State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Revision , 2022 Ohio 3003 ( 2022 )


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  • [Cite as State ex rel. Ames v. Portage Cty. Bd. of Revision, 
    2022-Ohio-3003
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    PORTAGE COUNTY
    STATE OF OHIO ex rel.                                    CASE NO. 2022-P-0015
    BRIAN M. AMES,
    Relator-Appellant,                      Civil Appeal from the
    Court of Common Pleas
    -v-
    PORTAGE COUNTY                                           Trial Court No. 2021 CV 00411
    BOARD OF REVISION,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    OPINION
    Decided: August 29, 2022
    Judgment: Affirmed
    Brian M. Ames, pro se, 2632 Ranfield Road, Mogadore, OH 44260 (Relator-Appellant).
    Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Christopher J. Meduri, Assistant
    Prosecutor, 241 South Chestnut Street, Ravenna, OH 44266 (For Respondent-
    Appellee).
    THOMAS R. WRIGHT, P.J.
    {¶1}     Relator, Brian M. Ames, appeals the entry granting summary judgment to
    respondent, Portage County Board of Revision (“the board”). We affirm.
    {¶2}     In 2021, Ames filed a “verified complaint in mandamus, declaratory
    judgment, and injunction for enforcement of R.C. 121.22” in the trial court.             In his
    complaint, Ames alleged that the board held a meeting on January 11, 2021. Present at
    the meeting was Sabrina Christian-Bennett, who Ames maintains was not yet a member
    of the board. However, Bennett participated in the meeting by making motions, seconds,
    and voting.   Based upon these allegations, Ames maintained that the meeting was
    conducted in violation of R.C. 121.22 (“the Open Meetings Act”). The board answered
    the complaint, denying that Bennett was not permitted to participate in the meeting and
    that her participation violated the Open Meetings Act and maintaining that Ames failed to
    state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
    {¶3}   Thereafter, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The
    trial court granted summary in favor of the board.
    {¶4}   Ames assigns three errors, the first two of which are consolidated for
    discussion:
    {¶5}   “[1.] The trial court erred by denying summary judgment to Relator Mr. Ames
    and granting summary judgment to Respondent Board of Revision.
    {¶6}   “[2.] The trial court erred by failing to rule on the actual controversy before
    the court.”
    {¶7}   “We review decisions awarding summary judgment de novo, i.e.,
    independently and without deference to the trial court’s decision.” Hedrick v. Szep, 11th
    Dist. Geauga No. 2020-G-0272, 
    2021-Ohio-1851
    , ¶ 13, citing Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co.,
    
    77 Ohio St.3d 102
    , 105, 
    671 N.E.2d 241
     (1996).
    Civ.R. 56(C) specifically provides that before summary
    judgment may be granted, it must be determined that: (1) No
    genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated;
    (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law;
    and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds
    can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence
    most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion
    for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to
    that party.
    2
    Case No. 2022-P-0015
    Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 
    50 Ohio St.2d 317
    , 327, 
    364 N.E.2d 267
     (1977); Allen v.
    5125 Peno, LLC, 
    2017-Ohio-8941
    , 
    101 N.E.3d 484
    , ¶ 6 (11th Dist.), citing Holliman v.
    Allstate Ins. Co., 
    86 Ohio St.3d 414
    , 415, 
    715 N.E.2d 532
     (1999). “The initial burden is
    on the moving party to set forth specific facts demonstrating that no issue of material fact
    exists, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Allen at ¶ 6, citing
    Dresher v. Burt, 
    75 Ohio St.3d 280
    , 292-293, 
    662 N.E.2d 264
     (1996). “If the movant
    meets this burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to establish that a genuine
    issue of material fact exists for trial.” Allen at ¶ 6, citing Dresher at 293.
    {¶8}   Here, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the board, thus
    effectively denying Ames’ motion for summary judgment. Ames’ claims turn on the
    applicability of the Open Meetings Act.
    {¶9}   R.C. 121.22(C) provides:
    All meetings of any public body are declared to be public
    meetings open to the public at all times. A member of a public
    body shall be present in person at a meeting open to the
    public to be considered present or to vote at the meeting and
    for purposes of determining whether a quorum is present at
    the meeting.
    The minutes of a regular or special meeting of any public body
    shall be promptly prepared, filed, and maintained and shall be
    open to public inspection. The minutes need only reflect the
    general subject matter of discussions in executive sessions
    authorized under division (G) or (J) of this section.
    {¶10} There is no dispute that the board is a public body; a meeting was held on
    January 11, 2021, which was open to the public; board members were present in person;
    and minutes were prepared.        However, Ames maintains that Bennett had not been
    selected by the commissioners to serve as a board member pursuant to R.C. 5715.02
    prior to Bennett making and seconding motions and voting.
    3
    Case No. 2022-P-0015
    {¶11} R.C. 5715.02 provides:
    The county treasurer, county auditor, and a member of the
    board of county commissioners selected by the board of
    county commissioners shall constitute the county board of
    revision, or they may provide for one or more hearing boards
    when they deem the creation of such to be necessary to the
    expeditious hearing of valuation complaints. Each such
    official may appoint one qualified employee from the official’s
    office to serve in the official’s place and stead on each such
    board for the purpose of hearing complaints as to the value of
    real property only, each such hearing board has the same
    authority to hear and decide complaints and sign the journal
    as the board of revision, and shall proceed in the manner
    provided for the board of revision by sections 5715.08 to
    5715.20 of the Revised Code. Any decision by a hearing
    board shall be the decision of the board of revision.
    A majority of a county board of revision or hearing board shall
    constitute a quorum to hear and determine any complaint, and
    any vacancy shall not impair the right of the remaining
    members of such board, whether elected officials or
    appointees, to exercise all the powers thereof so long as a
    majority remains.
    Each member of a county board of revision or hearing board
    may administer oaths.
    {¶12} We need not reach, nor was the trial court required to reach, whether
    Bennett was selected by the commissioners as the board representative prior to the
    meeting at issue, as we are aware of no authority supporting the proposition that a
    violation of R.C. 5715.02 necessarily results in a violation of the Open Meetings Act. As
    set forth above, there is no dispute that the board is a public body; a meeting was held
    on January 11, 2021, which was open to the public; board members were present in
    person; and minutes were prepared. Although Ames maintained that Bennett’s purported
    non-member status “constructively” closed the meeting, we cannot discern the basis for
    this conclusory allegation.
    4
    Case No. 2022-P-0015
    {¶13} Accordingly, no material fact was in dispute, and the board was entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law; conversely, Ames’ motion for summary judgment was
    appropriately denied. Therefore, Ames’ first and second assigned errors lack merit.
    {¶14} In his third assigned error, Ames argues:
    {¶15} “[3.] The trial court committed reversible error by ruling in favor of the [board]
    while it was represented by Mr. Meduri.”
    {¶16} Ames maintains that a visiting trial court judge, who sat on this case by
    assignment of the Ohio Supreme Court and issued the appealed judgment, is represented
    by the same attorney that represents the board. Ames argues that although the judge
    voluntarily recused himself after issuing judgment, disqualification should have occurred
    prior to judgment.
    {¶17} However,
    Authority to pass upon the disqualification of a judge of the
    Court of Common Pleas is vested in the Chief Justice under
    Section 5(C) of Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, which reads
    as follows:
    “The chief justice of the supreme court or any judge of that
    court designated by [her] shall pass upon the disqualification
    of any judge of the courts of appeals or courts of common
    pleas or division thereof. Rules may be adopted to provide
    for the hearing of disqualification matters involving judges of
    courts established by law.”
    Since only the Chief Justice or [her] designee may hear
    disqualification matters, the Court of Appeals [is] without
    authority to pass upon disqualification or to void the judgment
    of the trial court upon that basis. Although a judge would be
    without power to hear and determine a cause after
    disqualification, his judgment, however erroneous, before
    disqualification is not void.
    (Footnotes omitted.) Beer v. Griffith, 
    54 Ohio St.2d 440
    , 441-442, 
    377 N.E.2d 775
     (1978).
    5
    Case No. 2022-P-0015
    {¶18} As the issue of disqualification is not properly before this court, we do not
    reach the merits of Ames’ third assigned error.
    {¶19} Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    MARY JANE TRAPP, J.,
    JOHN J. EKLUND, J.,
    concur.
    6
    Case No. 2022-P-0015
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022-P-0015

Citation Numbers: 2022 Ohio 3003

Judges: Wright

Filed Date: 8/29/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/29/2022