State v. Williams , 2021 Ohio 3704 ( 2021 )

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2021-Ohio-3704.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
CLINTON COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Appellant, : CASE NO. CA2021-05-016
: OPINION
- vs - 10/18/2021
:
PATRICIA A. WILLIAMS, :
Appellee. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM CLINTON COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CRI20-500-261
Andrew T. McCoy, Clinton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Melvin Planas, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Alycia Bemmes, Clinton County Public Defender, and Amanda Waechter, Assistant Public
Defender, for appellee.
PIPER, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant, the state of Ohio, appeals a decision of the Clinton County Court
of Common Pleas granting a motion to suppress in favor of appellee, Patricia Williams.1
1. Pursuant to Loc.R. 6(A), we sua sponte remove this case from the accelerated calendar for the purpose
of issuing this opinion.
Clinton CA2021-05-016
{¶ 2} An officer was on duty in a marked cruiser when he observed Williams driving
her vehicle on a street in Wilmington, Ohio. The officer recognized Williams from prior
encounters with her, and learned through police dispatch that Williams had a suspended
driver's license. The officer performed a traffic stop, and Williams acknowledged that she
was aware of her license suspension.
{¶ 3} During his investigation into Williams' suspended license, the officer asked
Williams if she had any weapons in her vehicle. Williams answered that she did not. The
officer then asked, "nothing in the car I need to know about at all?" When Williams again
answered "no," the officer asked, "would you mind if I looked?" and Williams responded, "I
don't care." Williams then exited her vehicle, leaving her purse in the front seat.
{¶ 4} The officer searched the car, including her purse, and discovered a plastic
bag of methamphetamine within Williams' purse. Williams was indicted on one count of
aggravated possession of drugs. Williams filed a motion to suppress. The trial court held
a hearing during which the officer testified, and a video was shown of the stop as recorded
on the officer's body camera.
{¶ 5} After the hearing, the trial court ruled in favor of Williams, finding that the
search violated Williams' Fourth Amendment rights because her voluntary consent to
search her car did not extend to the search of her purse. The state now appeals the trial
court's ruling, raising the following assignment of error:
{¶ 6} WHETHER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IS VIOLATED WHERE A
DEFENDANT VOLUNTARY [SIC] CONSENTS TO THE SEARCH OF HER AUTOMOBILE
AND THE OFFICER EXTENDS THE SEARCH TO THE CONTENTS OF ANY
CONTAINERS FOUND WITHIN SAID VEHICLE.
{¶ 7} The state argues in its assignment of error that the trial court erred in granting
Williams' motion to suppress.
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{¶ 8} Appellate review of a ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed
question of law and fact. State v. Taste, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2020-06-012, 2021-
Ohio-3286, ¶ 11-12. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court, as the trier of
fact, is in the best position to weigh the evidence in order to resolve factual questions and
evaluate witness credibility. State v. Nelson, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2017-08-042,
2018-Ohio-2819, ¶ 17. Thus, we are bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact if they
are supported by competent, credible evidence. Id.{¶ 9} An appellate court, however, independently reviews the trial court's legal
conclusions based on those facts and determines, without deference to the trial court's
decision, whether as a matter of law, the facts satisfy the appropriate legal standard. State
v. Reedijk, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2020-12-086, 2021-Ohio-2879.
{¶ 10} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution assures the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Marcum, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2017-05-057, 2018-Ohio-1009. Warrantless searches and seizures are unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment except for a few well-delineated exceptions, one of which is
consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973). "A police
officer's request for consent to search a vehicle stopped for a traffic violation is valid if it is
made, and voluntary consent is obtained, during the period of time reasonably necessary
to process the traffic citation * * * in other words, while the driver is lawfully detained for the
traffic violation." State v. Sexton, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2019-08-133, 2020-Ohio-4179, ¶
25.
{¶ 11} In support of its argument that the officer did not violate Williams' rights, the
state relies upon State v. Tepfenhart, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2018-CA-130, 2019-Ohio-4599. In
that case, an officer stopped a vehicle because the driver was driving erratically. The officer
suspected the driver was under the influence of narcotics and asked the driver for consent
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to search the vehicle, but did not inform the driver of his purpose for searching. The driver
gave consent without limitation. The officer searched the car, including a purse that was in
the front of the vehicle. Inside the purse, the officer located a flexible glasses case that was
open on one side. Within the case, the officer discovered a napkin wrapped around two
plastic baggies of heroin. When the driver moved to suppress the drugs, the trial court
denied the request, and the driver appealed.
{¶ 12} The Tepfenhart court determined that the driver's open-ended consent to
search her vehicle extended to consent to search the purse found within. The court noted
that the standard for measuring the scope of consent is that of "objective reasonableness
– what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the
police officer and the [consenting person]?" Id. at ¶ 8. As such, the subjective intentions
of the requesting officer or driver are not relevant. Id. citing United States v. Mendoza-
Gonzalez, 318 F.3d 663, 667 (5th Cir.2003).
{¶ 13} The court noted that the United States Supreme Court has determined that
consent to search a vehicle can include closed containers within it when such consent is
granted without limitation. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 111 S.C.t 1801 (1991). "Thus,
when a person is informed of the item or items (usually drugs, weapons, or both) for which
the consent to search is being sought, and then consent is granted without limitation, the
consent includes unlocked but closed containers (such as a purse) that could contain the
announced subject of the search." Id. at ¶ 10, citing State v. Boling, 2d Dist. Montgomery
No. 25310, 2013-Ohio-4813, ¶ 21; State v. Stepp, 4th Dist. Scioto No. 09CA3328, 2010-
Ohio-3540, ¶ 31.
{¶ 14} The Tepfenhart court then went on to analyze whether consent is extended
to closed, but easily opened, containers within the vehicle when the officer does not inform
the driver of what he or she is looking for. The court concluded that a driver's "general
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open-ended consent included her purse and the glasses case within the purse. A person
who grants an open-ended consent to search her vehicle should reasonably understand
that the search will include readily-opened, closed containers located inside the vehicle."
The court further determined that the officer's failure to articulate the reason for the
requested consent did not alter the conclusion "because a reasonable person should
understand that a police officer seeking general permission to search a vehicle is looking
for evidence of illegal activity * * * [and] that such evidence might be [located] in closed
containers." Id.{¶ 15} In the case sub judice, the officer directly asked Williams if there were any
weapons in her vehicle and when she responded no, asked again whether there was
anything in the car he needed to know about. When Williams again answered no, the officer
asked if she would mind if he checked. Thus, Williams was expressly aware that the officer
would be searching the vehicle for weapons or other items the officer would have needed
to know about, which could be easily found in her purse. The fact that the officer may have
actually been looking for drugs does not change the fact that Williams was readily aware of
the parameters of the officer's intended search, and that a search for weapons or items of
interest to a police officer would include her purse.
{¶ 16} However, and even if Williams was not aware that the officer could search for
weapons or instrumentalities of a crime, her open-ended consent included the purse
because a reasonable person would understand that an officer who asks for permission to
search an area is looking for evidence of illegal activity, which can be located in containers
within the vehicle.
{¶ 17} The trial court did not analyze the issue in this manner. Instead, the trial court
relied upon a case wherein a driver with multiple passengers was stopped. State v.
Raslovsky, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2019-CA-55, 2020-Ohio-515. The driver gave officers
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consent to search her own car and purse, but the court determined that the driver's consent
to search her own purse and vehicle did not extend to a search of the passenger's purse.
However, the facts of the case sub judice are readily distinguishable from Raslovsky
because Williams, who was the driver rather than a passenger, gave the officer consent to
search her own vehicle in which her own purse was located. Thus, the trial court's reliance
upon Raslovsky was misplaced.
{¶ 18} The correct inquiry is whether a reasonable person would have understood
that by the officer asking about weapons or items he needed to know about and then asking
to "check" the vehicle, that officer could search containers within the vehicle. The answer
here is that such understanding is reasonable under the circumstances where the officer
specifically referenced weapons or other items he needed to know about, Williams
responded that there were none, and then gave an open-ended and limitless consent to the
officer to verify her response by searching her vehicle.
{¶ 19} After reviewing the record, we find that Williams gave her consent to search
her vehicle and that such consent applied to the purse she left in the front seat. As such,
the trial court erred in granting Williams' motion to suppress and the state's single
assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 20} Judgment reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
HENDRICKSON and BYRNE, JJ., concur.
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