State v. Frazier , 2011 Ohio 434 ( 2011 )

[Cite as State v. Frazier, 2011-Ohio-434.]
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. Julie A. Edwards, P. J.
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
Hon. John W. Wise, J.
-vs-
Case No. 2010 CA 00042
JOHN WESLEY FRAZIER
Defendant-Appellant OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Criminal Appeal from the Court of Common
Pleas, Case No. 2009 CR 01024(A)
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 31, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
JOHN D. FERRERO GEORGE URBAN
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 111 Second Street, NW
RONALD MARK CALDWELL Suite 302
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR Canton, Ohio 44702
110 Central Plaza South, Suite 510
Canton, Ohio 44702-1413
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00042 2
Wise, J.
{¶1} Appellant John Wesley Frazier appeals from his convictions for murder
and aggravated robbery in the Court of Common Pleas, Stark County. The relevant
facts leading to this appeal are as follows.
{¶2} On June 22, 2009, appellant’s friend Mike Strychalski inquired of Canton
resident Raymond Pyles about purchasing some marijuana. Strychalski and Pyles set
up a date and time for the transaction. Strychalski also met with appellant, at which time
the two young men discussed robbing Pyles during the drug deal.
{¶3} On the next day, Pyles and his friend, Jesse Burns, drove a Toyota SUV
to a small playground in the Vienna Woods neighborhood in southwest Canton to
complete the drug deal. Appellant, standing with Strychalski at the passenger side
window of the truck, produced a handgun and demanded any money and valuables
from Pyles and Burns. After Pyles and Burns had turned over their cash, marijuana, and
cell phones, a physical struggle ensued between Burns and appellant, following which
Burns was fatally shot in the head.
{¶4} Appellant, who was a minor at the time, was thereafter bound over from
juvenile court and indicted as an adult on one count of aggravated murder and two
counts of robbery, all with firearm specifications.
{¶5} The case proceeded to a jury trial. On January 27, 2010, the jury found
appellant guilty of the lesser included offense of murder, and guilty of two counts of
aggravated robbery. Appellant was sentenced on February 10, 2010 to an aggregate
indeterminate sentence of thirty-one years to life in prison.
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00042 3
{¶6} On February 23, 2010, appellant filed a notice of appeal. He herein raises
the following three Assignments of Error:
{¶7} “I. THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING OF GUILT IS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶8} “II. THE TRIAL COURT’S (SIC) ERRED IN FAILING TO DECLARE A
MISTRIAL ON THE BASIS OF INCONSISTENT VERDICT BY THE JURY.
{¶9} “III. THE APPELANT (SIC) WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS OF
[LAW] BY THE MISCONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTOR.”
I.
{¶10} In his First Assignment of Error, appellant maintains his conviction was
against the sufficiency and manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
{¶11} In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, “[t]he relevant inquiry is
whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond
a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492,
paragraph two of the syllabus. It is well-established that a jury is free to believe all, part,
or none of any witness' testimony. See State v. Mossburg, Van Wert App.No. 15-06-10,
2007-Ohio-3343, ¶ 46, citing State v. Antill (1964), 176 Ohio St. 61, 197 N.E.2d 548.
{¶12} Appellant herein was convicted of one count of murder and two counts of
aggravated robbery.
{¶13} R.C. 2903.02(A) states in pertinent part: “No person shall purposely cause
the death of another * * *.”
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00042 4
{¶14} In addition, R.C. 2911.01(A)(1) states as follows: “No person, in
attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in section 2913.01 of the Revised
Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or offense, shall * * * [h]ave a deadly
weapon on or about the offender's person or under the offender's control and either
display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the offender possesses it, or use it[.]”
{¶15} The bulk of appellant’s argument goes to the evidence concerning the
shooter’s identity, which we will additionally analyze in regard to appellant’s “manifest
weight” claim. Nonetheless, the record reveals that both Strychalski and Pyles observed
appellant produce a handgun during the staged drug deal and demand “everything”
from Pyles and Burns in the SUV. Pyles described how he started to give chase in the
vehicle after Strychalski ran off toward home, while appellant and Burns wrestled over
the gun outside the SUV. Pyles then heard a gunshot and saw Burns sitting on the
ground, bleeding. Furthermore, David Taylor, who was given a ride by Strychalski and
appellant shortly after the shooting, heard appellant, who appeared upset and cursing,
state “I didn’t mean to shoot him in the head.” Taylor also observed appellant wrap a
handgun into a T-shirt as Strychalski drove up Dueber Avenue during this time.
{¶16} We note the State also presented deputy coroner testimony that the cause
of Burns’ death was a gunshot wound to the top of the skull, which penetrated into the
brain. Criminalist Michael Short opined that the deadly shot had the characteristics of a
Smith and Wesson .357 or .38 fired at close range to the victim. No shell casings were
found at the scene, although Canton Detective Joseph Mongold testified that if the
weapon had indeed been a revolver, the casings would not have been ejected.
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00042 5
{¶17} Accordingly, upon review of the trial court record in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, we hold appellant's convictions for murder and aggravated robbery
were supported by sufficient evidence.
{¶18} Turning to the second portion of this assigned error, we note our standard
of review on a manifest weight challenge to a criminal conviction is stated as follows:
“The court, reviewing the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving
conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.”
State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717. See also, State v.
Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 678 N.E.2d 541. The granting of a new trial
“should be exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily
against the conviction.” Martin at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717.
{¶19} The focus of appellant’s manifest weight claim is on alleged
inconsistencies in the testimony and credibility of the witnesses as to the perpetrator of
the robbery and shooting.
{¶20} The record consistently reveals that Strychalski was the person who
chiefly arranged the details of the drug transaction ruse to effectuate a robbery of Pyles.
Strychalski admitted to having access to a handgun, which had previously belonged to a
deceased friend. He also admitted to pointing the gun at appellant the night before the
shooting, when a “tussle” between Strychalski and appellant got out of hand. Appellant
presently attacks Strychalski as a “self-confessed liar” who gave three versions of the
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00042 6
events of June 23, 2009 to police officials. Appellant maintains that Strychalski had
significant incentive to put the blame for the shooting on appellant rather than himself.
{¶21} Appellant also challenges Pyles’ testimony, questioning Pyles’ recollection
that he turned his cash, drugs, and cell phone over to Strychalski, even though Pyles
testified that appellant was the one holding the gun. He notes that Pyles gave a second
statement to police about the robbery and shooting after being assured he would not be
charged with drug trafficking.
{¶22} The record reveals that appellant took the stand in his defense, essentially
countering the State’s theory of the case by portraying Strychalski as the perpetrator.
Appellant maintained that during the drug buy Strychalski pulled a gun from his
sweatpants pocket and ordered Pyles to turn over all the drugs. Appellant claimed to be
surprised by the robbery, following which he started to run, before being tackled by
Burns, who was physically larger than him. He then told the jury that as Burns was on
top of him, Strychalski intervened in the scuffle, ultimately shooting Burns. Appellant
presently maintains that his version of events correlates with the physical evidence of
Burns being shot on the very top of his head.
{¶23} Despite these varying versions of events, and differences in details
between Strychalski and Pyles, both of whom admittedly were involved in illegal drug
activities, we recognize that the jurors, as the firsthand triers of fact, were patently in the
best position to gauge the truth. It is worth reiterating, inter alia, that David Taylor, who
described himself as appellant’s friend and who apparently was not facing charges for
his limited involvement, clearly testified that he heard appellant announce his regret for
shooting Burns in the head.
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00042 7
{¶24} Upon review, we find the jury did not clearly lose its way and create a
manifest miscarriage of justice requiring that appellant's conviction be reversed and a
new trial ordered.
{¶25} Appellant's First Assignment of Error is therefore overruled.
II.
{¶26} In his Second Assignment of Error, appellant contends the jury's
conviction for appellant's murder of Burns is inconsistent with the convictions for
aggravated robbery of Burns and Pyles, and that the trial court committed reversible
error in denying a mistrial on that basis. We disagree.
{¶27} In essence, appellant, noting that the jury did not convict on aggravated
murder, contends that because the lesser offense of murder as instructed in this case
lacks the element of “while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing
immediately after committing or attempting to commit, aggravated robbery,” the jury’s
overall result is inconsistent and a mistrial was warranted.
{¶28} Our standard of review for evaluating a trial court's decision to grant or
deny a mistrial is abuse of discretion. State v. Graewe, Tuscarawas App.No. 2007 AP
10 0070, 2008-Ohio-5143, ¶ 46, citing State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 182,
510 N.E.2d 343. In order to find an abuse of discretion, we must determine the trial
court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable and not merely an error
of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d
1140. Generally, “[i]nconsistency in a verdict does not arise out of inconsistent
responses to different counts, but rather inconsistent responses to the same count.”
State v. Gardner, Montgomery App. No. 21027, 2006-Ohio-1130, ¶ 33, citing State v.
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00042 8
Adams (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 223, 374 N.E.2d 137; State v. Lovejoy (1997), 79 Ohio
St.3d 440, 683 N.E.2d 1112. Furthermore, an inconsistent verdict may very well be a
result of leniency and compromise by the jurors, rather than being caused by jury
confusion. State v. Fraley, Perry App.No. 03CA12, 2004-Ohio-4898, ¶ 15, citing United
States v. Powell (1984), 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461. See, also, State v.
Ballard, Cuyahoga App.No. 88279, 2007-Ohio-4017, ¶ 17.
{¶29} In addressing appellant’s motion for mistrial following the jury’s verdict, the
trial court reasoned as follows:
{¶30} “As It relates to the arguments made by counsel, the Court, while it may
not necessarily agree, finds that, in fact, there are theories, obviously the Court allowed
for the lesser included offense of murder to be submitted to the jury, the State was in
agreement with that, the Defense had requested it. I raised questions at the time. But,
nevertheless, in thinking it through, there is arguably the situation where a robbery takes
place and thereafter unrelated, at least in the minds of the fact finders, to the
aggravated robbery, an incident occurs reaching a murder. So that it wasn’t during the
commission of the aggravated robbery or immediately thereafter, enough of a break
being found to have existed.” Tr. at 530.
{¶31} Upon review of the aforesaid, and bearing in mind the potentiality for juror
leniency or compromise, we hold the trial court's denial of the motion for mistrial on the
allegation of inconsistent verdicts was not arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable.
{¶32} Appellant’s Second Assignment of Error is therefore overruled.
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00042 9
III.
{¶33} In his Third Assignment of Error, appellant argues he was deprived of due
process of law based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct. We disagree.
{¶34} A conviction will be reversed for prosecutorial misconduct only where it is
clear beyond a reasonable doubt that, absent the prosecutor's comments, the jury
would not have found the defendant guilty. State v. Benge, 75 Ohio St.3d 136, 141, 661
N.E.2d 1019, 1996-Ohio-227. Furthermore, isolated comments by a prosecutor are not
to be taken out of context and given their “most damaging meaning.” See Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo (1974), 416 U.S. 637, 647, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431. Generally, a
prosecutor's conduct at trial is not grounds for reversal unless that conduct deprives the
defendant of a fair trial. State v. Loza (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 61, 78, 641 N.E.2d 1082.
Furthermore, juries are presumed to follow and obey the limiting instructions given them
by the trial court. State v. DeMastry, 155 Ohio App.3d 110, 127, 799 N.E.2d 229, 2003-
Ohio-5588, ¶ 84, citing State v. Franklin (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127, 580 N.E.2d 1.
{¶35} Appellant’s concerns focus on the prosecutor’s calling of Ashley Dorr, a
juvenile placement officer, who briefly checked on appellant at his mother’s residence
earlier on the day of the shooting of Burns. Appellant first maintains that calling Dorr at
all was simply an attempt by the prosecutor to cast appellant’s character in a bad light
by suggesting he had a juvenile record. However, given Dorr’s recollection that
Strychalski was at the residence with appellant, it was not improper for the State to
present evidence that the two young men were together in southwest Canton the day of
the murder, possibly planning the staged drug deal.
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00042 10
{¶36} Appellant also takes specific objection to the prosecutor’s question to
Dorr, on re-direct, concerning the reason that juveniles who are released from the
Community Corrections Facility (“CCF”) are periodically supervised. Dorr started to
respond: “Fear for the community. We don’t want to send kids ***.” Tr. at 239. At that
point, the trial judge sua sponte cut the answer off and instructed the jury to disregard.
Id.{¶37} We note that earlier on direct examination, Dorr had simply identified
herself as a family court employee; it was defense counsel that thereafter brought out
that Dorr was a court placement officer and that appellant had been a juvenile resident
of CCF for several months. See Tr. at 236-237. Upon review, and in light of the trial
court’s curative instruction, we do not conclude the prosecutor’s questioning of Dorr,
assuming, arguendo, it was improper, would have prejudicially affected appellant's
substantial rights. Loza, supra.
{¶38} We therefore find no reversible error based on the basis of prosecutorial
misconduct.
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00042 11
{¶39} Appellant’s Third Assignment of Error is therefore overruled.
{¶40} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas,
Stark County, Ohio, is hereby affirmed.
By: Wise, J.
Edwards, P. J., and
Farmer, J., concur.
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
JUDGES
JWW/d 0112
Stark County, Case No. 2010 CA 00042 12
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee :
:
-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
JOHN WESLEY FRAZIER :
:
Defendant-Appellant : Case No. 2010 CA 00042
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio, is affirmed.
Costs assessed to appellant.
___________________________________
___________________________________
___________________________________
JUDGES