Harris v. Pro-Lawn Landscaping, Inc. , 2012 Ohio 498 ( 2012 )

[Cite as Harris v. Pro-Lawn Landscaping, Inc., 2012-Ohio-498.]
Court of Appeals of Ohio
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
No. 97302
FREDERICK D. HARRIS, M.D.
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
vs.
PRO-LAWN LANDSCAPING, INC.
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
JUDGMENT:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Civil Appeal from the
Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Case No. CV-748247
BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Kilbane, J.
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 9, 2012
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Michael D. Rossi
Guarnieri & Secrest, P.L.L.
151 East Market Street
P.O. Box 4270
Warren, OH 44482
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Patrick S. Corrigan
55 Public Square
Suite 930
Cleveland, OH 44113
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:
{¶ 1} Appellant Frederick D. Harris, M.D., appeals the judgment of the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas that dismissed the case with prejudice. For the reasons
stated herein, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the matter for further
proceedings.
{¶ 2} On February 9, 2011, Harris filed a complaint against appellee, Pro-Lawn
Landscaping, Inc. (“Pro-Lawn”). Harris sought to recover damages in connection with
alleged negligent and defective landscaping services provided by Pro-Lawn.
{¶ 3} On April 7, 2011, Pro-Lawn filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R.
12(B)(6) and Civ.R. 41. Pro-Lawn claimed that the identical claim had been filed and
dismissed twice before and that the second dismissal was with prejudice. Pro-Lawn
attached exhibits to its motion reflecting the prior complaints and dismissals.
{¶ 4} In opposing the motion, Harris argued that both prior dismissals were
without prejudice. He attached journal entries reflecting the prior dispositions. The
entries show that the first action was dismissed without prejudice on February 13, 2009,
after the plaintiff failed to appear for the final pretrial. The second action was dismissed
without prejudice on August 10, 2010, for failure to prosecute.
{¶ 5} The trial court denied the first motion to dismiss. Subsequently, on August
5, 2011, Pro-Lawn filed another motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6).
Pro-Lawn argued that Harris failed to timely reassert his claim and that Ohio’s savings
statute, R.C. 2305.19, could not be used to revive the action. The trial court granted the
motion, which was unopposed by Harris, and dismissed the action with prejudice on
August 21, 2011. Harris filed an opposition brief the following day. He then filed a
timely appeal to this court.
{¶ 6} Under his sole assignment of error, Harris claims the trial court erred in
granting the motion to dismiss. He claims that the court failed to convert Pro-Lawn’s
motion into a motion for summary judgment where matters outside the complaint were
not excluded by the court. He further argues that the complaint sets forth an actionable
claim and that the standard for a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion was not met. We find merit to
his argument.
{¶ 7} Our review of a trial court’s decision to dismiss a complaint pursuant to
Civ.R. 12(B)(6) is de novo. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. v. McKinley, 130 Ohio St.3d
156, 2011-Ohio-4432, 956 N.E.2d 814, ¶ 12. In order for a court to dismiss a complaint
under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it must
appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts warranting relief, after all
factual allegations of the complaint are presumed true and all reasonable inferences are
made in the nonmoving party’s favor. State ex rel. Findlay Publishing Co. v. Schroeder,
76 Ohio St.3d 580, 581, 1996-Ohio-360, 669 N.E.2d 835. A complaint may not be
dismissed under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failing to comply with the applicable statute of
limitations unless the complaint on its face conclusively indicates that the action is
time-barred. McKinley at ¶ 13.
{¶ 8} When ruling on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, a court may not rely upon
evidence or allegations outside the complaint. State ex rel. Fuqua v. Alexander, 79 Ohio
St.3d 206, 207, 1997-Ohio-169, 680 N.E.2d 985. Civ.R. 12(B)(6) instructs in pertinent
part:
When a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted presents matters outside the pleading and such matters are not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as a motion for summary
judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56. Provided however, that
the court shall consider only such matters outside the pleadings as are
specifically enumerated in Rule 56. All parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all materials made pertinent to such a motion by Rule
56.
However, it has been recognized that courts may take judicial notice of “appropriate
matters” in determining a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion without converting it to a motion for
summary judgment. State ex rel. Scott v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St.3d 324,
2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 26, citing State ex rel. Neff v. Corrigan, 75 Ohio
St.3d 12, 16, 1996-Ohio-231, 661 N.E.2d 170.
{¶ 9} In moving for a dismissal in this matter, Pro-Lawn asserted that the action
had been filed and dismissed twice before and that the savings statute could not be
re-invoked. While documents evincing the prior cases and dismissals were submitted by
the parties, these were not appropriate matters upon which judicial notice could be taken.
As this court has previously recognized,
A trial court may take judicial notice of “appropriate matters” in
considering a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
However, a trial court cannot take judicial notice of court proceedings in
another case. Similarly, a trial court may not take judicial notice of prior
proceedings in the court even if the same parties and subject matter are
involved. A trial court may only take judicial notice of prior proceedings
in the immediate case. (Citations and quotations omitted.) NorthPoint
Properties, Inc. v. Petticord, 179 Ohio App.3d 342, 2008-Ohio-5996, 901
N.E.2d 869, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.).
In accordance with the foregoing, the trial court was precluded from taking judicial notice
of any proceedings in the prior actions.
{¶ 10} We recognize that harmless error has been found where a trial court fails to
provide notice of its intent to convert a motion to dismiss to a motion for summary
judgment where both parties rely on matters outside the complaint and no prejudice
results. See EMC Mtge. Corp. v. Jenkins, 164 Ohio App.3d 240, 2005-Ohio-5799, 841
N.E.2d 855, ¶ 12-14 (10th Dist.). However, in this case, there is no indication that the
trial court converted the motion and Harris was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to
submit evidence on the timeliness of his claims.
{¶ 11} The complaint set forth a tort claim for alleged negligent and defective
landscaping services. Harris alleged that he retained Pro-Lawn on or about March 19,
2007, “to construct a center island fountain, pave a walkway around the fountain, plant
various flowers and plants, and install and repair an irrigation system.” While Harris
alleged damage to his property, the complaint does not state when the landscaping
services were performed or when the damage became apparent.
{¶ 12} In moving to dismiss the action, Pro-Lawn argued that Ohio’s savings
statute, R.C. 2305.19(A), could not be invoked a second time. However, it is not clear
that Harris utilized the savings statute. The complaint fails to reflect when the cause of
action accrued, and no argument was presented as to the applicable statute of limitations.
Because it cannot be conclusively ascertained from the face of the complaint that the
action is time-barred and it does not appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts warranting relief, the trial court erred in granting Pro-Lawn’s motion to
dismiss. Harris’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
Judgment reversed, cause remanded.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and
MARY EILEEN KILBANE, J., CONCUR