Columbia Gas Transm., L.L.C. v. Ogle , 2012 Ohio 1483 ( 2012 )

[Cite as Columbia Gas Transm., L.L.C. v. Ogle, 2012-Ohio-1483.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
HOCKING COUNTY
COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION, LLC, :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 10CA11
:
vs. : Released: March 21, 2012
:
CHARLES and MELANIE OGLE : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
Defendants-Appellants. :
APPEARANCES:
Charles R. and Melanie A. Ogle, Rockbridge, Ohio, pro se.
James M. Doerfler, Reed Smith, LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellee.
McFarland, J.:
{¶1} Appellants Charles and Melanie Ogle appeal the judgment of the trial
court granting declaratory judgment to Appellee Columbia Gas Transmission,
LLC. Appellants argue that the trial court erred by 1) failing to dismiss Appellee’s
complaint; 2) entering a decision that contains erroneous facts and that decides
issues beyond the scope of the complaint; and 3) denying Appellants’ motion for
post-judgment relief. Having reviewed the record, we find that the trial court erred
by denying Appellants due process and we reverse the trial court’s judgment and
remand the cause for further proceedings.
Hocking App. No. 10CA11 2
FACTS
{¶2} Appellants own approximately 88 acres of land situated in Hocking
County, Ohio. There exists a lease between Appellants (lessors) and Appellee
(lessee), whereby Appellee stores and extracts natural gas from underneath
Appellants land. The lease purportedly gives Appellee the right to access the
subject property to use and maintain an existing natural gas well. Appellee
believes that the lease also gives it the right to construct additional wells, subject to
obtaining regulatory approval. Consequently, Appellee marked a site for a
proposed second well on Appellants’ property and began the process to obtain
regulatory approval to construct the second well.
{¶3} Appellants, on the other hand, are unhappy with the proposed well’s
location and their proposed compensation. Appellants believe that the lease
prohibits Appellee from constructing a well within 300 feet of a barn; yet at the
time of the lease’s execution, no barn existed in the property. To take advantage of
this clause in the lease, Appellants erected a barn within 300 feet of the new well’s
proposed location. Appellants also began filing papers with various government
entities in an effort to prohibit the second well’s construction.
{¶4} Given Appellant’s objections and anticipating litigation and
interference from Appellants, Appellee filed the instant action. Appellee requested
the trial court declare that 1) the lease gives Appellee the right to unimpeded
Hocking App. No. 10CA11 3
access to the first well for the purposes of maintaining and operating it; and 2) the
lease gives Appellee the right to drill additional wells as needed, subject to
regulatory approval. Appellee also requested a permanent injunction prohibiting
Appellants from interfering with Appellee’s rights under the lease.
{¶5} Subsequently, Appellants filed their own action for declaratory
judgment, seeking a declaration that the lease is unconscionable. The trial court
consolidated this case with Appellee’s action, because the two cases involved the
same facts and the construction of the same lease.
{¶6} Appellee moved for summary judgment on Appellants’ claims, and
Appellants voluntarily dismissed their claims. The trial court then entered
judgment on May 14, 2010 in Appellee’s favor. Appellants objected to the trial
court’s final judgment entry and sought reconsideration.1 Subsequently,
Appellants filed the instant appeal alleging the following assignments of error.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
I. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING
APPELLEE’S COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF GENUINE ISSUE OF
MATERIAL FACT, CASE, OR JUDICIABLE CONTROVERSY.
II. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING A DECISION
AND JUDGMENT ENTRY (NUNC PRO TUNC), WITH
ERRONEOUS STATEMENTS AS FACT AND ISSUES FOR
WHICH THERE WAS NO AMENDED COMPLAINT.
1
The record contains no ruling from the trial court on this issue.
Hocking App. No. 10CA11 4
III. “THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS’
RULE 60(B) MOTION FOR POST-JUDGMENT RELIEF.”
ANALYSIS
I.
{¶7} We address Appellants’ second assignment of error first because it is
dispositive. In their second assignment of error, Appellants argue the trial court
erred when it issued its final decision and judgment entry. Specifically, Appellants
take issue with the trial court’s recitation of facts, and the fact that they were
unaware the trial court was entertaining entering a final judgment.
{¶8} Appellee filed its motion for summary judgment on March 1, 2010.
Appellee requested the trial court dismiss the “unconscionability claims alleged by
[Appellants].” In its supporting memorandum, Appellee explained Appellants’
claims were untimely and substantively deficient, and requested the trial court
dismiss Appellants’ claims of unconscionability. Appellee did not request
judgment upon its own claims.
{¶9} On March 16, 2010, Appellants dismissed their claims for
unconscionability, effectively mooting Appellee’s motion for summary judgment,
and filed a memorandum contra stating the same. The record does not reveal that
the trial court formally ruled upon Appellee’s motion for summary judgment.
Hocking App. No. 10CA11 5
{¶10} On April 6, 2010, the trial court notified the parties that it would
conduct a pretrial on May 14, 2010, followed by the trial to the court on July 16,
2010. No subsequent notices altered this schedule.
{¶11} On May 14, 2010, the trial court signed an entry entitled “Stipulated
Decision and Judgment Entry,” which did not contain the parties’ signatures or
their attorneys’ signatures, and granted Appellee’s claims for declaratory
judgment. The trial court then filed a nunc pro tunc entry that was identical, except
it deleted the word “stipulated” from the caption. Appellants objected to this entry
and requested reconsideration, which the trial court did not grant.
{¶12} “The fundamental requirements of due process are notice and an
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and manner.” Carver v. Map Corp.,
4th Dist. No. 01CA2757, 2001-Ohio-2403, citing State v. Hochhausler (1996), 76
Ohio St.3d 455, 459, 668 N.E.2d 457 and In re Adoption of Zschach (1996), 75
Ohio St.3d 648, 653, 665 N.E.2d 1070. “However hurried a court may be in its
efforts to reach the merits of a controversy, the integrity of procedural rules is
dependent upon consistent enforcement because the only fair and reasonable
alternative thereto is complete abandonment.” Miller v. Lint (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d
209, 215, 404 N.E.2d 752. “‘Civ.R. 56 does not authorize courts to enter
summary judgment in favor of a non-moving party.’” Todd Dev. Co. v. Morgan,
116 Ohio St.3d 461, 880 N.E.2d 88, 2008-Ohio-87, at ¶15, quoting Marshall v.
Hocking App. No. 10CA11 6
Aaron (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 48, 472 N.E.2d 335, at the syllabus. The exception to
this prohibition is “an entry of summary judgment against the moving party does
not prejudice his due process rights where all relevant evidence is before the court,
no genuine issue as to any material fact exists, and the non-moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” State ex rel. Cuyahoga Cty. Hosp. v. Ohio Bur. of
Workers’ Comp., 27 Ohio St.3d 25, 28, 500 N.E.2d 1370, citing Houk v. Ross
(1973), 34 Ohio St.2d 77, 296 N.E.2d 266, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶13} In the instant case, the trial court’s final judgment entry deprived
Appellants of due process and must be reversed. First and foremost, the record
reveals no procedural process by which the trial court arrived at its judgment.
There is no indication that the trial court issued its ruling in response to a pending
motion, a previously held hearing, or other dispositive procedural device.
{¶14} Second, even assuming that the trial court’s entry was its ruling on
Appellee’s motion for summary judgment,2 the trial court was without authority to
rule on claims not addressed within the motion. The trial court was only permitted
to enter summary judgment in Appellee’s favor (the moving party) or in
Appellants’ favor (the non-moving parties), regarding Appellants’ claims of
unconscionability. A trial court cannot sua sponte enter summary judgment on
2
The trial court’s entry did not purport to be a ruling on the pending motion for summary judgment.
Hocking App. No. 10CA11 7
issues not raised within a party’s motion for summary judgment. Doing so violates
the basic principles of due process.
{¶15} Similarly, a trial court may not unilaterally forego a trial and decide
the merits of case without notifying the parties and giving them an opportunity to
be heard. Appellee’s argument that the record discloses no objection from
Appellants concerning the submission of the tendered final judgment entry is
neither persuasive nor dispositive. Just the same, the record discloses no notice the
trial court was going to consider the merits of Appellee’s claims before the
scheduled bench trial. Without such notice, the trial court deprived Appellants of
due process.
{¶16} Accordingly, we sustain Appellants’ second assignment of error and
reverse the trial court’s judgment.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND THE
CAUSE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS
CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION.
Hocking App. No. 10CA11 8
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE REVERSED AND THE CAUSE
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS
OPINION and that the Appellants recover of Appellee costs herein taxed.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Hocking County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
Any stay previously granted by this Court is hereby terminated as of the date
of this entry.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Exceptions.
Harsha, J.: Concurs in Judgment and Opinion.
Abele, P.J.: Dissents.
For the Court,
BY: _________________________
Matthew W. McFarland, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.