State v. Ruffin , 2013 Ohio 1447 ( 2013 )

[Cite as State v. Ruffin, 2013-Ohio-1447.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 98764
STATE OF OHIO
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
vs.
WILLIAM RUFFIN
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JUDGMENT:
AFFIRMED
Criminal Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-496450
BEFORE: Keough, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 11, 2013
APPELLANT
William Ruffin
Inmate No. 552-035
Grafton Correctional Institution
2500 South Avon-Belden Road
Grafton, Ohio 44044
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Timothy J. McGinty
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
By: Kristen L. Sobieski
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
The Justice Center, 9th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:
{¶1} In 2007, defendant-appellant, William Ruffin, was indicted in a three-count
indictment. Count 1 charged him with drug possession in violation of R.C. 2925.11, a
first-degree felony, with a major drug offender specification. Count 2 charged Ruffin
with drug trafficking in violation of R.C. 2925.03, a first-degree felony, with a major drug
offender specification, and Count 3 charged him with possession of criminal tools in
violation of R.C. 2923.24, a fifth-degree felony.
{¶2} Ruffin pled not guilty to the charges and filed a motion to supress the
evidence against him and to obtain the identity of the informant who contacted the police
with information that led to his arrest. The trial court denied both motions. Ruffin then
pled no contest to the indictment. He was convicted of all charges, and the trial court
sentenced him to ten years incarceration on each of Counts 1 and 2 and one year on Count
3. The court ordered all terms to run concurrently, for an aggregate term of ten years.
{¶3} Ruffin appealed his convictions to this court, challenging only the trial
court’s denial of his motion to suppress. This court held that the the trial court properly
denied the motion to suppress and affirmed Ruffin’s convictions. State v. Ruffin, 8th
Dist. No. 91289, 2009-Ohio-861.
{¶4} Ruffin subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his plea, which the trial
court denied. This court dismissed Ruffin’s appeal of that ruling.
{¶5} On July 18, 2012, Ruffin filed a motion for resentencing, which the trial
court denied. Ruffin now appeals from that ruling.
{¶6} Ruffin argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion for
resentencing. He contends that he is a first-time offender and should have been
sentenced to the minimum sentence of three years instead of the maximum ten-year
sentence he received, and that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury
when sentencing him by engaging in improper fact-finding to determine his ten-year
sentence, contrary to the holding in State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856,
845 N.E.2d 470. Ruffin’s argument is without merit.
{¶7} Under the doctrine of res judicata,
a final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who was
represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any proceeding except
an appeal from that judgment, any defense or any claimed lack of due
process that was raised or could have been raised by the defendant at trial,
which resulted in that judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that
judgment.
State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 226 N.E.2d 104 (1967), syllabus.
{¶8} It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata bars claims that were raised
or could have been raised on direct appeal. State v. Davis, 119 Ohio St.3d 422,
2008-Ohio-4608, 894 N.E.2d 1221. Because Ruffin could have, but did not, raise any
issue regarding sentencing in his direct appeal, the issue is now barred by res judicata.
{¶9} Moreover, Ruffin’s motion must be construed as a petition for
postconviction relief and, as such, is untimely. “Where a criminal defendant, subsequent
to his or her direct appeal, files a motion seeking vacation or correction of his or her
sentence on the basis that his or her constitutional rights have been violated, such a
motion is a petition for postconviction relief as defined in R.C. 2953.21.” State v.
Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 1997-Ohio-304, 679 N.E.2d 1131, syllabus. In his motion,
Ruffin argued that the trial court had violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by
determining facts not proven to a jury nor admitted by him in order to sentence him to the
maximum ten-year sentence.
{¶10} R.C. 2953.21(A)(20) provides that petitions for postconviction relief “shall
be filed no later than one hundred eighty days after the date on which the trial transcript is
filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction.” Ruffin’s
petition was filed some five years after he was convicted and was obviously untimely.
{¶11} Furthermore, there was no error in sentencing. By pleading no contest,
Ruffin admitted to the facts of the indictment, which charged in Count 1 that he possessed
crack cocaine in an amount equal to or exceeding 100 grams. Under R.C.
2925.11(C)(4)(f), if the amount of drugs involved equals or exceeds 100 grams of
cocaine, possession of cocaine is a felony of the first degree, the offender is automatically
classified as a major drug offender, and the court shall impose as a mandatory prison term
the maximum prison term prescribed for a first-degree felony under R.C. 2929.14(A)(1).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sentencing Ruffin to ten years incarceration on
Count 1.
{¶12} The trial court properly denied Ruffin’s motion for resentencing and the
assignment of error is therefore overruled.
{¶13} Affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR