State v. Thomas , 2022 Ohio 2218 ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Thomas, 
    2022-Ohio-2218
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO,                              :    APPEAL NO. C-210519
    TRIAL NO. C-21CRB-1708
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
    :      O P I N I O N.
    VS.
    :
    GREGG THOMAS,                               :
    Defendant-Appellant.                  :
    Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
    Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
    Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 29, 2022
    Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Paula E. Adams,
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Raymond T. Faller, Hamilton County Public Defender, and Sarah E. Nelson, Assistant
    Public Defender, for Defendant-Appellant.
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    BERGERON, Judge.
    {¶1}   If an incensed employee is spotted alone next to the manager’s damaged
    car, but no one saw him actually inflict the damage, is it reasonable for the trial court
    to find the employee guilty of criminal damaging? On appeal, the defendant here
    contends that the scant evidence available in this case, most of which is circumstantial,
    mandates reversal of his conviction. We see things differently, however, and affirm
    the judgment of the trial court for the reasons explained below.
    I.
    {¶2}   In January 2021, defendant-appellant Gregg Thomas worked at the
    KFC/Taco Bell in Norwood. During one of his shifts, some type of disagreement
    erupted between Mr. Thomas and the manager, Ruth Whetstone. Frustrated by his
    behavior, Ms. Whetstone sent Mr. Thomas home and assumed that he left the
    premises. But about a half hour later, other employees alerted her to the fact that he
    was lingering in the parking lot near her car. Prying open the door, Ms. Whetstone
    observed Mr. Thomas “ranting and raging” outside the restaurant while “destroying”
    her car, which now had a conspicuous pile of trash dumped on its roof. She confronted
    Mr. Thomas about the scene and claims that he admitted, “Yeah, I did it”—although it
    remains unclear whether he was simply acknowledging littering on her car or actually
    inflicting damage to it (that she would soon notice). Ms. Whetstone then called the
    Norwood police, who escorted Mr. Thomas off the property.              Afterwards, Ms.
    Whetstone inspected her car only to discover the bumper kicked in and a windshield
    wiper bent backwards.
    {¶3}   The Norwood police charged Mr. Thomas with criminal damaging
    pursuant to R.C. 2909.06(A)(1). Ms. Whetstone was the only witness during the bench
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    trial, and in addition to her testimony, the state produced a photograph of Mr. Thomas
    standing near Ms. Whetstone’s car with what appears to be a pile of trash on the roof.
    No other damage to Ms. Whetstone’s vehicle is visible in the photograph. The trial
    court found Mr. Thomas guilty of criminal damaging and sentenced him to 30 days in
    jail suspended, six months of probation, and court costs.
    {¶4}   Mr. Thomas now appeals, presenting three assignments of error. In his
    first assignment of error, Mr. Thomas maintains that the state failed to present
    sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for criminal damaging.          His second
    assignment of error claims that the trial court erred by considering his alleged
    confession before the state established the corpus delicti of the crime. And in his third
    assignment of error, Mr. Thomas argues that his conviction was against the manifest
    weight of the evidence.
    II.
    {¶5}   For ease of discussion, we address Mr. Thomas’ first and third
    assignments of error together, both of which take aim at the state’s evidence (or lack
    thereof). Turning first to Mr. Thomas’ sufficiency challenge, “the question is whether
    the evidence presented, when viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
    would allow any rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond
    a reasonable doubt.” State v. Dent, 
    163 Ohio St.3d 390
    , 
    2020-Ohio-6670
    , 
    170 N.E.3d 816
    , ¶ 15. Sufficiency determinations are reviewed de novo but “the court is not to
    weigh the evidence.” State v. MacDonald, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180310, 2019-
    Ohio-3595, ¶ 12; Dent at ¶ 15 (“Our [sufficiency-of-the-evidence] review is de novo.”).
    To obtain a conviction for criminal damaging, the state must prove that Mr. Thomas
    knowingly caused or created a substantial risk of physical harm to Ms. Whetstone’s
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    property. R.C. 2909.06(A)(1) (“No person shall cause, or create a substantial risk of
    physical harm to any property of another without the other person’s consent * * *
    [k]nowingly, by any means.”). “ ‘Physical harm to property’ means any tangible or
    intangible damage to property that, in any degree, results in loss to its value or
    interferes with its use or enjoyment.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2901.01(A)(4). Since
    the defense does not dispute that the damage to the bumper or windshield wiper
    constitutes “physical harm to property,” Mr. Thomas’ argument boils down to whether
    the evidence sufficed to show that he inflicted the harm.
    {¶6}   According to Mr. Thomas, the only evidence marshaled by the state was
    a photo showing trash on the roof of Ms. Whetstone’s car. Assuming he did confess to
    dumping the trash, Mr. Thomas decries the impropriety of using such an admission to
    infer that his criminal conduct extended to the bumper and windshield wiper damage.
    {¶7}   The law does not require the state to produce direct evidence that Mr.
    Thomas committed each individual act of vandalism. The elements of a crime may be
    proven by circumstantial evidence. “ ‘Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence
    inherently possess the same probative value and therefore should be subject to the
    same standard of proof.’ ” State v. Lowery, 
    160 Ohio App.3d 138
    , 
    2005-Ohio-1181
    ,
    
    826 N.E.2d 340
    , ¶ 19 (1st Dist.), quoting State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991), paragraph one of the syllabus. Less than an hour after being disciplined
    and sent home from work by Ms. Whetstone, Mr. Thomas was photographed standing
    alone in an agitated state next to her trash-riddled car on a dark, snowy night. No
    other cars or individuals appear in the vicinity.     That suffices as circumstantial
    evidence from which the trial court could conclude that any confession on the part of
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Mr. Thomas—“Yeah, I did it”—extended beyond the trash to the windshield wiper and
    bumper damage.
    {¶8}   Mr. Thomas also asserts that, assuming we excluded consideration of
    his confession, merely being near Ms. Whetstone’s car is not proof that he damaged it.
    In this regard, Mr. Thomas features State v. Dotson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98884,
    
    2013-Ohio-2200
    . In Dotson, a jilted boyfriend showed up at his ex-girlfriend’s house
    with another individual to collect some belongings left there. Id. at ¶ 4. The ex-
    girlfriend’s father ordered Mr. Dotson and his friend to leave, after which the living
    room window shattered. Id. The trial court acknowledged that the state failed to
    identify who broke the window, and neither the ex-girlfriend nor her father witnessed
    Mr. Dotson commit the act. Id. at ¶ 3-4. The Eighth District reversed the criminal-
    damaging conviction because “the state’s evidence established merely that Dotson was
    present when the window shattered.” Id. at ¶ 13.
    {¶9}   Mr. Thomas’s conviction is factually distinct from Dotson because he
    was the only party involved, and as far as the record discloses, the only person
    anywhere near the car. Dotson involved a “who-done-it” scenario where the state
    could not identify the culpable party between Mr. Dotson and his friend. Unlike a
    scenario with multiple individuals present who could have caused the damage, here,
    we have a solitary individual near the vehicle when it was damaged—who,
    coincidentally, was the same person Ms. Whetstone dismissed from work shortly
    before the damage occurred. “On a sufficiency challenge, we generally defer to the
    credibility determinations of the trial court so long as those determinations are
    reasonable.” State v. Cole-Walker, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-200038, 2021-Ohio-
    1507, ¶ 13. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the state, as we must in a
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    sufficiency challenge, we cannot say that no reasonable trier of fact could conclude that
    Mr. Thomas dumped the trash, dented the bumper, and bent the windshield wiper.
    Accordingly, Mr. Thomas’ first assignment of error challenging the sufficiency of the
    evidence is overruled.
    {¶10} Although we find sufficient evidence to support the conviction, we may
    nevertheless conclude that the judgment is against the manifest weight of the
    evidence. State v. Patton, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190649, 
    2021-Ohio-295
    , ¶ 16.
    “[T]he sufficiency of the evidence is quantitatively and qualitatively different from the
    weight of the evidence.” Eastley v. Volkman, 
    132 Ohio St.3d 328
    , 
    2012-Ohio-2179
    ,
    
    972 N.E.2d 517
    , ¶ 23. Because we are sitting as a “thirteenth juror” when evaluating
    the manifest weight of the evidence, State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St.3d 380
    , 387, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
     (1997), we will “review the entire record, weigh the evidence and
    reasonable inferences, [and] consider the credibility of the witnesses.”        State v.
    Barnthouse, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-180286, 
    2019-Ohio-5209
    , ¶ 6. But we will only
    reverse and grant a new trial if “the trier of fact clearly lost its way, resulting in a
    manifest miscarriage of justice.” 
    Id.
    {¶11} On his weight-of-the-evidence challenge, Mr. Thomas argues that his
    alleged confession of “Yeah, I did it,” is too vague to be attributed to anything other
    than the trash pile on top of the vehicle. Mr. Thomas insists that the trash alone cannot
    support the “physical harm” element of criminal damaging, and certainly the trash did
    not cause damage to the bumper or the windshield wiper. But it is reasonable to infer
    that an employee who is angry enough to lash out by hanging around in freezing
    temperatures and dumping trash on a car would also be prompted to inflict damage
    on the bumper and bend the windshield wiper.
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    {¶12} Finally, in his manifest-weight challenge, Mr. Thomas claims that Ms.
    Whetstone failed to testify about any specific damage caused by the trash. In support,
    Mr. Thomas relies on State v. Reams, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-04-28, 
    2005-Ohio-1085
    ,
    in which the defendant admitted to kicking the license plate of a car but denied kicking
    the body as alleged by the victim. The victim in Reams presented no evidence of
    resulting damage from the alleged kick and her daughters gave conflicting testimony
    about the prior condition of the car. Id. at ¶ 15. The Third District held that where
    “three State witnesses never agree on a single dent on the body of the car,” the
    conflicting evidence weighed heavily against the criminal-damaging conviction. Id.
    {¶13} Building on Reams, Mr. Thomas’ argument centers on damage caused
    by the trash, but he ignores the fact that the trial court found him responsible for all
    of the damage. Unlike in Reams, Ms. Whetstone produced an estimate showing that
    she suffered $900 worth of damages to her bumper, and we see no conflicting evidence
    on this score. Direct evidence against Mr. Thomas may be scarce, but this is far from
    being the “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the
    conviction.” See State v. Martin, 
    20 Ohio App.3d 172
    , 175, 
    485 N.E.2d 717
     (1st
    Dist.1983).   Accordingly, we overrule Mr. Thomas’ third assignment of error
    challenging the weight of the evidence.
    III.
    {¶14} In his second assignment of error, Mr. Thomas avers that the trial court
    erred by admitting his confession into evidence before the state established the corpus
    delicti of the crime. “Before a confession to a crime is admissible, the state must have
    some evidence outside of the confession tending to establish the corpus delicti.” State
    v. Kraft, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060238, 
    2007-Ohio-2247
    , ¶ 18, citing State v.
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Edwards, 
    49 Ohio St.2d 31
    , 
    358 N.E.2d 1051
     (1976), paragraph one of the syllabus.
    “The state’s evidentiary burden under the corpus delicti rule is minimal: only a
    ‘modicum of evidence’ is necessary to satisfy the rule.” Kraft at ¶ 20, quoting State v.
    Marshall, 5th Dist. No. 2005CA00052, 
    2006-Ohio-83
    , ¶ 19. “This evidence does not
    need to relate to every element of the offense and can be circumstantial.” 
    Id.
    {¶15} Mr. Thomas insists that because dumping trash on a vehicle is not a
    criminal act under R.C. 2909.06(A)(1), the state must produce independent evidence
    of the damage to the bumper outside of his alleged trash-dumping confession.
    Assuming this point for argument’s sake, it fails to consider the totality of the
    evidentiary record. Ms. Whetstone testified that shortly after she ordered Mr. Thomas
    to leave work, she and multiple other employees observed him near her car. He
    appeared upset, hurled insulting names at her, and no one else was in the vicinity of
    the vehicle that now had trash on top of it. After this incident, she discovered the
    damage to her car. Is this an open and shut case? No, but this testimony satisfies the
    “modicum of evidence,” even if circumstantial, necessary to establish the corpus delicti
    of criminal damaging and therefore supports the admission of Mr. Thomas’
    confession. Accordingly, Mr. Thomas’ second assignment of error is overruled.
    *      *      *
    {¶16} In light of the foregoing analysis, we overrule all of Mr. Thomas’
    assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Judgment affirmed.
    ZAYAS, P. J., and WINKLER, J., concur.
    Please note:
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    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion
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