State v. Jones , 2013 Ohio 572 ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Jones, 
    2013-Ohio-572
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 98209
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    DEMETRIUS JONES
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-524453
    BEFORE:           Blackmon, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                     February 21, 2013
    2
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Rufus Sims
    75 Public Square
    Suite 1111
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Timothy J. McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: Mark J. Mahoney
    Katherine Mullin
    Assistant County Prosecutors
    9th Floor Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    3
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.:
    {¶1} Appellant Demetrius Jones (“Jones”) appeals his conviction for murder and
    assigns the following error for our review:
    I. Where a defendant is convicted of murder pursuant to R.C.
    2903.02(B), and felonious assault is both the key element of the offense
    and the predicate, the conviction must be overturned where the jury
    acquitted the defendant of the separate charge of felonious assault.
    {¶2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent law we affirm Jones’s conviction.
    The apposite facts follow.
    Facts
    {¶3} The Cuyahoga County Grand Jury charged Jones with one count of murder
    in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B), and one count of felonious assault in violation of R.C.
    2903.11(A)(1). The charges arose from the murder of his girlfriend’s one-year-old baby
    who was left in Jones’s care.
    {¶4} The murder count alleged that Jones “did cause the death of [C.G.], as a
    proximate result of the offender committing or attempting to commit an offense of
    violence that is a felony of the first or second degree, to wit: felonious assault, in
    violation of Section 2903.02 of the Revised Code.” The felonious assault count alleged
    that Jones “did knowingly cause serious physical harm to [C.G.].”   The jury returned a
    guilty verdict on the murder count, but not guilty on the felonious assault count. Jones
    moved for an acquittal and/or new trial. He argued that the acquittal on the felonious
    assault count was inconsistent with the verdict on the murder count because felonious
    4
    assault is an element of the murder count. The trial court granted the motion, and the
    state appealed.
    {¶5} This court in State v. Jones, 8th Dist. No. 96901, 
    2012-Ohio-920
    , reversed
    the trial court’s granting of the motion. Relying on well established precedent, we held
    that “‘a verdict that convicts a defendant of one crime but acquits him of another, even
    when the first crime requires proof of the second, may not be disturbed merely because
    the two findings are irreconcilable.’” Id. at ¶ 7, quoting U.S. v. Powell, 
    469 U.S. 57
    ,
    65, 
    105 S.Ct. 471
    , 
    83 L.Ed.2d 461
     (1984). We explained, “it is equally possible that the
    jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the compound offense, and
    then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the
    lesser offense.” Jones at ¶ 9.
    {¶6} On remand, the trial court reinstated the conviction and sentenced Jones to
    15 years to life.
    Res Judicata
    {¶7} In his assigned error, Jones contends that his conviction was against the
    manifest weight of the evidence because the jury found him not guilty of the separate
    offense of felonious assault; therefore, he contends he did not have the mens rea
    necessary to commit the felony-murder offense that was predicated on felonious assault.
    {¶8} We conclude that res judicata prevents Jones from raising these arguments.
    This court has already held that his conviction for murder could stand in spite of the fact
    the jury found him not guilty of felonious assault. Jones is attempting to appeal our prior
    5
    decision by filing another appeal because he is attempting to reargue that a defendant
    cannot be found guilty of felony-murder and not guilty of a separate charge for the
    predicate offense. The law of the case doctrine precludes us from altering our prior
    decision. The law of the case doctrine provides that the decision of a reviewing court in
    a case remains the law of the case on the legal questions involved for all subsequent
    proceedings in the case at both the trial and reviewing levels. Nolan v. Nolan, 
    11 Ohio St.3d 1
    , 3, 
    462 N.E.2d 410
     (1984); State v. Frazier, 8th Dist. No. 95814,
    
    2011-Ohio-2927
    .
    {¶9} Additionally, res judicata also prevents our review of Jones’s argument.
    “Where an argument could have been raised on an initial appeal, res judicata dictates that
    it is inappropriate to consider that same argument on a second appeal following remand.”
    State v. D'Ambrosio, 
    73 Ohio St.3d 141
    , 143, 
    1995-Ohio-129
    , 
    652 N.E.2d 710
    . Accord
    State v. Gillard, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 548
    , 549, 
    1997-Ohio-183
    , 
    679 N.E.2d 276
     (on appeal after
    remand, “new issues” are barred by res judicata). He could have filed a cross-appeal in
    the first appeal in order to preserve his arguments, but failed to do so. Gillard, 78 Ohio
    St.3d at 549 (because the appellant failed to raise these issues in his cross-appeal when
    his conviction was affirmed, his arguments are barred by res judicata.) Accordingly,
    Jones’s sole assigned error is overruled.
    {¶10} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant its costs herein taxed.
    6
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
    execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is
    terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, JUDGE
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and
    MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 98209

Citation Numbers: 2013 Ohio 572

Judges: Blackmon

Filed Date: 2/21/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014