State v. Farhat , 2022 Ohio 1716 ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Farhat, 
    2022-Ohio-1716
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    PORTAGE COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO,                                  CASE NO. 2021-P-0111
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Criminal Appeal from the
    -v-                                     Court of Common Pleas
    GERALD L. FARHAT,
    Trial Court No. 2019 CR 00211
    Defendant-Appellant.
    OPINION
    Decided: May 23, 2022
    Judgment: Reversed; remanded
    Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Pamela J. Holder, Assistant
    Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
    James P. Gilbride, 100 North Avenue, Suite 103, No. 200, Tallmadge, OH 44278 (For
    Defendant-Appellant).
    JOHN J. EKLUND, J.
    {¶1}     Appellant, Gerald Farhat, appeals his conviction for theft from a person in a
    protected class in the Portage County Court of Common Pleas.
    {¶2}     The trial court sentenced appellant to 18 months incarceration. Appellant
    raises a single assignment of error arguing that the trial court did not afford him the right
    of allocution pursuant to Crim.R. 32(A)(1). The State has conceded error in this matter.
    {¶3}     After review of the record and the applicable caselaw, we find appellant’s
    assignment of error has merit. The judgment of the Portage County Court of Common
    Pleas is reversed, and this matter is remanded for resentencing.
    Substantive and Procedural History
    {¶4}    On March 1, 2019, appellant was indicted on identity theft, theft from a
    person in a protected class, and forgery. On May 19, 2020, appellant pled guilty to theft
    from a person in a protected class in violation or R.C. 2913.02(A)(1), (B)(1) and (3), a
    felony of the fourth degree. The State dismissed the remaining charges. Appellant failed
    to appear at the Adult Probation Department for his presentence investigation
    appointment, a warrant for his arrest was issued, and he was arrested the following year
    in May 2021.
    {¶5}    The sentencing hearing was held on May 19, 2021. At the hearing,
    appellant’s defense counsel addressed the court and explained the reason he failed to
    appear for nearly a year. The court then asked appellant “is there anything you would like
    to tell me before I sentence you?” Appellant explained that he had other matters in Summit
    County and that he “should have been more mature” and was wrong by making his
    decision to not report to probation for the presentence report.
    {¶6}    The court then proceeded to sentencing, reviewed the presentence report,
    and recited appellant’s prior criminal history. The court found that appellant was not
    amenable to community control sanctions and the presumption of community control had
    been overcome. The court began to relate the facts of the case to appellant saying:
    THE COURT: * * * You said you were hired to put a roof on a house,
    ordered the materials, contractor somehow threw a fit, you gave the
    job to him –
    DEFENDANT: That –
    THE COURT: My turn to talk. No, no, no, no. Then the next thing you
    know, you got charged. Well this gentleman is out $1,900.00.
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    {¶7}   Appellant was not given any further opportunity to address the court and the
    court sentenced him to the maximum 18-month term with 14 days jail credit.
    {¶8}   On October 21, 2021, appellant filed a pro se Motion for Leave to File a
    Delayed Appeal, which was untimely filed by approximately four months. This court
    granted the Leave to File a Delayed Appeal on November 19, 2021.
    Assignment of Error and Analysis
    {¶9}   Appellant sole assignment of error states:
    {¶10} “The trial court committed prejudicial error when it denied Farhat his right of
    allocution as it applied to the theft offense for which he was sentenced contrary to Crim.R.
    32(A)(1). (Sentencing T.p. 6-8).”
    {¶11} Appellant contends that his sentence should be remanded for resentencing
    because the trial court erred in denying appellant the right of allocution at the hearing.
    {¶12} Crim.R. 32(A)(1) provides: “at the time of imposing sentence, the court shall
    * * * address the defendant personally and ask if he or she wishes to make a statement
    in his or her own behalf or present any information in mitigation of punishment.” “Trial
    courts must painstakingly adhere to Crim.R. 32, guaranteeing the right of allocution. A
    Crim.R. 32 inquiry is much more than an empty ritual: it represents a defendant's last
    opportunity to plead his case or express remorse.” State v. Green, 
    90 Ohio St. 3d 352
    ,
    359-360, 
    738 N.E.2d 1208
     (2000). “The purpose of allocution is to permit the defendant
    to speak on his own behalf or present any information in mitigation of punishment.” State
    v. Reynolds, 
    80 Ohio St. 3d 670
    , 684, 
    687 N.E.2d 1358
     (1998). “Judges should leave no
    room for doubt that the defendant has been issued a personal invitation to speak prior to
    sentencing.” Green v. United States, 
    365 U.S. 301
    , 305, 
    81 S.Ct. 653
    , 
    5 L.Ed.2d 670
    3
    Case No. 2021-P-0111
    (1961). The trial judge must unambiguously and explicitly ask the defendant, in an inquiry
    directed only to him, whether he has anything to say prior to sentencing. State v. Green
    at 359.
    {¶13} If the right of allocution is not afforded to the defendant, “the judgment of
    sentence shall be reversed and the cause shall be remanded for resentencing, unless the
    error is invited or harmless.” State v. Brown, 
    166 Ohio App. 3d 252
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1796
    , 
    850 N.E.2d 116
    , ¶ 8 (11th Dist.). The doctrine of waiver is not always applicable to the right
    of allocution. State v. Campbell, 
    90 Ohio St. 3d 320
    , 324, 
    738 N.E.2d 1178
     (2000). The
    defendant may only waive the right after the court has asked the defendant if he wishes
    to speak in allocution. 
    Id.
    {¶14} The doctrine of invited error provides an exception to the right of allocution
    if the defendant invited or induced the court’s failure to provide him with allocution. 
    Id.
    Harmless error is “any error, defect, irregularity, or variance which does not affect
    substantial rights.” Crim.R. 52(A). “It is not harmless error when the defendant is
    prejudiced by the court’s conduct, or a substantial right is violated.” State v. Coppa, 11th
    Dist. Portage No. 2021-P-0034, 
    2021-Ohio-4570
    , ¶ 15, citing State v. Jencson, 5th Dist.
    Knox 
    2021-Ohio-3256
    , ¶ 19.
    {¶15} Here, although appellant was offered an opportunity to speak at the
    sentencing hearing, he spoke only to the reason for his failure to appear for nearly one
    year. Appellant’s right of allocution was his “last opportunity to plead his case or express
    remorse.” State v. Green, 
    supra, at 359-360
    . The trial court did not afford appellant an
    opportunity to address the substance of his offense, offer any mitigating considerations,
    speak to his lengthy criminal history, or to express remorse for his actions. The record
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    demonstrates that appellant attempted to do so, but that the court cut him off and said
    “My turn to talk. No, no, no, no.” Thus, appellant was not afforded the right of allocution
    that Crim.R. 32(A)(1) requires.
    {¶16} The State concedes that appellant was not afforded the right of allocution
    that Crim.R. 32(A)(1) requires and makes no argument that harmless error or invited error
    applies.
    {¶17} Appellant’s assignment of error is well taken, and we remand for
    resentencing to afford appellant the right of allocation. Upon remand, the court shall
    provide appellant the right of allocution by personally asking if he would wish to make a
    statement prior to sentencing.
    MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,
    MATT LYNCH, J.,
    concur.
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