Wagar Plaza Condominium Owners Assn., Inc. v. Iaffaldano , 2012 Ohio 801 ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as Wagar Plaza Condominium Owners Assn., Inc. v. Iaffaldano, 
    2012-Ohio-801
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 96427
    WAGAR PLAZA CONDOMINIUM OWNERS
    ASSOCIATION, INC.
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    IOANNELLA IAFFALDANO, ET AL.
    DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Civil Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-715511
    BEFORE:          Blackmon, A.J., Sweeney, J., and Cooney, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                              March 1, 2012
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS
    Michael L. Wolpert
    12200 Fairhill Road, B211
    Cleveland, Ohio 44120
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
    Cullen J. Cottle
    Kaman & Cusimano
    50 Public Square, Suite 2000
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, A.J.:
    {¶1} Appellants Ioannella B. Iaffaldano and Marla N. Diop (“Owners”) appeal the
    trial court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Wagar Plaza Condominium
    Owners Association, Inc. (“the Association”), issuing a permanent injunction against
    them, and ordering them to pay the Association’s attorney fees. Owners assign the
    following errors for our review:
    I. Inadequate recognition of material facts.
    II. Inadequate opportunity to address and resolve the issues.
    {¶2} Having reviewed the record and pertinent facts, we affirm the trial court’s
    decision. The apposite facts follow.
    {¶3} The Association is a nonprofit entity that operates 16 condominium units at
    the Wagar Plaza Condominium located at 20006 Detroit Road in Rocky River, Ohio.
    Iaffaldano is the title owner of Units 11 and 12 in the Wagar Plaza complex.
    Iaffaldano’s daughter, Marla Diop, co-owns Unit 12, but does not reside at Wagar Plaza.
    Iaffaldano, who resides alone in Unit 12, leases Unit 11 to three other individuals.
    {¶4} On January 14, 2010, the Association filed a complaint for preliminary and
    permanent injunction against Owners. The Association sought an injunction requiring
    Owners to remove all unauthorized items from the common elements and limited
    common elements of the property; specifically hanging plants, patio extension, plastic
    fence, plants and vegetables, lighting, bird bath, and lawn ornament.
    {¶5} The complaint also sought to enjoin Owners from permitting boarders or
    transient renters. In addition, the Association sought to enjoin Owners from continued
    violation of the parking restrictions and from operating a business out of the units.
    Further, the Association sought to enjoin Owners from creating a nuisance on the
    premises. Finally, the complaint sought attorney fees and the reimbursement of costs
    incurred in connection with the action.
    {¶6} Initially, on March 2, 2010, Iaffaldano answered the complaint on behalf of
    herself and Diop, and maintained that she was not in violation of the Association’s
    bylaws, or had since rectified any issues in which she had not been in compliance. On
    March 30, 2010, Diop filed a Clarification of Answer pointing out that she did not own
    Unit 11 and did not have any control over any items in Unit 12.
    {¶7} On September 20, 2010, Owners filed a motion for summary judgment,
    which the Association opposed, and subsequently filed their own motion for summary
    judgment. On December 9, 2010, the trial court granted the Association’s motion for
    summary judgment and denied Owners’ motion for summary judgment.
    {¶8} Subsequently, on January 11, 2011, the trial court convened a hearing on
    the Association’s claim for attorney fees.      Owners failed to appear for the hearing.
    After the hearing, the trial court awarded the Association $11,347 in attorney fees.
    Summary Judgment
    {¶9} We will simultaneously address Owners’ assigned errors because both
    concern whether the trial court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the
    Association.
    {¶10} We review an appeal from summary judgment under a de novo standard of
    review.   Baiko v. Mays, 
    140 Ohio App.3d 1
    , 
    746 N.E.2d 618
     (8th Dist. 2000), citing
    Smiddy v. The Wedding Party, Inc., 
    30 Ohio St.3d 35
    , 
    506 N.E.2d 212
     (1987); N.E. Ohio
    Apt. Assn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 
    121 Ohio App.3d 188
    , 
    699 N.E.2d 534
     (8th
    Dist. 1997).   Accordingly, we afford no deference to the trial court’s decision and
    independently review the record to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate.
    {¶11}    Under Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when, (1) no genuine
    issue as to any material fact exists, (2) the party moving for summary judgment is entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) when viewing the evidence most strongly in favor
    of the nonmoving party, reasonable minds can reach only one conclusion that is adverse
    to the nonmoving party.
    {¶12}    The moving party carries an initial burden of setting forth specific facts
    that demonstrate his or her entitlement to summary judgment. Dresher v. Burt, 
    75 Ohio St.3d 280
    , 292-293, 
    662 N.E.2d 264
     (1996).       If the movant fails to meet this burden,
    summary judgment is not appropriate; if the movant does meet this burden, summary
    judgment will be appropriate only if the nonmovant fails to establish the existence of a
    genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 293.
    {¶13} This first portion of the Association’s complaint sought an injunction to
    compel Iaffaldano to comply with the declaration and bylaws.        A trial court’s decision
    on whether to issue injunctive relief is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
    Danis Clarkco Landfill Co. v. Clark Cty. Solid Waste Mgt. Dist., 
    73 Ohio St.3d 590
    , 
    653 N.E.2d 646
    , paragraph three of the syllabus (1995). The term “abuse of discretion”
    connotes more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the court’s attitude is
    unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    ,
    
    450 N.E.2d 1140
     (1983).
    {¶14} The party seeking a permanent injunction must demonstrate by clear and
    convincing evidence that they are entitled to relief under applicable statutory law, that an
    injunction is necessary to prevent irreparable harm, and that no adequate remedy at law
    exists. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Stoneham, 
    140 Ohio App.3d 260
    , 268, 
    747 N.E.2d 268
    (5th Dist. 2000).
    {¶15}        Chapter 5311 of the Ohio Revised Code governs condominium
    associations. R.C. 5311.19 provides that individuals who purchase condominiums are
    bound by all covenants and conditions in the deed, as well as the condominium
    declaration and bylaws. Grand Bay of Brecksville Condominium v. Markos , 8th Dist.
    No. 73964, 
    1999 WL 166016
     (Mar. 25, 1999). Further, the statute also authorizes an
    association to seek an injunction where a unit owner fails to comply with any of the rules
    or regulations. Georgetown Arms Condominium Unit Owners’ Assn. v. Super, 
    33 Ohio App.3d 132
    , 133, 
    514 N.E.2d 899
     (8th Dist. 1986).
    {¶16}       In the instant case, the Declaration of Condominium Ownership, attached
    to both the complaint and the Association’s motion for summary judgment, contains rules
    governing the obstruction of the common elements, alteration of the common elements,
    the exterior surfaces, prohibited activities, and rental of family units.
    {¶17} As previously stated, the Association alleged that Owners had violated its
    rules governing the common elements by having hanging plants, patio extension, plastic
    fence, plants and vegetables, lighting, a bird bath, and a lawn ornament. The Association
    further alleged that Owners remained noncompliant throughout the proceedings below.
    {¶18} Our review of Iaffaldano’s deposition and that of her daughter, Diop, taken
    on October 28, 2010, supports the Association’s claims. Iaffaldano testified in pertinent
    part as follows:
    Q.      I want to talk a little bit about some of the features that are outside
    your unit; in particular, the deck and balconies. Can you tell me, as
    you sit here today, what exists on your decks and balconies as far as
    items, decorations, that type of thing? Let’s start with unit 11.
    A.      * * * I have plastic patio chairs and little glass side tables.
    Q.      How many chairs?
    A.      Two chairs.
    Q.      And how many side tables?
    A.      Two.
    ***
    Q.      What about plants?
    A.      I have plants along the length of the railing on the deck.
    Q.      These are live plants?
    A.      Yes.
    Q.      * * * Now, do these plants hang over the railing of the balcony?
    A.      That’s the way plants grow.
    Q.      What kind of plants are they?
    A.      They are sweet potato vines, midnight lace sweet potato vines, double
    impatiens, and silverdust, and velvet coleus.
    Q.      Let’s talk about unit 12 for a second. I understand there are
    additional tiles that extend out from the cement patio, and there was, at
    one point, a plastic fence for your dog that was in unit 12.
    A.      * * * Okay. There’s a — I put a border of stones — which, I guess you
    could call them tiles, they’re not really stones — around the edge of
    the patio. I guess you could call them functional or decorative.
    Q.      How many patio tiles or stones have you placed out there?
    A.      I don’t know how many. It’s just around the edge.
    Q.      And how far does it extend beyond your patio?
    A.      Like 16 inches. Iaffaldano Depo. 51-54.
    {¶19}    A review of the above exchange in conjunction with the Declaration of
    Condominium Ownership, reveals that Owners were in violation of the rules governing
    obstruction and alteration of the common elements.    Diop testified in her deposition that
    there were hanging plants and a patio extension. Diop Depo. 13-16. When asked if she
    had obtained written approval to install the patio stones or any of the other items,
    Iaffaldano refused to answer. Iaffaldano admitted that she had installed outdoor lighting,
    but had removed it in March or April 2010. As such, we conclude Owners were in
    violation of the rules governing obstruction and alteration of the common elements.
    {¶20} As it pertains to the impact of Owners’ leasing of Unit 12, the record
    indicates that the unit was occupied by three individuals that were not members of
    Owners’ family. According to the Association’s rules, each unit is allowed two vehicles
    on the premises and the indoor garage is expected to be used as the primary parking area
    for said vehicles. The Association alleged that Owners are in violation because the
    tenants in Unit 12 are utilizing three parking spaces instead of two.
    {¶21}    In her deposition, Iaffaldano testified that she was currently using the
    indoor garage space of Units 11 and 12 for her two vehicles, while two of the tenants in
    Unit 12 were using the allotted outside spaces, and the third was using the outside space
    of Unit 16, which is nonowner-occupied. Iaffaldano testified that she had permission
    from the tenant in Unit 16 to use their outdoor parking space. Iaffaldano Depo. 48.
    However, Iaffaldano admitted that she never notified the Association that she was
    utilizing the outdoor parking space of Unit 16 and testified that she did not have
    permission from the owner of the unit.
    {¶22}     Section 1(B)(1) of the Association’s rule states in pertinent part as
    follows:
    If another owner has granted permission to utilize their outside
    parking space on a continuing basis, the Board of Managers must be
    notified with a description of the vehicle so it will not be inadvertently
    towed.
    {¶23}    Here, by her own testimony, Iaffaldano was in violation of the rules
    governing parking on the premises because she did not notify the Association that the
    third tenant was utilizing the outdoor parking space allotted to Unit 16. We conclude
    there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding Owners’ violation of the rules
    governing obstruction and alteration of the common elements, as well as the rules
    governing parking on the premises.
    {¶24} Nonetheless, Owners argue the trial court failed to recognize material facts
    and did not afford her the opportunity to address or resolve the issues. However, in
    denying Owners’ motion for summary judgment, the trial court stated in pertinent part as
    follows:
    The Court finds that defendants have failed to attach any supporting
    documentation to their motion for summary judgment (Filed
    09/20/2010) and to their motions to amend defendant[s’] motions for
    summary judgment (Filed 11/18/2010) as required under Civil Rule
    56(C). Accordingly, there is no evidence before the court to consider
    whether there is no issue of material fact and if defendants are entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law. Journal Entry 12/09/2010.
    {¶25}     Summary judgment cannot be rendered on mere allegations alone.
    Snodgrass v. Mayfield Hts., 8th Dist. No. 90643, 
    2008-Ohio-5095
    , 
    2008 WL 4433897
    .
    Owners had the initial burden of setting forth specific facts to demonstrate their
    entitlement to summary judgment. Dresher, 
    75 Ohio St.3d 280
    , 
    662 N.E.2d 264
    . This
    they failed to do. However, as discussed above, the record supports the trial court’s
    determination that the Association was entitled to summary judgment.
    {¶26} Finally, a trial court’s award of attorney fees is reviewed for an abuse of
    discretion. Christescu v. Christescu, 8th Dist. No. 90304, 
    2008-Ohio-3540
    , 
    2008 WL 2764871
    . The decision to award attorney fees is discretionary and will not be reversed
    absent an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. In re T.S., 8th Dist.
    No. 96657, 
    2011-Ohio-6756
    , 
    2011 WL 6917620
    .
    {¶27}     The record indicates that on January 11, 2011, the trial convened a
    hearing on attorney fees. The hearing was scheduled for 2:30 p.m., but the trial court
    waited until 3:00 p.m. for Owners to appear. However, Owners failed to appear. The
    Association’s attorney testified and submitted a fee bill in the amount of $11,347, and an
    affidavit attesting to the reasonableness of the fees.       Thereafter,   finding the fees
    reasonable, the trial court awarded $11,347 to the Association.      We conclude the trial
    court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees. Accordingly, we overrule
    Owners’ assigned errors.
    {¶28}    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellants costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into
    execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE
    JAMES J. SWEENEY, J., and
    COLLEEN CONWAY COONEY, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 96427

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 801

Judges: Blackmon

Filed Date: 3/1/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014