with a Motion
    for Stay of Execution of Sheriff’s Sale, Motion for Foreclosure Mediation and Motion for
    Extension of Time to Answer. Via Judgment Entry of April 12, 2011, the trial court
    denied Appellants’ motion to vacate.
    {¶ 6} Appellants now appeal, assigning as error:
    {¶ 7} “I.   THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
    VACATE THE UNDERLYING JUDGMENT AS DEFENDANTS/APPELANTS MADE
    THE REQUISITE SHOWING UNDER CIV. R. 60 (B) IN THEIR MOTION TO VACATE,
    SPECIFICALLY CIV. R. 60 (B) (1) AND (5).
    {¶ 8} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
    TAKE      HEED     OF   THE   UNDERLYING       POLICY      OF   OHIO   COURTS   AND
    ‘LONGSTANDING PRACTICE’ WITH RESPECT TO ADJUDICATING MATTERS ON
    THEIR MERITS AS OPPOSED TO PROCEDURAL DEFECTS.
    {¶ 9} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
    ADDRESS, OR EVEN CONSIDER, ALLEGATIONS OF OPERATIVE FACTS WHICH
    DEMONSTRATE THAT DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO RELIEF UNDER CIV. R.
    60 (B).
    {¶ 10} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING
    DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS’ REQUEST FOR AN ORAL HEARING ON HIS [SIC]
    MOTION TO VACATE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE WERE ALLEGATIONS OF
    OPERATIVE FACTS WHICH WOULD WARRANT RELIEF UNDER CIV. R. 60 (B).”
    I, II, III & IV
    {¶ 11} Appellants’ assigned errors raise common and interrelated issues;
    therefore, we will address the arguments together.
    {¶ 12} Civ. R. 60(B) provides the basis upon which a party may obtain relief from
    judgment, and states in pertinent part: “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
    court may relieve a party * * * from a final judgment, order or proceedings for the
    following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly
    discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to
    move for a new trial under Rule 59(B); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
    intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
    judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it
    is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
    judgment should have prospective application; or (5) any other reason justifying relief
    from the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons
    (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
    entered to taken.”
    {¶ 13} Furthermore, “a motion for relief from judgment under Civ. R. 60(B) is
    addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that court's ruling will not be
    disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” Griffey v. Rajan (1987),
    
    33 Ohio St.3d 75
    , 77, 
    514 N.E.2d 1122
    , and Citibank (South Dakota), N.A. v. Stein,
    Fairfield App. No. 05CA71, 2006–Ohio–2674 at ¶ 27. In order to find an abuse of
    discretion, we must determine that the trial court's decision denying Appellants’ motion
    was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable, and not merely an error of law or
    judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    , 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
    .
    {¶ 14} The Ohio Supreme Court interpreted Civ. R. 60(B) in the seminal case of
    GTE Automatic Electric, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 
    47 Ohio St.2d 146
    , 
    351 N.E.2d 113
     as follows: “To prevail on his motion under Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must
    demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense or claim to present if relief is
    granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R.
    60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and, where
    the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2), or (3), not more than one year after the
    judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken.” 
    Id.
     at 150–151.
    {¶ 15} A trial court must determine whether the motion contains allegations of
    operative facts which would warrant relief under Civil Rule 60(B), and if so, should grant
    an evidentiary hearing. Adomeit v. Baltimore (1974), 
    39 Ohio App.3d 97
    .
    {¶ 16} Herein, Appellants moved the trial court for relief from judgment due to
    excusable neglect and/or inadvertence alleging they were misinformed by a third-party
    loan modification company. However, as noted by the trial court, Appellants offered only
    a self-serving affidavit in support of their motion which did not support their alleged
    defenses. “Unsworn allegations of operative facts contained in a motion for relief from
    judgment filed under Civ.R. 60(B) or in a brief attached to the motion are not sufficient
    evidence upon which to grant a motion to vacate judgment.” East Ohio Gas Co. v.
    Walker (1978), 
    59 Ohio App.2d 216
    . Furthermore, reliance upon a third party loan
    modification company does not justify failing to file an Answer to the complaint.
    {¶ 17} Appellants’ first defense asserted Appellee lacked standing or was not the
    real party in interest; however, Appellee filed the assignment of the mortgage
    subsequent to the filing of the complaint, but prior to the trial court’s judgment, thereby
    curing any defect. The failure to be a real party in interest is not a jurisdictional defect.
    State ex rel. Jones v. Suster (1998), 
    84 Ohio St.3d 70
    .
    {¶ 18} As Civil Rule 60(B) does not require the trial court to weigh the evidence,
    the court was not charged with issuing findings of fact. A trial court “[is] not required to
    cite every piece of evidence or testimony offered in its decision, and the fact that a
    particular piece of evidence or testimony [is] not mentioned does not mean it was
    ignored.” Gardner v. Bisciotti, 
    2010-Ohio-5975
    . As an appellate court, we presume the
    trial court properly considered the affidavit offered in support of Appellants’ motion to
    vacate the judgment.
    {¶ 19} Upon review of the record, the trial court did not err in overruling
    Appellants’ Civil Rule 60(B) motion to vacate the trial court’s July 1, 2010 Judgment
    Entry.
    {¶ 20} The April 12, 2011 Judgment Entry of the Delaware County Court of
    Common Pleas is affirmed.
    By: Hoffman, P.J.
    Farmer, J., and Wise, J. concur
    s/ William B. Hoffman _________________
    HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
    s/ Sheila G. Farmer __________________
    HON. SHEILA G. FARMER
    s/ John W. Wise _____________________
    HON. JOHN W. WISE IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DELAWARE
    COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    BANK OF AMERICA,
    NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,                     :
    :
    Appellee,               :
    :
    :
    v.                                        :        JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    EZEKIEL JIMENEZ ET AL.,                   :
    :
    :
    Appellants.             :        CASE NO. 2011CAE050046
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Opinion, the April 12, 2011 Judgment
    Entry of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs to Appellants.
    s/ William B. Hoffman ________________
    HON. WILLIAM B. HOFFMAN
    s/ Sheila G. Farmer __________________
    HON. SHEILA G. FARMER
    s/ John W. Wise ____________________
    HON. JOHN W. WISE
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11CAE050046

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 5606

Judges: Hoffman

Filed Date: 10/31/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014