Huffman v. Huffman , 2022 Ohio 2020 ( 2022 )

[Cite as Huffman v. Huffman, 2022-Ohio-2020.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WASHINGTON COUNTY
CHERYL HUFFMAN, :
: Case No. 21CA13
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
:
v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT
: ENTRY
DAVID L. HUFFMAN, :
:
Defendant-Appellee. : RELEASED: 06/09/2022
APPEARANCES:
William B. Summers, Summers & Associates, Parkersburg, West Virginia, for
Appellant.
Eric L. Fowler, Marietta, Ohio, for Appellee.
Wilkin, J.
{¶1} This is an appeal from a Washington County Court of Common Pleas
judgment entry of divorce. Appellant, Cheryl Huffman, appeals asserting a single
assignment of error: “Did the lower court commit reversible error by failing to
inquire as to the specifics of the settlement agreement in the final hearing to
confirm the parties knew what was being agreed to?” Appellee, David L.
Huffman, has filed a brief in opposition. After reviewing appellant’s arguments,
the record, and applicable law, we overrule her assignment of error and affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
BACKGROUND
{¶2} Appellant and appellee were married in 2006. They have no children.
On September 10, 2020, appellant filed a complaint seeking to divorce appellee.
Washington App No. 21CA13 2
Both parties were represented by counsel throughout the entire case. The
parties reached a separation agreement prior to the final divorce hearing that
divided and distributed their property, financial assets, and liabilities. They
reduced the agreement to writing in the form of a proposed judgment entry that
was submitted to the court.
{¶3} On June 10, 2021, the court held a final divorce hearing. During the
hearing, the attorneys, and the court, questioned the parties regarding various
issues pertinent to the divorce, including the separation agreement. After the
hearing, the court issued a final judgment of divorce that incorporated the parties’
separation agreement. It is this judgment entry that appellant appeals.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
DID THE LOWER COURT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO
INQUIRE AS TO THE SPECIFICS OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT IN
THE FINAL HEARING TO CONFIRM THE PARTIES KNEW WHAT WAS BEING
AGREED TO?
{¶4} Appellant essentially submits two arguments in support of her
assignment of error. First, she claims that “the nineteen-question inquiry” during
the final divorce hearing was insufficient to show that she understood the terms
of the separation agreement. Second, she maintains that the trial court erred by
not requiring the separation agreement to be read into the record, citing Bottum
v. Jankovic, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99526, 2013-Ohio-4914.
{¶5} Appellant contends that she was not asked a sufficient number of
questions at the final divorce hearing to ensure that she understood the
settlement agreement’s terms. Appellant asserts that “[a] court cannot simply
acknowledge the existence of some type of Agreement without further
Washington App No. 21CA13 3
investigation to confirm the agreement proffered is the one agreed to by both
parties.” Otherwise, parties “would be free to submit any type of Agreement they
would want thereafter with terms not necessarily agreed upon.” Appellant
asserts that “[t]his is exactly the type of issue identified in Bottum when it
emphasized that the terms are not memorialized on the record, and this is
exactly the type of issue we have in this case by not having the terms
memorialized or ratified on the record by the [appellant].”
{¶6} In sum, appellant maintains that the court erred because the
questioning of appellant was insufficient to ensure her understanding of the
agreement, and the court was required to have the agreement read into the
record. Therefore, she argues that the trial court “abused its discretion” in
adopting the agreement.
{¶7} In response, appellee claims that the parties negotiated a separation
agreement. At the hearing, “[t]he attorneys for the respective parties posed
questions of the litigants and the court further posed questions.” Further, there
was no evidence that either party did not understand the agreement, or did not
sign it voluntarily. Therefore, appellee maintains that this court should affirm the
trial court’s judgment entry of divorce, which incorporated the separation
agreement.
A. Law
1. Standard of Review
{¶8} “ ‘The standard of review applicable to a ruling on a motion to enforce
a settlement agreement depends upon the issues disputed, and may present a
Washington App No. 21CA13 4
mixed question of law and fact.’ ” Mathews v. E. Pike Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn.,
4th Dist. Pike No. 12CA831, 2013-Ohio-4437, ¶ 14, quoting Barstow v. O.U. Real
Estate, III, Inc., 4th Dist. No. 01CA49, 2002-Ohio-4989 ¶ 36. “If the dispute is an
evidentiary one, we will not reverse the trial court's determination that a
settlement exists as long as the trial court had sufficient evidence before it as to
the terms of the settlement.’ ” Id., quoting Barstow, citing Chirchiglia v. Ohio Bur.
of Workers' Comp., 138 Ohio App.3d 676, 679, 742 N.E.2d 180 (2000). “If the
dispute is a question of law, we must employ a de novo review to determine
whether the trial court's decision to enforce the settlement agreement is based
upon an erroneous standard or a misconstruction of the law.” Id., citing Barstow
at ¶ 36, citing Continental W. Condominium Unit Owners Assn. v. Howard E.
Ferguson, Inc., 74 Ohio St.3d 501, 502, 660 N.E.2d 431(1996). A de novo
review affords no deference to the trial court’s decision. McClure v. McClure,
119 Ohio App. 3d 76, 79, 694 N.E.2d 515 (4th Dist. 1997), citing Burns v. Daily,
114 Ohio App.3d 693, 683 N.E.2d 1164 (4th Dist. 1996).
{¶9} Appellant does not challenge any specific term(s) of the agreement.
Rather, she argues that the trial court erred in the method that it used in adopting
the agreement, i.e., she claims that the court erred by not reading the settlement
agreement into the record, and by failing to engage appellant with more in-depth
questioning to ensure she understood the agreement. As these are matters of
law, we review them under a de novo standard of review.
2. Separation Agreements
Washington App No. 21CA13 5
{¶10} Like any settlement agreement, “ ‘[w]hen the parties to a divorce
action enter into a separation agreement, the court must construe that agreement
in accordance with ordinary rules of contract law.’ ” McLaughlin v. McLaughlin,
178 Ohio App. 3d 419, 2008-Ohio-5284, 898 N.E.2d 79, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), citing
McLaughlin v. McLaughlin, 4th Dist. Athens No. 00CA14, 2001 WL 803025 (Mar.
26, 2001) *3, citing Patel v. Patel, 4th Dist. Athens Nos. 98CA29 and 98CA30,
1999 WL 167608 (Mar. 23, 1999). Where the parties to a divorce enter into a
settlement agreement, the agreement constitutes a binding contract, which
cannot be unilaterally repudiated by one of the parties. Cochenour v.
Cochenour, 4th Dist. Ross No. 13CA3420, 2014-Ohio-3128, ¶ 28, citing Barstow,
2002-Ohio-4989, ¶ 38. “Thus, settlement agreements ‘can only be set aside for
the same reasons that any other contract could be rescinded, such as fraud,
duress, or undue influence.’ ” Id., quoting Barstow at ¶ 38.
{¶11} Settlement agreements “may be either written or oral, and may be
entered into prior to or at the time of a divorce hearing.” Hass v. Bauer, 156 Ohio
App.3d 26, 2004-Ohio-437, 804 N.E.2d 80, ¶ 19 (9th Dist.), citing Muckleroy v.
Muckleroy, 9th Dist. Summit No. 14443, 1990 WL 129242 (Sept. 5, 1990). But,
“[i]t is preferable that a settlement be memorialized in writing.” Mathews v. E.
Pike Loc. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Edn., 4th Dist. Pike No. 12CA831, 2013-Ohio-4437, ¶
22, citing Pawlowski v. Pawlowski, 83 Ohio App.3d 794, 798–799, 615 N.E.2d
1071 (10th Dist. 1992).
{¶12} Parties may reach a settlement on their own (extra-judicial
settlement), or in the presence of the court. “ ‘There is a difference between an
Washington App No. 21CA13 6
extra-judicial settlement and a settlement made in open court.’ ” Briceland v.
Briceland, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 20 CO 27, 2021-Ohio-3161, ¶ 31, quoting
Thomas v. Thomas, 5 Ohio App.3d 94, 98, 449 N.E.2d 478 (5th Dist. 1982).
{¶13} “An in-court agreement is one that occurs ‘during the course of a
hearing’ and in the ‘presence of the court.’ ” Richmond v. Evans, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 101269, 2015-Ohio-870, ¶ 13, citing Kolar v. Shapiro, 11th Dist.
Lake No. 2007-L–148, 2008-Ohio-2504, quoting Booth v. Booth, 11th Dist. Lake
No.2002-P–0099, 2004-Ohio-524. “Where the agreement is read into the record
in open court and agreed upon, the court may enter judgment adopting its
terms.” Bottum, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99526, 2013-Ohio-4914. Placing an in-
court agreement on the record has “significance because * * * a trial judge cannot
generally adopt his or her recollection and understanding of a settlement
agreement as a judgment of the court without an evidentiary hearing.” Evans,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 2015-Ohio-870, ¶ 33, citing Bolen v. Young, 8 Ohio
App.3d 36, 37, 455 N.E.2d 1316 (10th Dist. 1982). Therefore, “[w]hen the in-
court record does not reflect an agreement and/or the proposed entry does not
reflect an agreement, and there is a factual dispute present between the parties,
the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to adjudicate the issues in
dispute.” Phillips v. Phillips, 5th Dist. Stark Nos.2004CA00105 and
2004CA00005, 2005-Ohio-231, ¶ 27, citing Morform Tool Corp. v. Keco
Industries, Inc., 30 Ohio App.2d 207, 284 N.E.2d 191 (1st Dist.1971); Bolen.
{¶14} Alternatively, parties may reach an extra-judicial settlement
agreement, which occurs outside the court presence. Bolen, at 36. An extra-
Washington App No. 21CA13 7
judicial settlement is enforceable as a binding contract if it evidences a meeting
of the minds between the parties. Apple v. Hyundai Motor Am., 2d Dist.
Montgomery No. 23218, 2010-Ohio-949, ¶ 8. “Any instrument in writing, properly
executed, which evidences a meeting of the minds of the parties thereto, is
sufficient [to be a contract].” Sage v. Flueck, 132 Ohio St. 377, 380, 7 N.E.2d
802 (1937). Therefore, “where the agreement is made out of the presence of the
court, the court may properly sign a journal entry reflecting the settlement
agreement in the absence of any factual dispute concerning the agreement.”
(Citations omitted.) Bauer, 156 Ohio App.3d 26, 2004-Ohio-437, 804 N.E.2d 80,
¶ 16 (9th Dist.), citing Muckleroy, 1990 WL 129242 at *2, citing Mack v. Polson
Rubber Co., 14 Ohio St.3d 34 (1984). Notably, “a written settlement agreement
executed by both parties—is not unenforceable simply because it was not
“entered in open court” or “read into the record” at the time the parties reached
their agreement. (Emphasis added.) Evans at ¶ 33, citing Fowler v. Smith, 12th
Dist. Butler No. CA2003-02-042, 2003-Ohio-6257, ¶ 16, citing Erbeck Farms, Inc.
v. Mason, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA90–09–065, 1991 WL 84024, * 7 (May 20,
1991).
B. Analysis
{¶15} One of appellant’s contentions is that Bottum required the trial court
herein to read the settlement agreement into the record. In Bottum, the parties
reached a settlement during a recess in the trial, presented it to the court when
trial re-convened and the agreement was read into the record. 2013-Ohio-4914at ¶ 5. As an in-court agreement, there was a need to have the settlement read
Washington App No. 21CA13 8
into the record so as to memorialize its terms. Evans, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
2015-Ohio-870, ¶ 33. There is no such need in this case. Unlike Bottum, the
agreement here was an “extra judicial” agreement that had been reduced to
writing prior to the final divorce hearing, and submitted to the court. A written
separation agreement does not need to be read into the record to be
enforceable. Evans at ¶ 33. Further, there is nothing in the record indicating that
either party disputed the terms of the agreement, so a hearing was not necessary
to resolve any such dispute. Phillips, 5th Dist. Stark Nos. 2004CA00105 and
2004CA00005, 2005-Ohio-231, ¶ 27. Therefore, we reject appellant’s argument
that the trial court erred in failing to have the agreement herein read into the
record.
{¶16} Appellant also contends that the trial court erred by failing to subject
appellant to more in-depth questioning regarding her understanding of the
separation agreement. She also purports that a court cannot “simply
acknowledge” an agreement “without further investigation to confirm the
agreement proffered is the one agreed to by both parties.”
{¶17} As we recognized infra, the parties negotiated an agreement that
was reduced to writing, which was signed by the parties and their respective
attorneys and submitted to the court. Appellant testified that she twice reviewed
the agreement with her attorney and entered into it voluntarily. Further, appellant
failed to point out any specific misunderstanding she had regarding the
agreement or any of its terms, nor did she allege any fraud, duress, or undue
influence in reaching the agreement. More specifically, she did not allege that
Washington App No. 21CA13 9
the agreement submitted to the court is different from the one adopted by the
court and incorporated into the final divorce decree.
{¶18} Under these facts, we find that the parties have achieved a meeting
of the minds in reaching the separation agreement herein, so the need for in-
depth questioning regarding her understanding of the agreement was mitigated.
As the court of appeals in Bauer recognized: “where the agreement is made out
of the presence of the court, the court may properly sign a journal entry reflecting
the settlement agreement in the absence of any factual dispute concerning the
agreement.” 156 Ohio App.3d 26 at ¶ 16.
{¶19} Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err in failing to engage
in more in-depth questioning of appellant regarding her understanding of the
separation agreement herein.
CONCLUSION
{¶20} Having rejected appellant’s arguments, we overrule her sole
assignment of error pertaining to the parties’ separation agreement. Accordingly,
we affirm the trial court’s final divorce decree.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED.
Washington App No. 21CA13 10
JUDGMENT ENTRY
It is ordered that the JUDGMENT BE AFFIRMED and costs be assessed
to appellant.
The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the
Washington County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule
27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Smith, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.
For the Court,
BY: ______________________________
Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final
judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the
date of filing with the clerk.