State v. Davis , 2012 Ohio 2642 ( 2012 )


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  •          [Cite as State v. Davis, 
    2012-Ohio-2642
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
    STATE OF OHIO,                                       :   APPEAL NO. C-110620
    TRIAL NO. 11CRB-16060
    Plaintiff-Appellee                           :
    vs.                                                :        O P I N I O N.
    JUSTIN DAVIS,                                        :
    Defendant-Appellant.                             :
    Criminal Appeal From: Hamilton County Municipal Court
    Judgment Appealed From Is: Reversed and Appellant Discharged
    Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: June 15, 2012
    John P. Curp, City Solicitor, Charlie Rubenstein, City Prosecutor, and Melanie J.
    Reising, Assistant City Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Robert R. Hastings, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant.
    Please note: This case has been removed from the accelerated calendar.
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Per Curiam.
    {¶1}    Following a bench trial, defendant-appellant Justin Davis was convicted
    of possessing a drug abuse instrument in violation of R.C. 2925.12(A). Because his
    conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence, we must reverse.
    Factual Background
    {¶2}    At trial, Cincinnati Police Officer Jason Rice testified that on June 1,
    2011, he and his partner were investigating a drug complaint near the corner of
    Montgomery Road and Woodmont Avenue in Cincinnati, Ohio. They observed a
    vehicle pull alongside another vehicle in a parking lot, and shortly thereafter, the
    vehicles left together. The officers found the two vehicles on nearby Arrow Avenue,
    parked side-by-side in a manner consistent with a drug transaction.
    {¶3}    As Rice and his partner approached the vehicles, one vehicle fled but the
    other remained. The officers ordered the occupants in the remaining vehicle to put
    their hands on the dashboard and asked whether they had anything on them. Seated in
    the front passenger seat, Davis replied that he had a needle. Rice instructed Davis to
    exit from the vehicle and advised him of his Miranda rights. Davis then told the
    officers that the needle was in his pocket, and from there Rice recovered a hypodermic
    needle and syringe. Davis admitted to Rice that he occasionally came to Ohio to buy
    heroin, and that he had intended to buy heroin from an individual in the vehicle that
    had fled. Police later stopped that vehicle and found heroin inside. No heroin was
    recovered from Davis, and no heroin was found in the hypodermic needle or syringe.
    {¶4}    Based on this evidence, the trial court found Davis guilty of possessing a
    drug abuse instrument in violation of R.C. 2925.12(A), fined him $200 plus court costs,
    and suspended his driver’s license for six months. This appeal followed.
    2
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Analysis
    {¶5}    In his single assignment of error, Davis argues that his conviction was
    both not supported by sufficient evidence and contrary to the manifest weight of the
    evidence. In light of the particular wording of R.C. 2925.12(A), his assertion has merit.
    {¶6}    The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
    States Constitution “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond
    a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
    charged.” In re Winship, 
    397 U.S. 358
    , 364, 
    90 S.Ct. 1068
    , 
    25 L.Ed.2d 368
     (1970). In
    deciding whether the evidence adduced at trial is legally sufficient to support a finding
    of guilt, “[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
    elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 
    61 Ohio St.3d 259
    , 
    574 N.E.2d 492
     (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v.
    Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 
    99 S.Ct. 2781
    , 
    61 L.Ed.2d 560
     (1979). A reviewing court must
    reverse any conviction not supported by sufficient evidence. E.g., State v. Fyffe, 
    67 Ohio App.3d 608
    , 615, 
    588 N.E.2d 137
     (10th Dist.1990).
    {¶7}    Davis was convicted of possessing a drug abuse instrument in violation
    of R.C. 2925.12(A), which provides
    No person shall knowingly make, obtain, possess, or use
    any instrument, article, or thing the customary and
    primary purpose of which is for the administration or
    use of a dangerous drug, other than marihuana, when
    the instrument involved is a hypodermic or syringe,
    whether or not of crude or extemporized manufacture or
    assembly, and the instrument, article, or thing involved
    3
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    has been used by the offender to unlawfully administer
    or use a dangerous drug, other than marihuana, or to
    prepare a dangerous drug, other than marihuana, for
    unlawful administration or use.
    {¶8}     Thus, for criminal liability to attach under this statute, the instrument
    in question must have been used by the offender either (1) to unlawfully administer or
    use a dangerous drug or (2) to prepare a dangerous drug for unlawful administration or
    use. Although the trial court determined that Davis “had a needle to prepare it for [a]
    dangerous drug for unlawful administration or use,” that is not a crime under this
    particular statute. Given the statute’s unambiguous language, an offender must have
    actually used the instrument, not merely have possessed the instrument with the intent
    to use it at a later time. Compare R.C. 2925.14 (defining “drug paraphernalia” as “any
    equipment, product, or material of any kind that is used by the offender, intended by
    the offender for use, or designed for use, in * * * preparing * * * or otherwise
    introducing into the human body, a controlled substance” and prohibiting its
    possession [emphasis added]).
    {¶9}     The state directs our attention to Wadsworth v. Eutin, 9th Dist. No.
    09CA0074-M, 
    2010-Ohio-4654
    . In Eutin, the Ninth Appellate District held that the
    prosecution had presented sufficient evidence, albeit circumstantial, that the defendant
    had used syringes to administer or prepare a dangerous drug for use where police had
    found the syringes with a burnt spoon containing a white, powdery residue in the
    defendant’s purse. Id. at ¶ 11.
    {¶10}    In the case at bar, however, although the state presented evidence that
    Davis had previously bought heroin in Ohio and had intended to buy heroin
    immediately before his arrest, we cannot say that these facts alone are sufficient to
    4
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    show that Davis had actually used the hypodermic needle and syringe in his pocket
    either to unlawfully administer or use a dangerous drug, or to prepare a dangerous drug
    for unlawful administration or use. Because the state failed to present any evidence to
    support this essential element of possessing a drug abuse instrument—as the legislature
    has defined the offense under R.C. 2925.12(A)—we must hold that Davis’s conviction
    was not supported by sufficient evidence. Consequently, his further assertion that his
    conviction was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence is rendered moot. See
    State v. Hartley, 
    194 Ohio App.3d 486
    , 
    2011-Ohio-2530
    , 
    957 N.E.2d 44
    , ¶ 48 (1st
    Dist.).
    {¶11}   The single assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of conviction
    is reversed, and Davis is discharged from further prosecution in this case.
    Judgment reversed and appellant discharged.
    S UNDERMANN , P.J., H ENDON and F ISCHER , JJ.
    Please note:
    The court has recorded its own entry this date.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: C-110620

Citation Numbers: 2012 Ohio 2642

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/15/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/19/2016