Hatfield v. Hatfield , 2022 Ohio 737 ( 2022 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as Hatfield v. Hatfield, 
    2022-Ohio-737
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
    HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO
    JENNIFER HATFIELD,                               :   APPEAL NO. C-210295
    TRIAL NO. DR1901615
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                      :
    :     O P I N I O N.
    VS.
    :
    NATHAN HATFIELD,                                 :
    Defendant-Appellant.                       :
    Appeal From:        Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations
    Division
    Judgment Appealed From Is: Affirmed
    Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: March 11, 2022
    Ryan L. Debra, for Plaintiff-Appellee,
    Cornetet, Meyer, Rush & Stapleton and Karen P. Meyer, for Defendant-Appellant.
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    CROUSE, Presiding Judge.
    {¶1}   Defendant-appellant Nathan Hatfield (“father”) appeals the judgment
    of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division,
    raising two assignments of error for our review concerning the trial court’s allocation
    of parenting time. For the reasons that follow, we overrule both assignments of error
    and affirm the judgment of the domestic relations court.
    Factual and Procedural Background
    {¶2}   Father and plaintiff-appellee Jennifer Hatfield (“mother”) were
    married in October 2013 and have two children together: D.H. and L.H. D.H. was
    born in September 2015. D.H. is on the autism spectrum and struggles with
    transitions and schedule changes. L.H. was born in April 2019. L.H. was born
    prematurely, spent several months in the neonatal intensive care unit prior to being
    discharged from the hospital, and requires ongoing therapy to address
    developmental delays. Father left the family home on or about July 31, 2019, shortly
    after L.H. came home from the hospital.
    {¶3}   Mother filed for divorce on August 29, 2019. The parties reached a
    negotiated settlement on property issues and agreed to shared parenting, but did not
    agree on the allocation of parenting time. Each party submitted a shared-parenting
    plan to the court. Father’s plan sought equal parenting time with overnights, while
    mother’s plan included less overnights for father. Gina Iames, the parenting
    investigator, recommended a different schedule as well after completing a brief
    investigation focused solely on parenting time. Her schedule alternated between two
    weeknight overnights for father on week one, followed by one weeknight overnight
    and a full weekend on week two. Iames testified that she formulated this schedule
    2
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    “basically from what the parents told me they wanted for parenting time.” After
    considering these plans and the testimony of the parties, the domestic relations court
    found the following parenting schedule to be in the best interest of the children:
    Father shall have parenting time each Tuesday and Thursday
    beginning at 4:00pm and ending at 7:30pm. In addition, Father shall
    have parenting time every other weekend beginning at [sic] Friday at
    4:00pm until Sunday at 6:00pm.
    Pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(D), the court stated in its March 18, 2021 entry on
    parenting time that, “Mother shall prepare a shared parenting plan incorporating the
    agreements of the parties and this entry and submit said plan to the Court by April 1,
    2021 at 12:00pm.” Then, on April 9, 2021, the court entered the decree of shared
    parenting with time allocated as set forth in the shared-parenting plan.
    {¶4}   In two assignments of error, father contests this schedule and
    contends that he should have been given more parenting time.
    First Assignment of Error
    {¶5}   In his first assignment of error, father argues the domestic relations
    court abused its discretion by allocating parenting time “in violation of the parties’
    agreement and wishes” by rejecting the schedule proposed by the parenting
    investigator and “arbitrarily choos[ing] an entirely different schedule which gives the
    children substantially less time to be parented by their Father.”
    {¶6}   We review the domestic relations court’s decision on issues related to
    parental rights and responsibilities for an abuse of discretion. In re K.S., 1st Dist.
    Hamilton No. C-190754, 
    2020-Ohio-6863
    , ¶ 7, citing Miller v. Miller, 
    37 Ohio St.3d 71
    , 74, 
    523 N.E.2d 846
     (1988), and Cwik v. Cwik, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-090843,
    3
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    
    2011-Ohio-463
    , ¶ 41; see Hoskins v. Hoskins, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120130 and
    C-120213, 
    2013-Ohio-1126
    , ¶ 11 (“[t]he trial court has broad discretion when setting a
    parenting schedule”). This court has stated that:
    [t]he discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be
    accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and
    the impact the court’s determination will have on the lives of the
    parties concerned. The knowledge a trial court gains through
    observing the witnesses and the parties in a custody proceeding cannot
    be conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed record.
    In re K.S. at ¶ 7, quoting Miller at 74. Only in cases where the “court’s decision
    regarding the child’s best interests is not supported by competent, credible evidence”
    should we find an abuse of discretion. In re K.S. at ¶ 7, quoting In re D.M., 1st Dist.
    Hamilton No. C-140648, 
    2015-Ohio-3853
    , ¶ 11.
    {¶7}    Once a domestic relations court determines shared parenting is
    appropriate, it must also determine an appropriate plan for shared parenting. “The
    allocation of parenting time is a ‘term’ of a shared parenting plan,” and must be in
    the children’s best interest. Bishop v. Bishop, 4th Dist. Washington No. 08CA44,
    
    2009-Ohio-4537
    , ¶ 35, quoting Herdman v. Herdman, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-08-32,
    
    2009-Ohio-303
    , ¶ 6. See R.C. 3109.04(D)(1)(a). When both parties submit shared-
    parenting plans, as is the case here, the court will review the plans to determine
    which of the plans, if any, are in the best interest of the children. R.C.
    3109.04(D)(1)(a)(ii). If neither plan is in the children’s best interest, the court can
    order changes to the plans submitted by the parents. 
    Id.
     Once the revised plan is
    submitted, the court may approve it if is in the best interest of the children. 
    Id.
    4
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    {¶8}     In determining the best interest of the children, the court should
    consider the following factors:
    (a) The wishes of the child’s parents regarding the child’s care;
    (b) * * * the wishes and concerns of the child, as expressed to the
    court;
    (c) The child’s interaction and interrelationship with the child’s
    parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
    the child’s best interest;
    (d) The child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and
    community;
    (e) The mental and physical health of all persons involved in the
    situation[.]
    R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(a) – (e).
    {¶9}     After considering testimony from the parties, and reviewing the
    submitted plans, the court issued its own schedule, and provided its reasoning for
    setting the schedule in its entry on parenting time. The court stated that “the
    children will develop the best relationship possible with both parents if their
    schedules and routines are solidified with minimal transitions.” The court went on to
    state that “[d]espite Mother’s willingness to compromise and allow Father school
    overnights, it is clearly in the children’s best interest to have a consistent weekly
    schedule.” The court found that “Mother’s home is better suited for” “calm and
    predictable” overnights. In support of that finding, the court noted that “[t]he
    children are more familiar with the marital home,” and that “Mother’s home is closer
    to school, and closer to their maternal family.” The court also found that “[t]here is
    5
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    no indication that equal parenting time would be in the best interest of the children.”
    In support of this finding, the court noted that “Father’s testimony focused far more
    on [D.H.] than it did on [L.H.]” The court stated that father’s bond with L.H. seemed
    “strained by Father’s diminished presence in [L.H.’s] life.” The court also noted its
    belief “that Father had a stronger interest in reducing his child support obligation
    than an interest in quality time and care-taking of the children.” The court stated,
    “For example,” father seemed to believe that when the children were sleeping, it is
    not “ ‘actual parenting time,’ ” which “contradicts the reality of caring for small
    children in the middle of the night.”
    {¶10} Father argues that the court’s allocation of parenting time is arbitrary
    and unsupported by any facts establishing that it is in the best interest of the
    children. Father specifically objects to three of the court’s findings relied upon in
    reaching its decision.
    {¶11} First, father claims that if the court aimed to set a schedule that
    minimized transitions, then “clearly the parenting investigator’s recommendations
    are superior.” While the schedule set by the court may have increased the amount of
    transitions, the court noted in its entry that it also allows the children to have the
    desired “consistent weekly schedule,” in which they can sleep in the same bed each
    weeknight. Mother testified that she felt it was important for D.H. to “sleep in the
    same bed every night and be able to * * * get to school on time and not get anxiety
    with getting ready for school in the morning.” Mother also testified that D.H. would
    sometimes have “sudden outbursts,” if there is a change to a routine. Father
    recognized D.H.’s “need for consistency,” but said that “[i]f you take the time to
    explain to him what is happening and if I ask, he usually, his answer is [literally], oh,
    6
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    okay.” It is clear that minimizing transitions was not the only consideration of the
    court in constructing its parenting schedule. Rather, the court found that it was in the
    children’s best interest to have a “consistent weekly schedule” with “calm and
    predictable” overnights.
    {¶12} Second, father argues “[n]o facts were submitted to support[] [the]
    statement” that “[t]he children are more familiar with the marital home.” Mother
    testified that D.H. calls the marital home, “home,” and calls father’s apartment,
    “daddy’s place.” Mother also testified that D.H.’s school is “literally one minute from
    the [marital home],” and that father’s home was approximately 30 minutes away.
    Mother further testified that the children’s maternal grandmother’s (“grandmother”)
    lives four or five minutes from the marital home and watches them weekly. Mother
    testified that grandmother “has watched [the children] since they were born,” and
    has a close relationship with them. Mother claimed that grandmother or other
    nearby family members would be there “in a pinch” “if something were to happen.”
    Mother stated that she was unsure who father would be able to call in a similar
    situation.
    {¶13} Father contends that the children are familiar with both residences
    because they have been parented at both since the separation. He notes that L.H.
    “had been parented by both of her parents at separate residences all her life save the
    first four months.” Father testified that he has a crib and a twin bed for the children
    at his apartment; and that the children enjoy taking walks in his neighborhood and
    watching movies together when they are with him.
    {¶14} Based on the testimony presented, it was reasonable for the court to
    find that the children were more familiar in the home where they have spent the
    7
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    majority of their childhood, and where they are in close proximity to their school and
    their relatives. While the testimony does not indicate that the children are by any
    means “unfamiliar” with father’s home, the court’s finding that the children were
    more familiar in the marital home was based on competent and credible evidence
    and was not abuse of discretion.
    {¶15} Third, father argues that the court’s finding that his bond with L.H.
    was strained was not supported by the facts. On this point, much of the testimony
    concerned mother’s and father’s respective attendance at L.H.’s therapy sessions.
    Mother testified that she attended every therapy session. However, father admitted
    that his attendance was not consistent.
    {¶16} Testimony also demonstrated that father left the marital home within
    days of L.H. arriving home from the hospital—and he has been out of the marital
    home ever since. The court asked father about his relationship with L.H., stating, “I
    have to tell you I haven’t heard—you didn’t give any testimony about your interaction
    with your daughter. Have you bonded with her?” Father acknowledged that his
    testimony had focused more on D.H., and stated that “I had a hard time initially, if
    I’m being candid, bonding with [L.H.] in those first months that she was home just
    due to the limited interaction that I had with her.” Father went on to testify about
    L.H.’s development stating that “as she has kind of grown and developed, she loves
    to sing, likes to sing and dance, and watch Baby Shark.” The court’s finding that
    father’s bond with L.H. was strained was supported by the testimony.
    {¶17} After reviewing the record, we find the court’s parenting schedule was
    based on competent and credible evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.
    8
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    Second Assignment of Error
    {¶18} Father’s second assignment of error states that “the trial court erred in
    dismissing the recommendations of the parenting counselor to which both parties
    had agreed in favor of a schedule which was not agreed upon by the parties or
    recommended by the parenting counselor.”
    {¶19} First, the record does not show that the parties agreed to the proposed
    schedule of the parenting investigator. Although the record shows that mother was
    willing to compromise, it is clear that the parties had not yet agreed on parenting
    time. In the March 17, 2021 hearing on parenting time, the court began the hearing
    by stating, “the reality is mom and dad are both agreeing to Mother’s Shared
    Parenting Plan with the Court deciding child support and parenting time. So in the
    Court’s decision, * * * when I come up with child support and [a] parenting time
    schedule that is sent to you, * * * I guess you can insert that in Mother’s Shared
    Parenting Plan and then get the parties to sign it, and that would be complete. So can
    I—can we put that on the record, saying that’s what we are doing?” After the parties
    agreed, the court reiterated, “[s]o we just need to do child support and parenting
    time. All right.”1
    {¶20} Second, a court may reject a parenting investigator’s proposed
    schedule if the court does not believe the schedule is in the best interest of the
    children. Hoskins v. Hoskins, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120130 and C-120213, 2013-
    Ohio-1126, ¶ 10-11. Because the domestic relations court must consider the best
    1 In its entry on parenting time, the court stated, “The parties have agreed to shared parenting.
    The only remaining issues for the Court to determine is the shared parenting time schedule and
    the corresponding determination of child support.”
    9
    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
    interest of the children above all else, it was not an abuse of discretion to reject the
    parenting investigator’s schedule and to issue its own schedule.
    {¶21} For the foregoing reasons, we overrule father’s first and second
    assignments of error and affirm the judgment of the domestic relations court.
    Judgment affirmed.
    WINKLER and BOCK, JJ., concur.
    Please note:
    The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion
    10