State v. Stroub , 2011 Ohio 169 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Stroub, 
    2011-Ohio-169
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
    WYANDOT COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,                                CASE NO. 16-10-02
    v.
    EDWARD D. STROUB,                                          OPINION
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    Appeal from Wyandot County Common Pleas Court
    Trial Court No. 09 CR 0032
    Judgment Affirmed
    Date of Decision: January 18, 2011
    APPEARANCES:
    Scott B. Johnson for Appellant
    Jonathan K. Miller for Appellee
    Case No. 16-10-02
    WILLAMOWSKI, J.
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant Edward D. Stroub (“Stroub”) brings this appeal
    from the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Wyandot County. For the
    reasons set forth below, the judgment is affirmed.
    {¶2} On April 29, 2009, the Wyandot County Grand Jury indicted Stroub
    on two counts of trafficking in a Schedule II controlled substance in violation of
    R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) with specifications that the sales occurred within the vicinity
    of a school and one count of trafficking in a Schedule III controlled substance in
    violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) with a specification that the sale occurred within
    the vicinity of a school.1 The arraignment was held on April 30, 2009, and Stroub
    entered pleas of not guilty to all counts. On March 30, 2010, Stroub entered into a
    plea agreement with the State.                 The plea agreement set forth the following
    conditions.
    Defendant shall plead guilty to Count One of the Indictment
    (F4) [trafficking in Schedule II controlled substance]. The State
    will dismiss the School Specification to County One.
    The State will dismiss Count Two and the School Specification
    to County Two.
    The State will amend Count Three to less than the bulk amount.
    Defendant shall plead guilty to Count Three of the Indictment
    (F3) [trafficking in Schedule II controlled substance], as
    amended, and the School Specification to Count Three.
    1
    All three counts also contained criminal forfeiture specifications as well. Upon the State’s motion, the
    trial court dismissed these specifications on March 23, 2010.
    -2-
    Case No. 16-10-02
    The State and Defendant will jointly recommend a basic prison
    term of twelve (12) months on Count One and a basic prison of
    (sic) two (2) years on Count Three, consecutive to each other.
    Agreement, 3. The trial court held a change of plea hearing and discussed the
    terms of the plea agreement with Stroub. Stroub then signed the agreement in
    open court and the trial court accepted the plea.
    {¶3} On April 15, 2010, a sentencing hearing was held. The trial court
    sentenced Stroub to twelve months in prison for Count One and three years in
    prison for Count Three. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively
    for a total sentence of four years. Stroub appeals the judgment and raises the
    following assignments of error.
    First Assignment of Error
    The trial court erred in accepting [Stroub’s] criminal rule
    waiver at the plea hearing in that it was not knowing and
    voluntary with respect to the school specification.
    Second Assignment of Error
    [Stroub’s] conviction of trafficking with a school specification
    was not supported by the sufficiency of the evidence with
    respect to the school specification.
    Third Assignment of Error
    The counsel for [Stroub] provided ineffect (sic) assistance of
    counsel.
    -3-
    Case No. 16-10-02
    {¶4} Stroub alleges in his first assignment of error that his guilty plea
    was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. Specifically, Stroub claims that his
    guilty plea to the school specification was not clear.
    (B) Effect of guilty or no contest pleas. With reference to the
    offense or offenses to which the plea is entered:
    (1) The plea of guilty is a complete admission of the
    defendant’s guilt.
    ***
    (C) Pleas of guilty and no contest in felony cases.
    ***
    (1) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of
    guilty or a plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of
    guilty or no contest without first addressing the defendant
    personally and doing all of the following:
    (a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
    voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and
    of the maximum penalty involved, and if applicable, that the
    defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
    community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing
    (b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
    defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
    contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may
    proceed with judgment and sentence.
    (c) Informing the defendant and determining that the
    defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is waiving
    the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against him or her,
    to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in the
    defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the
    defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which
    -4-
    Case No. 16-10-02
    the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or
    herself.
    Crim.R. 11.
    {¶5} Here, Stroub claims that since he did not clearly enter a guilty plea
    to the school specification, the trial court erred in accepting his plea. A review of
    the record reveals the following dialogue between the trial court and Stroub.
    The Court: All right. Mr. Stroub, as to the first aggravated
    trafficking in drugs charge that it’s proposed you’re going to
    plead to, tell me what your understanding of the penalty
    associated with this charge, what that is, the maximum penalty.
    The Defendant: I got it wrote – I got it wrote down here. Is that
    the third degree or the fourth degree?
    The Court: That would be the felony of the fourth degree.
    The Defendant: Yeah. I just started reading it. Is says that I
    can get up to a year, I think, eighteen months. I didn’t read the
    rest of it. Yeah. Eighteen months is on that second sheet. Yeah.
    I seen (sic) that.
    The Court: And you could get a maximum fine of $5,000?
    The Defendant: Right.
    The Court: An also on the felony of the third degree that you
    are proposing to plead to, can you tell me what the maximum
    fine for that is?
    The Defendant: Up to ten thousand.
    The Court: And do you understand at least five thousand is
    mandatory?
    The Defendant: That’s what it says, yeah.
    -5-
    Case No. 16-10-02
    The Court: Can you tell me what the maximum time in prison
    is you could receive?
    The Defendant: It says five years.
    The Court: And you understand you could receive five years if
    you got the maximum penalty?
    The Defendant: That’s what it says, yes.
    ***
    The Court: do you understand the nature of these charges and
    the possible defenses you might have to them?
    The Defendant: Yes.
    The Court: Are you entering this plea voluntarily and of your
    own free will?
    The Defendant: yes.
    ***
    The Court: Well, let’s read the sentence recommendation. It
    says, Defendant shall plead guilty to Count One in the
    indictment, F4. The State will dismiss the school specification to
    Count One. State will dismiss Count Two and the school
    specification to Count Two. State will amend Count Three to
    less than the bulk amount. Defendant shall plead guilty to
    Count Three of the indictment, an F3 as amended, and the
    school specification to Count Three.
    ***
    The Court: Again, Mr. Stroub, are you entering this plea
    voluntarily?
    The Defendant: Yes.
    -6-
    Case No. 16-10-02
    The Court: You may sign the plea.
    March 30, 2010 Transcript, 5-14 (emphasis added). Stroub then signed the plea
    agreement in open court. Although Stroub later questioned whether the school
    was within 1,000 feet of his home, the State stated that GPS mapping was done
    and Stroub’s home was within the required distance for the specification. Tr. 16.
    The trial court then questioned Stroub as to whether he admitted the specification.
    The Defendant: If that’s what they say. I didn’t measure it.
    I’m just going by what they’re saying.
    The Court: Well, I need to know you know what the amended
    indictment, what it accuses you of in Count One and in Count
    Three with the specification and you’re admitting to those
    allegations.
    The Defendant: I thought they was (sic) dropping that school
    specification. Okay. I thought they was (sic) dropping it. Like
    I said, if they’re saying it’s within one thousand feet, I have no
    way of measuring it.
    The Court: But what I’m saying is you’re admitting to what
    you’re accused of in the amended indictment in Count 1 and
    Count 3?
    The Defendant: Yes.
    Tr. 17. Despite the fact that Stroub stated that he did not know about the school
    specification remaining for Count Three, a review of the record indicates that the
    trial court informed him that the specification as to Count Three was remaining
    and that Count Three would be an F3. Thus the record supports a conclusion that
    -7-
    Case No. 16-10-02
    the guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. The first assignment of
    error is overruled.
    {¶6} In his second assignment of error, Stroub argues that the school
    specification was not supported by sufficient evidence. Crim.R.11(B)(1) provides
    that a guilty plea is a complete admission of guilt. By entering a guilty plea, one
    waives the requirement that the State prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). The guilty plea itself provides all the necessary proof of the
    elements of the offense and is sufficient evidence to support the conviction. State
    v. Fuller, 12th Dist. No. CA2008-09-240, 
    2009-Ohio-5068
    , ¶105. Since Stroub
    entered a guilty plea to the offenses, including the school specification, he cannot
    now argue that the evidence is insufficient. Thus, the second assignment of error
    is overruled.
    {¶7} Finally, Stroub claims that he was denied effective assistance of
    counsel. “Reversal of convictions on ineffective assistance requires the defendant
    to show ‘first that counsel’s performance was deficient and, second that the
    deficient performance prejudice the defense so as to deprive the defendant of a
    fair trial.’” State v. Cassano, 
    96 Ohio St.3d 94
    , 
    2002-Ohio-3751
    , ¶105, 
    772 N.E.2d 81
    . The defendant must show that there was a reasonable probability that
    but for counsel’s error, the result of the trial would have been different. Id. at
    ¶108.
    -8-
    Case No. 16-10-02
    {¶8} Stroub argues that counsel was ineffective for not speaking up at the
    change of plea hearing concerning the school specification and for not clarifying
    the State’s sentencing memorandum. However, in both instances, the trial court
    was aware of the facts. The trial court specifically questioned Stroub about his
    plea to the school specification. As discussed above, Stroub voluntarily and
    knowingly entered his guilty plea. The trial court also heard Stroub’s statement as
    to the involvement of the third party to the sales. The trial court acknowledged
    that Stroub had twice facilitated drug sales from his home near a school. Stroub
    has not indicated in any way how the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel
    prejudiced him. Without a showing of prejudice, the third assignment of error
    must be overruled.
    {¶9} Having found no error prejudicial to Stroub, the judgment of the
    Court of Common Pleas of Wyandot County is affirmed.
    Judgment Affirmed
    ROGERS P.J., and PRESTON, J., concur.
    /jlr
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16-10-02

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 169

Judges: Willamowski

Filed Date: 1/18/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014