State v. Taylor , 2012 Ohio 1365 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •       [Cite as State v. Taylor, 
    2012-Ohio-1365
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO,                                  :   APPEAL NO. C-110282
    TRIAL NO. 00CRB-1968
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                    :
    vs.                                          :       O P I N I O N.
    TIMOTHY M. TAYLOR,                              :
    Defendant-Appellant.                   :
    Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
    Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
    Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 30, 2012
    John P. Curp, City Solicitor, Charles Rubenstein, City Prosecutor, and Christopher Liu,
    Assistant City Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Rubenstein & Thurman, L.P.A., and Scott A. Rubenstein, for Defendant-Appellant.
    Please note: This case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    S YLVIA S IEVE H ENDON , Judge.
    {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Timothy M. Taylor appeals from the judgment of the
    Hamilton County Municipal Court denying his application for expungement of a criminal
    conviction.
    The Background
    {¶2}   In January 2000, Taylor was convicted of possession of illegal drug
    paraphernalia, in violation of R.C. 2925.14.
    {¶3}   In January 2011, Taylor applied to the municipal court for the expungement
    of his criminal record, pursuant to R.C. 2953.32. The probation department prepared a
    written report regarding the application. The report indicated that Taylor was not eligible
    for expungement because he was not a first offender. According to the report, Taylor had
    been convicted in 1983 of leaving the scene of an accident.
    {¶4}   Taylor filed a memorandum in support of his expungement application, along
    with copies of the probation report and the court’s 1983 record of the conviction of
    “Timothy M. Taylor.”      He argued that the court’s records from the 1983 case were
    insufficient to conclusively determine that he was the same “Timothy M. Taylor” that had
    been convicted of the 1983 offense. As an alternative, Taylor argued that even if he had
    been convicted in 1983, that plea was invalid because it had likely been made without the
    assistance of counsel.
    {¶5}   At a hearing on the expungement application, the court asked Taylor’s
    counsel, “So you’re saying it’s not your client [that had been convicted in 1983]?” And
    counsel responded, “There’s no way to prove it positively.” Then the court asked, “He
    [Taylor] says it’s not him?” And counsel responded: “I don’t think the state can meet the
    2
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    burden to show it is.” Taylor did not testify or present any other evidence at the hearing.
    The court denied the application.
    The Appeal
    {¶6}   In a single assignment of error, Taylor argues that the trial court erred by
    denying his application for expungement. He contends that the trial court should have
    considered him eligible for expungement because the court’s records did not establish that
    he had had a prior conviction.
    {¶7}   Only a first offender may apply to a sentencing court to seal the record of his
    conviction. R.C. 2953.32(A)(1). If the applicant does not qualify as a “first offender,” the
    court has no jurisdiction to expunge the conviction record. See State v. Coleman, 
    117 Ohio App.3d 726
    , 728, 
    691 N.E.2d 369
     (1st Dist.1997).
    {¶8}   A first offender is defined as “anyone who has been convicted of an offense in
    this state or any other jurisdiction and who previously or subsequently has not been
    convicted of the same or a different offense in this state or any other jurisdiction.” R.C.
    2953.31(A).    For purposes of R.C. 2953.31 through 2953.36, convictions for minor
    misdemeanors and some traffic offenses are not considered previous or subsequent
    convictions. 
    Id.
    {¶9}   Upon the filing of an expungement application, the sentencing court must
    “direct its regular probation officer, a state probation officer, or the department of probation
    of the county in which the applicant resides to make inquiries and written reports as the
    court requires concerning the applicant.” R.C. 2953.32(B). Then the court must determine
    whether criminal proceedings are pending against the applicant, and whether the applicant
    is a first offender. R.C. 2953.32(C)(1). Even if the applicant is a first offender and has no
    pending charges, the court may deny the application if the court determines that he has not
    3
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    been adequately rehabilitated or that the government’s need to maintain the conviction
    records outweighs his interests in having the records sealed. 
    Id.
     Because expungement is
    achieved by eliminating the general public’s access to conviction information, the state has a
    significant interest in ensuring that expungement is granted only to those who meet all the
    eligibility requirements set forth in R.C. 2953.32. State v. Hamilton, 
    75 Ohio St.3d 636
    ,
    640, 
    665 N.E.2d 669
     (1996).
    Was Taylor a First Offender?
    {¶10}    Whether an applicant is a first offender is generally a question of law to be
    determined de novo by a reviewing court. State v. Patterson, 
    128 Ohio App.3d 174
    , 
    714 N.E.2d 409
     (1st Dist.1998). However, the issue of whether the applicant is a “first offender”
    is often a question of fact. 
    Id.
    {¶11} In this case, Taylor did not dispute that a conviction for leaving the scene of
    an accident in violation of R.C. 4549.02 would constitute a previous or subsequent
    conviction for expungement purposes. See R.C. 2953.31(A). So if Taylor had had a prior
    conviction for that particular traffic violation, he would not be a “first offender” for
    expungement purposes, as a matter of law.
    {¶12} Accordingly, the court had to resolve the factual question of whether Taylor
    had a prior conviction for a violation of R.C. 4549.02. At the conclusion of the hearing on
    Taylor’s application, the court determined that he did have a prior conviction for violating
    R.C. 4549.02 and, therefore, was not a first offender for expungement purposes.
    {¶13} The purpose of an expungement hearing is to provide the court “with all
    relevant information bearing on an applicant’s eligibility for expungement. Advocacy is
    subordinated to information gathering.” Hamilton, 75 Ohio St.3d at 640, 
    665 N.E.2d 669
    .
    In determining whether to grant an application for expungement, the court reviews matters
    4
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    of record, as well as information from the applicant, the prosecutor, and independent court
    investigation by its probation department. 
    Id.
    {¶14} In this case, the court’s investigation through its probation department
    revealed that Taylor had had a prior conviction for leaving the scene of an accident. At the
    hearing on his application, Taylor had had an opportunity to present testimony or other
    evidence to dispute that he was the person convicted in 1983. The court attempted to gather
    more information to aid in its determination of whether Taylor was a first offender, but
    Taylor and his counsel declined to give direct responses to the court’s questions.
    {¶15} The court’s conclusion that Taylor had had a prior conviction for leaving the
    scene of an accident in violation of R.C. 4549.02 was supported by the uncontradicted
    investigation report from its probation department. That conviction prevented Taylor from
    claiming “first offender” status under R.C. 2953.32. Because Taylor did not qualify as a
    “first offender,” the court had no jurisdiction to expunge his conviction record.           See
    Coleman, 117 Ohio App.3d at 728, 
    691 N.E.2d 369
    .
    {¶16} Taylor also argues that even if the trial court believed that he had sustained
    the 1983 conviction, that conviction was void because it had been uncounseled. But because
    this contention is not supported by the record, we find no merit in the argument.
    {¶17} Accordingly, we overrule the assignment of error and affirm the trial court’s
    judgment.
    Judgment affirmed.
    HILDEBRANDT, P.J., and FISCHER, J., concur.
    Please note:
    The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C-110282

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 1365

Judges: Hendon

Filed Date: 3/30/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/19/2016