State v. Coleman , 2022 Ohio 3807 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Coleman, 2022-Ohio-3807.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 30060
Appellant
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
CHARLES COLEMAN COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellee CASE No. 2019-10-3680
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: October 26, 2022
TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals from the judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas, granting Appellee, Charles Coleman’s, motion to dismiss on speedy trial
grounds. This Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} Mr. Coleman was arrested on October 20, 2019, and charged with improperly
handling firearms in a motor vehicle. He posted bond the following day and was released from
jail. On November 12, 2019, however, the trial court revoked Mr. Coleman’s bond as a result of
his having been arrested on new and unrelated felony charges. Thereafter, Mr. Coleman remained
incarcerated because he was unable to make bond in his new case (hereinafter, “the November
case”). Given that Mr. Coleman was incarcerated and awaiting trial in the November case, the
trial court never reinstated his bond in this case. It is undisputed that the trial court consolidated
this case and the November case for purposes of any pretrial hearings and trial.
2
{¶3} Throughout November and December 2019, the trial court ordered several
continuances at the request of defense counsel. The trial was scheduled to begin on April 6, 2020,
but various events, including the onset of the global pandemic, prevented the trial from going
forward. Numerous continuances ensued with the attorneys and the trial court convening multiple
times through telephone and video conferences. Finally, the trial court set the matter for trial on
July 12, 2021. The trial court judge notified the parties that she would be absent that day and a
visiting judge would be presiding over the trial.
{¶4} On the morning of his scheduled trial, Mr. Coleman filed a motion to dismiss his
indictment on speedy trial grounds. The State responded in opposition to his motion to dismiss,
and a hearing was held before the visiting judge. The visiting judge determined that Mr. Coleman
had a right to bond in this case and, because his bond was never reinstated, each day he spent in
jail was subject to Ohio’s statutory triple-count provision. The visiting judge determined that Mr.
Coleman’s speedy trial time expired on March 7, 2020. Thus, she granted his motion to dismiss.1
{¶5} The State now appeals from the trial court’s judgment of dismissal in favor of Mr.
Coleman and raises one assignment of error for this Court’s review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DISMISSED APPELLEE COLEMAN’S INDICTMENT ON SPEEDY TRIAL
GROUNDS.
1
The trial court denied Mr. Coleman’s motion to dismiss the November case. That dismissal has
been challenged in an appeal filed by Mr. Coleman. See State v. Coleman, 9th Dist. Summit No.
30133, 2022-Ohio-____. This Court declined to consolidate this appeal and Mr. Coleman’s appeal
in the November case. However, the two decisions are being released simultaneously as the speedy
trial issues presented in the appeals are interrelated.
3
{¶6} In its sole assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred when it
dismissed Mr. Coleman’s indictment on speedy trial grounds. The State contends that the trial
court made clearly erroneous factual findings and erred in its legal conclusions. For the following
reasons, this Court sustains the State’s assignment of error.
{¶7} “When a trial court denies a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, this Court
reviews questions of law de novo, but considers whether the trial court’s factual determinations
are clearly erroneous.” State v. Burroughs, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 14CA010595, 2016-Ohio-1139,
¶ 4. “The Supreme Court of Ohio has found that the statutory speedy trial provisions set forth in
R.C. 2945.71 are coextensive with Ohio and federal constitutional speedy trial provisions.” State
v. Gaines, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 00CA008298, 2004-Ohio-3407, ¶ 9.
{¶8} A defendant charged with a felony must be brought to trial within 270 days of his
arrest. R.C. 2945.71(C)(2). “When a defendant is incarcerated without bail on the pending charge,
each day is counted as three days.” State v. Brown, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 20CA011618, 2021-Ohio-
2540, ¶ 9, citing R.C. 2945.71(E). “This ‘triple-count’ provision, however, only applies when the
defendant is being held solely on the charge at issue.” State v. Gall, 9th Dist. Lorain No.
18CA011445, 2019-Ohio-4907, ¶ 5. “If the accused is also being held in jail on other charges, the
triple-count provision is inapplicable.” State v. Stephens, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26516, 2013-Ohio-
2223, ¶ 12. Accord State v. MacDonald, 48 Ohio St.2d 66, 71 (1976).
{¶9} Mr. Coleman was arrested on October 20, 2019, so his speedy trial time began to
run on October 21, 2019. See State v. Browand, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 06CA009053, 2007-Ohio-
4342, ¶ 12. He posted bond that same day and was released from jail. On November 12, 2019,
the trial court revoked his bond because he had been arrested in conjunction with the November
case. Thereafter, Mr. Coleman remained incarcerated.
4
{¶10} The visiting judge determined that 22 days of speedy trial time elapsed between
Mr. Coleman’s arrest and his bond revocation in this case. From that point forward, the visiting
judge triple-counted each day Mr. Coleman spent in jail for purposes of calculating his speedy trial
time. The visiting judge reasoned that Mr. Coleman was entitled to bond and, because his bond
was never reinstated, he was being “held in jail in lieu of bail * * *.” R.C. 2945.71(E). Although
the visiting judge acknowledged that Mr. Coleman also was being held in connection with the
November case, she reasoned that the November case had no bearing on his availability for trial
in this case. The visiting judge wrote:
Defendant was not unavailable “by reason of other criminal proceedings against
him”. [R.C. 2945.72(A)]. Even had he made bond in [the November] case, he
would still be in jail on this case because no bond had been set. Therefore that other
case was not making him unavailable.
Based on her application of the triple-count provision, the visiting judge determined that Mr.
Coleman’s speedy trial time expired on March 7, 2020.
{¶11} Notably, R.C. 2945.72 provides for the tolling of an accused’s speedy trial time.
State v. Phillips, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27661, 2016-Ohio-4687, ¶ 6. Time expended in connection
with a tolling event is not counted against the State, as the tolling event effectively pauses the
speedy trial clock. See, e.g., State v. Gedeon, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29153, 2019-Ohio-3348, ¶ 13.
The question of whether a tolling event has occurred is entirely distinct from the question of how
days that have not been tolled will be calculated. Compare R.C. 2945.71 with R.C. 2945.72. It
appears that, in analyzing Mr. Coleman’s motion to dismiss, the visiting judge conflated the two
concepts.
{¶12} There is no dispute that Mr. Coleman’s bond was revoked on November 12, 2019,
because the trial court learned that he had been arrested on new felony charges. From that point
forward, Mr. Coleman was being held in jail on two separate matters: this case and the November
5
case. As previously noted, the triple-count provision does not apply when a defendant is also being
held in jail on other charges. See MacDonald, 48 Ohio St.2d at 71; Stephens, 2013-Ohio-2223, at
¶ 12; State v. Skorvanek, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 08CA009399, 2009-Ohio-3924, ¶ 23. Because Mr.
Coleman also was being held in jail on the November case, each day he spent in jail after
November 12th counted as a single day for purposes of calculating his speedy trial time.
{¶13} The record reflects that Mr. Coleman made a request for discovery on November
18, 2019. He also moved for a bond modification several times and requested continuances on
November 21, 2019, December 9, 2019, December 18, 2019, and December 20, 2019,
respectively. Each of Mr. Coleman’s motions and requests tolled his speedy trial time, so his time
was tolled until at least January 8, 2020. See R.C. 2945.72(E), (H). From the day his speedy trial
time began to run until the day of his discovery request, no more than 28 days elapsed.
{¶14} On January 8, 2020, the trial court, both attorneys, and Mr. Coleman signed a jury
trial order setting this matter for trial on April 6, 2020. During the hearing on Mr. Coleman’s
motion to dismiss, the visiting judge specifically found that Mr. Coleman did not ask for the trial
to be continued to April 6th and that there was “no reason given” for that continuance. That finding
was clearly erroneous, however, as the January 8th order specifically provided that the trial was
being set for April 6th “[a]t the Defendant’s request * * *.” Any period of delay necessitated by a
“motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused” constitutes a tolling event. R.C.
2945.72(E). The same is true for any continuances granted upon an accused’s own motion. R.C.
2945.72(H). Because the trial court selected an April trial date at Mr. Coleman’s request, his
speedy trial time was further tolled as a result of the court’s January 8th order.
{¶15} Mr. Coleman concedes that his speedy trial time was tolled from March 9, 2020,
through July 30, 2020, as a result of tolling orders issued in response to COVID-19. See Executive
6
Order 2020-01D Declaring a State of Emergency,
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/static/publicorders/Executive-Order-2020-01D.pdf (accessed
September 2, 2022); In re Tolling of Time Requirements Imposed by Rules Promulgated by the
Supreme Court and Use of Technology, 158 Ohio St.3d 1447, 2020-Ohio-1166 (“the Tolling
Order”). The Tolling Order expired on July 30, 2020, so Mr. Coleman’s speedy trial time resumed
on July 31, 2020. On August 7, 2020, however, he requested a continuance so that his counsel
might prepare for trial. The trial court granted his request and set the matter for trial on November
2, 2020. Accordingly, no more than eight days of speedy trial time elapsed from July 31st to
August 7th, bringing the total number of days that had elapsed to 36 days.
{¶16} The trial court ultimately continued Mr. Coleman’s trial several more times. Those
continuances occurred on November 10, 2020, November 30, 2020, and February 10, 2021. The
final continuance resulted in the trial being set for July 12, 2021, which is the date Mr. Coleman
filed his motion to dismiss. The record reflects that the trial court met with the attorneys before
each continuance, either by telephone or videoconferencing, to discuss the status of the case. Each
time, the court indicated that a continuance would be required due to issues related to COVID-19
and certain standing orders of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons set
forth in State v. Coleman, 9th Dist. Summit No. 30133, 2022-Ohio-____, this Court must conclude
that those continuances were reasonable, and thus, constituted tolling events under R.C.
2945.72(H).
{¶17} The record does not support the conclusion that, at the time Mr. Coleman filed his
motion to dismiss, 270 days or more had elapsed for purposes of calculating his speedy trial time.
See R.C. 2945.71(C)(2). Because Mr. Coleman’s speedy trial time had not yet expired, the visiting
judge erred by granting his motion to dismiss. Thus, the State’s assignment of error is sustained.
7
III.
{¶18} The State’s assignment of error is sustained. The judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with the foregoing opinion.
Judgment reversed,
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
8
Costs taxed to Appellee.
THOMAS A. TEODOSIO
FOR THE COURT
CARR, J.
CALLAHAN, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CORGAN, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellant.
ANGELA M. KILLE, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.