State v. Knipp , 2014 Ohio 3878 ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Knipp, 2014-Ohio-3878.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
BUTLER COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, : CASE NO. CA2013-07-114
: OPINION
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:
SAMUEL M. KNIPP III, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
CRIMINAL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
Case No. CR2013-04-0636
Michael T. Gmoser, Butler County Prosecuting Attorney, Michael A. Oster, Jr., Government
Services Center, 315 High Street, 11th Floor, Hamilton, Ohio 45011, for plaintiff-appellee
Clyde Bennett II, 119 East Court Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for defendant-appellant
PIPER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Samuel Knipp III, appeals his ten-year sentence in the
Butler County Court of Common Pleas for rape and two counts of gross sexual imposition.
{¶ 2} Knipp was arrested after a child reported to a school resource officer that Knipp
had fondled her buttocks and vagina while the two sat and watched a movie. After an
investigation began, two other child victims who resided in the same home with Knipp came
forward and told officers that Knipp had sexually abused them as well, including forced
Butler CA2013-07-114
cunnilingus and digital penetration. Knipp was in a trusted relationship with each of the
victims, and the abuse started when the children were much younger and continued over the
years.
{¶ 3} Knipp was interviewed by officers and admitted to the touching, though he
blamed the children for being too developed, mature acting, and stated that all three victims
were curious about him in a sexual manner. Knipp also told investigators that family
members and people who knew him were aware that he had "issues" and "demons," and that
the children should have known "you don't get under the blankets with me." Knipp was
arrested and charged by a bill of information with a single count of rape and two counts of
gross sexual imposition. The three counts were specific to acts performed upon three
separate victims.
{¶ 4} Knipp pled guilty to the three counts, and the trial court sentenced him to four
and one-half years on one count of gross sexual imposition, ten years on the rape charge,
and 17 months on the remaining gross sexual imposition charge. The trial court ordered the
sentences to run concurrently for an aggregate sentence of ten years. Knipp appeals the
trial court's decision, raising the following assignment of error:
{¶ 5} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, CONTRARY TO LAW, WHEN IT IMPOSED A
MAXIMUM PRISON TERM FOR RAPE, A FIRST DEGREE FELONY.1
{¶ 6} Knipp argues in his assignment of error that the trial court erred in sentencing
him to ten years in prison on the rape charge.
{¶ 7} "The standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) shall govern all felony
sentences." State v. Crawford, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-12-088, 2013-Ohio-3315, ¶
6, quoting State v. A.H., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98622, 2013-Ohio-2525, ¶ 7. Pursuant to
1. Although Knipp argues that the trial court's ten-year sentence was a maximum one, the maximum sentence
for a first-degree felony is 11 years. R.C. 2929.14(A)(1).
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Butler CA2013-07-114
R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), when hearing an appeal of a trial court's felony sentencing decision, "the
appellate court may increase, reduce, or otherwise modify a sentence that is appealed under
this section or may vacate the sentence and remand the matter to the sentencing court for
resentencing." However, as explicitly stated in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2), "[t]he appellate court's
standard for review is not whether the sentencing court abused its discretion."
{¶ 8} Instead, an appellate court may take any action authorized under R.C.
2953.08(G)(2) only if the court "clearly and convincingly finds" that either: (1) "the record
does not support the sentencing court's findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13,
division (B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised
Code, whichever, if any, is relevant," or (2) "[t]hat the sentence is otherwise contrary to law."
A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial court considers the
purposes and principles of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed in R.C. 2929.12, and
sentences appellant within the permissible statutory range. Crawford, 2013-Ohio-3315 at ¶
9; State v. Elliott, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2009-03-020, 2009-Ohio-5926, ¶ 10.
{¶ 9} After reviewing the record, the trial court's sentence is not clearly and
convincingly contrary to law. The trial court very clearly stated in its sentencing entry that it
had considered the purposes and principles of sentencing according to R.C. 2929.11 and
had balanced the seriousness and recidivism factors within R.C. 2929.12. The trial court also
discussed its review of the purposes and principles of sentencing and the recidivism factors
within R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 during the sentencing hearing before sentencing
Knipp.
{¶ 10} Knipp argues that his sentence was erroneous because his conduct was not
more serious than conduct normally constituting rape, he had a limited criminal history, and
he was unlikely to commit crime in the future. We disagree. The trial court reiterated the
facts that were contained in Knipp's PSI, including the seriousness of his crimes, and that he
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essentially placed the blame on the children for getting under the covers with him. Knipp also
admitted to committing multiple acts of sexual abuse, but was nonchalant in explaining his
behavior. For example, Knipp described touching one victim's vagina as "nothing major." In
another example, Knipp admitted to investigators that he fondled one victim because she had
her leg on his leg, and he took the victim's action to mean "open game." The trial court also
recounted the need to protect the public from Knipp and his continual sexual abuse of young
children.
{¶ 11} The trial court sentenced Knipp to ten years on the rape charge, which is a first-
degree felony. According to R.C. 2929.14(A)(1), "for a felony of the first degree, the prison
term shall be three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven years." Knipp's ten-year
sentence was therefore within the statutory range. Having considered the purposes and
principles of sentencing, and sentencing Knipp within the statutory range for his offense, the
trial court's sentence was not clearly and convincingly contrary to law.
{¶ 12} Having found that Knipp's ten-year aggregate sentence was properly ordered,
Knipp's single assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 13} Judgment affirmed.
RINGLAND, P.J., and S. POWELL, J., concur.
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