State v. Black , 2013 Ohio 4908 ( 2013 )

[Cite as State v. Black, 2013-Ohio-4908.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 99421
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
KIMBERLY N. BLACK
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART
AND REMANDED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-562834
BEFORE: Jones, J., Boyle, P.J., and Blackmon, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 7, 2013
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Michael B. Telep
4438 Pearl Road
Cleveland, Ohio 44109
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
BY: Jennifer A. Driscoll
Assistant County Prosecutor
The Justice Center, 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
LARRY A. JONES, SR., J.:
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Kimberly Black appeals the sentence imposed by the
trial court on her aggravated murder, murder, and endangering children convictions. We
affirm in part; reverse in part and remand.
{¶2} In 2012, Black was charged in a nine-count indictment with aggravated
murder, murder, felonious assault, and endangering children in the deaths of her daughter,
Kymshia Ruffin, and friend, Sharice Swain, and in injuries to Black’s daughter, Teraji
Ruffin.
{¶3} In November 2012, Black pleaded guilty as follows: Count 1, murder of
Swain in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A); Count 2, aggravated murder of Kymshia Ruffin in
violation of R.C. 2903.01(C); Count 8, endangering Kymshia Ruffin in violation of R.C.
2919.22(A), a third-degree felony; and Count 9, endangering Teraji Ruffin in violation of
R.C. 2919.22(A), a fourth-degree misdemeanor.
{¶4} In December 2012, the trial court sentenced Black to a combined sentence of
life in prison without the possibility of parole for 33 years as follows: Count 1, life with
possibility of parole in 15 years; Count 2, life with possibility of parole in 30 years; Count
8, three years; and Count 9, six months. The trial court further ordered that the
three-year sentence in Count 8 run consecutive to all other counts.
{¶5} It is from this sentence that Black appeals, raising two assignments of error
for our review:
I. The trial court abused its discretion and committed plain error when it
failed to merge the allied offenses of aggravated murder and endangering
children, and sentenced the defendant on both offenses where the charges
originated out of the same conduct towards the same victim.
II. The trial court committed reversible error and imposed a sentence
contrary to law when the record reveals the court failed to consider all
mandatory sentencing factors required by R.C. 2929.13.
Allied Offenses
{¶6} In her first assignment of error, Black contends that the trial court erred when
it failed to merge the allied offenses of aggravated murder and endangering children.
{¶7} Our review of an allied offenses question is de novo. State v. Webb, 8th
Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98628, 2013-Ohio-699, ¶ 4, citing State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d
482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 28.
{¶8} Under Ohio law, “[w]here the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment or information
may contain counts for all such offenses, but the defendant may be convicted of only
one.” R.C. 2941.25(A). However,
[w]here the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of
dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses of
the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate animus as
to each, the indictment or information may contain counts for all such
offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.
R.C. 2941.25(B).
{¶9} In State v. Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153, 2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061,
the Ohio Supreme Court redefined the test for determining whether two offenses are
allied offenses of similar import subject to merger pursuant to R.C. 2941.25 by overruling
its previous holding in State v. Rance, 85 Ohio St.3d 632, 710 N.E.2d 699 (1999).
Rance required a comparison of the statutory elements in the abstract to determine
whether the statutory elements of the crimes corresponded to such a degree that the
commission of one crime would result in the commission of the other. Now, pursuant to
Johnson, the conduct of the accused must be considered in determining whether two
offenses should be merged as allied offenses of similar import under R.C. 2941.25. Id.at syllabus.
{¶10} The inquiry under Johnson is two-fold: (1) “whether it is possible to commit
one offense and commit the other with the same conduct,” and (2) “whether the offenses
were committed by the same conduct, i.e., ‘a single act, committed with a single state of
mind.’” Id. at ¶ 48-49, quoting State v. Brown, 119 Ohio St.3d 447, 2008-Ohio-4569,
895 N.E.2d 149, ¶ 50 (Lanzinger, J., dissenting). If the answer to both questions is in
the affirmative, then the offenses are allied offenses of similar import and must merge.
Johnson at ¶ 50.
{¶11} Conversely, if the court determines that the commission of one offense will
never result in the commission of the other, if the offenses are committed separately, or if
the defendant has separate animus for each offense, the offenses will not merge. Id. at ¶
51; R.C. 2941.25(B).
{¶12} Black was convicted in Count 2 of the aggravated murder of Kymshia
Ruffin, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(C), which provides that: “No person shall
purposely cause the death of another who is under thirteen years of age at the time of the
commission of the offense.” She was also convicted in Count 8 of endangering
Kymshia, in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A), which states: “No person, who is the parent *
* * of a child under eighteen years of age * * * shall create a substantial risk to the health
or safety of the child, by violating a duty of care, protection, or support.” The
indictment lists the date of both offenses as on or about May 17, 2012.
{¶13} Recently, this court, sitting en banc, held that the trial court has a mandatory
duty to inquire and determine whether multiple charges are allied offenses of similar
import. State v. Rogers, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 98292, 98584, 98585, 98586, 98587,
98588, 98589, and 98590, 2013-Ohio-1027, 990 N.E.2d 1085, ¶ 55. Specifically, we held:
(a) Where a facial question of allied offenses of similar import presents
itself, a trial court judge has a duty to inquire and determine under R.C.
2941.25 whether those offenses should merge. A trial court commits plain
error in failing to inquire and determine whether such offenses are allied
offenses of similar import.
(b) A defendant’s failure to raise an allied offenses of similar import issue
in the trial court is not a bar to appellate review of the issue.
(c) While facts establishing the conduct of the offender offered at the time
of a plea may be used to establish that offenses are not allied, a guilty plea
alone that does not include a stipulation or a finding that offenses are not
allied offenses of similar import does not conclusively resolve the merger
question. Thus, a guilty plea does not constitute a valid waiver of the
protections from possible double jeopardy under R.C. 2941.25.
Id. at ¶ 63.
{¶14} Pursuant to Rogers, if, on review, the trial court record lacks sufficient
factual detail to determine whether the offenses are allied offenses of similar import, a
remand is necessary to establish the underlying facts of the defendant’s conduct so the
trial court can properly determine whether the subject crimes should merge for sentencing
purposes. “If the facts necessary to determine whether offenses are allied offenses of
similar import are not in the record and the trial court does not inquire, then plain error
exists when the issue is raised on appeal.” Id. at ¶ 46. This is the case even if
defendant fails to raise the issue in the trial court or the convictions are a result of a guilty
plea.
{¶15} Conversely, if the record contains sufficient facts from which to determine if
the offenses are allied offenses of similar import, our de novo review of the offenses may
suffice to establish whether the offenses are allied. That being said, we caution that, in
most cases, if a trial court has completely failed to consider the issue of allied offenses, it
is the trial court that should make the initial determination, not a reviewing court.
{¶16} In the case at bar, no discussion was had at the plea or sentencing hearings
about whether the convictions for aggravated murder and endangering children were
allied offenses of similar import.
{¶17} Our first part of the inquiry under Johnson, whether it is possible to commit
one offense and commit the other with the same conduct, shows that it is possible to
commit both aggravated murder, R.C. 2903.01(C), and child endangering, R.C.
2919.22(A), with the same conduct. See generally Johnson, 128 Ohio St.3d 153,
2010-Ohio-6314, 942 N.E.2d 1061; State v. Johnson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94813,
2011-Ohio-1919; State v. Grube, 4th Dist. Gallia No. 12CA1, 2013-Ohio-692, ¶ 51.
Thus, as to the first prong of the Johnson test, it would appear that these two convictions
should be merged. The trial court should have realized from the face of the charges that
a merger analysis of the aggravated murder and endangering of Kymshia convictions was
necessary. Because it did not perform a merger analysis, the court committed plain
error. Rogers at ¶ 34.
{¶18} Black contends that the facts as they can be gleaned from the plea and
sentencing hearings, presentence report, and clinical evaluations show that both the
aggravated murder and child endangering occurred at about the same time to the same
victim. According to Black, the offenses should merge because both involved
recklessness that resulted in Kymshia’s death. The state counters that Black’s actions on
the evening of May 17 constituted separate behavior and results, in part, because Black
had a daily habit of smoking PCP and “the very fact that she exposed her children to
drugs and her behavior on the drugs constitute child endangering”; therefore, the
convictions should not merge.
{¶19} Our review of the trial court record, which includes the transcript from the
plea and sentencing hearings, the presentence investigation report, and the court
psychiatric reports, shows that on May 17, 2012, Black, a habitual drug user, was partying
with three or four friends. At some point, she smoked a cigarette laced with PCP and
her friends may have also consumed PCP. Black was sitting in her longtime friend
Swain’s car and Swain was in the driver’s seat. Black became upset with Swain
because, according to Black, she thought Swain had just murdered her (Black’s) four
children. Black took out a razor blade and fatally cut Swain’s throat. Eyewitnesses
also saw her get out of the car and punch Swain through the driver side window. Black
then took or cut off her own clothes and walked up to the porch of her house.
{¶20} Naked, Black got her four children off the porch. Witnesses stated that
Black took one-year-old Teraji in her arms and two-year-old Kymshia by the hand.
Black’s two older children walked in front of her. While walking away from the scene,
Swain’s car began to move and hit Black, Teraji, and Kymshia. Kymshia suffered fatal
injures and Teraji was hospitalized for her injuries. The car then struck the house across
the street. It is unclear from the record before us at what point during this incident
Swain died.
{¶21} Although we are able to review the plea and sentencing hearing transcripts,
the presentence investigation report, and the court psychiatric clinic reports in our de
novo review, the record does not contain sufficient factual information that would permit
us to complete an allied offenses of similar import analysis. The facts of this case as
presented by the limited record “facially present a question of intertwined conduct,”
Rogers at ¶ 26; therefore, not only is an allied offenses merger analysis required, but,
based on this record, would benefit from an initial review by the trial court. See Grube,
4th Dist. Gallia No. 12CA1, 2013-Ohio-692, ¶ 52.
{¶22} Finally, although not raised by Black on appeal, because the remaining
counts are offenses committed against separate victims, Swain and Teraji, we find that
these counts are not allied offenses of similar import. See State v. Dix, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 94791, 2011-Ohio-472, ¶ 22 (finding that where a defendant commits the
same offense against different victims during the same course of conduct and the offense
is defined in terms of conduct toward another, then there is a dissimilar import for each
person subjected to the harm). Because Ohio sentencing laws do not recognize the
sentencing-package doctrine, our decision to remand the case for an allied offenses
analysis on Counts 2 and 8 does not affect Black’s sentences for her other convictions.
See State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824.
{¶23} Therefore, the first assignment of error is sustained to the degree that we
find the trial court committed plain error in failing to hold an allied offenses analysis on
Counts 2 and 8. We reverse the sentences as to Counts 2 and 8 only and remand the
case for an appropriate review.
Consecutive Sentences
{¶24} In the second assignment of error, Black argues that the trial court failed to
make the findings required to impose consecutive sentences. The trial court imposed a
three-year sentence on Count 8, endangering children, and ordered it run consecutive to
the sentences for Counts 1, 2, and 9. But because we are remanding this case for an
allied offenses analysis on Counts 2 and 8, and Count 8 was the only count the trial court
ordered to run consecutive, we need not determine whether the trial court made the
requisite statutory findings to impose consecutive sentences.
{¶25} The second assignment of error is therefore moot and overruled. See
App.R. 12(A)(1)(C).
{¶26} The sentences on Counts 2 and 8 are reversed and the case is remanded.
{¶27} Accordingly, judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part and the case is
remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellant and appellee split the costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LARRY A. JONES, SR., JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, P.J., and
PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR