Bonanno v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs. ( 2012 )


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  • [Cite as Bonanno v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 
    2012-Ohio-5167
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    :      JUDGES:
    WILLIAM BONANNO                                     :      William B. Hoffman, P.J.
    :      Sheila G. Farmer, J.
    Plaintiff-Appellant         :      Julie A. Edwards, J.
    :
    -vs-                                                :      Case No. 2012 AP 02 0011
    :
    :
    OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND                          :      OPINION
    FAMILY SERVICES, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING:                                     Civil Appeal from Tuscarawas County
    Court of Common Pleas Case No.
    2011 AA 09 0991
    JUDGMENT:                                                    Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                                      November 2, 2012
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellant                                      For Defendants-Appellees
    MICHAEL F. HARRINGTON                                        MICHAEL DEWINE
    Southeastern Ohio Legal Services                             Ohio Attorney General
    322 West High Avenue
    New Philadelphia, Ohio 44663                                 BY: SUSAN M. SHEFFIELD
    Associate Assistant Attorney General
    Health and Human Services Section
    20 West Federal Street, 3rd Floor
    Youngstown, Ohio 44503
    [Cite as Bonanno v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 
    2012-Ohio-5167
    .]
    Edwards, J.
    {¶1}    Plaintiff-appellant, William Bonanno, appeals from the January 13, 2012,
    Judgment Entry of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas affirming the
    decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission denying him
    unemployment compensation benefits.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶2}    Appellant William Bonanno was hired by Stocker Sand and Gravel
    Company in March of 2003 as a laborer. Appellant operated machinery that was used
    to move, shake and sort gravel.
    {¶3}    Appellant typically worked from 7:00 or 7:30 a.m. until 4:00 or 5:00 p.m.
    When he arrived at work, appellant usually started up the machinery for the day and
    would make sure that there were no problems with the equipment. During the first two
    days of the week of August 12, 2010, appellant was working the afternoon shift and the
    machinery was already running when he arrived at work. Appellant merely took over the
    controls from another machine operator.
    {¶4}    On August 12, 2010, when he arrived at work, the machinery was not
    running because there was a problem with the dredge. Appellant discovered a piece of
    rebar that was stuck in the rock box of a conveyor belt. Appellant then climbed up on to
    the rock box, which was approximately 50 feet in the air, via a catwalk onto the
    conveyor belt and into the rock box and removed the rebar. Prior to doing so, appellant
    forgot to lock out and tag out the machine. Appellant’s employer has a written policy
    that the power to a machine must be turned off and a red sign posted notifying other
    employees that work is being performed on the machine.                    The employee manual
    Tuscarawas County App. Case No. 2012 AP 02 0011                                            3
    provided to appellant in February of 2003 states, in relevant part, that “[i]n all instances,
    where possible, power must be cut off and proper lock-out/tag-out procedures must be
    performed before service or repair work is begun.” Appellant was aware of such policy.
    After appellant’s employer observed that appellant did not lock out and tag out the
    equipment before working on the conveyor, appellant was discharged for failing to
    follow company safety rules by working on equipment with the power on.
    {¶5}   Appellant applied for unemployment compensation benefits and was
    denied the same on the basis that he had been discharged with just cause. Appellant
    then appealed and on redetermination the decision was affirmed.
    {¶6}   Subsequently, a hearing before an Unemployment Compensation Hearing
    Officer was held on May 4, 2011. Pursuant to a Decision mailed on May 6, 2011, the
    Hearing Officer found that appellant was discharged for just cause and that he was not
    eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Appellant then appealed to the
    Unemployment Compensation Review Commission which issued a Decision disallowing
    his request for review.
    {¶7}   On September 22, 2011, appellant filed an appeal with the Tuscarawas
    County Court of Common Pleas. Both parties filed briefs. As memorialized in a
    Judgment Entry filed on January 13, 2012, the trial court affirmed the decision of the
    Unemployment Compensation Review Commission.
    {¶8}   Appellant now raises the following assignments of error on appeal:
    {¶9}   “I.   THE    TRIAL    COURT      ERRED       BY    DEFERRING        TO    THE
    UNEMPLOYMENT              COMPENSATION          REVIEW          COMMISSION’S        (UCRC)
    APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS IN THE CASE.
    Tuscarawas County App. Case No. 2012 AP 02 0011                                          4
    {¶10} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT CONSIDERING ALL PRONGS
    OF R.C. 4141.282(H) WHICH ALLOWS FOR A DECISION TO BE REVERSED NOT
    ONLY WHEN IT IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE BUT
    ALSO IF IT WAS UNLAWFUL OR UNREASONABLE.
    {¶11} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS JUST
    CAUSE FOR TERMINATION OF MR. BONANNO’S EMPLOYMENT AND THE DENIAL
    OF HIS UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS.”
    I, II, III
    {¶12} Appellant, in his three assignments of error, argues that the trial court
    erred in affirming the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review
    Commission’s finding that there was just cause for appellant’s discharge and holding
    that appellant, therefore, was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits. We
    disagree.
    {¶13} An appeal of a decision rendered by the Review Commission is governed
    by R.C. 4141.282(H), which provides, in pertinent part: “ * * * If the court finds that the
    decision is unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, it
    shall reverse, vacate, or modify the decision, or remand the matter to the commission.
    Otherwise, such court shall affirm the decision of the commission.”
    {¶14} An appellate court's standard of review in unemployment compensation
    cases is limited. An appellate court may reverse a board's decision only if the decision is
    unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, Tzangas,
    Plakas & Mannos v. Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, 
    73 Ohio St.3d 694
    , 696, 1995–Ohio–206, 
    653 N.E.2d 1207
    , citing Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. Of
    Tuscarawas County App. Case No. 2012 AP 02 0011                                           5
    Review, 
    19 Ohio St.3d 15
    , 17–18, 
    482 N.E.2d 587
     (1985). An appellate court may not
    make factual findings or determine the credibility of the witnesses, but rather, is required
    to make a determination as to whether the board's decision is supported by evidence on
    the record. 
    Id.
     The hearing officer is in the best position to judge the credibility of the
    witnesses as the fact finder. Shaffer–Goggin v. Unemployment Compensation Review
    Commission, 5th Dist. No. 03–CA–2, 2003–Ohio–6907, citing, Hall v. American Brake
    Shoe Co., 
    13 Ohio St.2d 11
    , 
    233 N.E.2d 582
     (1968); Brown–Brockmeyer Co. v. Roach,
    
    148 Ohio St. 511
    , 
    76 N.E.2d 79
     (1947).
    {¶15} A reviewing court is not permitted to make factual findings, determine the
    credibility of witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the commission; where the
    commission might reasonably decide either way, the courts have no authority to upset
    the commission's decision. Irvine, supra at 17–18. “‘Every reasonable presumption must
    be made in favor of the [decision] and the findings of facts [of the Review
    Commission].’”     Ro–Mai Industries, Inc. v. Weinberg, 
    176 Ohio App.3d 151
    , 2008–
    Ohio–301, 
    891 N.E.2d 348
    , ¶ 7 (9th Dist.), quoting Karches v. Cincinnati, 
    38 Ohio St.3d 12
    , 19, 
    526 N.E.2d 1350
     (1988).
    {¶16} In order to qualify for unemployment compensation benefits, a claimant
    must satisfy the criteria set forth in R.C. 4141.29(D)(2)(a). That section provides:
    {¶17} “ * * *
    {¶18} “(D)* * * [N]o individual may * * * be paid benefits * * *:
    {¶19} “(2) For the duration of the individual's unemployment if the director finds
    that:
    Tuscarawas County App. Case No. 2012 AP 02 0011                                              6
    {¶20} “(a) The individual quit his work without just cause or has been discharged
    for just cause in connection with the individual's work, * * *.”
    {¶21} The Ohio Supreme Court has defined “just cause” as that which, to an
    ordinarily intelligent person, is a justifiable reason for doing or not doing a particular act.
    Irvine, supra at 17; Tzangas, supra at 697. The determination of whether just cause
    exists for an employee's dismissal under R.C. 4141.29 is based upon whether there
    was some fault on the part of the employee that led to the dismissal. Tzangas, supra at
    paragraph two of the syllabus. Furthermore, where an employee demonstrates
    “‘unreasonable disregard for [the] employer's best interests,’ just cause for the
    employee's termination is said to exist.” Kiikka v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Servs. (1985), 
    21 Ohio App.3d 168
    , 169, 
    486 N.E.2d 1233
    , (8th Dist. 1985); quoting Stephens v. Bd. of
    Rev., 8th Dist. No. 41369, 
    1980 WL 355009
    . See, also, Binger v. Whirlpool Corp., 
    110 Ohio App.3d 583
    , 590, 
    674 N.E.2d 1232
     (6th Dist. 1996). “Just cause” does not typically
    require intentional action and the determination of just cause depends upon the “unique
    factual considerations of the particular case” and is therefore an issue for the trier of
    fact. Irvine, supra at 17.
    {¶22} In the case sub judice, the Unemployment Compensation Review
    Commission found, and we concur, that appellant was discharged with just cause for
    failing to follow his employee’s safety rules. There is no dispute that appellant did not
    lock out and tag out the machine as required by his employer’s policy. While appellant
    may not have intended to violate the safety rules and may have forgotten to follow the
    rules, as is stated above, just cause does not require intentional action.
    Tuscarawas County App. Case No. 2012 AP 02 0011                                          7
    {¶23} At the May 4, 2011 hearing, Bryan Stocker, Vice President of Stocker
    Sand and Gravel Company, testified as follows when asked about the reason for the
    policy that a machine be locked off and tagged: “Because it, if, if he didn’t follow it
    there’s a good chance he’s either going to get hurt or killed, one of the two. “ Transcript
    at 9. He further testified that while the machine was not actually running, “it was ready,
    to run, one button and it would’ve been running. Anybody could’ve come in and push
    (sic) the start button and it would’ve turned on.” Transcript at 9. The Hearing Officer, in
    her Decision, indicated that she found such testimony credible and that although
    appellant testified that he “simply forgot to follow the correct steps prior to beginning
    work on the machine, claimant’s negligence in that instance was a significant violation
    of the employer’s safety procedures.” Appellant, by failing to comply with the rules,
    showed an “unreasonable disregard” for his employer’s best interests and subjected his
    employer to potential legal liability.
    {¶24} Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not err in affirming
    the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission. The Board's
    decision was not unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence.
    Tuscarawas County App. Case No. 2012 AP 02 0011                                   8
    {¶25} Appellant's three assignments of error are, therefore, overruled.
    {¶26} Accordingly, the judgment of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common
    Pleas is affirmed.
    By: Edwards, J.
    Hoffman, P.J. and
    Farmer, J. concur
    ______________________________
    ______________________________
    ______________________________
    JUDGES
    JAE/d0827
    [Cite as Bonanno v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 
    2012-Ohio-5167
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    WILLIAM BONANNO                                       :
    :
    Palintiff-Appellant        :
    :
    :
    -vs-                                                  :       JUDGMENT ENTRY
    :
    OHIO DEPARTMENT OF JOB AND                            :
    FAMILY SERVICES, et al.,                              :
    :
    Defendants-Appellees             :       CASE NO. 2012 AP 02 0011
    For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion on file, the
    judgment of the Tuscarawas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.                     Costs
    assessed to appellant.
    _________________________________
    _________________________________
    _________________________________
    JUDGES