State ex rel. Smith v. DeWeese , 2014 Ohio 3849 ( 2014 )


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  • [Cite as State ex rel. Smith v. DeWeese, 
    2014-Ohio-3849
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    RICHLAND COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE EX REL.                                               JUDGES:
    Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J.
    WILLIAM E. SMITH                                            Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J.
    Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    Petitioner
    Case No. 14CA8
    -vs-
    HONORABLE JAMES DEWEESE                                     OPINION
    Respondent
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                               Writ of Prohibition
    JUDGMENT:                                              Dismissed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                                September 3, 2014
    APPEARANCES:
    For Petitioner                                         For Respondent
    WILLIAM E. SMITH, PRO SE                               JILL M. COCHRAN
    #651-930 N.C.I.                                        Assistant Richland County Prosecutor
    15708 St. Rt. 78 West                                  38 South Park Street, 2nd Floor
    Caldwell, Ohio 43724                                   Mansfield, Ohio 44902
    Richland County, Case No. 14CA8                                                                2
    Hoffman, P.J.
    {¶1}   Petitioner, William E. Smith, has filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition.
    Respondent has filed a Motion to Dismiss.
    {¶2}   In order for a writ of prohibition to issue, petitioner must prove that: (1) the
    lower court is about to exercise judicial authority; (2) the exercise of authority is not
    authorized by law; and, (3) the petitioner has no other adequate remedy in the ordinary
    course of law if a writ of prohibition is denied. State ex rel. Keenan v. Calabrese (1994),
    
    69 Ohio St.3d 176
    , 178, 
    631 N.E.2d 119
    . A writ of prohibition, regarding the
    unauthorized exercise of judicial power, will only be granted where the judicial officer's
    lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is patent and unambiguous. Ohio Dept. of Adm. Serv.,
    Office of Collective Bargaining v. State Emp. Relations Bd. (1990), 
    54 Ohio St.3d 48
    ,
    
    562 N.E.2d 125
    . State ex rel. Daniels v. Harris 
    2008 WL 5197131
    , 1 (Ohio App. 5
    Dist.).
    {¶3}   Petitioner was released on parole in 2008 after having served a prison
    sentence for felonious assault. As a condition of his parole, Petitioner was ordered to
    report to a halfway house. He failed to do so and remained at large until 2013 when he
    was imprisoned for violating his 2008 parole. The expiration of the parole violation
    sentence is in 2016.
    {¶4}   Because Petitioner failed to appear at the halfway house, Petitioner was
    indicted on one count of escape in 2009. Petitioner was arraigned on the escape in late
    2013. The trial court ordered Petitioner to be housed in a prison close to the trial court
    rather than his “parent institution.” The escape charge was initially assigned to Judge
    Henson, however, pursuant to the Richland County local rules, Judge Henson
    Richland County, Case No. 14CA8                                                            3
    transferred the case to Respondent, Judge DeWeese because Judge DeWeese was
    the judge on Petitioner’s first case.
    {¶5}   Petitioner raises four claims: (1) He seeks an order staying the escape
    charge until this complaint in procedendo is resolved, (2) He seeks an order returning
    him to his parent institution, (3) He seeks an order removing Respondent from his
    escape case, and (4) He seeks an order finding a conviction on the escape charge
    would result in double jeopardy because Petitioner is already serving a sentence for a
    parole violation based upon the same conduct as the escape charge.
    FIRST CLAIM – STAYING CRIMINAL CASE
    {¶6}   Petitioner offers no authority for the proposition that there is a right to the
    requested stay.     Petitioner does not allege Respondent lacks jurisdiction over the
    underlying cause.
    {¶7}   A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ issued by a higher court to a
    lower court or tribunal to prevent usurpation or exercise of judicial powers or functions
    for which the lower court or tribunal lacks jurisdiction. State ex rel. Winnefeld v. Butler
    Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas (1953), 
    159 Ohio St. 225
    , 
    112 N.E.2d 27
    .
    {¶8}   Further, the criminal case was fully resolved while this case was pending
    making the claim moot. Additionally, Petitioner has already perfected an appeal from
    the criminal case judgment which provides an adequate remedy at law for Petitioner.
    SECOND CLAIM – RETURN TO “PARENT” PRISON
    {¶9}   Petitioner requests the trial court be prohibited from having Petitioner
    housed in the Mansfield Correctional Institution. Petitioner seeks to be returned to the
    Noble Correctional Institution. Petitioner’s most recent pleading indicates he is now
    Richland County, Case No. 14CA8                                                          4
    housed at the Noble Correctional Institution, therefore, this claim is also moot because
    the relief he sought has already been obtained. See e.g. State ex rel. D & D Bonding,
    Ltd. v. Johnston, 4th Dist. Jackson Co. No. 04CA10, 
    2005-Ohio-6797
     (request for writ of
    prohibition preventing a policy that judge had already discontinued was moot).
    THIRD CLAIM – REMOVING RESPONDENT FROM RAPE CASE
    {¶10} Petitioner does not allege Respondent does not have general subject
    matter jurisdiction over his escape case.
    {¶11} As the Supreme Court has held, “Neither mandamus nor prohibition will
    issue if the party seeking extraordinary relief has an adequate remedy in the ordinary
    course of law.” Dzina v. Celebrezze, 
    108 Ohio St.3d 385
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1195
    , 
    843 N.E.2d 1202
    , ¶ 12. In the absence of a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court
    having general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party
    contesting that jurisdiction has an adequate remedy by appeal. State ex rel. Powell v.
    Markus, 
    115 Ohio St.3d 219
    , 
    2007-Ohio-4793
    , 
    874 N.E.2d 775
    , ¶ 8.” State ex rel. Plant
    v. Cosgrove, 
    2008-Ohio-3838
    , 
    119 Ohio St. 3d 264
    , 
    893 N.E.2d 485
    , 486.
    {¶12} Because Respondent as a common pleas court judge has general subject
    matter jurisdiction over felony cases, prohibition does not lie.
    FOURTH CLAIM – DOUBLE JEOPARDY
    {¶13} Petitioner’s final claim is the trial court was prohibited from acting because
    the escape charge exposed Petitioner to double jeopardy. The Supreme Court has
    held, “Double jeopardy claims are not cognizable in prohibition. State ex rel. White v.
    Junkin (1997), 
    80 Ohio St.3d 335
    , 338, 
    686 N.E.2d 267
    , 269–270.”             State ex rel.
    Whiteside v. Fais, 
    2001-Ohio-97
    , 
    91 Ohio St. 3d 463
    , 464, 
    746 N.E.2d 1113
    , 1114.
    Richland County, Case No. 14CA8                                                        5
    {¶14} Because claims regarding double jeopardy are not cognizable in
    prohibition, the requested writ will not issue.
    CONCLUSION
    {¶15} Petitioner has failed to demonstrate he is entitled to have a writ of
    prohibition issued. For this reason, the motion to dismiss is granted and the request for
    writ of prohibition is denied.
    By: Hoffman, P.J.
    Farmer, J. and
    Delaney, J. concur
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14CA8

Citation Numbers: 2014 Ohio 3849

Judges: Hoffman

Filed Date: 9/3/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014