State v. Gasser , 2014 Ohio 2569 ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Gasser, 2014-Ohio-2569.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF WAYNE )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 13CA0042
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
ANTHONY GASSER WAYNE COUNTY MUNICIPAL COURT
COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. TRC-13-06-06124
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: June 16, 2014
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant Anthony Gasser appeals the judgment of the Wayne County Municipal
Court that denied his motion to suppress. This Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} After spotting Gasser with an open container of beer while sitting behind the
wheel of his car, a police officer subjected Gasser to various sobriety tests. As a result, the
officer cited Gasser for having physical control of a vehicle while under the influence. After
initially pleading not guilty, Gasser moved to suppress all evidence resulting from the alleged
illegal stop. The trial court held a hearing on the motion and denied it. Gasser subsequently
pleaded no contest to the charge and the trial court sentenced him accordingly, staying
imposition of the sentence pending appeal. Gasser filed a timely appeal in which he raises one
assignment of error for review.
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II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DENIED THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS
FILED BY DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF THE 4TH AMENDMENT OF
THE US CONSTITUTION AND ARTICLE 1 OF THE OHIO CONSTITUTION.
{¶3} Gasser argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress that
alleged that the officer conducted an illegal stop. This Court disagrees.
{¶4} A motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v.
Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. “When considering a motion to suppress,
the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve
factual questions and evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” Id., citing State v. Mills, 62 Ohio
St.3d 357, 366 (1992). Generally, a reviewing court “must accept the trial court’s findings of
fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8. The reviewing
court must then “independently determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court,
whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard.” Id.{¶5} The United States Supreme Court has held:
The Fourth Amendment [to the United States Constitution] guarantees the right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Temporary detention of individuals during
the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a
limited purpose, constitutes a seizure of persons within the meaning of this
provision. An automobile stop is thus subject to the constitutional imperative that
it not be unreasonable under the circumstances.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10
(1996).
{¶6} Moreover,
[t]he essential purpose of the proscriptions in the Fourth Amendment is to impose
a standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by government
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officials, including law enforcement agents, in order to safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions[.] Thus, the permissibility of a
particular law enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.
(Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-654 (1979).
Therefore, as the stopping and detention of automobile occupants constitutes a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes, it must be reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 653.
{¶7} The key premise is that the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable
searches and seizures, not every search and seizure irrespective of reasonableness. As a general
rule, for a search or seizure to be reasonable, it must occur as a result of the execution of a
warrant premised on probable cause. Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; State v. Dunn,
131 Ohio St.3d 325, 2012-Ohio-1008, ¶ 13-14. Numerous exceptions to the warrant requirement
developed over time, including the community-caretaking/emergency aid exception which
“allows police officers to stop a person to render aid if they reasonably believe that there is an
immediate need for their assistance to protect life or prevent serious injury.” Dunn at ¶ 22.
{¶8} This Court has recognized:
“A key community caretaking function is to help motorists who are stranded or in
distress.” State v. Chapa, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-66, 2004-Ohio-5070, ¶ 8.
Accordingly, community caretaking functions have been recognized in cases
where a vehicle is stationary in an area where it should not be parked, as it gives
rise to an inference as to the vehicle’s or the driver’s impairment. See, e.g.,
Bucyrus v. Lewis, 66 Ohio App.3d 256 (3d Dist.1990) (driver sleeping in vehicle
parked in bank’s drive-through lane), State v. Chrzanowski, 180 Ohio App.3d
324, 2008-Ohio-6993 (11th Dist.) (driver sitting in vehicle stopped on the
roadway), Chapa (driver stopped her vehicle “in the middle of the roadway with
its headlights on and leaving no room for other vehicles to pass.”).
State v. Clapper, 9th Dist. Medina No. 11CA0031-M, 2012-Ohio-1382, ¶ 13.
{¶9} In this case, Officer Michael Davis of the Smithville police department testified
that he was on patrol one evening when he saw a car parked in the turn-around area of a 400-
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yard driveway to a private residence. The turn-around area was close to the street. Based on his
experience patrolling the area, Officer Davis knew that the homeowners did not park their cars in
that area of driveway. On the other hand, the officer had observed disabled vehicles parked in
that area.
{¶10} Officer Davis entered the license plate number into LEADS and discovered that
that vehicle was not registered to any homeowner at the residence. In fact, the registered owner
of the vehicle lived in Rittman, not Smithville. Accordingly, the officer became suspicious as to
why the vehicle was parked there.
{¶11} Officer Davis parked approximately 20 feet off to the left of the vehicle, leaving
room for the driver to back up and exit the driveway. He then approached the car to check on the
welfare of the driver. As he approached, the officer saw an open can of beer in the center
console. Upon speaking to Gasser, the officer noticed the odor of alcohol and that Gasser’s eyes
were glassy and bloodshot. The officer thereafter had Gasser exit the vehicle and perform
various sobriety tests, the results of which gave rise to the charge.
{¶12} Under the circumstances, where a vehicle that did not belong to a resident of the
home was parked in a place where only disabled vehicles were ever known to be parked, the
officer reasonably investigated the situation as part of his community caretaking function. The
officer left an adequate amount of room between his patrol car and Gasser’s vehicle to allow
Gasser to exit the driveway. The officer approached for the purpose of inquiring as to the
suspected distress of the driver. Under these circumstances, the trial court correctly concluded
that the officer was properly engaged in a community caretaking function when he spotted the
open beer container in Gasser’s vehicle. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the motion
to suppress. Gasser’s assignment of error is overruled.
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III.
{¶13} Gasser’s sole assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Wayne
County Municipal Court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Wayne County
Municipal Court, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A
certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
WHITMORE, J.
CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:
WESLEY JOHNSTON, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DANIEL R. LUTZ, Prosecuting Attorney, and NATHAN R. SHAKER, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.