Lindsay P. v. Towne Properties Asset Mgt. Co., Ltd. , 2013 Ohio 4124 ( 2013 )


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  • [Cite as Lindsay P. v. Towne Properties Asset Mgt. Co., Ltd., 
    2013-Ohio-4124
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    BUTLER COUNTY
    LINDSAY P.,                                              :
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                             :          CASE NO. CA2012-11-215
    :                   OPINION
    - vs -                                                                    9/23/2013
    :
    TOWNE PROPERTIES ASSET                                   :
    MANAGEMENT CO., LTD, et al.,
    :
    Defendants-Appellees.
    :
    CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
    Case No. CV2011-05-1658
    Haughey & Deters, LLC, Dennis P. Deters, Laura A. Tholke, 121 West High Street, Oxford,
    Ohio 45056, for plaintiff-appellant
    Droder & Miller Co., L.P.A., A. Dennis Miller, Bradley A. Powell, Zachary D. Bahorik, 125
    West Central Parkway, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202, for defendant-appellee, Towne Properties
    Asset Management Co., LTD
    Courtney Haynes, #638-479, Chillicothe Correctional Institution, P.O. Box 5500, Chillicothe,
    Ohio 45601, defendant-appellee, pro se
    PIPER, J.
    {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Lindsay P. (Lindsay), appeals a decision of the Butler County
    Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee, Towne
    Butler CA2012-11-215
    Properties Asset Management Co., LTD (Towne Properties).
    {¶ 2} Lindsay, a single mother, moved into an apartment complex operated by Towne
    Properties with her young daughter. Lindsay occupied an apartment above the one leased to
    Rhonda Schmidt. Schmidt's boyfriend, Courtney Haynes, lived in Schmidt's apartment even
    though he was not on the lease. Soon after Lindsay moved above Schmidt and Haynes, she
    began to complain to Town Properties management about the noise coming from Schmidt's
    apartment. Oftentimes, the rap music coming from Schmidt's apartment was so loud that it
    woke Lindsay's young daughter from naps and scared the child.
    {¶ 3} On multiple occasions, management would warn Schmidt about the noise, and
    Schmidt would assure management that the noise would cease. However, it did not. In
    addition to the loud music, Lindsay could also hear Schmidt and Haynes fighting loudly.
    Several times, management told Lindsay to call the police when the noise was too loud,
    which Lindsay did on multiple occasions. Lindsay also placed notes on Schmidt's door,
    asking that the noise stop. In response to the complaints, Schmidt and Haynes began
    retaliating against Lindsay by banging on her door and trying to confront her for reporting
    them to management and the police and for leaving notes. Lindsay reported the banging and
    intimidating behavior of Schmidt and Haynes to Town Properties management, and
    management was aware that Lindsay was afraid of her downstairs neighbors.
    {¶ 4} Late one night, Lindsay received a message that someone was contacting her
    through her Facebook account. When Lindsay logged on, Haynes, who was using the alias
    Curtis Foru, began conversing with her through messages. Haynes began the exchange by
    stating that he knew the two had had their differences, that he had seen Lindsay upset and
    crying, and that he knew that things were not "easy for a single mom." Haynes went on to
    say, "leave all your worries and concerns and troubles behind and have fun with me, let
    things go beyond and experience excitement together like never before. * * * You will really
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    Butler CA2012-11-215
    like having a friend so close that can satisfy you in so many great ways * * *. Forget the
    notes this time and just come in." At the end of this first message, Haynes included a link to
    a pornographic website, which depicted a large African-American man who looked similar to
    Haynes having sexual relations with a smaller white woman who looked similar to Lindsay.
    Haynes then commented, "I'm more than willing to do all of that for you in the video. Lets
    [sic] stop fighting and just enjoy being so near."
    {¶ 5} Lindsay immediately suspected that Haynes was the person messaging her,
    and tried in vain to have Haynes state his real name. On multiple occasions during the
    exchange, Lindsay tried to have Haynes use his real name, and on multiple occasions
    throughout the exchanges, Lindsay expressed to Haynes that she was afraid because of the
    contents of his message. When Lindsay insisted that the messenger identify himself,
    Haynes turned up the music in his apartment and asked if Lindsay could hear it. Haynes
    also made several references to their disagreements regarding the loud music, and told
    Lindsay that his messaging her was "the only way to talk to [her] without all the hostility * * *."
    Haynes also told Lindsay, "to be real honest, I did all of this cause I can't get you out of my
    mind, even your voice is so beautiful in my head! I just honestly had to take a chance, even
    tho its [sic] pretty weird."
    {¶ 6} The morning after the Facebook incident occurred, Lindsay went to Towne
    Properties management and reported what had occurred. Management printed out the
    Facebook exchange, and told Lindsay to go to the police, which Lindsay did. Lindsay then
    asked to be let out of her lease because she was afraid of Haynes, and did not feel safe at
    the apartment complex. Management told Lindsay that it was not possible for her to break
    the lease, and told Lindsay instead that she could move to a different apartment a few streets
    over. Lindsay expressed concern that the apartment offered was on the first floor because of
    safety and accessibility reasons. According to Lindsay, Towne Properties showed her a
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    Butler CA2012-11-215
    different possible apartment, which was located in the "same grouping" as her original
    apartment. Lindsay considered the apartment so close to her original one "out of the
    question," and agreed to move into the first-floor apartment. Management then told Schmidt
    and Haynes that Lindsay was moving and to not have any additional contact with her.
    {¶ 7} During the time that Lindsay reported her complaints regarding Schmidt and
    Haynes, management had become aware that Haynes was not on Schmidt's lease. After the
    Facebook incident, management told Schmidt that Haynes would have to vacate the property
    because he was not on the lease. Schmidt then told management that she wanted to add
    Haynes to the lease, and management began to take steps to add Haynes to the lease, even
    after being informed of the Facebook incident and being aware of the other complaints.
    Haynes came into the office and filled out an application, which was intended to include a
    credit and criminal background check. However, when the credit application came back as
    indicating a negative credit history, the criminal background check was not performed.
    Haynes was not added to Schmidt's lease.
    {¶ 8} A few days after Lindsay was moved and while he was still living with Schmidt,
    Haynes broke into Lindsay's apartment and raped her. Lindsay's daughter was also in the
    apartment and heard her mother being raped by Haynes. Lindsay sustained multiple
    physical injuries in addition to the psychological impact the rape had on her and her
    daughter. Haynes was apprehended by police, and was tried and convicted of rape and
    aggravated burglary. The trial court sentenced Haynes to nine years in prison, and Haynes
    1
    was classified as a Tier III sexual offender.
    {¶ 9} Lindsay filed a civil action against Towne Properties alleging negligence,
    negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of contract.                  Towne Properties
    1. This court affirmed Haynes' convictions and sentence in State v. Haynes, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA2010-10-
    273, 
    2011-Ohio-5743
    .
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    Butler CA2012-11-215
    answered, and the two parties engaged in discovery. During discovery, Lindsay gave a
    deposition, as did several employees of Town Properties who were involved in the
    happenings pertinent to Lindsay's suit. Deponents included Erin Fulmer, the complex
    manager; Nancy Marquez, the assistant manager; Shawna Wieland, a corporate trainer of
    Towne Properties' policies; Erick Grossl, the District Manager; Jeff Robbins, a former
    Maintenance Manager for the complex; and Carol Case, a leasing agent.
    {¶ 10} Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted Towne
    Properties' motion. In its decision, the trial court found that Haynes' rape of Lindsay was not
    foreseeable and that Towne Properties did not fail to take reasonable precautions. The trial
    court also granted summary judgment regarding the negligent infliction of emotional distress
    and breach of contract claims. Lindsay now appeals the trial court's decision, raising three
    assignments of error. Lindsay has not addressed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
    regarding negligent infliction of emotional distress in her brief, and also acknowledged at oral
    arguments that she is not challenging the trial court's grant of summary judgment regarding
    the breach of contract claim. Therefore, we will confine our analysis to the trial court's
    decision regarding negligence. For ease of discussion, and because they are interrelated,
    we will discuss Lindsay's first and second assignments of error together.
    {¶ 11} Assignment of Error No. 1:
    {¶ 12} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION
    FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE WERE MATERIAL ISSUES AT FACT TO
    BE LITIGATED.
    {¶ 13} Assignment of Error No. 2:
    {¶ 14} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE ASSIGNMENT THAT THERE WAS NOT
    A DUTY TO PROTECT OWED TO THE TENANT BY THE LANDLORD.
    {¶ 15} Lindsay argues in her first and second assignments of error that the trial court
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    Butler CA2012-11-215
    erred in granting summary judgment to Towne Properties because there are genuine issues
    of material fact that must be litigated.
    {¶ 16} This court's review of a trial court's ruling on a summary judgment motion is de
    novo. Broadnax v. Greene Credit Serv., 
    118 Ohio App.3d 881
    , 887 (2d Dist.1997). Civ.R.56
    sets forth the summary judgment standard and requires that (1) there be no genuine issues
    of material fact to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
    and (3) reasonable minds can come to only one conclusion which is adverse to the
    nonmoving party. Slowey v. Midland Acres, Inc., 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2007-08-030,
    
    2008-Ohio-3077
    , ¶ 8. The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no
    genuine issue of material fact. Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., 
    54 Ohio St.2d 64
    (1978).
    {¶ 17} The nonmoving party "may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleading, but
    his response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, must set forth specific facts
    showing the existence of a genuine triable issue." Mootispaw v. Eckstein, 
    76 Ohio St.3d 383
    ,
    385 (1996). A dispute of fact can be considered "material" if it affects the outcome of the
    litigation. Myers v. Jamar Enterprises, 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2001-06-056, 
    2001 WL 1567352
    ,*2 (Dec. 10, 2001). A dispute of fact can be considered "genuine" if it is supported
    by substantial evidence that exceeds the allegations in the complaint. 
    Id.
    {¶ 18} Summary judgment is not appropriate where the resolution of a factual dispute
    will depend in part upon the credibility of the witnesses. Layer v. Kings Island Co., 12th Dist.
    Warren No. CA2002-10-106, 
    2003-Ohio-2375
    , ¶ 14, citing Turner v. Turner, 
    67 Ohio St.3d 337
     (1993). Nor is summary judgment the proper vehicle for weighing the evidence where
    only a trial on the merits can resolve the dispute. Wagner v. Ohio State Univ. Med. Ctr., 
    188 Ohio App.3d 65
    , 
    2010-Ohio-2561
    , ¶ 37 (10th Dist.).
    {¶ 19} In order to establish a negligence claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate a duty
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    Butler CA2012-11-215
    owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and injury proximately caused by
    the defendant's breach of duty. Jeffers v. Olexo, 
    43 Ohio St.3d 140
    , 142 (1989). "Duty, as
    used in Ohio tort law, refers to the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant from
    which arises an obligation on the part of the defendant to exercise due care toward the
    plaintiff." Wallace v. Ohio Dept. of Commerce, 
    96 Ohio St.3d 266
    , 
    2002-Ohio-4210
    , ¶ 23.
    {¶ 20} Generally, landlords do not have a duty to protect their tenants from the criminal
    acts of third parties. Doe v. Beach House Dev. Co., 
    136 Ohio App.3d 573
     (8th Dist.2000).
    However, if a "special relationship" exists between plaintiff and defendant, that defendant's
    duty to protect the plaintiff from harm caused by a third party may exist. Johnson v.
    Spectrum of Supportive Services, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 82267, 
    2003-Ohio-4404
    , ¶ 23.
    Such a duty exists when the landlord "should have reasonably foreseen the criminal activity
    and failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent such activity." Id. at ¶ 18. However, it is
    not necessary that the defendant should have anticipated the specific injury. Profitt v. Tate
    Monroe Water Assn., Inc., 12th Dist. Clermont No. CA2012-10-072, 
    2013-Ohio-2278
    .
    Instead, the "test for foreseeability is whether a reasonably prudent person, under the same
    or similar circumstances as the defendant, should have anticipated that injury to the plaintiff
    or to those in like situations is the probable result of the performance or nonperformance of
    an act." Id. at ¶ 19, citing Commerce & Industry Ins. Co. v. City of Toledo, 
    45 Ohio St.3d 96
    ,
    98 (1989).
    {¶ 21} It is well-established in Ohio law that "criminal behavior of third persons is not
    predictable to any degree of certainty." Adkins v. RLJ Management Co., 5th Dist. Muskingum
    No. CT2011-0012, 
    2011-Ohio-6609
    , ¶ 13. Accordingly, "the foreseeability of a criminal act
    depends upon the knowledge of the defendant, which must be determined by the totality of
    the circumstances, and it is only when the totality of the circumstances are 'somewhat
    overwhelming' that the defendant will be held liable." Wagner, 
    2010-Ohio-2561
     at ¶ 23,
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    Butler CA2012-11-215
    quoting Staten v. Ohio Exterminating Co., Inc., 
    123 Ohio App.3d 526
    , 530 (10th Dist.1997);
    see also Brown-Spurgeon v. Paul Davis Systems of Tri-State Area, Inc., 12th Dist. Clermont
    No. CA2012-09-069, 
    2013-Ohio-1845
    , ¶ 33. "The mere fact that misconduct on the part of
    another might be foreseen is not of itself sufficient to place the responsibility upon the
    defendant * * * it is only where the misconduct was to be anticipated, and taking the risk of it
    was unreasonable, that liability will be imposed for consequences to which such intervening
    acts contributed." Wagner at ¶ 25. Stated another way, "when liability is asserted against a
    landowner for the criminal acts of third parties, the burden is upon the plaintiff to establish
    that the owner knew or should have known about the assailant's dangerous propensities or
    knew the attack was imminent." Adkins, 
    2011-Ohio-6609
     at ¶ 15.
    {¶ 22} Based on the foregoing legal standard, we must decide if there exist genuine
    issues of material fact regarding whether Haynes' criminal act or dangerous propensities
    were to be anticipated and whether Town Properties' actions in regard to its willingness to
    take the risk of such criminal acts were unreasonable. After reviewing the record, we find
    that there are genuine issues of material fact that require litigation.
    {¶ 23} Although the trial court determined that Haynes' rape of Lindsay was not
    foreseeable, we find that reasonable minds could reach different conclusions on this issue so
    that summary judgment is not appropriate. Viewed in a light most favorable to Lindsay, the
    record indicates that Towne Properties management was aware that Lindsay was frightened
    of Haynes because of his actions toward her, and that Haynes' actions demonstrated his
    dangerous propensities toward Lindsay.
    {¶ 24} The trial court noted, and we agree, that the exchanges between Lindsay and
    Haynes began as mere noise complaints. The record is replete with references to the fact
    that Lindsay complained of the noise coming from Schmidt's apartment to multiple entities,
    including Towne Properties management, the police, as well as Schmidt and Haynes directly.
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    Butler CA2012-11-215
    Upon being faced with Lindsay's complaints, Haynes and Schmidt confronted Lindsay, often
    banging on her door and trying to confront her. Lindsay testified that while Schmidt and
    Haynes never made any explicit threats to her, she was nonetheless "terrified" because
    Schmidt and Haynes would bang on her door and scream at her through the door. The
    record also makes reference to Haynes banging on Lindsay's door with a fire extinguisher
    and looking "menacing" at her. Lindsay testified that it was "absolutely terrifying" every time
    her door was pounded upon, that the pounding and yelling was done so in a "threatening
    manner," and that she informed Towne Properties management "how menacing it was to
    have somebody pounding on your door and screaming at you through the door."
    {¶ 25} The record reveals that Towne Properties management was aware that Lindsay
    was very frightened by her exchanges with Haynes. In a letter Erin Fulmer wrote to the
    District Manager, Erick Grossl, she stated, "Lindsay then came in a few days later saying that
    the man downstairs would come up to her front door. He would bang loudly on the door
    trying to get Lindsey to open the door. She said that he was very upset that she told on him.
    She was afraid of him because he seemed very angry." Fulmer's knowledge of Lindsay's
    fear of Haynes is further demonstrated by the following exchange within Fulmer's deposition.
    [Q] So you perceived that [Lindsay] was actually afraid of
    [Haynes]?
    [A] Yes.
    [Q] Okay. Did that play into the decision to move Lindsay?
    [A] Yes.
    Another Towne Property employee wrote to Grossl and stated, "I heard a complaint that the
    man below [Lindsay] had come to her door pounding, yelling and threatening her. My
    understanding thru [sic] the other girls in the office was that each time she called the police
    he would come to her door banging and threatening. She was very afraid of him and did not
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    Butler CA2012-11-215
    answer the door." Carol Case, one of Towne Properties leasing agents, wrote to Grossl that,
    Lindsey had mentioned to me that she had called the police on
    several occasions and that the resident would retaliate by making
    even more noise and pounding on her door. At one point,
    Lindsey did call in tears and express to me that this resident
    made her feel uncomfortable and that she was not comfortable
    calling the police for fear of additional retaliation. I expressed to
    Lindsey that it was important for her to call the police and file a
    complaint, as this would allow us the means we need to take
    action on the matter.
    {¶ 26} Case, who handled one of Lindsay's specific complaints regarding Haynes'
    behavior, went to Schmidt's apartment one day to tell Haynes to lower his music. Case
    spoke to Lindsay after speaking with Haynes to assure Lindsay that Haynes was told to turn
    down the music, and Case told Lindsay that Haynes had tried to "intimidate" her when she
    told him to turn down the music. Case was also familiar with Lindsay's fear of Haynes, as
    she offered to come and sit with Lindsay after the Towne Properties office had closed for the
    day so that Lindsay would not be alone.
    {¶ 27} Beyond the threatening manner in which Haynes pounded on Lindsay's door,
    the record contains the Facebook exchange during which Haynes contacted Lindsay using
    an alias.2 Lindsay testified that the messages on Facebook sent a "shock of terror" through
    her knowing that Haynes had taken action to learn her identity and how to access her on
    Facebook, given how much information Haynes knew about her. Haynes made reference to
    Lindsay as a single mother, that he had seen her crying and upset on occasion, and that he
    had watched her since she moved in. Haynes went on to say, "leave all your worries and
    concerns and troubles behind and have fun with me, let things go beyond and experience
    excitement together like never before. * * * You will really like having a friend so close that
    2. Lindsay told management that when Haynes was banging on the door, he had his hood up, a reasonable
    inference being that Haynes did not want to be easily identified.
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    Butler CA2012-11-215
    can satisfy you in so many great ways * * *.3 Forget the notes this time and just come in." At
    the end of this first message, Haynes included a link to a pornographic website, which
    depicted a large African American man who looked similar to Haynes having sexual relations
    with a smaller white woman who looked similar to Lindsay. Haynes then commented, "I'm
    more than willing to do all of that for you in the video. Lets [sic] stop fighting and just enjoy
    being so near."4
    {¶ 28} While it is true that Lindsay did not click on the link until she reported the
    exchange to Towne Property management and police, the record demonstrates that the
    exchange made Lindsay very frightened. Even absent the pornographic link, the Facebook
    exchange was sexual in nature, including multiple propositions by Haynes, and indicated that
    Haynes had somehow found out who Lindsay was and how to access her Facebook page.
    Lindsay testified that she considered the message "stalking as soon as I read it."5 Lindsay
    conveyed her belief to Towne Properties management that Haynes' contact via Facebook
    constituted stalking. According to the deposition testimony of a leasing agent of Towne
    Properties, Lindsay told her, "I was contacted last night by the guy that lives below me and he
    is stalking me on Facebook."
    3. Counsel for Towne Properties asserted at oral arguments that the Facebook communication had "no sexual
    connotation." However, it is reasonable to assume that Haynes' statements regarding "letting things go beyond,"
    "experienc[ing] excitement together like never before," and "having a friend so close that can satisfy you in so
    many great ways" was sexual in nature, especially when paired with the link to the pornographic website and
    Haynes' comment that he was willing to perform the acts seen in the pornographic movie upon Lindsay.
    4. The record does not contain the actual video, and this court has not viewed the website as included in the
    Facebook exchange. However, Lindsay testified to the contents of the video, and at the summary judgment
    phase, we will construe the facts in a light most favorable to her as the nonmoving party. We would also note
    that Towne Properties' counsel asserted at oral argument that Haynes sent Lindsay a separate link to the
    pornographic video in an email sometime after the Facebook exchange. However, the record clearly
    demonstrates that the link to the pornographic video was embedded at the end of the first Facebook
    communication that Haynes sent Lindsay.
    5. Counsel for Towne Properties asserted at oral arguments that the record did not contain any indication that
    the Facebook communication was considered by any party as "stalking." However, the record indicates that
    Lindsay believed it to be stalking, and that Towne Properties was aware of Lindsay's belief that Haynes' conduct
    constituted stalking.
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    {¶ 29} When Towne Properties management learned of the Facebook incident
    immediately after it occurred, management considered it serious enough to instruct Lindsay
    to inform the police of the exchange, which Lindsay did. It is undisputed that the police did
    not pursue charges against Haynes because of the Facebook exchange, nor did they
    investigate the matter.6 However, that does not change the fact that Towne Properties
    management was well aware of the history between Haynes and Lindsay and concerned
    enough about the circumstances to suggest moving Lindsay away from Haynes on the day
    after the communication occurred.
    {¶ 30} While Haynes' Facebook communication alone did not rise to the level of
    criminal activity, it nonetheless made Towne Properties management even more aware of
    why Lindsay feared Haynes, and aware of Haynes' escalating behavior toward Lindsay. In
    fact, Fulmer noted within a letter to Grossl that Lindsay communicated her fear to
    management regarding Haynes' communication with her. "Lindsay came in to our office
    complaining that she is afraid of her neighbor as she believes that he is trying to contact her
    over facebook [sic]."
    {¶ 31} Despite the trial court couching the circumstances as merely noise complaints,
    the record reveals that Towne Properties management recognized that Haynes' behavior
    focusing on Lindsay was increasing and changing in nature. Fulmer testified during her
    deposition that management agreed to move Lindsay because Fulmer believed that Lindsay
    was afraid of Haynes and because of the communication between Haynes and Lindsay.
    Fulmer further testified that she was cognizant that Haynes' behavior was intensifying, "it was
    a continued noise complaint, it has escalated from noise from the below unit to now he is
    contacting her on Facebook." Fulmer also stated, "it was just becoming more than a noise
    6. The record seems to indicate that the police did not view the pornographic video, as Lindsay testified that she
    gave the police the printout, but did not testify that she and the officer viewed the pornographic video together.
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    Butler CA2012-11-215
    complaint with him contacting her and going up to her door." Fulmer also testified that after
    Lindsay reported the Facebook incident, Fulmer contacted Grossl and explained to him the
    escalating nature of Haynes' conduct.
    I just explained to him what I read at the time on the Facebook
    and just let him know at this point it had gone from a noise
    complaint and it has escalated, now he is contacting her. And at
    one point he did knock on her door. And that at this point it's just
    becoming something other than a noise complaint.
    (Emphasis added.)
    {¶ 32} In light of Towne Properties' knowledge of Haynes' hostility and preoccupation
    with Lindsay, along with the uninvited sexual suggestions he made toward her, the totality of
    the circumstances indicate that Towne Properties may have been aware of the foreseeability
    of Haynes' criminal act. Therefore, genuine issues of material fact remain regarding the
    foreseeability of Haynes' eventual uninvited entrance into Lindsay's residence and Haynes'
    nonconsensual sexual conduct with Lindsay.
    {¶ 33} This court is cognizant that the criminal acts of third parties are very difficult to
    predict and that a landlord does not generally have a duty to protect its tenants from the
    criminal acts of third parties. However, there are issues of fact regarding whether Towne
    Properties should have reasonably foreseen Haynes' criminal activity.                The record
    demonstrates that Towne Properties was aware of how Haynes was acting toward Lindsay,
    and that Lindsay was "scared," "terrified," and that Lindsay felt threatened. The record also
    demonstrates that Towne Properties was aware of Haynes' dangerous propensities, as it
    knew that Lindsay felt threatened by Haynes to the point that an employee offered to sit with
    Lindsay even after business hours so that she would not be alone. Towne Properties was
    also made aware of Haynes' Facebook communication with Lindsay and that he
    propositioned her sexually, including statements that he could not get Lindsay out of his
    mind. Towne Properties told Lindsay that it was "taking care of it" in regard to Lindsay's fear
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    Butler CA2012-11-215
    of Haynes and the developing circumstances, and asked Lindsay to contact police so that
    such police records would allow Towne Properties "the means we need to take action on the
    matter." Towne Properties also told Lindsay that it would "keep an eye on" the relations
    between Haynes and Lindsay. Despite being aware of the threat Haynes posed Lindsay,
    Towne Properties continued to allow Haynes to live in Schmidt's apartment and even
    attempted to add him to the lease. Summary judgment is simply not proper here, given that
    only a trial on the merits can resolve whether Haynes' criminal activity was foreseeable.
    {¶ 34} Based on the totality of the circumstances, reasonable minds could also differ
    as to whether Towne Properties took reasonable steps to protect Lindsay from Haynes'
    dangerous propensities. Summary judgment is inappropriate, given the conflicting testimony
    as to whether Towne Properties took reasonable steps to protect Lindsay and the need for a
    trier of fact to weigh and determine witness credibility regarding these pertinent issues.
    {¶ 35} First, the record contains conflicting testimony as to whether Lindsay asked to
    be released from her lease after the Facebook incident. Lindsay specifically testified, "I
    asked them what can be done about this. I told him I was scared. I told them I wanted to
    leave. I didn't want to stay here anymore with this type of behavior going on around me and
    they immediately told me that that was not an option." However, Fulmer denied that Lindsay
    ever asked to be let out of her lease, and testified that no one discussed the possibility of
    7
    letting Lindsay out of her lease. Contrary to Fulmer's testimony, Lindsay testified that Towne
    Properties management told her that she could not break her lease and that relocating her to
    another apartment in the community was the "only thing they could do."
    7. Counsel for Towne Properties asserted at oral argument that there was "no evidence that [Lindsay] asked to
    be released" from her lease and that Lindsay only asserted that she asked to be let out of her lease in an
    affidavit submitted to the court after her deposition was taken. However, one can reasonably read Lindsay's
    deposition testimony and reach the opposite conclusion.
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    Butler CA2012-11-215
    {¶ 36} This issue is one of credibility that must be determined by a trier of fact and is
    important to the analysis of whether Towne Properties took reasonable steps to protect
    Lindsay once it was aware of Lindsay's fear of Haynes. While Fulmer asserted that Lindsay
    did not want out of her lease, Lindsay testified that she specifically asked to be let out
    because she was fearful of Haynes. Although Towne Properties management stated that
    letting someone out of their lease was not a possibility, the testimony of Shawna Wieland,
    Towne Properties' senior corporate trainer, indicates otherwise. Wieland testified that "there
    are exceptions where we will let people out of leases if the district manager and the manager
    are okay with it, but it's not a policy. It's not a lease agreement clause, it's scenario."
    Wieland also testified that she was aware of circumstances "where people have been let out
    of their lease because they feel unsafe," and that Towne Properties had let tenants out of
    8
    their leases before.
    {¶ 37} Whether Towne Properties refused to let Lindsay out of her lease is a material
    fact that can only be resolved at trial. The issue is material because of Towne Properties'
    claim that it took reasonable steps to protect Lindsay. Instead of letting Lindsay out of her
    lease, Towne Properties moved Lindsay to another apartment within close proximity to her
    old apartment and in close proximity to Haynes. Despite Lindsay expressing her concern
    regarding living on the first floor where she feared for her safety, Lindsay testified that Towne
    Properties told her that moving her to the other apartment was the "only thing they could do."
    Wieland's testimony directly contradicts Towne Properties' statement to Lindsay, and
    indicates that it was possible for Towne Properties to let Lindsay out of her lease so that she
    could move away from the complex, and away from Haynes.
    {¶ 38} The circumstances are further compounded because of the way in which
    8. Towne Properties' counsel suggested at oral arguments that the record did not contain evidence that Towne
    Properties let tenants out of their leases. The record, however, does appear to contain such testimony.
    - 15 -
    Butler CA2012-11-215
    Towne Properties addressed Haynes after Lindsay moved. Instead of moving Lindsay
    quietly and then making Haynes vacate the property, Fulmer specifically told Schmidt and
    Haynes that Lindsay was moving and warned them to stay away from her.9 Fulmer then
    began the process of trying to add Haynes to Schmidt's lease. During her testimony, Fulmer
    admitted that she told Haynes and Schmidt not to contact Lindsay. "I told them that the
    neighbor was moving and that they're not to have any contact with her in the hallway. And I
    believe at that time I explained to him that he needed to fill out an application." Fulmer also
    stated in her letter to Grossl that she told Schmidt and Haynes that they were not to have any
    contact with Lindsay.
    {¶ 39} Although Towne Properties was sufficiently concerned about Lindsay's safety
    that they moved her, Fulmer, by directly talking to Haynes and informing him that Lindsay
    was moving, may have exacerbated the circumstances. According to Marquez, an assistant
    manager, Fulmer's informing Haynes and Schmidt that Lindsay was moving and telling them
    not to have contact with Lindsay was "unusual" and not "something that would have been
    done. It wasn't policy to do that or it wasn't common practice * * * because it's not anyone
    else's business where someone is moving. We would never give that information out to
    anyone." Only a jury can decide what weight to give the fact that Towne Properties had
    knowledge that on more than one occasion when Lindsay reported Haynes to authorities, he
    would retaliate by confronting her. Fulmer gave Lindsay's private information to Haynes by
    telling him that she was being moved, and Fulmer's communication with Haynes and Schmidt
    is undisputed from the record.
    {¶ 40} In addition to not letting Lindsay break her lease, expressly informing Haynes
    that Lindsay was moving, and then placing Lindsay in a first-floor apartment even though she
    9. Towne Properties' counsel asserted at oral arguments that there was not "anything in the evidence" to
    suggest that management told Haynes to stay away from Lindsay. However, the record indicates otherwise.
    - 16 -
    Butler CA2012-11-215
    expressed concern for her safety, Towne Properties also began the process of adding
    Haynes to Schmidt's lease. When various facts are put into context with one another, it
    creates a question of fact as to whether Town Properties took reasonable steps to protect
    Lindsay.
    {¶ 41} The record indicates that Towne Properties management often deemed
    persons who caused trouble within the apartment complex as being "banned" from the
    complex. A letter would be issued notifying the recipient that he or she was banned from the
    complex and would be considered a trespasser if found at the complex again. The record
    contains seven examples of such notifications, as well as a template letter used by Towne
    Properties management. Although Towne Properties management issued notifications to
    others who caused trouble at the complex, Haynes never received any similar admonition,
    and instead, was given the opportunity to be added to Schmidt's lease. Instead of deeming
    him "banned" for his prior actions and behavior toward Lindsay, Towne Properties went
    through the initial steps necessary to add Haynes to Schmidt's lease, including having him fill
    out an application and performing a credit check. While Haynes raped Lindsay before he
    was ever added to Schmidt's lease, the fact that Towne Properties was willing to add Haynes
    to Schmidt's lease, instead of banning him from the property, while knowing of his potential
    dangerous propensities raises questions of material fact regarding whether Towne Properties
    should have anticipated an injury to Lindsay as the probable result of its actions.
    {¶ 42} Our decision today in no way indicates our belief as to what the ultimate
    decision on the merits may be. Instead, our review of the record merely establishes that
    summary judgment is not proper in this case because there are genuine issues of material
    fact to be litigated, neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and reasonable
    minds can come to different conclusions regarding the issues discussed herein. Moreover,
    summary judgment is improper where several issues depend upon witness credibility and the
    - 17 -
    Butler CA2012-11-215
    weight of the evidence.
    {¶ 43} Accordingly, we sustain Lindsay's first and second assignments of error and
    remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
    {¶ 44} Assignment of Error No. 3:
    {¶ 45} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S PARTIAL
    SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
    {¶ 46} Lindsay argues in her third assignment of error that the trial court erred in not
    granting her motion for summary judgment. Lindsay argues that Towne Properties engaged
    in reckless misconduct by moving Lindsay to the first-floor apartment and for not making
    Haynes leave the property. However, given our analysis of the first two assignments of error,
    we overrule Lindsay's third assignment of error.
    {¶ 47} Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded for
    further proceedings.
    RINGLAND, P.J., and M. POWELL, J., concur.
    - 18 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: CA2012-11-215

Citation Numbers: 2013 Ohio 4124

Judges: Piper

Filed Date: 9/23/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2016

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