State v. Reinhardt , 2014 Ohio 4071 ( 2014 )

[Cite as State v. Reinhardt, 2014-Ohio-4071.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO, : APPEAL NO. C-130560
TRIAL NO. B-1203015-C
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
O P I N I O N.
vs. :
SARA REINHARDT, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas
Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: September 19, 2014
Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Melynda Machol,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
William R. Gallagher and Herbert Haas, for Defendant-Appellant.
Please note: this case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
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F ISCHER , Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Sara Reinhardt appeals the decision of the trial
court denying her postsentence motion to withdraw her guilty plea, alleging that her
counsel and the trial court induced her into entering the plea. Because we determine
that Reinhardt failed to demonstrate that a manifest injustice occurred, we affirm the
denial of her motion.
{¶2} A Hamilton County grand jury indicted Reinhardt in May 2012 for
four counts of deception to obtain a dangerous drug, specifically hydrocodone and
diazepam, under R.C. 2925.22(A)—felonies of the fifth degree. According to the bill
of particulars, Reinhardt allegedly received forged prescriptions from a codefendant,
filled those prescriptions, and gave some of the pills to her codefendant. After
numerous continuances, the case proceeded to trial where a jury was sworn and
impaneled. Prior to opening statements in July 2013, Reinhardt entered into a
written plea agreement, whereby she agreed to plead guilty to one count of theft
under R.C. 2913.02, a misdemeanor of the first degree, in exchange for the dismissal
of the counts as charged in the instant indictment, as well as the dismissal of a
related indictment in the case numbered B-1206734. The trial court accepted
Reinhardt’s plea after a full Crim.R. 11 colloquy, and sentenced Reinhardt to three
years’ community control, including 12 months of electronic monitoring.
{¶3} On August 27, 2013, Reinhardt filed a motion to withdraw her guilty
plea under Crim.R. 32.1, supported by her affidavit and the affidavit of her friend,
Gayle Bachman. Reinhardt alleged that she was a former Iranian citizen who had
renounced her citizenship to become employed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation as a Farsi contract linguist. Because of the instant indictment,
Reinhardt had been suspended from her position with the FBI.
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{¶4} In her affidavit, Reinhardt maintained her innocence of the charges.
She stated that she had desired to go to trial, so she had rejected a plea deal from the
state to dismiss all four of the felony counts if she agreed to plead guilty to a
misdemeanor charge, even though the prosecutor had threatened to indict her on
additional felony charges if she refused to plead. When she rejected the deal,
Reinhardt then had been indicted for drug trafficking in the case numbered B-
1206734.
{¶5} Reinhardt alleged that she had begun to receive increased pressure
from her attorney to plead guilty. Her attorney had told her that the judge would
impose consecutive, maximum sentences if she refused to take a plea bargain.
Meanwhile, the state had continued to offer plea deals. Reinhardt attached a copy of
the transcript of proceedings from the second day of trial, after the jury had been
impaneled, where the trial court requested that past plea deals be placed on the
record. The prosecutor recounted three plea deals that had been offered to
Reinhardt over the last eight months, including theft with diversion. The prosecutor
then offered a second-degree misdemeanor attempt charge, eligible for diversion.
The trial court told Reinhardt, “[t]his is your last opportunity to accept that, because
otherwise once we start a trial I am not going to be inclined to agree to it.” Further
discussion took place, and the trial court stated to Reinhardt, “[y]ou have got one
minute to make your decision, because I can hear the jury out in the hall.” Reinhardt
then declined to take the deal.
{¶6} After Reinhardt had turned down this most recent plea deal,
according to Reinhardt, her attorney had told her that the judge “was very angry that
she would not plead guilty,” and that the judge would sentence her to nine-and-a-
half years in prison. According to Reinhardt and Bachman, Reinhardt’s attorney had
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become irate with Reinhardt, yelling and screaming, at which point Reinhardt had
finally broken under the pressure and pleaded guilty.
{¶7} In her Crim.R. 32.1 motion, Reinhardt alleged that the trial court had
been biased against her. Reinhardt attached copies of the judgments of convictions
of her two codefendants, who had received more favorable sentences. Reinhardt also
attached to her motion a copy of the transcript of proceedings from the postplea,
sentencing hearing, which she argued showed the trial court’s bias against her:
THE COURT: * * * I saw you get offered three deals that the majority
of people that come in here—and I wouldn’t even say the majority, I
would say every defendant who comes in here would have cried to
have. * * * I want to explain something to you. This Court’s time is
valuable. * * * I want to talk to you about the inconvenience that you
have caused this Court. You have caused us thousands of dollars in
court time. * * * You ought to be ashamed of yourself. * * * You ought
to—I just cannot tell you how narcissistic you have appeared to this
Court. * * * And unfortunately, because this is a misdemeanor, I
cannot send you to the department of corrections, because trust me, I
would have. If you had gotten convicted, I would have sent you, and I
would have sent you consecutively. That would have been a lot of time
in a place that you do not want to be.
{¶8} In addition to the alleged coercion by the trial court and counsel,
Reinhardt argued in her motion that she had taken a plea deal because it meant that
she would not have to serve any jail time. Nevertheless, she had spent three days and
two nights in jail awaiting her electronic-monitoring unit.
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{¶9} The trial court held a hearing on Reinhardt’s motion where Reinhardt
submitted the matter to the trial court on her motion without requesting an
evidentiary hearing. The trial court denied Reinhardt’s motion, stating that it had
been “a participant in all of this,” and that no manifest injustice occurred to allow
withdrawal of her plea postsentence. Reinhardt now appeals the denial of her
motion.
{¶10} In her sole assignment of error, Reinhardt alleges that the trial court
erred in denying her motion.
{¶11} Under Crim.R. 32.1, a trial court may permit a defendant to withdraw
a guilty plea after sentence only “to correct manifest injustice.” State v. Shirley, 1st
Dist. Hamilton No. C-130121, 2013-Ohio-5216, ¶ 8, citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio
St.2d 261, 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph one of the syllabus. “Manifest
injustice” involves an “ ‘extraordinary and fundamental flaw in a plea proceeding.’ ”
Shirley at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Tekulve, 188 Ohio App.3d 792, 2010-Ohio-3604, 936
N.E.2d 1030, ¶ 7 (1st Dist.). The burden of proving “manifest injustice” lies with a
defendant, and an appellate court reviews a trial court’s determination of whether
that standard has been met by the defendant for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Kostyuchenko, 2014-Ohio-324, 8 N.E.3d 353, ¶ 4 (1st Dist.), citing Smith.
{¶12} A trial court need not hold a hearing on a postsentence motion under
Crim.R. 32.1 where the facts as alleged in the motion do not merit withdrawal of the
plea. State v. Dye, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120483, 2013-Ohio-1626, ¶ 6.
{¶13} On appeal from the denial of her motion, Reinhardt argues that her
plea was not voluntarily made because she received ineffective assistance of counsel,
the trial court participated in the plea-bargaining process with a demonstrated bias
against her, and the trial court induced her to plead with a promise of no jail time.
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{¶14} Ineffective assistance of counsel may form the basis of a defendant’s
postsentence motion to withdraw his plea if the defendant can show that “ ‘counsel’s
performance was deficient,’ ” and that “ ‘there was a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s deficient performance, the petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.’ ” See State v. Holloman, 1st Dist. Hamilton
No. C-030391, 2004-Ohio-2178, ¶ 14, quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
{¶15} According to Reinhardt’s and Bachman’s affidavits, Reinhardt’s
attorney pressured her to plead guilty by threatening that the trial court would
sentence her to nine-and-one-half years in prison if she lost at trial because of the
trial court’s “anger” regarding her unwillingness to accept a plea deal. Her counsel
resorted to yelling and screaming.
{¶16} Accepting the affidavits of Reinhardt and Bachman as true, the
actions of Reinhardt’s counsel did not constitute deficient performance. At the time
Reinhardt pleaded guilty, she faced multiple felony drug charges. She had been
offered at least three plea deals by the state over a period of eight months. Just prior
to opening statements, the prosecutor had offered Reinhardt a second-degree
misdemeanor attempt charge, eligible for diversion. The trial court then had
indicated to Reinhardt that it would not accept such a deal once trial began.
Reinhardt again turned down the deal. At this point, according to Reinhardt, her
counsel became coercive, and she pleaded guilty. Counsel could have reasonably
believed that pleading guilty was the best strategy for Reinhardt to avoid prison.
This court will not second guess counsel’s trial strategy, and we presume that
counsel’s conduct fell within a wide range of competent assistance. State v.
Sweeting, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-120733, 2013-Ohio-5097, ¶ 16; see State v.
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Davie, 96 Ohio St.3d 133, 2002-Ohio-3753, 772 N.E.2d 119, ¶ 7, quoting Strickland
at 691 (“Strickland charges us to ‘apply a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s
judgments[.]’ ”).
{¶17} In addition to coercion by counsel, Reinhardt argues that the trial
court’s participation in the plea-bargaining process, and the trial court’s bias against
her, coerced her into taking a plea deal. As to a judge’s participation in the plea-
bargaining process, the Ohio Supreme Court has cautioned that “the judge’s position
in the criminal justice system presents a great potential for coerced guilty pleas and
can easily compromise the impartial position a trial judge should assume.” State v.
Byrd, 63 Ohio St.2d 288, 292, 407 N.E.2d 1384 (1980). Therefore, a defendant’s
plea is not voluntary where a judge’s participation in the plea process could lead the
defendant to believe that he could not have a fair trial or sentence. See State v.
Pippin, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060929, 2007-Ohio-5974, citing Byrd; State v.
Sawyer, 183 Ohio App.3d 65, 2009-Ohio-3097, 915 N.E.2d 715 (1st Dist.).
{¶18} The record does not support Reinhardt’s argument that the trial court
induced her to enter a guilty plea. Although the trial court requested that all of the
prior plea deals be on the record, the record does not indicate that the trial court had
been involved in those prior discussions. When the state offered Reinhardt yet
another deal of diversion just prior to opening statements, the trial court told
Reinhardt that it would not be inclined to accept such a deal once trial began and
that Reinhardt had one minute to make a decision. Despite the trial court’s
statements to her, however, Reinhardt declined to take that deal, negating her claim
of coercion.
{¶19} The remainder of Reinhardt’s allegations of coercion stem from
events that occurred after Reinhardt had agreed to plead guilty. Reinhardt relies on
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the trial court’s statement from the later hearing on her Crim.R. 32.1 motion to
withdraw her plea where the trial court stated it was a “participant in all of this.” She
further relies on the more lenient sentences received by her codefendants and the
trial court’s statements to her at the sentencing hearing, which occurred after the
plea had been entered. These postplea statements, as well as the other actions of
which Reinhardt complains, did not cause Reinhardt to plead guilty involuntarily.
{¶20} Finally, Reinhardt argues that the trial court promised her that she
would not serve jail time, but Reinhardt had to spend three days in jail awaiting her
electronic-monitoring device. Reinhardt argues that the trial court’s promised
sentence induced her to plead, and the breach of that promise resulted in an
involuntary plea. See State v. Bonnell, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2001-12-094,
2002-Ohio-5882, ¶ 18 (“[w]hen a trial court promises a certain sentence, the
promise becomes an inducement to enter a plea, and unless that sentence is given,
the plea is not voluntary.”).
{¶21} In Reinhardt’s case, the trial court imposed a sentence that did not
include jail time. Because of circumstances beyond the trial court’s knowledge or
control, Reinhardt unfortunately could not be fitted right away with an electronic-
monitoring device and had to await the time in jail. Therefore, Reinhardt’s argument
that the trial court did not impose a “promised” sentence is without merit.
{¶22} In conclusion, Reinhardt has failed to show that her counsel and the
trial court coerced her into entering her guilty plea. The trial court engaged
Reinhardt in a full and in-depth Crim.R. 11 colloquy in which Reinhardt agreed that
she had entered the plea by her own free will, and that she was pleading voluntarily.
Because Reinhardt’s Crim.R. 32.1 motion did not demonstrate that a manifest
injustice occurred, and Reinhardt’s counsel appeared at the hearing on the matter
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and submitted on the motion, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Reinhardt’s motion without an evidentiary hearing. See Dye, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
C-120483, 2013-Ohio-1626, at ¶ 6.
{¶23} We overrule Reinhardt’s assignment of error, and we affirm the
judgment of the trial court denying her Crim.R. 32.1 motion.
Judgment affirmed.
DINKELACKER, P.J., and DEWINE, J., concur.
Please note:
The court has recorded its own entry on the date of the release of this opinion.
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