Johnson v. State ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as Johnson v. State, 
    2011-Ohio-3470
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    Nos. 95842, 95843, 95844, 95845,
    95846, 95847, 95848, and 95849
    MICHAEL JOHNSON, ET AL.
    PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
    vs.
    STATE OF OHIO
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Civil Appeals from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CV-666875, CV-648395, CV-649493, CV-655194,
    CV-648100, CV-646671, CV-650694, and CV-652766
    BEFORE:               Boyle, J., Blackmon, P.J., and Celebrezze, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED:                         July 14, 2011
    2
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
    William D. Mason
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Daniel T. Van
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    8th Floor, Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES
    For Thomas J. Keppler, Jeffrey S. Mader,
    Clemon Crawford, Joseph A. Dohar, Guy Brewer,
    and Earnest Tisdel, Jr.
    Robert L. Tobik
    Cuyahoga County Public Defender
    BY: Cullen Sweeney
    Assistant Public Defender
    310 Lakeside Avenue
    Suite 400
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    For Alan D. Christine, Jr.
    Michael V. Heffernan
    75 Public Square, Suite 700
    Cleveland Ohio 44113
    Michael P. Shaughnessy
    Thomas E. Shaughnessy
    11510 Buckeye Road
    Cleveland, Ohio 44104
    Michael Johnson, pro se
    1373 West 80th Street, #5
    Cleveland, Ohio 44102
    3
    MARY J. BOYLE, J.:
    {¶ 1} This consolidated appeal arises from the trial court’s ruling in eight sex offender
    reclassification cases.   Defendant-appellant, the state of Ohio (“State”), appeals the trial
    court’s judgments granting relief from reclassification under Ohio’s Adam Walsh Act
    (“AWA”) for the plaintiffs-appellees, Michael Johnson, Jeffrey Mader, Alan Christine, Jr.,
    Clemon Crawford, Joseph Dohar, Thomas Keppler, Guy Brewer, and Earnest Tisdel, Jr.
    (collectively referred to as “appellees”).   We affirm.
    {¶ 2} All eight appellees were initially classified by operation of law under Ohio’s
    Megan’s Law.      But after Ohio enacted the AWA, the appellees were reclassified, subjecting
    them to new reporting and notification requirements.      Consequently, in 2008, each of the
    appellees filed a petition with the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, contesting their
    reclassification and the application of the AWA.      While appellees’ petitions were pending,
    the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision in State v. Bodyke, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 266
    ,
    
    2010-Ohio-2424
    , 
    933 N.E.2d 753
    , wherein the Court held that, “R.C. 2959.031 and 2950.032,
    the reclassification provisions in the AWA, are unconstitutional because they violate the
    separation-of-powers doctrine.”     Bodyke at ¶2.
    {¶ 3} Consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Bodyke, the trial court
    subsequently granted the appellees’ individual petitions and restored each appellee to his
    previous sex offender status under Megan’s Law.
    4
    {¶ 4} The State appeals, raising the following two assignments of error:
    {¶ 5} “I.     The trial court erred in applying State v. Bodyke, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 266
    ,
    
    2010-Ohio-2424
    , to a petitioner who was not classified under Megan’s Law by an Ohio court
    because under these circumstances there is no violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
    {¶ 6} “II.     The trial court erred in applying State v. Bodyke, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 266
    ,
    
    2010-Ohio-2424
    , to a petitioner who did not demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence
    that they were previously classified by an Ohio court.”
    {¶ 7} The gravamen of the State’s appeal is that (1) Bodyke is not applicable to the
    appellees because their original classifications arose by operation of law — not a
    court-ordered classification; and (2) absent evidence that they were originally classified by an
    Ohio court, they were not entitled to relief.
    {¶ 8} Recently, however, this court has addressed and overruled these same
    arguments and issues that the State raises in the instant appeal, recognizing that Bodyke
    applies when an offender’s classification under Megan’s Law arose by operation of law.     See,
    e.g., Speight v. State, 8th Dist. Nos. 96041-96405, 
    2011-Ohio-2933
    ; Hannah v. State, 8th Dist.
    Nos. 95883-95889, 
    2011-Ohio-2930
    ; Rollins v. State, 8th Dist. Nos. 96192-96194,
    
    2011-Ohio-3264
    .      Indeed, “regardless of the manner in which appellees were originally
    classified, R.C. 2950.031 and 2950.032 have been severed and may no longer be enforced.”
    Rollins at ¶23.     Consistent with this authority, we find that the trial court did not err by
    5
    granting appellees’ petitions and reinstating their prior sex offender classifications that arose
    by operation of law under Megan’s Law.         The State’s assignments of error are overruled.
    Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellees recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas
    court to carry this judgment into execution.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the
    Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    MARY J. BOYLE, JUDGE
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, P.J., and
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 95842, 95843, 95844, 95845, 95846, 95847, 95848, 95849

Judges: Boyle

Filed Date: 7/14/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014