State v. McGowan , 2015 Ohio 3429 ( 2015 )


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  • [Cite as State v. McGowan, 2015-Ohio-3429.]
    STATE OF OHIO, JEFFERSON COUNTY
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    SEVENTH DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO,                                )   CASE NO. 14 JE 37
    )
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                   )
    )
    VS.                                           )   OPINION
    )
    FREDERICK McGOWAN,                            )
    )
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.                  )
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                         Criminal Appeal from the Court of
    Common Pleas of Jefferson County,
    Ohio
    Case No. 13CR247
    JUDGMENT:                                         Affirmed.
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee:                           Atty. Jane M. Hanlin
    Prosecuting Attorney
    Jefferson County Justice Center
    16001 State Route 7
    Steubenville, Ohio 43952
    For Defendant-Appellant:                          Atty. Eric M. Reszke
    Suite 810, Sinclair Bldg.
    100 North 4th St.
    Steubenville, Ohio 43952
    JUDGES:
    Hon. Carol Ann Robb
    Hon. Gene Donofrio
    Hon. Mary DeGenaro
    Dated: August 20, 2015
    [Cite as State v. McGowan, 2015-Ohio-3429.]
    ROBB, J.
    {¶1}    Defendant-Appellant Frederick L. McGowan appeals his conviction and
    sentence entered in Jefferson County Common Pleas Court. Two issues are raised
    in this appeal. The first issue is whether the conviction for possession of drugs was
    against the manifest weight of the evidence. The second issue is whether the trial
    court erred in ordering an aggregate ten year sentence. For the reasons expressed
    below, the conviction and sentence are hereby affirmed.
    Statement of the Facts
    {¶2}    On July 12, 2013, the Jefferson County Drug Task Force executed a
    search warrant on a suspected drug house at 809 Market Street, Toronto, Ohio. Tr.
    105. The house became known to the Drug Task Force through Toronto Police
    Department’s surveillance and a confidential informant. Tr. 102, 105. Two of the
    apartments in the house were rented by Nathaniel Richmond, an alleged member of
    the Chicago Boys, a local gang whose members are known for drug trafficking and
    violent crimes. Tr. 103-104.
    {¶3}    The officers entered the house through Apartment Number 1. There
    they found Appellant and a prostitute naked in the single bedroom apartment. Tr.
    107. Appellant informed the officers which pants were his, brown pants size 44. Tr.
    108, 165. Upon searching those pants, the officers found one rock of crack cocaine,
    one small bag of marijuana, and $520 in cash. Tr. 109, 218. Appellant admitted that
    the drugs and money found in the brown pants were his.
    {¶4}    In plain view on the kitchen table, a small amount of crack cocaine and
    crack pipe were found. The prostitute admitted these items were hers. Tr. 110.
    Appellant was paying the prostitute for her services with crack cocaine. She received
    the first amount prior to performing sexual services; the rock found in Appellant’s
    pants was her final payment after services were performed. Tr. 112.
    {¶5}    Both Appellant and the prostitute were taken into custody.
    {¶6}    The officers continued the search of the residence. Tr. 112. In the
    living room closet, the officers found a black duffle bag. Tr. 117, 121. Inside the
    black duffle bag was a letter addressed to Appellant. Tr. 121-122. A pair of jeans
    -2-
    was also found in the closet. In the pocket of those jeans 8 bags of heroin and 27
    bags of individually wrapped rocks of crack cocaine were found. Tr. 123, 125, 220.
    Each bag of heroin weighed about 10 grams, for a total weight of 74.8 grams. Tr.
    125, 194. The jeans were labeled size 36. Tr. 165. They were sent to BCI to be
    tested for Appellant’s DNA and it was later confirmed that a mixture of DNA was
    found on the jeans. Tr. 123, 211. The mixture of DNA included contributions from
    Appellant and at least one unknown individual. Tr. 211. Also found in the closet was
    a toothbrush that tested positive for Appellant’s DNA. Tr. 128, 208.
    {¶7}     A black Samsung AT&T cell phone belonging to Appellant was found
    during the search. Tr. 135. Text messages on this phone that concerned the Drug
    Task Force Agents were from “Tilla.” Tr. 136. The officer testified that the name
    “Tilla” is associated with a person named “Tracy McGowan,” Appellant’s cousin. Tr.
    136-137. The officer testified that Tracy McGowan is a known member of the
    Chicago Boys, who was convicted of drug trafficking several times. Tr. 137. Tilla text
    messaged Appellant at 4:08 on July 12 stating, “U need to movie dat.” Tr. 137. In
    response Appellant text messaged, “Ok.”         Tr. 137.   At 4:11 Tilla again texted
    Appellant and asked, “Where u at?” Tr. 138. Fifteen minutes before the execution of
    the search warrant, Tilla texted Appellant, “Yo, u better move dat shit cuz.” Tr. 138.
    Statement of the Case
    {¶8}     Based upon the above, Appellant was indicted for possession of heroin
    a violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(6)(e), a first-degree felony, and possession of
    cocaine a violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(4)(b), a fourth-degree felony. 12/18/13
    Indictment.
    {¶9}     Appellant pled not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. Following
    testimony and presentation of evidence, the jury found Appellant guilty of both
    charges. 11/18/14 Verdict Judgments. Sentencing occurred immediately. The trial
    court sentenced Appellant to ten years for possession of heroin and one year for
    possession of cocaine.       The trial court ordered the sentences to be served
    concurrently.
    {¶10} Appellant timely appealed his conviction and sentence.
    -3-
    First Assignment of Error
    “The jury verdict of guilty to the offenses of possession of drugs was against
    the manifest weight of the evidence.”
    {¶11} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and
    all reasonable inferences, and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the
    evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of
    justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.            State v.
    Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St. 3d 380
    , 387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    (1997). “Weight of the evidence
    concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial,
    to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’“ 
    Id. In making
    its
    determination, a reviewing court is not required to view the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the prosecution, but may consider and weigh all of the evidence
    produced at trial. 
    Id. at 390.
           {¶12} Although an appellate court can consider and weigh all of the evidence,
    only where the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction shall a new trial be
    ordered. State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App. 3d 172
    , 175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
    (1st Dist.1983).
    The extraordinary relief of a new trial is limited because determinations of witness
    credibility, conflicting testimony, and evidence weight are primarily for the trier of the
    facts who sits in the best position to judge the weight of the evidence and the
    witnesses' credibility by observing their gestures, voice inflections, and demeanor.
    State v. Rouse, 7th Dist. No. 04–BE–53, 2005–Ohio–6328, ¶ 49, citing State v. Hill,
    
    75 Ohio St. 3d 195
    , 205, 
    661 N.E.2d 1068
    (1996). See also Seasons Coal Co., Inc. v.
    Cleveland, 
    10 Ohio St. 3d 77
    , 80, 
    461 N.E.2d 1273
    (1984).
    {¶13} Appellant was convicted of R.C. 2925.11 (A)(C)(4)(b) and (6)(e), which
    provides:
    (A) No person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a
    controlled substance or a controlled substance analog.
    ***
    -4-
    (C) Whoever violates division (A) of this section is guilty of
    one of the following:
    ***
    (4) If the drug involved in the violation is cocaine or a compound,
    mixture, preparation, or substance containing cocaine, whoever violates
    division (A) of this section is guilty of possession of cocaine. The
    penalty for the offense shall be determined as follows:
    ***
    (b) If the amount of the drug involved equals or exceeds five
    grams but is less than ten grams of cocaine, possession of cocaine is a
    felony of the fourth degree, and division (B) of section 2929.13 of the
    Revised Code applies in determining whether to impose a prison term
    on the offender.
    ***
    (6) If the drug involved in the violation is heroin or a compound,
    mixture, preparation, or substance containing heroin, whoever violates
    division (A) of this section is guilty of possession of heroin. The penalty
    for the offense shall be determined as follows:
    ***
    (e) If the amount of the drug involved equals or exceeds five
    hundred unit doses but is less than two thousand five hundred unit
    doses or equals or exceeds fifty grams but is less than two hundred fifty
    grams, possession of heroin is a felony of the first degree, and the court
    shall impose as a mandatory prison term one of the prison terms
    prescribed for a felony of the first degree.
    R.C. 2925.11.
    {¶14} Appellant argues that the evidence fails to support the guilty verdict for
    possessing the drugs found in the blue jeans. He claims there was no evidence that
    he wore the jeans. He further asserts that there were other people with access to the
    jeans and to the apartment complex.
    -5-
    {¶15} Contrary to Appellant’s assertion, there was testimony that could lead
    the jury to conclude Appellant was in possession of the crack cocaine and heroin
    found in the jeans. A review of the testimony supports this conclusion.
    {¶16} Appellant admitted that the brown pants, and the one rock of crack
    cocaine and a bag of marijuana found in those pants, were his. However, he denied
    the crack cocaine and heroin found in the jeans were his.
    {¶17} Testimony established that the crack cocaine in the brown pants was
    very similar to the crack cocaine found in the jeans. Officer Hanlin from the Drug
    Task Force explained that crack cocaine does not always look the same. He stated it
    will differ in size, in color, and in the packaging.    Tr. 142.   However, the crack
    Appellant was claiming to own and the crack found in the jeans were same in color
    and size. Exhibit 7 Photographs of Crack Cocaine; Tr. 143. Also, the packaging was
    the same. Tr. 142; Exhibit 17 Photographs of Crack Cocaine.               Officer Hanlin
    explained that crack cocaine is typically stuffed in the corner of a sandwich bag with a
    knot tied tightly at the top. Tr. 142-143. The sandwich bags, in this case, were cut
    with scissors after the knot, which Officer Hanlin explained is not normal; instead, he
    testified that the sandwich bag is normally torn. Tr. 143.
    {¶18} The similarities of the two crack exhibits did not stop at appearance and
    packaging. It extended to chemical content. The purity level of the crack found in the
    jeans as compared to the crack found in the brown pants was nearly identical. The
    purity level of the cocaine found in the jeans was 64.9 percent with 2.9 percent error.
    Tr. 148, 192; State’s Exhibit 26. The purity level of the crack found in the brown
    pants, which Appellant admitted was his, was 64.6 percent with 2.9 percent error. Tr.
    147, 191; State’s Exhibit 25. A special agent with the Drug Enforcement
    Administration testified this level of purity was unusually high. Tr. 192-193. Given
    the color, size, and purity level, the special agent opined that the crack found in the
    jeans and the crack found in the brown pants were “in all likelihood * * * the same --
    same cocaine.” Tr. 193.
    {¶19} We now turn our review to linking the crack in the jeans to possession
    of crack by Appellant. There was evidence that connected Appellant to the jeans.
    -6-
    {¶20} The jeans were found in a closet with other items owned by Appellant.
    For instance, a duffle bag with a letter addressed to Appellant and his toothbrush
    were found in the closet. Samuel Troyer, a DNA analyst from the Ohio Bureau of
    Criminal Investigation (“BCI”), tested the toothbrush for Appellant’s DNA. The test
    indicated that the DNA on the toothbrush was consistent with Appellant’s DNA; this
    DNA could be found in 1 in every 295 sextillion, 200 quintillion random individuals.
    Tr. 208-209; State’s Exhibit 28.
    {¶21} Appellant’s DNA was also found on the jeans containing the drugs.
    Troyer testified that the jeans were tested at the waistband for DNA. Tr. 210. The
    sample taken from the jeans presented a profile mixture. Tr. 211. The mixture was
    consistent with contributions from Appellant and at least one unknown individual. Tr.
    211. The analyst testified that he would expect 1 in every 618,800 individuals to be
    included in the mixture. Tr. 211; State’s Exhibit 28. Troyer admitted, on cross-
    examination, that Appellant’s DNA could have gotten on the jeans by picking them up
    and folding them, and not by wearing them. Tr. 214.
    {¶22} Appellant’s counsel focused on the size difference between the brown
    pants and the jeans insinuating, given the difference, the jeans could not belong to
    Appellant. The jeans were a size 36; the brown pants were a size 44. Officer Hanlin
    testified that when the jeans and the brown pants were held up and compared there
    was little size difference; he opined that the brown pants did not appear to be six
    inches bigger than the jeans. Tr. 165. Furthermore, both the jeans and the brown
    pants were admitted into evidence; the jury was able to compare the size. Even
    more compelling, the jury actually got to see Appellant in the jeans to determine if
    they fit. Tr. 227-228. Appellant put on the jeans and lifted his shirt up so the jury
    could see. Tr. 228. He also bent over and squatted so the jury could see if the jeans
    fit. Tr. 228-229.
    {¶23} Cellular phone text messages also linked the crack and heroin that
    were found in the jeans to Appellant. Those text messages were from Appellant’s
    cousin, Tracy McGowan, who goes by the name “Tilla.” Tilla is a known member of
    the Chicago Boys gang, and has been investigated and convicted of drug trafficking
    -7-
    several times. Tr. 136-137. Tilla sent Appellant two text messages on July 12 stating,
    “U need to movie dat,” and “Yo, u better move dat shit cuz.” Tr. 137-138; State’s
    Exhibit 16. The last text message occurred about fifteen minutes before the execution
    of the search warrant. Tr. 138. The jury could reasonably conclude the texts were
    advising Appellant to get the crack and heroin out of the apartment because a search
    for it might occur.
    {¶24} On cross-examination, Officer Hanlin admitted it was possible that the
    text messages where telling Appellant to get rid of the drugs he admitted to having in
    his brown pants, not the crack and heroin found in the jeans. Tr. 173. While this may
    be a possible conclusion, it was not the conclusion reached by the jury.
    {¶25} The jury was in the best position to determine whether or not Appellant
    possessed the crack and heroin found in the jeans. Considering all the evidence,
    and the fact that the jury got to see Appellant in the jeans, we conclude the trier of
    fact did not clearly lose its way and create such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
    the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered. State v. McKnight, 
    107 Ohio St. 3d 101
    , 2005–Ohio–6046, 
    837 N.E.2d 315
    , ¶ 71.
    {¶26} This court is not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments. This assignment
    of error is meritless.
    Second Assignment of Error
    “The trial court committed reversible error in sentencing the defendant to ten
    (10) years in prison.”
    {¶27} Appellant argues that the trial court failed to consider factors which
    weighed against this crime being more serious than conduct normally constituting the
    offense, and factors which supported the conclusion that recidivism was not likely.
    Specifically, he asserts the trial court did not favorably weigh the facts that: he had no
    prior delinquency adjudications; the possession of heroin was 74.8 grams and was
    not near the threshold of 250 grams that apply under the Major Drug Offender
    statute; he was on worker’s compensation at the time of the offense; his part in the
    drug trafficking enterprise was limited due to his short residency period in Jefferson
    -8-
    County; and, no firearm or weapon was found on his person or in the apartment
    when the search warrant was executed.
    {¶28} This court is currently split as to the standard to apply in felony
    sentencing cases. State v. Stillabower, 7th Dist. No. 14 BE 24, 2015-Ohio-2001, ¶ 8-
    11, citing State v. Hill, 7th Dist. No. 13 MA 1, 2014–Ohio–919 (Vukovich, J., Donofrio,
    J., majority with DeGenaro, J., concurring in judgment only with concurring in
    judgment only opinion) and State v. Wellington, 7th Dist. No. 14 MA 115, 2015–Ohio–
    1359 (Robb, J., DeGenaro, J., majority with Donofrio, J. concurring in judgment only
    with concurring in judgment only opinion).
    {¶29} One approach, as applied in Hill, is to apply the test set out in the
    plurality opinion in State v. Kalish, 
    120 Ohio St. 3d 23
    , 2008–Ohio–4912, 
    896 N.E.2d 124
    , ¶ 26. Kalish provides a two part test.         First, it is determined whether the
    sentence is clearly and convincingly contrary to law. 
    Id. at ¶
    13–14. Second, the
    court’s discretion in selecting the sentence within the permissible statutory range is
    reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
    Id. at ¶
    17.
    {¶30} The other approach, as applied in Wellington, is to strictly follow R.C.
    2953.08(G), which provides appellate courts are only to review felony sentences to
    determine if they are contrary to law.       R.C. 2953.08(G) specifically indicates the
    appellate court's standard for review for felony sentencing is not whether the
    sentencing court abused its discretion.
    {¶31} As we mentioned in Stillabower, a certified question concerning what
    felony sentencing standard of review applies is pending before the Ohio Supreme
    Court. Stillabower, 2015-Ohio-2001 at ¶ 11, citing State v. Marcum, 
    141 Ohio St. 3d 1453
    , 2015–Ohio–239, 
    23 N.E.3d 1453
    .
    {¶32} Regardless of which test we apply, the sentence is upheld.
    {¶33} The ten year sentence for possession of heroin, a first-degree felony, is
    within the applicable range set forth in R.C. 2929.14(A)(1). Likewise, the one year
    sentence for possession of crack cocaine, a fourth-degree felony, is within the
    applicable range set forth in R.C. 2929.14(A)(4).
    -9-
    {¶34} In the judgment entry, the trial court indicated that it considered R.C.
    2929.11, the purposes and principles of sentencing, and balanced the seriousness
    and recidivism factors under R.C. 2929.12. 11/26/14 J.E. At the sentencing hearing,
    the trial court did not specifically mention R.C. 2929.11 or 2929.12.        However,
    although the trial court is required to consider both R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 when
    considering the appropriate sentence, the court is not required to mention the
    statutes at the sentencing hearing. State v. Mathis, 
    109 Ohio St. 3d 54
    , 2006–Ohio–
    855, 
    846 N.E.2d 1
    , ¶ 38 (required to consider the R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12); State
    v. White, 7th Dist. No. 13 JE 33, 2014-Ohio-4153, ¶ 9.
    {¶35} The record before us indicates the trial court considered both statutes.
    Appellant’s arguments pertain to the balancing of the seriousness and recidivism
    factors enumerated in R.C. 2929.12. The trial court considered these factors.
    {¶36} The trial court noted Appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine
    with the intent to distribute in 1996, along with other charges, and was sentenced to
    14 years. Tr. 268, 273. Appellant was released, violated his parole, and returned to
    prison for two years in 2010. Tr. 269, 274. When the offense before us occurred, he
    was on parole.     Tr. 278.    This information relates to recidivism and indicates
    Appellant is more likely to commit future crimes. R.C. 2929.12(D)(1)-(3). Although
    Appellant was not adjudicated a delinquent nor committed an offense as a juvenile,
    his adult offenses are pertinent and recent.
    {¶37} In weighing the seriousness of the crime, the trial court considered the
    facts of the crime. R.C. 2929.12(B), (C). Appellant was convicted of bringing two
    separate types of drugs into the county; the drugs were going to be sold from a drug
    house. Tr. 269-270, 278-279.       Although the testimony indicated that Appellant
    resided in Jefferson County a short period of time, that short period of residency does
    not mitigate the fact that drugs were brought into the county to be sold. The amount
    of heroin was 70 grams, which is in between the 50 to 250 grams that constitute a
    first-degree felony. Tr. 269; R.C. 2925.11(C)(6)(e). While this amount is closer to 50
    grams rather than 250 grams, sentences are not required to be based upon a
    -10-
    mathematical ratio.     Instead, trial courts weigh the factors and determine the
    appropriate sentence.
    {¶38} The trial court knew Appellant was on worker’s compensation when the
    offense was committed. Tr. 272. The trial court also knew Appellant did not have a
    firearm on his person at the time of arrest. Tr. 283. Those facts did not persuade the
    court that a lesser sentence should be imposed. In fact, the trial court indicated if
    Appellant had a weapon at the time of arrest, then it would have sentenced him to a
    longer term. Tr. 283.
    {¶39} Reviewing all the information considered by the trial court, we hold the
    trial court did not commit error in its sentence of this Appellant. This assignment of
    error is overruled.
    Conclusion
    {¶40} Both assignments of error are without merit.        The conviction and
    sentence are hereby affirmed.
    Donofrio, P.J., concurs.
    DeGenaro, J. concurs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14 JE 37

Citation Numbers: 2015 Ohio 3429

Judges: Robb

Filed Date: 8/20/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021