Durell v. Spring Valley Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals , 2012 Ohio 5098 ( 2012 )

[Cite as Durell v. Spring Valley Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2012-Ohio-5098.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR GREENE COUNTY, OHIO
BILL DURELL, et al. :
Plaintiff-Appellee : C.A. CASE NO. 2012 CA 23
v. : T.C. NO. 09CV402
SPRING VALLEY TOWNSHIP : (Civil appeal from
BOARD OF ZONING APPEALS, et al. Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
..........
OPINION
Rendered on the 2nd day of November , 2012.
..........
B. RANDALL ROACH, Atty. Reg. No. 0065537, 26 N. Wright Avenue, Fairborn, Ohio
45324
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
ELIZABETH A. ELLIS, Atty. Reg. No. 0074332, Greene County Prosecutor’s Office, 61
Greene Street, Xenia, Ohio 45385
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
..........
FROELICH, J.
{¶ 1} The Spring Valley Township Board of Zoning Appeals (“the BZA”)
appeals from a judgment of the Greene County Court of Common Pleas, which found that
2
the BZA had acted in a manner inconsistent with prior court judgments and had
“discriminated against [Bill] Durell” when it granted a variance for property owned by
Patrick Mahaffey after denying a similar request by Durell for a variance related to his own
adjoining property. The trial court’s judgment remanded the matter to the BZA to be
“sort[ed] out.”
{¶ 2} For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed
as modified.
Background and Procedural History
{¶ 3} The property at issue in this zoning dispute was originally one large parcel
of wooded land, owned by Mahaffey, abutting Spring Valley-Paintersville Road east of
Cemetery Road, in an A-10-Prime Agricultural District. The property encompassed
approximately 100 acres and had a long, somewhat rectangular shape, with the northernmost
narrow end abutting the road. Before the events at issue in this case, Mahaffey divided and
sold two parcels of land along the roadway; he retained ownership of approximately 88
acres, which was then landlocked. He also retained or subsequently obtained a 25-foot wide
access easement along the western edge of the property he had previously owned, from the
landlocked property to Spring Valley-Paintersville Road.
{¶ 4} In 1995, Mahaffey requested a variance from the BZA regarding his 88
landlocked acres. He sought to create five parcels of at least ten acres each for residential
development, which would have access to Spring Valley-Paintersville Road via a private
drive on the 25-foot access easement, but which would lack the 350-foot road frontage
normally required in an agricultural district. The BZA denied this request.
[Cite as Durell v. Spring Valley Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2012-Ohio-5098.]
{¶ 5} Mahaffey appealed from the BZA’s denial of the variance, but the parties
subsequently reached an agreement, which was approved by the trial court (Greene Case
No. 95 CV 0461) (“the 1997 agreed judgment”). The agreed judgment provided, in
pertinent part:
There shall be a maximum of three (3) houses built on three (3)
surveyed ten (10) acre tracts along the private lane leading from Spring
Valley-Paintersville Road southwardly to the said three (3) ten (10) acre tracts
along the westerly boundary line of [Mahaffey’s] property.
{¶ 6} The first lot that Mahaffey sold after the 1997 agreement was an 18-acre lot
farthest from the road, which was purchased by a predecessor in interest to Durell; a house
was not immediately built upon the property. Two additional lots of approximately 10 acres
each were sold to Mitchell and Bott (or their predecessors in interest), and houses were built
on those properties. A third 10-acre lot (albeit the fourth lot) was also created; Mahaffey
apparently built a house on this lot, and later sold the developed property to the Millers or
their predecessors in interest. Mahaffey retained ownership of approximately 22 acres. It
is unclear why the first lot created after the 1997 agreement was 18 acres, rather than 10
acres, and why Mahaffey sold three additional lots when, pursuant to the 1997 agreed
judgment, development was restricted to a total of three 10-acre lots.
{¶ 7} The purchases of the first two 10-acre lots (Mitchell’s and Bott’s) were the
subject of litigation when Mahaffey allegedly breached the purchase contracts. Greene Case
No. 2000 CV 307. The judgment entry in that case required Mahaffey to convey “good,
marketable fee simple title” to the lots in question and to construct an access driveway “at
his sole expense” over the 25-foot access easement. The judgment assumed, without
4
deciding, that Mahaffey, who still owned the third ten-acre lot at that time, would be the
owner of the third house using the access driveway.
{¶ 8} Pursuant to the 1997 agreed judgment and the 2000 judgment, Mahaffey
constructed a private drive on the access easement. The houses on the three 10-acre lots use
this driveway as their primary means of access; Mahaffey also accesses his remaining 22
acres using this drive, although there is no residence on that property. Mahaffey testified
that there is a shed on his property, in which he stores tools. The drive does not extend to
Durell’s property, which is the farthest from Spring Valley-Paintersville Road. Thus,
Durell’s property remains landlocked.
{¶ 9} In approximately 2001, Mahaffey became a member of the BZA.
{¶ 10} In 2003 and 2004, Durell took a number of steps aimed at building a house
on his property. First, he sought a construction permit from the BZA, which sought to use
the easement and the private drive to access his property. However, because Mahaffey (as
the predecessor in interest to Miller) was then also seeking to construct a residence on one of
the 10-acre lots, the BZA denied Durell’s request for a construction permit. According to
Durell, representatives of the BZA instructed him to request a variance instead. The BZA
granted Durell’s request for a variance insofar as the lot lacked the required frontage, but it
denied Durell’s request to access his land via the private drive. Instead, the BZA instructed
him to access his property by constructing a separate private drive to Cemetery Road, which,
according to Durell, was approximately 18 acres away from his property, over rugged
terrain. Durell did not build such a road or a house on the property.
{¶ 11} In 2006, Durell filed a Complaint against Mahaffey for declaratory
5
judgment, unlawful interference with an easement, and slander of title. (Greene Case No.
06 CV 184). In June 2007, the trial court granted a declaratory judgment in Durell’s favor,
concluding:
* * * The April 30, 1997 order, which the Court has viewed at length
with the parties, materially provides that [Mahaffey] would be permitted three
tracts, location unspecified, and three residences, also unspecified, to be
served by a private lane to be constructed by [Mahaffey] and utilized for
access by the contemplated residences to Spring Valley Paintersville Road.
* * * [T]he April 30, 1997 decision in Case No. 95-CV-0461 does not
reasonably specify the precise location of the permitted parcels. The intent
of the parties, including but not limited to [Mahaffey’s] provision for
northerly access to [Durell’s] * * * parcel by virtue of a deeded access
easement over the private lane upon [Mahaffey’s] property, the area of
[Durell’s] parcel itself being encompassed as a proposed building tract before
the Spring Valley Township Board of Trustees, the conveyance of the lot first
in time before all other lots conveyed from [Mahaffey’s] tract, and
[Mahaffey’s] desire to construct upon portions of the property. [sic] By
virtue of the foregoing, the Court hereby finds and orders that [Durell’s]
parcel, comprised of one of the proposed ten acre tracts together with residual
acreage to the south is the first of three lots for which a variance has been
granted by virtue of the order dated April 30, 1997 set forth in Case No.
95-CV-0461. * * *
6
It is the Order of the Court to all parties and the Spring Valley
Township Board of Trustees that [Durell] is herewith granted authority to
construct a single family residence upon the subject property * * * , there
shall be no requirement for ingress and egress to or from the * * * tract
owned by [Durell] excepting for the access easement set forth in [Durell’s]
deed of record to Spring Valley Paintersville Road. To the extent that this
order is in conflict with any existing orders set forth in Case No. 95-CV-0461
or 2000-CV-307 this order shall take precedence.
{¶ 12} In 2008, Mahaffey requested a variance from the BZA to allow him to build
on the 22 acres that he still owned from the original parcel. The variance request related to
the required frontage and the minimal lot dimensional requirements and, if granted, would
have made Mahaffey’s tract “a legal building lot in this A-10/Prime Agricultural District.”
Mahaffey proposed to access his property using the private drive on the access easement.
Durell and Mitchell objected to Mahaffey’s request for a variance on the grounds that the use
of the property had already been determined in the 1997 agreed judgment and that Durell’s
similar request for a variance had been denied. The BZA held a hearing at which arguments
and comments were presented from interested parties; briefs were also filed.
{¶ 13} In March 2009, the BZA granted Mahaffey’s request for a variance.
Mahaffey abstained from the vote. The BZA concluded that the 1997 agreed judgment was
a “voluntary compromise agreement,” which did not constitute litigation on the merits, and
that, although the trial court approved the agreement, the court had not “decided” the issue
on the merits. Thus, the BZA concluded that the doctrine of res judicata did not prevent
7
further action on the property, as some of the neighbors had argued. In granting the
variance, the BZA also concluded that “a significant change in circumstances” had occurred
with respect to the property, and the variance would allow Mahaffey “much greater
beneficial use” of the property than if he were not allowed to build a house on it. The
nature of the changes in circumstances identified by the BZA will be discussed in greater
detail below.
{¶ 14} Durell and Mitchell filed an Administrative Appeal and Complaint for
Declaratory Judgment in the trial court. The Complaint pointed out the inconsistency
between the BZA’s treatment of Durell’s request for a variance and Mahaffey’s request,
addressed the conflict of interest presented by Mahaffey’s role on the BZA (although he
abstained from the decision on this variance), and claimed that they (the adjacent property
owners) were denied the opportunity to present evidence at the hearing. Durell and
Mitchell requested that the trial court reverse the decision of the BZA, conduct a trial de
novo, find that the new variance was prohibited by the 1997 agreed judgment related to the
property, and enjoin the issuance of any certificate of zoning based on the variance. Upon
the BZA’s motion, the request for declaratory judgment was dismissed, and the matter
proceeded only as an administrative appeal.
{¶ 15} The trial court denied Durell and Mitchell’s request to present additional
evidence in the trial court about the alleged conflict of interest within the BZA and their
prior dealings with the BZA. This decision was based, in part, on the magistrate’s
conclusion that Durell and Mitchell had not been “prevented from” presenting such
evidence in the administrative proceedings, but had chosen not to do so; the trial court
8
overruled Durell’s objection to this finding and adopted the magistrate’s decision. The trial
court did hear arguments from the parties, but it based its decision on the record created in
the administrative proceedings.
The Trial Court’s Decision
{¶ 16} On January 25, 2012, the trial court issued its Judgment Entry on
Administrative Appeal (Greene Case No. 09 CV 0402). In its judgment, the trial court
listed the changes in circumstances cited by the BZA in support of its decision, which
included 1) the creation of the three ten-acre lots, 2) the construction of the private drive
“suitable for its purpose,” as evidenced by its approval by the Spring Valley Fire
Department, 3) the “approved creation” of a fourth parcel and “its subsequent improvement
with a single family residence,”1 and 4) the BZA’s observation that Mahaffey “has regularly
used the lane to access his property since 1987.” The Court also noted the BZA’s
conclusion that “special conditions” existed preventing Mahaffey from constructing a
single-family residence without a variance, and that these special conditions “[did] not result
from the previous actions of” Mahaffey.
{¶ 17} The trial court disagreed with the BZA’s conclusion, stating that the
changes that the BZA referred to in its decision had all occurred after the BZA’s denial of
Mahaffey’s variance request in 1995 and after the appeal of that denial to the trial court,
which was resolved by the 1997 agreed judgment. The trial court concluded that the
1
It is unclear by whom the creation of a fourth parcel was “approved”; the BZA may refer to the court’s decision in Case
No. 06 CV 0184, which required that Durell be given access to the private drive as the “first” of the three lots allowed by the 1997
agreed judgment. Also, we note that the trial court’s judgment in this case contradicts the BZA’s statement that a house has been
built on Durell’s lot.
9
22-acre parcel at issue in the current variance request was included within the parcel that was
the subject of Mahaffey’s 1995 variance request and 1997 agreed judgment, and that the
BZA had therefore been incorrect in concluding that “the disposition of the remainder
[Mahaffey’s remaining 22 acres] was never addressed by the Court.” The trial court
concluded that the 22-acre parcel was “governed by the requirements” set forth in the 1997
agreed judgment “unless those requirements were changed by subsequent Court Order.”
Based on the requirements of the 1997 agreed judgment, the trial court concluded:
· The three 10-acre tracts, with residences thereon, “exhausted the maximum
residential development permitted” by the 1997 agreed judgment; “a
maximum of three houses were permitted to be built on the three surveyed 10
acre tracts along the private lane. And there has been no Court Order that
modified or changed the Court-ordered maximum of three houses.”
· The Court’s judgment in Case No. 06 CV 0184, which resulted from Durell’s
prior litigation, “ORDERED that the Bill Durell tract * * * was the first of the
lots created pursuant to the Agreed Judgment Entry in Case No. 95 CV 0461,
and was entitled to access to Spring Valley Paintersville Road” via
the access easement.
· The BZA’s grant of a variance for Mahaffey to build a residence on the 22
acres still owned by him violated the 3-house maximum stated in the 1997
Agreed Judgment.
· The construction of the three residences on lots along the private lane
“prompted the BZA not to approve Durell’s use of the private lane, an
10
entitlement recognized by the Court” in Durell’s prior litigation (Case No. 06
CV 0184).
· Because, in Case No. 06 CV 0184, the Court held that Durell’s lot “was the
first of three lots for which a variance was granted” in the earlier case (Case
No. 05 CV 0461), Durell could not be required to access his property by any
means other than the access easement contained in Durell’s deed of record.
· The Court and the BZA “are bound by the Court’s previous holding in Case
No. 06 CV 0184 that granted Bill Durell authority to construct a single family
residence [with] access to Spring Valley Paintersville Road” via the easement
constructed by Mahaffey.
{¶ 18} Moreover, the trial court disagreed with the BZA’s conclusion that “a
sufficient change of circumstances existed to warrant granting [Mahaffey’s] variance.” The
Court stated that the alleged changes in circumstances since the 1997 agreed judgment had
all resulted from the “implementation of, conformance with, or disregard of the terms” of the
agreed judgment by Mahaffey.
{¶ 19} In sum, the trial court concluded that Mahaffey should not have been
granted a variance and that the BZA had “discriminated against Durell” when it denied his
variance, as compared with its treatment of Mahaffey’s request. The court remanded the
matter to the BZA for it, “with guidance from the Court, [to] sort out this entire matter for
the benefit of the Township and all affected Parties and residents” and for it to issue
variances or accomplish zoning changes consistent with the court’s conclusions and with the
1997 agreed judgment.
11
The BZA’s Argument on Appeal
{¶ 20} The BZA appeals from the trial court’s judgment, raising one assignment of
error. The BZA asserts that the trial court erred in remanding to the BZA without expressly
finding that the BZA had acted illegally or abused its discretion. Specifically, the BZA
argues that the trial court “never found that the decision of the BZA [was] unconstitutional,
illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported by the preponderance of
substantial, reliable, and probative evidence on the whole record,” as required by R.C.
2506.04. Moreover, the BZA argues that its own determination that res judicata did not
apply to bar Mahaffey’s request for a variance was “a reasonable conclusion based on
evidence in the record” and that the trial court abused its discretion “in substituting its
judgment for that of the BZA.”
Standard of Review
{¶ 21} As the BZA has correctly stated, in an administrative appeal pursuant to
R.C. Chapter 2506, the common pleas court considers the whole record, including any new
or additional evidence admitted under R.C. 2506.03, and determines whether the
administrative order is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or
unsupported by the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative evidence. Henley
v. Youngstown Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 90 Ohio St.3d 142, 147-148, 735 N.E.2d 433 (2000);
Mordick v. Dayton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24663, 2012-Ohio-289, ¶ 14.
{¶ 22} The Ohio Supreme Court has distinguished the standard of review to be
applied by common pleas courts and courts of appeals in R.C. Chapter 2506 administrative
appeals. R.C. 2506.04 “grants a more limited power to the court of appeals to review the
12
judgment of the common pleas court only on ‘questions of law,’ which does not include the
same extensive power to weigh ‘the preponderance of substantial, reliable, and probative
evidence.’” Henley at 147. In other words, as an appellate court, our standard of review in
an R.C. 2506.04 appeal is “more limited in scope.” Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34,
465 N.E.2d 848 (1984). “The fact that the court of appeals * * * might have arrived at a
different conclusion than the administrative agency is immaterial.” Id., citing Lorain City
School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 40 Ohio St.3d 257, 261, 533 N.E.2d
264 (1988). See also Cox v. Miami Cty. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2d Dist. Miami No.
2010-CA-29, 2011-Ohio-2820, ¶ 5-6.
Analysis
{¶ 23} As a preliminary matter, the BZA asserts that the trial court erred in
reviewing the BZA’s determination that its actions on Mahaffey’s variance request were not
barred by res judicata. Whether the previous litigation over the zoning status and property
rights related to this property were binding on the parties, and thus had a res judicata effect,
is clearly a question of law. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reviewing
the BZA’s interpretation of this issue. Likewise, because it is a question of law, we may
review the trial court’s conclusion on this issue. We agree with the trial court that the
BZA’s resolution of this issue was not entitled to deference on appeal.
{¶ 24} Additionally, the BZA argues that res judicata does not apply to granting a
variance “upon a showing of changed circumstances.” However, this argument disregards
the fact that the variance not only modified a prior zoning decision, as is usually the case, but
also conflicted with a judgment of the trial court. It also ignores the trial court’s conclusion,
13
which is supported by the evidence, that the changes in circumstances since the denial of
Mahaffey’s 1995 request for a variance, upon which the BZA relied, fell into one of two
categories: 1) they were “the natural and expected consequences” of the 1997 agreed
judgment, or 2) they resulted from Mahaffey’s disregard of the terms of the 1997 agreed
judgment. The trial court reasonably concluded that such “changes in circumstances” were
entitled to little weight and did not have greater force than the 1997 agreed judgment.
{¶ 25} The BZA also contends that the trial court’s judgment was improper
because the court did not expressly find that the BZA’s decision was “illegal, arbitrary,
capricious, unreasonable, or unsupported” by the record, as required by R.C. 2506.04.
Although it is true that the trial court did not use these terms, it is clear from the trial court’s
findings that it found the disparate treatment of Durell’s and Mahaffey’s requests for
variances to be arbitrary and unreasonable. Moreover, the trial court implicitly found the
BZA’s decision to be illegal insofar as it conflicted with the 1997 agreed judgment. In
other words, the trial court made the findings necessary to support its decision to reverse the
BZA’s decision, although it did not use the language of the statute.
{¶ 26} The BZA claims that it properly applied the factors set forth in Duncan v.
Middlefield, 23 Ohio St.3d 83, 491 N.E.2d 692 (1986) in granting Mahaffey’s variance in
2009. Duncan outlined a list of factors to be applied in deciding whether landowners had
encountered “practical difficulties” in using their property. In our view, however,
Mahaffey’s prior consent to an agreed judgment about the use of the property eliminated the
relevance of the Duncan factors to his subsequent application for a variance.
{¶ 27} The BZA further asserts that a recent decision of this court, Garringer v.
14
New Jasper Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2d Dist. Greene Nos. 2009-CA-50 and
2009-CA-59, 2010-Ohio-6223, supports its argument that the Duncan factors were the
correct factors to apply in this case. According to the BZA, Spring Valley Township
Zoning Resolution § 802.1 is identical to New Jasper Township Zoning Resolution §
802.1, which relates to “Single Non-Conforming Lots.”2 The sections provide, in pertinent
part:
In any district in which single-family dwellings are permitted, a single
family dwelling may be erected on any single lot of record at the effective
date of adoption of this amendment, not withstanding [sic] limitations
imposed by other provisions of this Resolution. * * * This provision shall
apply even though such lot fails to meet the requirements for area or width, or
both, that are applicable in the district.
Construction was subject to other height, lot coverage, and density restrictions.
{¶ 28} Durell and Mitchell correctly point out that the BZA did not raise this
argument in the trial court, and thus it has been waived. Moreover, even assuming, for the
sake of argument, that the 1997 agreed judgment did not exist, we would find that the Single
Non-Conforming Lot provision, and thus the holding in Garringer, is inapplicable to the
facts of this case. The Garringers sought to build a single residence on 55 acres of
landlocked agricultural property that lacked the required road frontage; like Mahaffey, the
Garringers accessed their property via an easement. When the Garringers sought a variance
2
Neither zoning ordinance is contained in the record, but we will assume, for the sake of this discussion, that the
ordinances are identical. The New Jasper zoning resolution is quoted in Garringer. Id. at ¶ 16.
15
from the frontage requirement, the BZA denied it, finding that the Garringers had not
established an unnecessary hardship or practical difficulty. Id. at ¶ 6. On appeal, the trial
court disagreed, concluding that the zoning resolution allowed a house to be built on the
property, and it ordered the BZA to grant the variance. We agreed with the trial court’s
reasoning, but we found that a variance was unnecessary. Id. at ¶ 23. We remanded for the
trial court “to order the [BZA] to grant a building permit to construct a single family
dwelling” on the property.
{¶ 29} The zoning resolutions at issue in Garringer and in this case apply to “any
single lot of record at the effective date of adoption” of the amendment. There is no
indication in Garringer that the property on which the owners sought to construct a home
had been divided or otherwise modified subsequent to the adoption of the resolution.
Although it is unclear when the Spring Valley Zoning Resolution was adopted, there is no
suggestion in this record that Spring Valley Township Zoning Resolution § 802.1 was
adopted during the course of these proceedings, i.e. more recently than 1995, when Mahaffey
sought the original variance. Several divisions of Mahaffey’s property were accomplished
after that time, and Mahaffey’s remaining 22-acre lot therefore was not “of record” when the
zoning resolution was adopted. Accordingly, the rationale of Garringer would not apply.
{¶ 30} The BZA correctly points out that, when Durell’s variance was denied in
2004, the trial court had not yet ruled (in Case No. 06 CV 0184) that Durell’s lot was “the
first of three lots for which a variance ha[d] been granted” by means of the 1997 agreed
judgment. To the BZA, this fact suggests that it could not have discriminated against Durell
in denying the 2004 variance application, at which point his priority had not yet been
16
established, and that, by the time of Mahaffey’s application in 2008, the 2006 decision had
“eviscerated the original 1997 agreement that only three residences should be constructed
along the private lane.”
{¶ 31} As far as we can tell from this record, the owners of the four lots which
have been divided from Mahaffey’s original lot since 1995 – Durell, Mitchell, Miller, and
Bott – bore no responsibility for Mahaffey’s non-compliance with the 1997 agreed
judgment. They, or their predecessors in interest, each purchased their lots with the
understanding with they would be permitted access via the private drive, and their deeds
contained easements to that effect. We understand that these events put the BZA in the
difficult position of either denying Durell’s 2004 request for a variance to allow construction
on his property or failing to comply with the 1997 agreed judgment by allowing four
properties to use the private drive. We also understand the trial court’s disapproval of the
BZA’s costly and perhaps impracticable solution that Durell be required to built a separate
private drive to Cemetery Road, although the trial court’s characterization of the decision as
“discrimination” might have been overstated on the record before us.
{¶ 32} Nonetheless, we disagree with the BZA that the 2006 decision granting
Durell access to Mahaffey’s private drive necessarily “eviscerated” the 1997 agreed
judgment, such that it placed no limitation on further development of Mahaffey’s land. The
trial court reasonably concluded that Mahaffey’s request for further development along the
private drive was in contravention of the court’s 1997 agreed judgment and of the rights of
the other property owners.
{¶ 33} The assignment of error is overruled.
17
Conclusion
{¶ 34} The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed insofar as it concluded that
the BZA improperly granted Mahaffey’s request for a variance, and the variance granted to
Mahaffey will be vacated. There is no other matter to “sort out.” The 1997 agreed
judgment remains, although effectively modified by subsequently approved building. By
virtue of the declaratory judgment in Case No. 06 CV 0184, Durrell has authority to build on
his lot and to access his property via the private drive built by Mahaffey and shared by the
other properties. Because there is no other issue to be resolved, we will modify the trial
court’s judgment insofar as it remanded the matter to the BZA for it to “sort out this entire
matter for the benefit of the Township and all affected Parties and residents” with the benefit
of the court’s guidance; no further action by the BZA is appropriate based on these
proceedings.
..........
HALL, J. and CELEBREZZE, J., concur.
(Hon. Frank D. Celebrezze, Jr., Eighth District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio).
Copies mailed to:
B. Randall Roach
Elizabeth A. Ellis
Hon. Stephen A. Wolaver
Case Name: Bill Durell, et al. v. Spring Valley Township Board of Zoning
Appeals, et al.
Case No.: Greene App. No. 2012 CA 23
Panel: Froelich, Hall, Celebrezze
Author: Jeffrey E. Froelich