Sangeri v. Yerra , 2020 Ohio 5520 ( 2020 )


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  • [Cite as Sangeri v. Yerra, 
    2020-Ohio-5520
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    Ashok K. Sangeri,                                      :
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                :
    No. 19AP-675
    v.                                                     :                     (C.P.C. No. 17DR-4265)
    Sahitya Yerra,                                         :                 (REGULAR CALENDAR)
    Defendant-Appellee.                 :
    N U N C P R O T U N C1
    D E C I S I O N
    Rendered on December 3, 2020
    On brief: Wood Long Family Law, and Jessica M. Wood, for
    appellant. Argued: Jessica M. Wood.
    On brief: Sanjay K. Bhatt, for appellee. Argued: Sanjay K.
    Bhatt.
    APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
    Division of Domestic Relations
    BRUNNER, J.
    {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Ashok K. Sangeri, appeals from the judgment entry and
    final divorce decree entered by the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of
    Domestic Relations on September 4, 2019. For the following reasons, we affirm.
    I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    {¶ 2} Sangeri and defendant-appellee, Sahitya Yerra, entered into an arranged
    marriage on April 17, 2016. No children were born as issue of the marriage. The parties
    separated just over one year after the marriage. On November 20, 2017, Sangeri filed a
    complaint for divorce. On February 10, 2018, Yerra filed her answer; she did not file a
    1   This decision replaces the previous decision filed on December 1, 2020 that was not in final format.
    No. 19AP-675                                                                             2
    counterclaim. On January 15, 2019, Sangeri filed an amended complaint to include, as an
    additional ground for divorce, that the parties were living separate and apart without
    cohabitation for more than one year. Yerra did not contest that allegation.
    {¶ 3} During the pendency of the case, Yerra filed a motion for temporary orders.
    Upon review of the parties' respective affidavits and in consideration of the parties'
    incomes, assets, and liabilities, the magistrate ordered Sangeri to pay spousal support in
    the amount of $1,500 per month for 8 months, commencing February 1, 2018. On June 21,
    2019, the trial court denied Sangeri's motion for a de facto termination date of the marriage.
    {¶ 4} A contested two-day trial was conducted on June 25 and 26, 2019, before a
    judge of the Division of Domestic Relations. It is undisputed that the parties were married
    in India on April 17, 2016, and that their parents had brokered the marriage. At the time of
    their engagement, Yerra lived in India, whereas Sangeri was living in Columbus, Franklin
    County, Ohio and working for L-Brands, where he had been employed for approximately 8
    years at that time. Sangeri earned $125,103 in 2016 and $126,900 in 2017 at L-Brands.
    {¶ 5} It also is undisputed that Yerra, after becoming engaged to Sangeri, came to
    the United States on a student visa and began her studies at New Hampshire University.
    Yerra testified she wanted to transfer to Indiana Technical University in order to be closer
    to Sangeri, but he did not agree to the transfer.
    {¶ 6} The parties dispute the basis for their marriage. Yerra asserted throughout
    her testimony her belief that she was fraudulently induced to marry Sangeri. She testified
    that, not long after their wedding, Sangeri told her he only married her so that his younger
    brother could marry. Yerra testified Sangeri and she returned to India for the wedding of
    Sangeri's younger brother. Thereafter, Sangeri told her that, with his brother's marriage
    accomplished, the purpose of their own marriage was over, and he was going to file for
    divorce.
    {¶ 7} Sangeri disputed Yerra's account of these events. He testified that he entered
    the marriage at his parents' instigation. He also testified that his brother did not meet the
    woman he later married until after Sangeri's engagement to Yerra. Sangeri testified that it
    was his understanding at the time he became engaged to Yerra that Yerra planned to come
    to the United States on a dependent visa until she could secure a student visa and attend
    the New Hampshire University. Sangeri testified that, after the parties' wedding in India,
    No. 19AP-675                                                                              3
    they returned to the United States separately, about two days apart. Sangeri returned to
    Columbus, and Yerra returned to New Hampshire. Sangeri testified that the parties'
    relationship after their wedding was good, and that they spoke regularly and met many
    times. He testified that he noticed a shift in Yerra's attitude toward him when they went to
    India for his brother's wedding.      He described their subsequent communications as
    argumentative and the marriage as "rocky." (June 25, 2019 Tr. at 40.) Sangeri testified his
    relationship with Yerra continued to deteriorate to the point that he told her he thought
    their marriage was over, and he felt she agreed. Sangeri testified that he sought legal advice
    to terminate the marriage in September 2017. He filed for divorce November 20, 2017.
    {¶ 8} Yerra testified that, while she was attending school in New Hampshire, she
    wanted to come to Columbus to visit Sangeri, but that Sangeri dissuaded her, claiming
    financial distress and refusing to pay for Yerra's travel to Columbus. Sangeri denied
    refusing to have Yerra visit but acknowledged he had not wanted to purchase the more
    expensive airline tickets for last-minute trips because it was a financially stressful time for
    him.
    {¶ 9} Yerra disputes Sangeri's claim of financial stress, testifying that he received
    income as a silent partner in an information technology service company, Telligen Tech.
    Sangeri denied being a silent partner in Telligen Tech or receiving income from it. He
    testified the company belonged to friends he helped out occasionally, even lending them
    substantial amounts of money while he was married to Yerra. He acknowledged the
    company has office locations at Airport Drive in Columbus, Ohio and in Hyderabad, India.
    Yerra also pointed to money Sangeri transferred to India, asserting the money was to pay
    Telligen Tech employees in India. Sangeri denied Yerra's assertion, testifying that the
    money transfers of $9,996 and $16,491 he made during the marriage were to his family and
    friends in India.
    {¶ 10} Yerra testified that, following her graduation from university, she continued
    to be in the United States on a student visa, on Optional Practical Training ("OPT") status.
    The expiration date of her OPT status was August 2020, with no guarantee that it would be
    renewed. Yerra's employment required her to live in the New York/New Jersey area. She
    testified that her net income was $4,000 a month. She shared a 3-bedroom home with 4 to
    5 people, and her monthly rent fluctuated from $1,000 to $2,000, depending on the
    No. 19AP-675                                                                             4
    number of people living in the house. She incurred additional expenses for transportation,
    food, and other necessities.
    {¶ 11} Yerra testified she wanted to stay married to Sangeri. She stated she would
    be the first person in her community to be divorced and was reluctant to return to India,
    due to the stigma attached to a divorced woman.
    {¶ 12} After the trial concluded, the parties submitted their respective proposed
    findings of facts and conclusions of law.
    {¶ 13} On September 4, 2019, the trial court issued a judgment entry for decree of
    divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the duration of
    the marriage was from April 17, 2016 to June 26, 2019. The trial court granted the divorce
    to Sangeri on the grounds that the parties had lived separate and apart for a period in excess
    of one year without cohabitation. Additionally, the trial court allocated martial and non-
    marital assets and made a distributive award to Yerra. Based on the parties' testimony and
    evidence adduced at trial, the trial court set forth in the divorce decree the following
    conclusions of law, directly addressing the parties' respective credibility:
    This Court is vested with broad discretion when fashioning a
    division of both marital property and marital debt. The award
    need not be equal but it must be equitable. The Court considers
    that spousal support is justifiable in this case, but based on the
    positions of the parties, a strict division of assets as revealed in
    testimony and by evidence presented at trial, as well as an
    award to [Yerra] for Attorney Fees, may be most appropriate in
    this matter. Awarding [Yerra] all marital equity in the Claver
    Condo is an appropriate substitute for spousal support in this
    matter. [Sangeri] attempts to make arguments for reducing the
    marital equity in the home based on the argument that "he
    alone contributed". The Court rejects this argument as an
    inappropriate attempt to reintroduce a de facto termination
    theory of the case, which with this Court has already disposed.
    [Yerra] testified she believed she was fraudulently induced to
    marry [Sangeri] in a scheme for an elder brother to marry first
    in order that [Sangeri's] younger brother be able to make a
    match considered advantageous to his family. The Court heard
    persuasive testimony on this topic. But the Court does not need
    to make a determination on these emotionally-laden matters in
    order to craft an equitable award based on the needs and
    relative dependencies of the parties.
    No. 19AP-675                                                                              5
    [Yerra] credibly demonstrated, through testimony and
    evidence, that she is vocationally vulnerable due to her visa
    limitations in the United States. Equally persuasive was her
    testimony that she is reluctant to return to her home country
    where she would face extreme stigma in her own culture of
    being a divorced woman, and [] lacks significant personal
    resources.
    The Court found [Sangeri] to lack credibility on the issues of
    transfers he made before filing for divorce and regarding his
    role in Telligen Tech. [Yerra] and her Counsel were required to
    expend time and resources to substantiate funds due to
    [Sangeri's] lack of transparency and non-disclosures. If full
    transparency existed, it may be that [Sangeri's] assets are far
    greater than what has been established in this Court.
    (Decree of Divorce at 5-6.)
    {¶ 14} The trial court, based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law, issued the
    following orders in the division of property section of the divorce decree:
    1. Yerra was awarded all the marital equity of $18,210.43 in the
    rental property located at 4120 Claver Drive, Columbus, Ohio
    ("Claver Condo"). The trial made this award in lieu of spousal
    support.
    2. Sangeri was ordered to pay Yerra the following sums of
    money:
       $19,563, the amount equal to one-half the funds Sangeri
    withdrew prior to filing for divorce;
       $9,996, the amount equal to one-half the marital funds
    transferred to India;
       $20,000, the amount equal to one-half the monies
    Sangeri was then known to have received from Telligen
    Tech during the marriage;
       $16,491, the amount equal to the funds Sangeri
    transferred to his friends and family prior to filing for
    divorce.
    3. Each party to maintain their bank accounts as titled in their
    own name.
    No. 19AP-675                                                                            6
       Each party to retain any and all personal property in
    their respective possession and control, including
    jewelry, household goods, and furniture.
       Sangeri to retain the 2007 Infiniti G35 and any other
    vehicles in his possession.
    (Decree of Divorce at 7-9.)
    {¶ 15} Additionally, the trial court found there was no marital debts.
    {¶ 16} The trial court awarded Yerra $10,000 in attorney fees and ordered Sangeri
    to pay the same.
    {¶ 17} Finally, the trial court issued orders regarding the parties' stipulations with
    respect to determining the marital value of Sangeri's 401(k) plan with L-Brands, a Morgan
    Stanley investment account, and an AST Equity Plan Solutions account.
    {¶ 18} In conclusion, the trial court stated it was "not required to make factual
    findings regarding each piece of evidence, and the omission of a fact from this decision does
    not suggest that the court did not consider that fact." (Decree of Divorce at 11.)
    {¶ 19} Sangeri now appeals.
    II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
    {¶ 20} Sangeri presents for our review 11 assignments of error:
    [1.] The trial Court erred and abused its discretion by granting
    100% of the equity in the 4120 Claver Drive property to [Yerra].
    [2.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by ordering
    [Sangeri] to pay $20,000 to [Yerra].
    [3.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by ordering
    [Sangeri] to pay $19,563 to [Yerra].
    [4.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by ordering
    [Sangeri] to pay $9,996 to [Yerra].
    [5.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by ordering
    [Sangeri] to pay $16,491 to [Yerra] to the extent this was
    ordered twice.
    [6.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by granting
    $10,000 in attorney fees to [Yerra].
    No. 19AP-675                                                                                7
    [7.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by finding
    the jewelry given to the parties as part of their wedding
    ceremony was [Yerra's] separate property.
    [8.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by finding
    there was no marital debt.
    [9.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to
    find the parties['] bank accounts to be marital assets and failing
    to equitably divide such.
    [10.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by ordering
    [Sangeri] to pay to [Yerra] one-half the marital value of the L-
    Brands Stock.
    [11.] The trial court erred and abused its discretion by ordering
    a division of assets and debts that was not equitable.
    III. DISCUSSION
    A. Determination and Division of Marital Property
    {¶ 21} Ten of Sangeri's 11 assignments of error—all except his sixth assignment of
    error regarding attorney fees—relate to the trial court's determinations regarding the
    parties' marital and non-marital property and how to divide any marital property equitably.
    We first address those 10 assignments of error.
    1. Law and Standards of Review
    {¶ 22} In divorce proceedings, the trial court is required to determine what
    constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property. R.C. 3105.171(B).
    Marital property does not include separate property. R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(b). Separate
    property is defined by statute, in relevant part, as "[a]ny gift of any real or personal property
    or of an interest in real or personal property that is made after the date of the marriage and
    that is proven by clear and convincing evidence to have been given to only one spouse."
    R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vii). The statute further provides that the commingling of separate
    property with any other type of property does not destroy its identity, unless the separate
    property is not traceable. R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(b). When the parties contest whether an
    asset is marital or separate property, it is presumed to be marital property unless proven
    otherwise. Wolf-Sabatino v. Sabatino, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-1161, 
    2011-Ohio-6819
    , ¶ 11. The
    party requesting that an asset be classified as separate property bears the burden of tracing
    it to his or her separate property. 
    Id.
    No. 19AP-675                                                                            8
    {¶ 23} We review a trial court's determination of property as marital or separate
    under a manifest weight standard and will affirm a trial court's determination if it is
    supported by some competent, credible evidence. Roush v. Roush, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-
    1071, 
    2017-Ohio-840
    , ¶ 18, citing Banchefsky v. Banchefsky, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-1011,
    
    2010-Ohio-4267
    , ¶ 36.
    {¶ 24} After determining what constitutes marital property and what constitutes
    separate property, the court is required to divide the marital and separate property
    equitably. R.C. 3105.171(B). With respect to marital property, R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) provides
    that marital property shall be divided equally, unless an equal division would be
    inequitable, in which case the property shall be divided in the manner the court determines
    equitable. The trial court must value the marital property to determine an appropriate
    division. See Raymond v. Raymond, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-363, 
    2011-Ohio-6173
    , ¶ 22 ("To
    comply with its duty [under R.C. 3105.171(C)(1)], the trial court must value and divide all
    marital property in a divorce, and in most cases, the failure to do so amounts to an abuse of
    discretion. Although a trial court possesses broad discretion to determine the value of
    marital property, it may not omit valuation altogether.") (citations omitted).
    {¶ 25} We review a trial court's determination of the value of marital property for
    abuse of discretion. Beagle v. Beagle, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-353, 
    2009-Ohio-6570
    , ¶ 11 ("A
    trial court has broad discretion to determine the value of marital property, and its
    determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion."); Grody
    v. Grody, 10th Dist. No. 07AP-690, 
    2008-Ohio-4682
    , ¶ 20 ("A trial court has broad
    discretion in developing a measure of value for property in a divorce case.").
    2. First Assignment of Error
    {¶ 26} In his first assignment of error, Sangeri asserts the trial court erred and
    abused its discretion by granting 100 percent of the equity in the Claver Condo to Yerra.
    The trial court found Sangeri's assertion essentially renewed his motion for a de facto
    termination date of the marriage, a motion the trial court had already denied. We agree.
    {¶ 27} It is undisputed that Sangeri purchased the Claver Condo in January 2017,
    while the parties were married. The trial court determined that the Claver Condo is marital
    property.
    No. 19AP-675                                                                             9
    {¶ 28} In the divorce decree, the trial court explicitly found it was more appropriate
    and equitable to award Yerra the full amount of the condo's equity in lieu of spousal
    support. The trial court found that "[c]redible testimony and evidence was shown to
    indicate [Sangeri] wanted [Yerra] to be dependent on him, he maintained financial control
    in such a manner that she was dependent on him, and the marriage itself was arranged in
    a way to increase her dependence." (Decree of Divorce at 4.) The trial court explained that
    its reasoning in making this award "is based on observation and weighing of the credibility
    of each party, the lack of transparency by [Sangeri] regarding financial transactions, and
    the clear disparity of income and financial vulnerability which puts [Yerra] in a weaker
    position." (Decree of Divorce at 7.) Additionally, as noted previously, the decree contains
    the trial court's specific rejection of Sangeri's argument that he alone contributed to the
    Claver Condo, finding his argument "an inappropriate attempt to reintroduce a de facto
    termination theory of the case, which with this Court has already disposed." (Decree of
    Divorce at 6.)
    {¶ 29} "The first step in making an equitable distribution of marital property is to
    determine the duration of the marriage." Heyman v. Heyman, 10th Dist. No. 05AP-475,
    
    2006-Ohio-1345
    , ¶ 31. R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(a) creates a presumption that the term of a
    marriage for purposes of property valuation is the time from the date of the marriage
    through the date of the final hearing in an action for divorce. Meeks v. Meeks, 10th Dist.
    No. 05AP-315, 
    2006-Ohio-642
    , ¶ 50. If the court determines use of that date would be
    inequitable, however, it may select a termination date that it considers equitable. R.C.
    3105.171(A)(2)(b). "[A] trial court may use a de facto termination of marriage date when
    the evidence clearly and bilaterally shows that it is appropriate based upon the totality of
    the circumstances." Meeks at ¶ 50. The court has discretion whether to use the final
    hearing date or a de facto termination date and this decision is subject to review for abuse
    of discretion. 
    Id.
    {¶ 30} In the matter before us, the trial court's explanation as to why it rejected the
    de facto termination date of the marriage requested by Sangeri is supported by competent,
    credible evidence. The trial court's decision clearly sets forth a rational evidentiary basis
    for awarding Yerra the full marital equity in the Claver Condo. Moreover, the trial judge
    was best situated to access the credibility of the witnesses and the evidence. Therefore, we
    No. 19AP-675                                                                           10
    find the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion in making this award, and this Court
    will not disturb the award.
    {¶ 31} Accordingly, the first assignment of error is overruled.
    3. Depleted Marital Funds – Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth
    Assignments of Error
    {¶ 32} In his second, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error, Sangeri asserts
    the trial Court erred and abused its discretion by ordering him to pay Yerra $20,000,
    representing one-half of the money Sangeri was known to have received from Telligen Tech
    during the marriage; $19,563, representing one-half the amount of money Sangeri
    withdrew before he filed for divorce; $9,996, representing one-half of the marital funds
    Sangeri transferred to India; and $16,491, representing one-half of the funds Sangeri
    transferred to his family and friends before he filed for divorce, an amount that Sangeri
    argues he is being ordered to pay twice.
    {¶ 33} The decree contains the trial court's rationale with respect to these four
    orders. The trial court determined that, based on Sangeri's affidavit of property and
    credible evidence adduced at trial, the record demonstrated that Sangeri had depleted
    marital assets prior to filing for divorce. The decree contains the trial court's findings of
    fact based on testimony, including the following:
    d. Credible testimony, including admissions by [Sangeri],
    during the trial suggest that [Sangeri] is a silent partner in * * *
    Telligen Tech * * *. The Court is convinced that sufficient
    testimony and physical evidence was shown at trial to support
    a finding that [Sangeri] has unreported ownership stake or
    some form of business relationship in or with this company
    that increases his assets and access to capital. The parties do
    not appear to be in a position to undertake a more thorough
    forensic analysis. Consequently, the Court must simply include
    this evidentiary issue in its weighing of equities.
    e. [Sangeri] received a check on June 6, 2017 for $40,000 from
    Telligen Tech. [Sangeri] claimed the check was a repayment for
    a loan made to the company. Credible testimony and physical
    evidence shows [sic] that this amount represents potential
    income to [Sangeri]. Whether it is income or a loan, there are
    no credible business documentation to support [Sangeri's]
    position in the matter. It is, at the very least, an informal
    transfer of marital property. Therefore, the Court will treat it as
    a marital asset.
    No. 19AP-675                                                                                           11
    ***
    g. [Sangeri] testified that he sought legal advice to terminate his
    marriage around September 2017. He filed for divorce
    November 20, 2017.
    h. [Sangeri] holds the following accounts. According to credible
    testimony and evidence, various sums totaling $39,125.93 were
    withdrawn in close proximity to [Sangeri] filing for divorce:
    i. Digital Federal Credit Union (DCU) # *849
    ii. Chase Bank # *839
    [Sangeri] was unwilling or unable to state a credible or
    appropriate business or personal reason for these transfers.
    i. [Sangeri] transferred funds totaling $19,992.29 to India from
    2/1/17 to 5/28/19. [Sangeri] contends these funds were to his
    parents for support. [Yerra] testified the transfers were related
    to [Sangeri's] interest in Telligen Tech and its India operations.
    The parties were subject to a Standard Mutual Temporary
    Restraining Order November 21, [2017]2. The Court finds that
    regardless of the purpose of the transfers, they were not
    exempted by the TRO, as they are not "day to day spending" in
    the sense of the agreement[.]
    j. In his Affidavit of Property, [Sangeri] acknowledged transfers
    to friends and family totaling $32,982. These transfers
    included $20,000 to Telligen Tech principal Ashwin Puppala.
    [Sangeri] was unwilling or unable to state a credible or
    appropriate business or personal reason for these transfers. He
    claimed he wanted to "help his friends." The Court does not
    find this to be an appropriate answer and the large transfer in
    particular raises questions about whether [Sangeri] and the
    recipient of this large gift followed applicable federal
    regulations for cash transfers. In any event, the Court considers
    these marital assets depleted without the consent or knowledge
    of [Yerra], and [Sangeri] is required to make her whole.
    (Decree of Divorce at 3-5.)
    {¶ 34} In the divorce decree, the trial court summarized its findings that Sangeri had
    depleted these martial assets, stating:
    2A typographical error in the September 4, 2019 divorce decree states the TRO issued November 21, 2019.
    The record in this matter clearly reflects that the TRO issued November 21, 2017, the day after Sangeri filed
    his divorce complaint.
    No. 19AP-675                                                                               12
    [Sangeri] seeks to ignore this depletion of these marital assets
    and additionally credit him $4,613.50 for a payment made to
    [Yerra] that he had already been required to pay, had not paid,
    and made the payment in Court. The Court will not
    countenance either argument. It is clear from the evidence and
    testimony provided that [Sangeri] not only depleted marital
    assets prior to divorce, he transferred funds to India outside the
    mutual standard Temporary Restraining Order; and displayed
    a thorough lack of transparency regarding his assets and
    interests. [Sangeri's] behavior amounts to either willful or
    reckless financial misconduct. The Court addresses this
    imbalance by requiring [Sangeri] to make payment of these
    funds to [Yerra] as her half of marital assets that were either
    willfully or recklessly depleted.
    (Decree of Divorce at 8.)
    {¶ 35} Both parties provided conflicting testimony as to the source and dispersal of
    these funds. The trial court found Yerra's testimony credible and Sangeri's testimony not
    credible. Moreover, the trial court found Sangeri's actions violated the mutual standard
    temporary restraining order the trial court had issued.
    {¶ 36} "It is the place of the trial court, not the reviewing court, to assess the
    credibility of the witnesses." Heyman at ¶ 18. Under the circumstances in this case, we
    conclude there was competent, credible evidence to support the trial court's conclusions
    and, therefore, the findings that Sangeri willfully or recklessly depleted these funds.
    Consequently, there is no abuse of discretion.
    {¶ 37} The second, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error are overruled.
    4. Jewelry – Seventh Assignment of Error
    {¶ 38} Sangeri's seventh assignment of error asserts the trial court erred and abused
    its discretion by finding the jewelry given to the parties as part of their wedding ceremony
    was Yerra's separate property.
    {¶ 39} In divorce proceedings, the trial court is required to determine what
    constitutes marital property and what constitutes separate property. R.C. 3105.171(B).
    Marital property does not include separate property. R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(b). Separate
    property is defined by statute, in relevant part, as "[a]ny gift of any real or personal property
    or of an interest in real or personal property that is made after the date of the marriage and
    that is proven by clear and convincing evidence to have been given to only one spouse."
    R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(vii). The statute further provides that the commingling of separate
    No. 19AP-675                                                                            13
    property with any other type of property does not destroy its identity, unless the separate
    property is not traceable. R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(b). When the parties contest whether an
    asset is marital or separate property, it is presumed to be marital property unless proven
    otherwise. Wolf-Sabatino at ¶ 11. The party requesting that an asset be classified as
    separate property bears the burden of tracing it to his or her separate property. 
    Id.
     We
    review a trial court's determination of property as marital or separate under a manifest
    weight standard and will affirm a trial court's determination if it is supported by some
    competent, credible evidence. Roush at ¶ 18, citing Banchefsky at ¶ 36.
    {¶ 40} The parties gave conflicting testimony regarding who had provided the
    jewelry to whom and when. Sangeri testified that he and Yerra received gold jewelry from
    her parents and his parents. He stated he had received a bracelet, a ring, and a necklace
    chain, while she received a couple of necklaces. However, Sangeri was unable to produce
    any admissible documentary evidence to support his testimony that his parents had
    purchased some of the jewelry and the jewelry provided by both sets of parents had been
    given to the parties jointly.
    {¶ 41} Yerra testified that no jewelry in her possession had been given to her by
    Sangeri's parents. She acknowledged that she had had some jewelry while she was staying
    with Sangeri in Columbus, but she had taken that jewelry with her when the parties traveled
    to India for the wedding of Sangeri's younger brother and left it with her parents when she
    returned to the United States. Yerra testified on cross-examination that the jewelry that
    was given to her at her wedding was purchased by her parents, and that was the jewelry she
    left with her parents. On redirect, she testified that neither Sangeri nor his parents had
    given her any jewelry at the time of the parties' wedding or thereafter. She stated that the
    jewelry Sangeri was describing had been given to her by her parents prior to her marriage.
    {¶ 42} In the divorce decree, the trial court found that the jewelry belonged solely to
    Yerra and thus was not marital property. The trial court explained its finding as follows:
    [Sangeri] claims he gave certain jewelry, valued according to
    his estimate to be $20,000, to [Yerra] which he now deems
    marital property. He provided grainy black and white photos
    and "receipts" as evidence. The Court is unable to make any
    determination regarding the composition or value of the
    jewelry in these photos. The "receipts" shown appear to be a
    calculation of numbers written on a jewelers' letterhead.
    [Sangeri] fails to establish any relationship between the
    No. 19AP-675                                                                             14
    "receipts" and the jewelry in the photos, and has also not
    established that he purchased the jewelry at all, or that he gave
    it to [Yerra]. Any jewelry in [Yerra's] possession, or any she
    placed with her family, is her separate property and shall
    remain her separate property. [Sangeri's] attempts to raise an
    issue of [Yerra] not including wedding jewelry on her Affidavit
    of Property, but, in the Court's view, the inclusion of wedding
    jewelry on Property Affidavits is not typical.
    (Decree of Divorce at 9.)
    {¶ 43} To the extent Sangeri challenges the credibility of Yerra's testimony, those
    issues were raised at trial and the trial court was able to consider them in evaluating and
    weighing the evidence.      The trial court found that Yerra's testimony overcame the
    presumption that the jewelry was marital property. "It is the place of the trial court, not the
    reviewing court, to assess the credibility of the witnesses." Heyman at ¶ 18. Although
    nothing in the record appears to support the trial court's finding that "the inclusion of
    wedding jewelry on Property Affidavits is not typical," we find that to be harmless error.
    (Decree of Divorce at 9.) Under the circumstances in this case, we conclude there was
    competent, credible evidence to support the trial court's conclusion and, therefore, the
    finding that the jewelry was Yerra's separate property was not against the manifest weight
    of the evidence.
    {¶ 44} The seventh assignment of error is overruled.
    5. Eighth Assignment of Error
    {¶ 45} In his eighth assignment of error, Sangeri asserts the trial court erred and
    abused its discretion by finding there was no marital debt.
    {¶ 46} In its findings of fact, the trial court found that "[Sangeri's] credit card
    liabilities include $2,164.07 (Chase Bank) and $14,946.99 (Bank of America). [Sangeri]
    confirmed that a portion was for payment of his attorney fees, and did not confirm the
    sources of the other liabilities." (Decree of Divorce at 5.)
    {¶ 47} In the divorce decree, the trial court stated it did not find any marital debt in
    this matter.
    {¶ 48} The property to be divided in a divorce proceeding includes not only the
    parties' assets but also any debts incurred by the parties. Marrero v. Marrero, 9th Dist.
    No. 02CA008057, 
    2002-Ohio-4862
    . Marital debt has been defined as any debt incurred
    during the marriage for the joint benefit of the parties or for a valid marital purpose.
    No. 19AP-675                                                                               15
    Ketchum v. Ketchum, 7th Dist. No. 
    2001 CO 60
    , 
    2003-Ohio-2559
    , citing Turner, Equitable
    Distribution of Property, Section 6.29, at 455 (2d Ed.1994, Supp.2002).
    {¶ 49} Sangeri's testimony indicated that his credit card debt immediately prior to
    his marriage of $12,981.00, and at the time of trial was $17,111.06, an increase of $4,130.06.
    Sangeri also testified he paid approximately $10,000.00 to his divorce attorneys using his
    Chase Bank and Bank of America credit cards. He was unable, however, to provide an
    accounting of what amount of the debt of either of these credit cards was for and whether
    it related to payments to his attorneys in the underlying matter. He conceded in his brief
    that any monies paid to his divorce counsel via credit card may be "grounds to consider
    some debt not marital." (Sangeri's Brief at 37.)
    {¶ 50} The parties stipulated that the allocation of credit card debt "shall be left to
    the determination of the Court." (Tr. at 71.) In the absence of any credible testimony or
    evidence as to what portion of Sangeri's credit card was for valid marital purposes, the trial
    court could not determine what, if any, of Sangeri's credit card debt was marital debt.
    Consequently, the trial court did not find it equitable under the circumstances to consider
    any portion of the parties' debt to be marital debt. The trial court found, therefore, no
    marital debt in this matter and ordered each party "to pay for and hold the other harmless
    on all personal debts and obligations." (Decree of Divorce at 9.) Given the record before
    us, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this determination.
    {¶ 51} Accordingly, the eighth assignment of error is overruled.
    6. Ninth Assignment of Error
    {¶ 52} In his ninth assignment of error, Sangeri asserts the trial court erred and
    abused its discretion by failing to find the parties' bank accounts to be marital assets and
    failing to equitably divide such.
    {¶ 53} R.C. 3105.171(F)(2) requires the trial court to consider the parties' assets and
    liabilities in the event the trial court makes an equitable distribution of the marital assets.
    The record before us demonstrates that the trial court considered this and other factors and
    set forth the basis for an equitable distribution in the divorce decree. As previously
    discussed, the trial court specifically addressed Sangeri's lack of transparency regarding
    financial matters as well as the evidence that Sangeri had depleted the marital assets prior
    to filing for divorce, violating the temporary restraining order in the process. Having
    No. 19AP-675                                                                             16
    addressed those inequities, the trial court determined that, in other regards, it was
    equitable that each party maintain their bank accounts as titled in their own name.
    {¶ 54} Yerra submits that, by ordering each party to keep their own bank accounts,
    the trial court made an equal division of the total bank account balances. Given the
    circumstances of this case, we agree, and find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
    this regard.
    {¶ 55} The ninth assignment of error is overruled.
    7. Tenth Assignment of Error
    {¶ 56} In his tenth assignment of error, Sangeri asserts the trial court erred and
    abused its discretion by ordering Sangeri to pay to Yerra one-half the marital value of the
    L-Brands Stock.
    {¶ 57} The trial court addressed this issue under the stipulations section of the
    divorce decree. The parties had stipulated that 300.88457 of Sangeri's share in L-Brands,
    from his Employee Stock Purchase Plan, were marital property. The parties further
    stipulated that, as of the date of the trial, the stock price was $24.17 per share. Thus, these
    shares had a total value of $7,235.14, as stipulated by the parties. Divided equally, each
    party would receive $3,617.57.
    {¶ 58} The trial court's determination incorporated the parties' stipulations as to
    how many shares constituted marital property and what the value of those shares was as of
    a date certain designated by the parties. The parties also stipulated that "[t]he division of
    the marital portion and whether or not it is equitable for defendant to receive value for such
    shall be left to the determination of the court." (Tr. at 71.) The trial court stated in the
    decree that the ordered distribution was determined under principles of equity.
    Consequently, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion with respect to the division
    of the L-Brands Stock shares.
    {¶ 59} The tenth assignment of error is overruled.
    8. Eleventh Assignment of Error
    {¶ 60} In his eleventh assignment of error, Sangeri asserts the trial court erred and
    abused its discretion by ordering a division of assets and debts that was not equitable.
    {¶ 61} We disagree. For all the foregoing reasons, we find the trial court did not err
    or abuse its discretion in division of marital assets and debts. Accordingly, the eleventh
    assignment of error is overruled
    No. 19AP-675                                                                              17
    B. Attorney's Fees – Sixth Assignment of Error
    {¶ 62} Sangeri's sixth assignment of error assets the trial court erred and abused its
    discretion by granting $10,000 in attorney fees to Yerra. We disagree.
    {¶ 63} In divorce proceedings, a trial court may award "all or part of reasonable
    attorney's fees and litigation expenses to either party if the court finds the award equitable."
    R.C. 3105.73(A). A trial court " 'may consider the parties' marital assets and income, any
    award of temporary spousal support, the conduct of the parties, and any other relevant
    factors the court deems appropriate' " to determine whether an award is equitable. Rodgers
    v. Rodgers, 8th Dist. No. 105095, 
    2017-Ohio-7886
    , ¶ 60, quoting Gentile v. Gentile, 8th
    Dist. No. 97971, 
    2013-Ohio-1338
    , ¶ 69.
    {¶ 64} We have held that an award of attorney fees under R.C. 3105.73 lies within
    the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion.
    Wehrle v. Wehrle, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-386, 
    2013-Ohio-81
    , ¶ 47, citing Huffer v. Huffer,
    10th Dist. No. 09AP-574, 
    2010-Ohio-1223
    , ¶ 19, citing Parker v. Parker, 10th Dist. No.
    05AP-1171, 
    2006-Ohio-4110
    , ¶ 36.
    {¶ 65} Yerra testified that she had been able to pay only $2,500 to her attorney as of
    the time of trial. In comparison, Sangeri had paid his attorneys $10,000. Yerra directs our
    attention to a holding of Rodgers at ¶ 70:
    "Where the amount of an attorney's time and work is evident
    to the trier of fact, an award of attorney fees, even in the
    absence of specific evidence to support the amount, is not an
    abuse of discretion." Dotts v. Schaefer, 5th Dist. Tuscarawas
    No. 2014 AP 06 0022, 
    2015-Ohio-782
    , ¶ 17. Indeed, domestic
    relations courts often rely on their own knowledge and
    experience to determine the reasonableness of attorney
    fees. See e.g., Long v. Long, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 11AP-510,
    
    2012-Ohio-6254
    , ¶ 20 ("The trial court * * * is not required to
    hear [expert] testimony and may rely on its own knowledge and
    experience to determine the reasonableness of the amount
    claimed."); Lundy v. Lundy, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2012-T-
    0100, 
    2013-Ohio-3571
    , ¶ 55 (Trial court "may evaluate the
    work performed by an attorney in a domestic-relations action
    * * * [a]nd * * * may use its own knowledge and experience to
    determine       the   reasonableness      [of]   the    amount
    claimed."); Groza-Vance v. Vance, 
    162 Ohio App.3d 510
    ,
    
    2005-Ohio-3815
    , 
    834 N.E.2d 15
    , ¶ 44 (10th Dist.) (same); Gore
    v. Gore, 2d Dist. Greene No. 09-CA-64, 
    2010-Ohio-3906
    , ¶ 39.
    No. 19AP-675                                                                          18
    {¶ 66} The trial court explained its decision on the subject matter ordering Sangeri
    to pay Yerra for her attorney fees:
    Due to [Sangeri's] lack of transparency regarding transfers of
    funds around the time of his filing for divorce, large checks
    written to friends and family without an identified purpose,
    and receipt of funds from Telligen Tech, he required [Yerra]
    and her Counsel to use time and resources to address these
    issues. Whether the financial misconduct is deliberate on the
    part of [Sangeri] or merely his manner of doing business, it put
    [Yerra] in a detrimental position. Therefore, the Court awards
    [Yerra] $10,000 in attorney fees, and orders [Sangeri] to pay
    same.
    (Decree of Divorce at 10.)
    {¶ 67} We find the trial court's award of attorney fees and expenses was readily
    explained and within the trial court's discretion.
    {¶ 68} The sixth assignment of error is overruled.
    IV. CONCLUSION
    {¶ 69} For the foregoing reasons, having independently examined the record,
    reviewed the parties' briefs, and listened to the parties' oral arguments, we conclude the
    trial court did not err in its decision. Accordingly, we overrule all eleven of Sangeri's
    assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common
    Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations.
    Judgment affirmed.
    SADLER, P.J., and NELSON, J., concur.