State v. Mogle , 2013 Ohio 5342 ( 2013 )

[Cite as State v. Mogle, 2013-Ohio-5342.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DARKE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO
Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
JOSEPH S. MOGLE
Defendant-Appellant
Appellate Case Nos. 2013-CA-4/
2013-CA-5
Trial Court Case Nos. 2012-CR-191/
2013-CR-21
(Criminal Appeal from
(Common Pleas Court)
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OPINION
Rendered on the 6th day of December, 2013.
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R. KELLY ORMSBY, III, by DEBORAH S. QUIGLEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0055455, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, Darke County Prosecutor’s Office, 504 South Broadway Street, Greenville,
Ohio 45331
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
DARRELL L. HECKMAN, Atty. Reg No. 0002389, One Monument Square, Suite 200, Urbana, Ohio
43078
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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WELBAUM, J.
{¶ 1} We are asked to decide whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant,
Joseph S. Mogle’s, motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. We find that the trial court abused its
discretion, and we vacate the guilty pleas and reverse the convictions.
{¶ 2} Where a preponderance of the evidence on the record demonstrates that Mogle
entered pleas of guilty after his attorney mistakenly told him, due to the attorney’s
misunderstanding, that the trial court promised that it would sentence Mogle to community
control and he was sentenced to prison, the trial court erred in not granting Mogle’s motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas.
{¶ 3} The record supports Mogle’s claim by a preponderance of the evidence that
Mogle relied upon a nonexistent promise that he would receive community control. First, his
attorney verified in the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas that due to having misunderstood
what the judge said, the attorney told Mogle that the trial court had promised to sentence him to
community control. Secondly, the trial court did not inquire of Mogle during the Rule 11 plea
colloquy whether he was relying on any promises not contained in the plea form. Thirdly, at the
time of sentencing, the record and docket indicate that the trial court and counsel were in
possession of a letter from the Defendant stating and attempting to verify the promise, but the
import of the letter was not discussed on the record. Fourthly, the attorney seemingly alluded to
the promise on the record at sentencing. Finally, the trial court verified in its order overruling the
motion that it had discussed tentative sentencing results with defense counsel, but made no
promises.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
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{¶ 4} Mogle was under supervision of community control for unlawful sexual conduct
with a minor, a felony of the 4th degree, that is the subject of a companion appeal in 2d Dist.
Darke No. 2013-CA-3. While under this supervision, Mogle was charged with two counts of
failure of duty to register, R.C. 2950.04(E) and 2950.99, felonies of the fourth degree, and
Aggravated Arson, R.C. 2909.02(A)(2), a felony of the second degree.
{¶ 5} On March 20, 2013, Mogle entered pleas of guilty to a reduced charge of arson,
R.C. 2909.03(A)(1), (2d Dist. Darke No. 2013-CA-5 ) and one count of failure of duty to register,
both felonies of the fourth degree. (2d Dist. Darke No. 2013-CA-4 ). These two appeals have
been consolidated herein.
{¶ 6} The State orally recommended prison as part of the plea bargain. The plea form
which Mogle signed stated: “No promises have been made except as part of this plea agreement
stated entirely as follows.” The blanks that followed were completed and indicated that no
promises had been made except the reduction, dismissal, and restitution which were described.
The plea form stated that the State recommended a prison sentence. The trial court did not ask
Mogle during the hearing if he had been promised anything else.
{¶ 7} When the trial court asked Defense Counsel if he had anything to say, he stated:
“Mr. Mogle is aware of certain discussions we’ve had in the meantime with the court, and
I think he has something [inaudible] that as well.” Tr., p. 4.
{¶ 8} The court held a sentencing and community control violation hearing on March
28, 2013. At the hearing, the trial court acknowledged receiving a letter from the Defendant the
previous day. A letter signed by Mogle dated March 26 was file-stamped March 29 at 8:21 a.m.,
and is part of the record. The court gave the Defendant’s letter to Defense Counsel. The letter was
not marked for identification but is apparently the one file-stamped the next day. It reads in part:
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I was supposed to be sentenced on March 25th and it was rescheduled for
some reason but I know that you and my attorney talked about my cases and some
of what will happen. I was informed that I wasn’t going to prison on these 2
Felony 4's. I just want to make sure that’s what the agreement was.
{¶ 9} The transcript indicates a pause in the proceedings after Defense Counsel
received the letter. When the proceedings recommenced, there was no further discussion on the
record concerning the letter or the alleged promise. The Adult Probation Department
recommended a prison term at the sentencing. The trial court sentenced Mogle to a prison term
of ten months on each charge, to be served concurrently, and a term of ten months of prison on
the probation violation, to be served consecutively to the two other concurrent ten-month terms.
{¶ 10} On April 24, 2013, Mogle’s Attorney filed a motion to withdraw the pleas of
guilty on the basis that Counsel was under the impression that an agreement had been made with
the Court in which the Defendant would receive a sentence of community control sanctions.
Counsel stated in the motion that although he was evidently mistaken about what the trial court
said, he had conveyed the promise to the Defendant, who relied upon the representation in
entering the guilty pleas.
{¶ 11} The court did not conduct a hearing on the motion. The trial court’s order
overruling the motion described its customary participation in cases, where it stated:
Contrary to the practice of some jurists who often have many years of
experience, this Court customarily directly participates in the extensive pre-trial
discussions with counsel regarding the facts of the case, the needs for evidentiary
hearings and the parameters of sentence which may be imposed. This practice of
engagement has been undertaken in order to make it somewhat easier for both
5
counsel to anticipate the conclusion of the case with the goal of maximizing the
efficiency of docket management (i.e. to try those cases worthy of a trial and to
plea those cases worthy of a plea). Such practice also helps the Court understand
and anticipate evidentiary and procedural matters.
Other Judges do not engage in this process. In such cases, if a case
proceeds to sentencing, their sentencing decisions are based merely on matters
which appear on the record, such as the recommendations of counsel, pre-sentence
investigations and related materials. Such distanced approach reduces the
likelihood of motions such as the one raised herein. Judgment Entry, Doc. #33,
p.3.
The trial court also described its participation in this case. Its order states:
Given the number of charges and their nature, numerous conversations
occurred between counsel and the Court. A plea offer by the State in Case No.
13-CR-00021 included amending the charge to Arson, a fourth degree felony; as
such, the presumptions against prison and the preference for community control
sanctions as incorporated in H.B. 86 were considered. At the last conference with
counsel, the Court indicated its perspective that a local sanction appeared
appropriate but that the perspective of the Adult Probation Department would
weigh significantly. Mr. Mogle’s community control sanction was imposed July
20, 2012 and the Probation Department would best know his amenability for
continued community control sanctions. Id. at p.2.
{¶ 12} Mogle appeals the trial court’s order overruling the motion to withdraw the two
guilty pleas.
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II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 13} Mogle states the following assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION
TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEA.
{¶ 14} Mogle’s statement of issue presented for review states: “Is a criminal defendant
who pleads guilty in reliance on his trial counsel’s promise that he will receive community
control, entitled to withdraw his guilty plea if Counsel’s justified representations are inaccurate?”
{¶ 15} We answer this question in the affirmative under the circumstances of this case.
We have emphasized the fact sensitive nature of this issue and limit our holding in this case to
the particular facts presented. In State v. McComb, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 22570, 22571,
2009-Ohio-295, ¶ 8, we stated:
The standard used to evaluate post-sentence motions for withdrawal asks whether
a manifest injustice will afflict the defendant if the plea is not withdrawn. See
Crim. R. 32.1. “Manifest injustice” eludes a single definition. The concept is
flexible and whether it exists depends on the facts and circumstances in each case.
(Citation omitted).
{¶ 16} The trial court’s determinations under Crim. R. 32.1 are reviewed by an abuse
of discretion standard. McComb, at ¶ 10, citing State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St. 3d 521, 584 N.E.2d 715
(1992). See, also, State v. Blatnik, 17 Ohio App. 3d 201, 202, 478 N.E.2d 1016 (6th Dist.1984).
{¶ 17} The trial court did not order a hearing on Mogle’s motion to withdraw the pleas.
The first issue is whether Mogle was entitled to a hearing on the motion. We have previously
stated:
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A hearing on a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not
necessary if the facts alleged by the defendant, even if accepted as true, would not
require the court to grant the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. E.g., State v.
Blatnik (1984), 17 Ohio App. 3d 201, 204. Where nothing in the record supports a
defendant’s claim that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made other than
his own self-serving affidavit or statement, the record is insufficient to overcome
the presumption that the plea was voluntary. (Citation omitted). State v. Burkhart,
2d Dist. Champaign No. 07-CA-26, 2008-Ohio-4387, ¶ 12.
{¶ 18} The first issue we address is whether a hearing should have been held on the
motion to withdraw. To begin the analysis, we must assume that Mogle’s allegation is true. If
the assumption leads to the conclusion that the motion should be granted, the first part of the test
of whether to hold a hearing is satisfied. Here, Mogle’s motion states that his attorney told him
that the judge promised him a community control sentence, although the attorney was mistaken.
The attorney’s statement to Mogle was in the form of a judge’s promise, not a mere prediction.
Therefore, for the reasons stated below, the first consideration in favor of a hearing was satisfied.
{¶ 19} The second issue is whether there is any evidence on the record supporting a
claim of an involuntary plea in addition to Mogle’s self-serving affidavit or statement. There
was sufficient corroboration to require an evidentiary hearing.
{¶ 20} Mogle’s attorney acknowledged in the motion and memorandum that he
conveyed the promise (due to misunderstanding the Court) to Mogle. When called upon by the
trial court to speak at sentencing, Defense Counsel stated, “Mr. Mogle is aware of certain
discussions we have had in the meantime with the court * * *.” Also, Mogle’s belief and reliance
are corroborated by his letter, which the trial court gave to his attorney at the sentencing hearing,
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and was later made part of the record. Finally, the trial court did not ask Mogle during the plea
colloquy whether Mogle was relying on any promises other than those detailed in the plea form.
{¶ 21} The State argued that there was evidence on the record that undermined the
plausibility of Mogle’s belief in the promise. However, such evidence is not definitive.
{¶ 22} The trial court stated at the change of plea hearing that it needed to confer with
the probation officer for an update on the Defendant’s progress. However, this does not eliminate
the possibility of a promised community control sentence. The information may have been
needed to determine the conditions of either a community control sentence or prison.
{¶ 23} The State points to its recommendation for a prison sentence as evidence that
community control was obviously not promised. However, the State also notes that the plea form
states that “recommendations by the parties are not binding and the judge has full discretion to
pronounce such sentence as the judge may determine to be appropriate.” If the judge had
promised community control as the Defendant was told, the plea form indicates that the court is
not bound by the State’s recommendation. The form also states that the judge has full discretion
to sentence as it may determine to be appropriate. From Mogle’s view that could be reasonably
interpreted to mean the judge had the discretion to impose a community control sentence as
promised.
{¶ 24} The answers to both parts of the test requiring a hearing were satisfied.
Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by not conducting an evidentiary hearing on the
motion to withdraw the guilty pleas.
{¶ 25} The next issue we must resolve is whether the trial court abused its discretion by
overruling the motion. We have previously discussed the law concerning when a defendant may
withdraw a post-sentencing plea by stating that:
9
A change of heart after becoming aware of an imminent, unexpectedly
harsh sentence does not entitle a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. Long at
*17. A manifest injustice generally does not result when a defendant holds (as he
discovers) a mistaken belief that his sentence would be significantly lighter than
the one actually imposed. See State v. Lambros (1988), 44 Ohio App. 3d 102, 541
N.E.2d 632. The reason for the belief is key. If defense counsel caused the belief,
what counsel exactly said must be examined. A manifest injustice does not
necessarily arise merely because counsel is wrong about the sentence that is
actually imposed. Only if counsel promised the defendant that a guilty plea will
result in a lower sentence than is actually imposed would a manifest injustice
potentially result. See State v. Blatnik (1984), 17 Ohio App. 3d 725, 478 N.E.2d
1016. If counsel simply made a prediction, there would be no manifest injustice.
Id. In other words, counsel’s erroneous advice and incorrect speculation
regarding the sentence that is likely to be imposed potentially results in a manifest
injustice only if counsel said that a guilty plea will result in a particular sentence,
but not if counsel said that it probably will result. (Emphasis added). McComb, 2d
Dist. Montgomery Nos. 22570, 22571, 2009-Ohio-295, at ¶ 9.
{¶ 26} The reason for the Defendant’s belief is key. If the Defense Attorney told the
Defendant what he speculated the sentence would be, and the attorney was mistaken, there is no
manifest injustice. If the Defense Attorney promised the Defendant what the sentence would be
and he is sentenced to more, manifest injustice is potentially present. Id.
III. CONCLUSION
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{¶ 27} Although the plea form states no other promises were made, the weight of the
evidence heavily favors Mogle’s motion. Mogle proved by a preponderance of the evidence that
he relied on a promise for a community control sentence and demonstrated manifest injustice
from the record. The trial court abused its discretion when it did not hold an evidentiary hearing
and overruled Mogle’s motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
{¶ 28} We sustain Mogle’s assignment of error. The order overruling Mogle’s motions
to withdraw his pleas of guilty is reversed, the guilty pleas are vacated, and the convictions are
reversed. The matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. It is so
ordered.
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FROELICH and HALL, JJ., concur.
Copies mailed to:
R. Kelly Ormsby, III
Deborah S. Quigley
Darrell L. Heckman
Hon. Jonathan P. Hein