State ex rel. Elder v. Matia , 2014 Ohio 3598 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as State ex rel. Elder v. Matia, 
    2014-Ohio-3598
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 101195
    STATE EX REL. EMMANUEL ELDER
    RELATOR
    vs.
    JUDGE DAVID T. MATIA
    RESPONDENT
    JUDGMENT:
    WRIT DISMISSED
    Writ of Prohibition
    Motion No. 475284
    Order No. 477267
    RELEASED DATE:                  August 19, 2014
    -i-
    FOR RELATOR
    Emmanule Elder, pro se
    Inmate No. A644-514, RI.C.I.
    Mansfield Correctional Institution
    P.O. Box 8107
    Mansfield, Ohio 44901
    ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENT
    Timothy McGinty
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    By: James E. Moss
    Assistant County Prosecutor
    9th Floor Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.:
    {¶1} On April 1, 2014, the relator, Emmanuel Elder, commenced this prohibition
    action against the respondent, Judge David T. Matia, to prevent the judge from trying him
    in the underlying case, State v. Elder, Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-13-573101-A.                  Elder
    argues that the trial court lacks jurisdiction because the necessary traffic ticket was not
    issued and because the trial judge ignored his notice of availability.         The respondent,
    through the Cuyahoga County prosecutor, moved to dismiss on May 29, 2014. Elder
    never filed a response. For the following reasons, this court grants the motion to dismiss.
    {¶2} The principles governing prohibition are well established. Its requisites are
    (1) the respondent against whom it is sought is about to exercise judicial power, (2) the
    exercise of such power is unauthorized by law, and (3) there is no adequate remedy at law.
    State ex rel. Largent v. Fisher, 
    43 Ohio St.3d 160
    , 
    540 N.E.2d 239
     (1989). Prohibition
    will not lie unless it clearly appears that the court has no jurisdiction of the cause that it is
    attempting to adjudicate or the court is about to exceed its jurisdiction.    State ex rel. Ellis
    v. McCabe, 
    138 Ohio St. 417
    , 
    35 N.E.2d 571
     (1941), paragraph three of the syllabus.
    “The writ will not issue to prevent an erroneous judgment, or to serve the purpose of
    appeal, or to correct mistakes of the lower court in deciding questions within its
    jurisdiction.” State ex rel. Sparto v. Juvenile Court of Darke Cty., 
    153 Ohio St. 64
    , 65,
    
    90 N.E.2d 598
     (1950). Furthermore, it should be used with great caution and not issue in
    a doubtful case. State ex rel. Merion v. Tuscarawas Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
    137 Ohio St. 273
    , 
    28 N.E.2d 641
     (1940).         Nevertheless, when a court is patently and
    unambiguously without jurisdiction to act whatsoever, the availability or adequacy of a
    remedy is immaterial to the issuance of a writ of prohibition. State ex rel. Tilford v.
    Crush, 
    39 Ohio St.3d 174
    , 
    529 N.E.2d 1245
     (1988); and State ex rel. Csank v. Jaffe, 
    107 Ohio App.3d 387
    , 
    668 N.E.2d 996
     (8th Dist.1995). However, absent such a patent and
    unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having general jurisdiction of the subject matter
    of an action has authority to determine its own jurisdiction. A party challenging the
    court’s jurisdiction has an adequate remedy at law via an appeal from the court’s holding
    that it has jurisdiction. State ex rel. Rootstown Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Portage
    Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 489
    , 
    678 N.E.2d 1365
     (1997).          Moreover,
    the court has discretion in issuing the writ of prohibition. State ex rel. Gilligan v.
    Hoddinott, 
    36 Ohio St.2d 127
    , 
    304 N.E.2d 382
     (1973).
    {¶3} In the underlying case, the grand jury indicted Elder for one count of failure
    to comply with order or signal of a police officer under R.C. 2921.331. According to the
    police report Elder attached to his complaint, the officers made a traffic stop on Lakeside
    Avenue because Elder’s van was impeding traffic and the officers observed a
    hand-to-hand transaction between two males.       When the officers approached the van,
    the van fled, forcing the officers to return to their car and give chase.   Eventually, the
    officers terminated the chase but were able to identify Elder as the van’s driver when they
    pulled up the van’s license plate.
    {¶4} Elder’s first argument is that because this case is a traffic case, the Ohio
    Traffic Rules necessarily govern.       The officers never issued a requisite traffic ticket to
    vest any court with jurisdiction over the underlying case.          In State v. Elder, 11th Dist.
    Lake No. 2013-L-128, 
    2014-Ohio-2567
    , the court of appeals rejected this argument.                In
    that case, the grand jury indicted Elder for failure to comply with order or signal of a
    police officer and other traffic offenses.    The court ruled that the indictment provided the
    court with the proper jurisdiction on all the charges.           “Even if the tickets were not
    properly filed or did not contain all of the information Elder believes was necessary, the
    fact that he was indicted would remedy that issue.” Id. at ¶ 18.            The Eleventh District
    concluded by noting that grand juries may indict originally without a complaint in another
    court. Therefore, the indictment vested the respondent with jurisdiction pursuant to R.C.
    2931.03, and the first claim is meritless.
    {¶5} Elder’s second argument is that in June and October 2013, he filed a notice
    of availability and request for trial on the pending charges pursuant to R.C. 2941.401.1
    He continues that because he has not been brought to trial in a timely manner pursuant to
    that statute, the trial court has lost jurisdiction to adjudicate his case. However, in State
    ex rel. Bowling v. Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton Cty., 
    24 Ohio St.2d 158
    , 
    265 N.E.2d 296
     (1970), the Supreme Court of Ohio refused to grant an extraordinary writ to
    enforce R.C. 2941.401 because filing a motion to dismiss in the trial court was the proper
    and adequate remedy at law.        If necessary, a defendant would have further remedy by
    1
    The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction’s website shows that Elder is serving
    a 30-month sentence for failure to comply with order or signal of a police officer.
    way of appeal.   Henderson v. Lebarron, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84030, 
    2004-Ohio-1002
    .
    Because an adequate remedy at law exists, prohibition will not lie.
    {¶6} Similarly, Elder’s other complaints concerning the lack of probable cause,
    improper identification, lack of evidence, police and prosecutorial misconduct, improper
    waiver of a preliminary hearing, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel do not deprive a
    trial court of jurisdiction. Such matters are within the trial court’s jurisdiction, and if
    necessary, any error may be remedied on appeal. State ex rel. Nalls v. Russo, 
    90 Ohio St.3d 410
    , 
    2002-Ohio-4907
    , 
    775 N.E.2d 522
    ; and        State v. Thorne, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
    No. 85024, 
    2004-Ohio-6288
    .
    {¶7} Relator also did not comply with R.C. 2969.25(C), which requires that an
    inmate file a certified statement from his prison cashier setting forth the balance in his
    private account for each of the preceding six months.      This also is sufficient reason to
    deny the mandamus, deny indigency status and assess costs against the relator.      State ex
    rel. Pamer v. Collier, 
    108 Ohio St.3d 492
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1507
    , 
    844 N.E.2d 842
    ; and Hazel v.
    Knab, 
    130 Ohio St.3d 22
    , 
    2011-Ohio-4608
    , 
    955 N.E.2d 378
    .
    {¶8} Accordingly, this court grants the respondent’s motion to dismiss and
    dismisses Elder’s complaint for a writ of prohibition. Relator to pay costs. This court
    directs the clerk of court to serve all parties notice of this judgment and its date of entry
    upon the journal as required by Civ.R. 58(B).
    ________________________________________
    PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, JUDGE
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
    EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR