State v. Glasser , 2012 Ohio 3265 ( 2012 )

[Cite as State v. Glasser, 2012-Ohio-3265.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ATHENS COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, : Case No. 11CA11
:
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
: DECISION AND
v. : JUDGMENT ENTRY
:
TERRENCE GLASSER, :
: RELEASED: 06/27/12
Defendant-Appellant. :
______________________________________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Timothy Young, State Public Defender, and Stephen P. Hardwick, Assistant State
Public Defender, Columbus, Ohio, for appellant.
Keller J. Blackburn, Athens County Prosecutor, Athens, Ohio, for appellee.
______________________________________________________________________
Harsha, J.
{¶1} Terrence Glasser appeals his convictions for two counts of aggravated
arson for setting fire to his home and an outbuilding on his property. Glasser contends
that although the trial court gave the jury legally correct instructions on the mens rea
and causation elements for aggravated arson, the wording or formatting of the
causation instructions undercut the State’s burden to prove the required mens rea.
Specifically, he complains about the wording indicating he is responsible for “the natural
and foreseeable consequences” of his conduct. After reviewing the charge in its
entirety, we conclude that the trial court’s causation instruction did not dilute the mens
rea element of “knowingly,” which the jury had to find to convict Glasser.
{¶2} Next, Glasser complains that when he testified at trial, the court incorrectly
made him invoke the marital communications privilege in the jury’s presence. We agree
that the trial court erred because the jury could improperly infer that Glasser was hiding
Athens App. No. 11CA11 2
incriminating statements he made to his wife. However, the error was harmless given
the substantial other evidence of his guilt.
{¶3} Glasser also contends that the trial court erred when it conducted part of a
hearing on the admission of the State’s trial exhibits outside of his presence. Even if we
assume defense counsel did not waive Glasser’s right to be present, Glasser cannot
establish plain error. Glasser’s counsel was at the hearing, and deciding whether to
contest the admissibility of exhibits is a legal issue within the professional judgment of
counsel. Glasser does not argue that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance and
has not demonstrated that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for his
absence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
I. Facts
{¶4} A grand jury indicted Glasser on two counts of aggravated arson. He
pleaded not guilty to the charges, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial where
although several witnesses testified, only a summary of the evidence follows.
{¶5} Roman Brandau, a fire and explosion investigator for the Ohio State Fire
Marshall’s Office, testified that he investigated the incident on the Glassers’ property.
His investigation revealed that two fires had been intentionally set – one in an
outbuilding and one in a bedroom. When he interviewed Glasser at the hospital,
Brandau noticed a strong odor of petroleum distillate on him. Glasser agreed to give
Brandau his clothing for analysis. By the time Brandau retrieved fire debris bags from
his car, Glasser placed his shirt, jeans, and shoes in a bag. Brandau also found a
safety cap/lid and a handkerchief in the bag. Later testing revealed that all the items
had medium petroleum distillate on them, which could be from paint thinner, charcoal
Athens App. No. 11CA11 3
starter, or lamp oil. Brandau also collected newspaper remnants from the floor near a
side door because he thought the paper might have been used to accelerate the fire’s
movement from the outbuilding to the house. The remnants tested positive for medium
isoparaffinic product, which could be from mineral spirits or lamp oil.
{¶6} Brandau and another investigator interviewed Glasser again two days
later at Appalachian Behavioral Health Care (ABH), a state psychiatric hospital. During
the interview Glasser claimed that he did not remember starting the fire in the
outbuilding. But later, he said: “To the best … to the best of my * * * recollection, and
I’m not 100% sure if it’s correct is I just wadded up a bunch of papers and lit’em on fire.”
He did this in the “very back” of the outbuilding. Glasser told investigators he used a Bic
lighter he got from a toolbox and newspaper already in the outbuilding. Glasser put an
“X” on a diagram of the outbuilding to mark the location where he lit the papers on fire.
Although investigators did not tell Glasser where the fire originated, he marked the
exact area of origin investigators found – the southeast corner of the building. He also
acknowledged that he probably put newspaper by the side door to move the fire from
the outbuilding to the house. Glasser admitted that the thought of setting fire to the
house crossed his mind but was “99% sure” he did not set the house on fire. Glasser
acknowledged that he thought he wadded up newspaper inside the house but could not
remember where he placed it. Brandau admitted that during the interview Glasser had
a visible injury on his forehead and complained that his head hurt several times.
{¶7} Richard Casto, owner and operator of a fire investigation firm, testified that
State Farm hired him to evaluate the Glassers’ property. Casto concluded someone
intentionally set two fires on the property – one in the outbuilding and one in a bedroom.
Athens App. No. 11CA11 4
Casto found a “combustible trailer” in the house, i.e., newspapers and other papers laid
through a hallway into the bedroom to unnaturally move the fire from one area to
another. He knew the papers were on the floor before the fire because they were
adhered to the carpet, and “you could peel it up and the carpet was pristine below it * *
*.”
{¶8} A.G., Glasser’s seven-year old son, testified that before his dad walked
him to school the morning of the fires he was “acting kind of funny. And he had this big
chunk tooken out of his head. * * * And he was laying papers down.” A.G. explained
that Glasser was “wadding [papers] up a little bit and putting them down.” He saw
Glasser do this by a side door of the house and near a shelf by the front door. Robin
Warren, a Nelsonville-York City Schools bus driver, testified that when she saw Glasser
walking his son to school that day, he was “like staggering like he was, I don’t know, like
he was hurt or something because his face was all messed up.” According to Warren,
his face was red, and he had a cut on his nose.
{¶9} Margaret Whitmore, the Glassers’ next door neighbor, testified that the fire
from the Glassers’ outbuilding spread to her attached garage while she was home.
Whitmore’s daughter, Millie Gwilym, testified that when she saw the Glassers’
outbuilding engulfed in flames, she told her mother and ran to the Glassers’ front door.
She found it ajar and yelled to get the attention of any occupants. After getting no
response, she went inside and continued to yell. She did not see any smoke in the
house. Glasser entered the living room and seemed angry that Gwilym had come
inside. She told him about the fire, and he said “the fire department’s been called.”
Gwilym turned and left, thinking he would follow her outside. Instead, he shut and
Athens App. No. 11CA11 5
locked the door behind her. Later, Gwilym saw smoke coming from the side of the
Glassers’ house opposite from the outbuilding/her mother’s garage. A group of people
broke into the home and brought Glasser out.
{¶10} Elizabeth Glasser, the appellant’s wife, testified that she was at work
during the fires. Elizabeth claimed that she “knew immediately that [her husband] was
the one that set the house on fire because of the previous way he had treated [her].”
After the incident she filed for divorce. Elizabeth acknowledged that she received over
$100,000 in insurance benefits after the fires. However, she claimed that her husband
set up the policy through his employer, State Farm, and that before the fires she had no
idea of its value or that it was only in her name. Elizabeth testified that she received
less than half of the policy’s value because of her husband’s actions. Her sister, Angela
Taggart, testified that when Glasser was in the hospital after the fires she heard him tell
Elizabeth that “we can buy the house [on] Fork Street now[,]” and Elizabeth was “just
kind of dazed by that.”
{¶11} Glasser testified that he did not set the fires. After he walked A.G. to
school, he saw smoke coming from the corner of Mrs. Whitmore’s house but assumed
she was burning trash. Glasser went home to change for work but before he could
someone knocked on the front door. As he approached the door, a woman came
inside. She told him that his “building was on fire,” and he told her to immediately call
911. When the woman left, Glasser closed the door behind her and locked it “just out of
habit.” He looked out a window in the master bathroom to check on Mrs. Whitmore’s
burn barrel and saw black smoke coming from his outbuilding but no flames. Glasser
went inside the outbuilding but hit a wall of black smoke and started to choke. He tried
Athens App. No. 11CA11 6
to get out, slipped on something wet, and fell to the floor. Glasser testified that he
thought he hit his head on a weight bench and went unconscious because everything
after the fall was “kind of fuzzy,” and he could not “remember a hundred percent of
everything.” He also scraped his wrist, banged his hip, and injured his shin. Glasser
claimed that when he fell, his jeans, shirt, and shoes came into contact with the wet
substance on the floor. He managed to get back into the house, which was not on fire
at that time, and someone helped him out front. He was taken to the hospital and later
moved to ABH. Glasser admitted that no one ever diagnosed him with a concussion.
{¶12} Glasser claimed he could not remember much that occurred after the fall.
He did not recall talking to Brandau in the hospital and remembered little about his
second interview with Brandau and Investigator Stellfox. Glasser testified that he did
not think he was capable of coherently relaying what happened to investigators because
he was “very jumbled up on the events” and could not get his thoughts together. He
thought investigators coerced him. Glasser testified that he had “fallen and taken a
blow to the head,” and investigators “took advantage” of his state of mind.
{¶13} In addition, Glasser testified that the cap Brandau found in his bag of
clothing looked like the cap from a container of Roundup he used the night before the
fires when he tried to spray his driveway for weeds. Regarding newspaper found in the
house, Glasser testified that while remodeling the old garage into a bedroom, he found
newspaper in the walls. However, Glasser acknowledged that he did not know what
type of insulation was used in the rest of the walls. Glasser testified that he had a “bad
habit of laying * * * newspapers around the living room” and was picking them up before
he walked A.G. to school. He also claimed the house had newspaper throughout the
Athens App. No. 11CA11 7
ceiling in the kitchen and living room and that he previously removed newspaper from
an access to the attic. Glasser denied having financial problems but admitted that he
had borrowed money from his wife’s parents before. He acknowledged looking at a
house on Fork Street but claimed he did not want to buy the house because it was in a
flood zone.
{¶14} Glasser offered the jury an alternative theory on how the fires started: a
thief started them to conceal his crime. Glasser testified that the day after jury selection
and the jury view of his property, he reviewed post-fire photographs and did not see
certain items in the outbuilding, like a table saw, toolboxes, and a power washer he
borrowed from Pete Taggart. Glasser also testified that his wife submitted an inventory
of items lost in the fire to State Farm, which included twenty-six jewelry pieces. Glasser
claimed that he did not see any remnants of the jewelry in the post-fire photographs.
He did not notice these items missing during the jury view because he “was very upset”
at the time. Glasser admitted that he never actually went through the rubble on his
property. He testified about other thefts on his property that occurred over a year before
the fires. According to Glasser, someone took everything in his wife’s car while it sat in
the driveway and someone stole a power painter he borrowed.
{¶15} However, during the State’s case in rebuttal, Brandau testified that the
table saw could be beneath a mass of debris in the outbuilding. In addition, Thomas
“Pete” Taggart testified that he saw the power washer he loaned Glasser on the
property after the fire.
{¶16} The jury found Glasser guilty on both counts, and this appeal followed.
II. Assignments of Error
Athens App. No. 11CA11 8
{¶17} Glasser assigns three errors for our review:
I. The trial court erred by giving an instruction that negates the
statutory mens rea of “knowing,” violating Mr. Glasser’s right
to require the State to prove all elements of the offense to the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. T.p. Vol. IV,
157-8, 177-8, 216-7.
II. The trial court erred by requiring Mr. Glasser to assert marital
privilege in front of the jury. T.p. Vol. IV, 79-81.
III. The trial court erred by holding a hearing on the admission of
exhibits outside the defendant’s presence. T.p. Vol. IV, 1-6.
III. Jury Instructions
{¶18} In his first assignment of error, Glasser contends that over his objection,
the trial court gave the jury improper instructions. Generally, we use a de novo
standard of review to determine whether jury instructions charge on all relevant
questions of the law that the evidence supports. State v. Brown, 4th Dist. No. 09CA3,
2009-Ohio-5390, ¶ 34. However, the actual wording and format are within the trial
court’s discretion. Id.{¶19} The trial court gave the following jury instruction:
The Defendant is charged in count one with aggravated arson. Before
you can find the Defendant guilty of aggravated arson on count one you
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about September 13,
2010 in Athens County, Ohio the Defendant by means of fire or explosion
knowingly caused physical harm to an occupied structure. A person acts
knowingly regardless of his purpose when he is aware that his conduct will
probably cause a certain result. A person has knowledge of
circumstances when he is aware that such circumstances probably exist.
Knowingly means that a person is aware of the existence of the facts and
that his acts will probably cause a certain result. Since you cannot look
into the mind of another, knowledge is determined from all the facts and
circumstances in evidence. You will determine from these facts and
circumstances whether there existed at the time in the mind of the
Defendant an awareness of the probability that he was causing physical
harm to an occupied structure by means of fire or explosion. Cause is an
Athens App. No. 11CA11 9
act or failure to act which in a natural and continuous sequence directly
produces the physical harm to the occupied structure and without which it
would not have occurred. The Defendant’s responsibility is not limited to
the immediate or most obvious result of the Defendant’s act or failure to
act. The Defendant is also responsible for the natural and foreseeable
consequences that follow in the ordinary course of events from the act or
failure to act.
{¶20} Glasser focuses on the court’s statements that: “The Defendant’s
responsibility is not limited to the immediate or most obvious result of the Defendant’s
act or failure to act. The Defendant is also responsible for the natural and foreseeable
consequences that follow in the ordinary course of events from the act or failure to act.”
Glasser acknowledges that these are correct statements of law but claims that because
these statements followed the court’s definition of the term “knowingly,” the jurors were
confused or misled about the required mens rea for aggravated arson and could have
convicted him based on “something more akin to recklessness or negligence.”
{¶21} Because Glasser’s argument is essentially that the court erred in the
wording or formatting of the instruction, we review this assignment of error under the
abuse of discretion standard. The phrase “abuse of discretion” connotes an attitude on
the part of the court that is unreasonable, unconscionable, or arbitrary. State v. Adams,
62 Ohio St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980). When applying the abuse of discretion
standard, a reviewing court is not free to merely substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court. In re Jane Doe 1, 57 Ohio St.3d 135, 138, 566 N.E.2d 1181 (1991).
{¶22} We understand Glasser’s concern. He complains the causation
instruction, following upon the heels of the definition of the mens rea of “knowingly,”
might cause a jury to lose track of the fact that the causation element does not supplant
or replace the element of “knowingly,” but is an additional element that the State must
Athens App. No. 11CA11 10
prove beyond reasonable doubt. See State v. Collier, 2nd Dist. No. 20131, 2005-Ohio-
119, ¶ 20. However, reviewing courts must consider jury instructions in their entirety.
State v. Price, 60 Ohio St.2d 136, 398 N.E.2d 772 (1979), paragraph four of the
syllabus. Here, the trial court specifically told jurors that before they could find Glasser
guilty, they had to find “beyond a reasonable doubt that * * * [he] by means of fire or
explosion knowingly caused physical harm to an occupied structure.” (Emphasis
added.) Then the court gave the jurors extensive instructions on what “knowingly”
meant and on what “cause” meant. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s
causation instruction did not dilute the mens rea element needed to convict Glasser of
aggravated arson. See State v. Siller, 8th Dist. No. 80219, 2003-Ohio-1948, ¶ 63.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the wording or format of the
jury instructions.
{¶23} Glasser also contends that the prosecutor became confused about the
mens rea and causation elements during his closing argument, which “compounded”
the trial court’s error in the instructions. However, we already determined that the trial
court did not err when it charged the jury. Moreover, even if the prosecutor made
confusing legal statements in his closing, it does not necessarily follow that the jurors
utilized an incorrect legal standard. The court specifically instructed the jury that “the
Court provides the instructions of law. It is your sworn duty to accept these instructions
and to apply the law as it is given to you.” (Emphasis added.) To the extent Glasser’s
argument implies prosecutorial misconduct occurred during closing arguments, he did
not separately assign this issue as error, so we do not address it. App.R. 12(A)(2);
App.R. 16(A)(7). Accordingly, we overrule Glasser’s first assignment of error.
Athens App. No. 11CA11 11
IV. Assertion of the Marital Communications Privilege in the
Jury’s Presence
{¶24} In his second assignment of error, Glasser contends that when he
testified, the trial court erroneously made him assert R.C. 2945.42’s marital
communications privilege in the jury’s presence. Glasser argues that his invocation of
the privilege had no legitimate evidentiary value and permitted the jury to improperly
draw an adverse inference against him.
{¶25} “The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court.” State v. Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, 960
N.E.2d 955, ¶ 113, quoting State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173, 510 N.E.2d 343 (1987),
paragraph two of the syllabus. Evid.R. 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.” Under Evid.R. 402, all relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise
provided by law. Evid.R. 403(A) provides that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence is not
admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.”
{¶26} At the start of trial, the court held a hearing outside the jury’s presence on
the marital communications privilege. When the hearing concluded, defense counsel
informed the court that Glasser intended to assert the privilege, and the court stated that
it would not admit conversations between the couple that occurred outside the presence
of a competent third person. When Glasser’s wife testified, the jury did not know that he
asserted a privilege to limit her testimony. Later in the trial, the State attempted to
argue that Glasser waived the privilege during his direct-examination by commenting
Athens App. No. 11CA11 12
that he told his wife a particular medication made him feel flat and emotionless. The
court held that Glasser’s statement did not constitute a “complete waiver,” and the State
could only “ask him about what he said” during his direct-examination.
{¶27} Then the following transpired during Glasser’s cross-examination:
[PROSECUTOR]: In your state of mind on September 13th
did you believe you were having marital problems?
[GLASSER]: Nothing major, no.
[PROSECUTOR]: Had you and your wife had a lot of one
on one discussions that week?
[GLASSER]: Yes. And the biggest thing that I had told her was that –
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.
[JUDGE]: Basis?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Privilege.
[PROSECUTOR]: May we approach?
BENCH CONFERENCE
[PROSECUTOR]: It’s his privilege to invoke. It’s his privilege to waive.
[JUDGE]: He hasn’t waived it yet.
[PROSECUTOR]: He was about to answer a question before the
objection.
[JUDGE]: His attorney is asserting it for him.
[PROSECUTOR]: I think he has to assert his privilege.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I can (inaudible)
[PROSECUTOR]: You have to assert your own right to remain silent.
We’ve dealt with that issue several times. The attorney can’t invoke your
rights for you. So if he wishes to testify –
[JUDGE]: I can ask him if he wishes to assert marital privilege.
Athens App. No. 11CA11 13
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I don’t think that should be done in the
presence of the jury.
***
[JUDGE]: Alright. I disagree * * *. I’ll ask him in the presence of the
jury.
END OF BENCH CONFERENCE
[JUDGE]: Mr. Glasser, your counsel has asserted marital privilege for
you. Do you agree with his assertion?
[GLASSER]: Yes sir.
{¶28} In its appellate brief, the State asserts that “[t]he Defense did ask that
[Glasser] be allowed to assert the privilege outside the hearing of the jury, but did not
make any objection to the judge asking and defendant asserting his privilege.” This
statement implies that we should apply plain error review to this assignment of error.
However, defense counsel clearly stated that he did not believe Glasser should have to
invoke the privilege in front of the jury, presumably because it would unfairly prejudice
his client. We do not believe a subsequent objection was necessary to preserve the
issue for review.
{¶29} R.C. 2945.42 provides: “Husband or wife shall not testify concerning a
communication made by one to the other, or act done by either in the presence of the
other, during coverture, unless the communication was made or act done in the known
presence or hearing of a third person competent to be a witness * * *.” Although neither
party raises the issue, the prosecutor’s initial question did not implicate the marital
communications privilege. The prosecutor asked Glasser if he and his wife “had a lot of
one on one discussions” the week of the fire. This question required a yes or no
Athens App. No. 11CA11 14
response. The prosecutor did not ask Glasser to testify about the contents of those
discussions (though he likely would have followed up with that question if Glasser
responded affirmatively). Unprompted, Glasser began to discuss the contents of those
conversations until his attorney intervened. Nonetheless, the jury still heard Glasser
invoke the privilege, and he claims as a result his credibility suffered.
{¶30} It is not clear why the trial court insisted that when Glasser testified, he
had to invoke the privilege in the jury’s presence, particularly considering the court
conducted all other discussions on the matter, e.g., Glasser’s invocation of the privilege
prior to his wife’s testimony, outside the jury’s hearing. The only relevance of Glasser’s
invocation of the privilege is that the jury could infer that Glasser made incriminating
statements to his wife and asserted the privilege to hide them from the jury. However,
“[f]or a privilege to have maximum effect, the possibility of prejudice that may arise
against the holder must be minimized. Otherwise the holder may be either intimidated
into waiving the privilege, or penalized for exercising the privilege. The goal is to
prevent the jury from treating an exercise of a privilege as the equivalent of evidence
against the holder, or in any way drawing an adverse inference from the assertion of a
privilege.” (Footnote omitted.) 3 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein’s Federal Evidence,
Section 513.03 (2d Ed.2007). “If objection to the disclosure of a confidential
communication must be made in the presence of the jury * * * the benefit of the privilege
is largely lost, because the claim of privilege is unduly stressed before the jury, which,
doubtless more often than not, is influenced by a conviction that, had the excluded
testimony been admitted, the party who claimed that it was privileged would have been
damaged by it.” Annotation, Right to insist that opponent’s claim of privilege shall be
Athens App. No. 11CA11 15
made in presence of jury, or to ask him if he is willing to waive privilege, 144 A.L.R.
1007, 1007 (1943).
{¶31} Though not adopted by Congress as a Federal Rule of Evidence, we find
United States Supreme Court Standard 513 a helpful guide in this matter:
Standard 513. Comment Upon or Inference From Claim of Privilege;
Instruction.
(a) Comment or inference not permitted. The claim of a privilege, whether
in the present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject
of comment by judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom.
(b) Claiming privilege without knowledge of jury. In jury cases,
proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to
facilitate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the
jury.
(c) Jury instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might
draw an adverse inference from a claim of privilege is entitled to an
instruction that no inference may be drawn therefrom.
Weinstein’s Federal Evidence, Section 513App.01.
{¶32} Based on these authorities, we conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion under Evid.R. 403(A) when it made Glasser invoke the marital
communications privilege in the jury’s presence. The probative value of the invocation
was slight because the jury could not hear the contents of the privileged
communications to learn whether they were in fact incriminating as opposed to perhaps
just embarrassing to Glasser. The danger of unfair prejudice was substantial because
the jury could unjustifiably infer that Glasser was hiding evidence of his guilt, lessening if
not destroying the benefit of his privilege.
{¶33} Next, we must determine whether the trial court committed reversible
error. Crim.R. 52(A) provides: “Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does
Athens App. No. 11CA11 16
not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” “Thus, Crim.R. 52(A) sets forth two
requirements that must be satisfied before a reviewing court may correct an alleged
error.” State v. Fisher, 99 Ohio St.3d 127, 2003-Ohio-2761, 789 N.E.2d 222, ¶ 7. First,
the court must determine whether an error occurred, i.e., a deviation from a legal rule,
which we have already done. Id. “Second, the reviewing court must engage in a
specific analysis of the trial court record – a so-called ‘harmless error’ inquiry – to
determine whether the error ‘affect[ed] substantial rights’ of the criminal defendant.” Id.In other words the error must have been prejudicial, i.e., it must have affected the
outcome of the trial. Id. The State has the burden of proving the error did not affect the
defendant’s substantial rights. State v. Perry, 101 Ohio St.3d 118, 2004-Ohio-297, 802
N.E.2d 643, ¶ 15. Because the court’s violation of Evid.R. 403(A) is a nonconstitutional
error, the State can establish the error was harmless by directing us to substantial other
evidence to support the verdict. State v. McNeill, 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 447, 700 N.E.2d
596 (1998). Here, we conclude that the State has satisfied its burden.
{¶34} Glasser did not request nor did the trial court give the jury an instruction
that it could not draw an adverse inference from the invocation of the privilege.
However, the discussion on privilege that occurred in front of the jury comprises less
than half a page of testimony during a four-day trial. Once Glasser asserted the
privilege on the stand, the prosecutor did not ask him any other questions that he
refused to answer on the basis of privilege. See, by way of contrast, State v. Dinsio,
176 Ohio St. 460, 468, 200 N.E.2d 467 (1964) where the Supreme Court of Ohio held
that once a witness invoked his right against self-incrimination, the trial court committed
prejudicial error when it allowed the prosecutor to continue asking the witness questions
Athens App. No. 11CA11 17
that went unanswered and “placed before the jury innuendo evidence or inferences of
evidence which the state could not get before the jury by direct testimony from the
witness.”
{¶35} Moreover, the State presented substantial evidence of Glasser’s guilt.
The State offered evidence that Glasser intentionally set fire to the outbuilding before he
took his son to school and placed newspaper near the house’s side door to move the
fire from the outbuilding to the house. A.G. saw Glasser wadding up papers before
school and putting them in various locations, including by the side door. Brandau
collected newspaper remnants by the side door that tested positive for medium
isoparaffinic product, which could be from mineral spirits or lamp oil.
{¶36} During an interview Glasser claimed that he did not remember starting the
fire in the outbuilding. But later, he said: “To the best … to the best of my * * *
recollection, and I’m not 100% sure if it’s correct is I just wadded up a bunch of papers
and lit’em on fire” in the outbuilding. Glasser told investigators that he used a Bic lighter
and newspaper. He marked the exact location where he set the fire on a diagram even
though investigators never gave him that information. He also acknowledged that he
probably put the newspaper by the side door to move the fire from the outbuilding to the
house. And although Glasser attempted to argue at trial that his statements were
coerced, nothing in the interview tape suggests investigators coerced him in any way.
{¶37} By the time Glasser finished walking A.G. to school, smoke was coming
from the outbuilding but the house was not yet on fire, which is presumably why Glasser
started a second fire in the bedroom. Glasser did not admit that he set the house fire in
his interviews with investigators. However, he acknowledged that he thought of setting
Athens App. No. 11CA11 18
the house on fire and was only “99% sure” he did not set it.
{¶38} Casto testified that the house contained a trail of newspapers and other
papers intentionally laid on the floor down a hallway into the bedroom to move the fire
through the house. He knew someone put the papers down pre-fire because the carpet
beneath them “was pristine.” Although Glasser admitted in an interview that he thought
he wadded up newspaper inside the house, he made weak efforts at trial to explain its
presence on the floor. He tried to attribute its presence to shoddy home construction,
i.e., newspaper in the walls, etc. However, even if the walls or ceiling contained
newspaper, Glasser failed to explain how it came to form a trail on the carpet before the
fire started. And again, A.G. saw Glasser wadding up papers before the fire and putting
them in various locations. Glasser tried to explain away this testimony by suggesting
A.G. was confused and that he was in fact picking up the papers. However, this
testimony does not explain why a trail of papers remained in the hallway.
{¶39} Multiple witnesses testified that Glasser had a chemical odor on his
person after the fires. Testing revealed that his clothing and the cap Brandau found
with the clothing all contained medium petroleum distillate, which could come from paint
thinner, charcoal starter, or lamp oil, i.e., items that could accelerate a fire. Glasser
testified that the distillate must have come from the wet substance he fell on in the
outbuilding. However, A.G. and Warren observed injuries to Glasser’s face when he
took A.G. to school, i.e., before the alleged fall.
{¶40} Glasser claimed that he saw smoke in the area of the outbuilding after he
walked A.G. to school but was not concerned because he thought Mrs. Whitmore was
burning trash. But when Gwilym told him that his “building was on fire,” Glasser claimed
Athens App. No. 11CA11 19
he told her to immediately call 911 instead of asking any questions to verify that she had
not just seen smoke in a burn barrel. Moreover, Gwilym testified that Glasser actually
told her that “the fire department’s been called.” Glasser never called the fire
department.
{¶41} Although Glasser offered the jury alternative theories on who started the
fires, they lacked evidentiary support. Glasser suggested that a thief started the fires to
conceal his crimes. However, by Glasser’s own testimony, the bedroom fire had to start
after Gwilym notified him about the outbuilding fire. Yet no one, including Glasser,
testified to seeing anyone suspicious on the property. Moreover, the fires occurred on
September 13, 2010, but Glasser testified that he did not realize items were missing
from the property until months later on April 27, 2011 – after his trial began. Glasser
based his claims of missing items solely on post-fire photographs. However, Mr.
Taggart testified that he saw the power washer Glasser claimed was missing on the
property post-fire. And Brandau testified that even one of the largest “missing” items –
a table saw – could be under a mass of debris still in the outbuilding. It stands to
reason that smaller “missing” items, like the toolboxes and jewelry, could also be under
debris or just simply not depicted in the photographs. The other thefts Glasser testified
to happened over a year before the fires and had no apparent connection to this
incident.
{¶42} During closing arguments, defense counsel suggested that Glasser’s wife
could have hired someone to start the fires to collect money from the insurance policy in
her name. But no evidence supports this theory either. Glasser admitted he set up the
policy in his wife’s name only. And the State presented evidence that Glasser set the
Athens App. No. 11CA11 20
fire so the couple could use his wife’s insurance proceeds to buy the “Fork Street”
house.
{¶43} In light of the substantial other evidence of Glasser’s guilt, we conclude
that the court’s error in making him invoke the marital communications privilege in the
jury’s presence was harmless.
{¶44} Glasser also accuses the State of prosecutorial misconduct within his
analysis for this assignment of error. Specifically, he argues that the prosecutor insisted
that he invoke the privilege in the jury’s presence in violation of his rights under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He did not separately
assign this issue as error, so we need not address this argument. App.R. 12(A)(2);
App.R. 16(A)(7). Nonetheless, as noted above, the prosecutor’s question did not
implicate the privilege – Glasser’s testimony about the content of marital
communications was unresponsive to the question at hand. In addition, the prosecutor
did not insist that Glasser invoke the privilege in the jury’s presence – the trial court did.
The prosecutor did not make any comment about whether Glasser needed to invoke the
privilege in front of the jury. Accordingly, we overrule the second assignment of error.
V. Proceedings Outside the Defendant’s Presence
{¶45} In his third assignment of error, Glasser contends that the trial court erred
when it conducted part of a hearing on the admission of the State’s exhibits outside his
presence, in violation of Crim.R. 43(A) and his constitutional rights. The State argues
that defense counsel not only failed to object to Glasser’s absence but expressly waived
his right to be present. Alternatively, the State claims that Glasser did not suffer any
prejudice. Glasser responds that counsel could not waive his right to be present,
Athens App. No. 11CA11 21
counsel did not waive his right even if counsel had the power to do so, and his exclusion
from the hearing is per se prejudicial.
{¶46} Before the hearing began, the trial court acknowledged that Glasser had
not arrived in the courtroom yet. The State asked the court to first admit all the exhibits
it believed defense counsel would not object to, i.e., all of the exhibits except #140 –
Casto’s report. The trial court asked defense counsel: “[A]re you able to respond to this
without Mr. Glasser being present?” Counsel responded: “Yes your Honor, I believe
so. We have no objection to the exhibits with the exception of #140.” Then the
attorneys proceeded to argue about the admissibility of that exhibit. Glasser arrived in
the middle of these arguments and was present when the court decided to admit only
portions of Casto’s report.
{¶47} We reject Glasser’s contention that his attorney could not waive his right
to be present at the hearing. State v. Hale, 119 Ohio St.3d 118, 2008-Ohio-3426, 892
N.E.2d 864, ¶ 103. We also reject his contention that a defendant’s unwaived absence
from a proceeding constitutes prejudice per se, i.e., it amounts to a structural error. The
Supreme Court of Ohio has reviewed such matters for prejudice. See Id.{¶48} Glasser did not object at the trial level to the fact that the court began the
hearing without him. Even if we assume that defense counsel’s statement did not
operate as a waiver of Glasser’s right to be present, he cannot demonstrate plain error.
“Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were
not brought to the attention of the court.” Crim.R. 52(B). “A silent defendant has the
burden to satisfy the plain-error rule[,] and a reviewing court may consult the whole
record when considering the effect of any error on substantial rights.” State v. Davis,
Athens App. No. 11CA11 22
4th Dist. No. 06CA21, 2007-Ohio-3944, ¶ 22, citing United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55,
59, 122 S.Ct. 1043, 152 L.Ed.2d 90 (2002). For a reviewing court to find plain error: 1.)
there must be an error, i.e., “a deviation from a legal rule”; 2.) the error must be plain,
i.e., “an ‘obvious' defect in the trial proceedings”; and 3.) the error must have affected
“substantial rights,” i.e., it must have affected the outcome of the proceedings. State v.
Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002). Furthermore, the Supreme
Court of Ohio has admonished courts that notice of plain error under Crim.R. 52(B) is to
be taken “with the utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent
a manifest miscarriage of justice.” Id., quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372
N.E.2d 804 (1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.
{¶49} “An accused has a fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of
his criminal trial.” Hale, supra, at ¶ 100. “An accused’s absence, however, does not
necessarily result in prejudicial or constitutional error.” State v. Davis, 116 Ohio St.3d
404, 2008-Ohio-2, 880 N.E.2d 31, ¶ 90. “[T]he presence of a defendant is a condition of
due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence,
and to that extent only.” (Emphasis sic.) Hale at ¶ 100, quoting Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107-108, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), overruled on
other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653(1964). The question is whether his presence has a “reasonably substantial”
relationship to “the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.” Id., quoting
Snyder at 105-106.
{¶50} Glasser cannot demonstrate that the outcome of the trial would have been
different had he been physically present for the entire hearing. Glasser was
Athens App. No. 11CA11 23
represented by counsel at the hearing and deciding whether to contest the admissibility
of exhibits involves legal issues within the professional judgment of counsel. See State
v. Frazier, 115 Ohio St.3d 139, 2007-Ohio-5048, 873 N.E.2d 1263, ¶ 142. Moreover,
Glasser does not argue that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Glasser has not
shown that his absence impaired his opportunity to defend against the charges and
therefore cannot demonstrate that his absence affected his substantial rights.
Accordingly, we overrule the third assignment of error.
VI. Conclusion
{¶51} Having overruled each of the assignments of error, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Athens App. No. 11CA11 24
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and that Appellant shall pay the
costs.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Athens
County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.
IF A STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE AND RELEASE UPON BAIL HAS
BEEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED BY THE TRIAL COURT OR THIS COURT, it is
temporarily continued for a period not to exceed sixty days upon the bail previously
posted. The purpose of a continued stay is to allow Appellant to file with the Supreme
Court of Ohio an application for a stay during the pendency of proceedings in that court.
If a stay is continued by this entry, it will terminate at the earlier of the expiration of the
sixty day period, or the failure of the Appellant to file a notice of appeal with the
Supreme Court of Ohio in the forty-five day appeal period pursuant to Rule II, Sec. 2 of
the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court of Ohio. Additionally, if the Supreme Court
of Ohio dismisses the appeal prior to expiration of sixty days, the stay will terminate as
of the date of such dismissal.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Exceptions.
Abele, P.J. & Kline, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court
BY: ________________________
William H. Harsha, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment
entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing
with the clerk.