Correa v. Dretke , 122 F. App'x 112 ( 2005 )


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  •                                                         United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    F I L E D
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FIFTH CIRCUIT                    January 31, 2005
    Charles R. Fulbruge III
    Clerk
    No. 04-20345
    Summary Calendar
    RICHARD CORREA, SR.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    DOUG DRETKE, DIRECTOR, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF
    CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS DIVISION;
    CYNTHIA A. POPP; RICHARD C. THALER; ROBERT H. QUADA,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Texas
    (4:03-CV-3934)
    Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    Richard Correa, Sr., Texas prisoner #1084369, appeals, pro se,
    the dismissal of his civil rights complaint for failure to state a
    claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
    1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This action arises out of the temporary seizure
    from Correa of the portable programmer for his implanted pulse
    generator.     Correa contends the district court erred by dismissing
    (1) his retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
    this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
    under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
    Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act, 29
    U.S.C. §§ 791-794e (RA); (2) his due process and equal protection
    claims; and (3) his deliberate indifference claims against Thaler
    and Popp.
    Correa did not state a viable retaliation claim because he did
    not allege defendants retaliated against him for engaging in a
    protected activity.        See Seaman v. CSPH, Inc., 
    179 F.3d 297
    , 301
    (5th Cir. 1999).         Because Correa did not allege he was treated
    differently from similarly situated prisoners or that defendants
    engaged in purposeful discrimination to harm an identifiable group,
    his complaint failed to state an equal protection claim upon which
    relief may be granted.        See Wheeler v. Miller, 
    168 F.3d 241
    , 252
    (5th Cir. 1999); Johnson v. Rodriguez, 
    110 F.3d 299
    , 306-07 (5th
    Cir.), cert denied, 
    522 U.S. 995
    (1997).
    Correa did not allege his freedom from restraint was curtailed
    by defendants; therefore, he did not allege they infringed upon a
    protected liberty interest.          See Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    ,
    484 (1995).       And, because Texas law provides an adequate post-
    deprivation remedy for the unlawful taking of property, Correa’s
    complaint   did    not   state   a   viable   due   process   claim   for   the
    infringement of a protected property interest.                See Cathey v.
    Guenther, 
    47 F.3d 162
    , 164 (5th Cir. 1995); Sheppard v. La. Bd. of
    Parole, 
    873 F.2d 761
    , 763 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing Hudson v. Palmer,
    
    468 U.S. 517
    , 533-35 (1984)).        Accordingly, Correa’s complaint did
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    not state a due process claim upon which relief may be granted.
    See Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 
    42 F.3d 925
    , 935 (5th Cir.
    1995).
    Because Correa did not allege Thaler was personally involved
    in a constitutional deprivation, his complaint did not state a
    viable deliberate indifference claim against Thaler. See Thompkins
    v. Belt, 
    828 F.2d 298
    , 303-04 (5th Cir. 1987).   His contention that
    Thaler was sufficiently personally involved in a constitutional
    deprivation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985- 1986 is without merit
    because he did not allege that Thaler’s actions were motivated by
    racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus. See Bradt
    v. Smith, 
    634 F.2d 796
    , 801-02 (5th Cir. Unit A Jan. 1981).
    Although Correa alleged facts showing Popp was aware of facts
    from which she could draw the inference that a substantial risk of
    harm existed, he did not allege facts showing Popp actually drew
    that inference.   This is, therefore, insufficient to state a claim
    for deliberate indifference.   See Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    ,
    837 (1994). Furthermore, as the interruption of Correa’s treatment
    was brief, any pain Correa suffered as a result of the interruption
    was insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.        See
    Mayweather v. Foti, 
    958 F.2d 91
    , 91 (5th Cir. 1992).
    The district court’s dismissal of Correa’s complaint counts as
    a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).       See Adepegba v.
    Hammons, 
    103 F.3d 383
    , 388 (5th Cir. 1996).      Correa is cautioned
    3
    that, if he accumulates three strikes, he may not proceed in forma
    pauperis   in   any    civil   action       or   appeal   filed    while     he   is
    incarcerated or detained in any facility, unless he is under
    imminent   danger     of   serious    physical     injury.        See   28   U.S.C.
    § 1915(g).
    AFFIRMED, SANCTION WARNING ISSUED
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