J.B. v. O.S.Y. , 2022 Ohio 3226 ( 2022 )

[Cite as J.B. v. O.S.Y., 2022-Ohio-3226.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
J.B., :
Petitioner-Appellee, :
No. 110623
v. :
O.S.Y., ET AL., :
Respondents. :
[Appeal by J.D., Respondent.] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 15, 2022
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-20-934899
Appearances:
The Pattakos Law Firm LLC and Peter G. Pattakos, for
appellant.
MATASAR JACOBS LLC, Christopher B. Congeni, and
Douglas G. Walters; Hilow & Spellacy Co., LLC, and Kevin
M. Spellacy, for appellee.
LISA B. FORBES, J.:
J.D. appeals the trial court’s order issuing a civil stalking protection
order (“CSPO”) against him. After reviewing the facts of the case and pertinent law,
we reverse the lower court’s judgment.
I. Facts and Procedural History
In the summer of 2020, a Cleveland-based group called With Peace
We Protest (“WPWP”) held five protests at three local restaurants affiliated with
Robert George (“George”) and a company he owns, Ethos Hospitality Group
(“Ethos”). On June 19, 2020, WPWP held a protest at TownHall. On June 27, 2020,
WPWP held consecutive protests at TownHall, Harry Buffalo, and Barley House. On
July 12, 2020, WPWP held another protest at TownHall. According to WPWP, the
organization was protesting George’s alleged “unethical business practices.”
J.D. is a founding member of WPWP, and he was part of all five
protests. J.B. is George’s cousin, and she works as the director of operations at
Ethos. J.B. was also present at all five of the protests at issue in the case at hand.
On July 15, 2020, J.B. filed a petition for a CSPO against J.D. and
O.S.Y., who is one of the protesters, based on the parties’ encounters at the protests.
The magistrate granted the ex parte CSPO against J.D. and O.S.Y. on the same day.
After holding a three-day hearing on August 3, 2020, August 26, 2020, and
January 15, 2021, the magistrate denied the full CSPO against O.S.Y. and granted
the full CSPO against J.D., restraining his movement in relation to J.B. until July 15,
2025.
The court overruled J.D.’s objections to the magistrate’s decision,
adopted the decision in its entirety, and issued its own additional findings of fact
and conclusions of law on June 28, 2021. It is from this order that J.D. appeals.
II. Hearing Testimony
A. J.B.
J.B. testified that as part of her job at Ethos, she travels from
“restaurant to restaurant.” J.B. encountered J.D. at Barley House, Harry Buffalo,
and TownHall while J.D. was protesting with WPWP. Asked if any of the
“conversations” she has had with J.D. have been threatening, J.B. answered, “Yes.”
1. The June 19, 2020 Protest
J.B. testified that the first protest was at TownHall on June 19, 2020.
According to J.B., at this protest, J.D. screamed “F*** TownHall” over and over and
he “threatened” and “followed” George into the Family Dollar store across the street.
J.B. also testified that J.D. and “another girl like started getting super aggressive.
They came up to the gate and said you should come over this gate and we’ll f******
show you whatever.” J.B. explained that “a couple of them [were] encouraging me
to come over the fence so they can show me what they’re going to do in my personal
space.” Asked why “they” wanted J.B. to come over the fence, she responded, “So
that they could whoop my a**.” J.B. also testified that no threats were made against
her on June 19, 2020.
2. The June 27, 2020 Protests
J.B. testified that on Saturday June 27, 2020, J.D. went to Harry
Buffalo, Barley House, and TownHall to protest.
J.B. testified that at the Harry Buffalo protest, J.D.
told me I was a stupid f****** b**** and that my — and that my p****
smells and some — like he wouldn’t f*** me or — it was disgusting.
And he started getting aggressive. And there was another person
named Chris that was there who told him to calm down because he was
— I don’t know.
Like I don’t — I’m like superuncomfortable saying it but I don’t know.
He just called me an ugly b**** and then proceeded —
Asked if any of J.D.’s statements were sexually suggestive, J.B.
answered, “Yes.” J.B. testified that she eventually put her “AirPods in and stopped
talking to them which then they went up to me and said f*** you over and over.”
J.B. testified that J.D. then went to Barley House to protest. J.B. also
went to Barley House “to make sure that the door was handled appropriately.”
According to J.B., she was further back from the protesters at Barley House, and she
had no interaction with J.D.
J.D. next went to TownHall to protest. J.B. also went to TownHall,
but she “tried to stay inside because of what happened at Harry Buffalo and how
aggressive [J.D.] got * * *.” According to J.B., she became aware of a fight that
occurred at Barley House involving “a girl and I think [J.D.] was involved.”
Asked what J.D. did “to threaten you personally” at the June 27, 2020
protest, J.B. responded as follows: “He specifically told me that — and I’ll repeat —
that my p***y stinks and that he wouldn’t f*** me * * *.” According to J.B., this did
not upset her “at all.”
3. The July 12, 2020 Protest
J.B. testified that the final protest took place at TownHall on July 12,
2020. J.D. attended the protest, and J.B was working at the “back gate” of TownHall
that day. Her job duties were “to provide people masks if they needed one, check
IDs, and help people get to their seats.” According to J.B., the city was supposed to
bring barricades because they brought them to the protests on June 19, 2020, and
June 27, 2020, but there were no barricades on July 12, 2020. This allowed the
protesters to get closer to the establishment than had been possible at the previous
protests.
According to J.B., she had her “personal first interaction” with J.D. at
the July 12, 2020 protest. J.D. and the other protestors came to the back door of
TownHall. J.B. testified that she was “fearful” of them when she saw them,
“especially because the police did not bring us barricades.” According to J.B., she
tried to make a police report to the officers stationed in squad cars at the protest, but
they would not roll down their car windows. J.B. called the police “so many times”
but, according to J.B., the police informed her that they were instructed not to
interfere with the protest. J.B. testified that she “called 9-1-1 and they kept hanging
up on me because the police were there.”
J.B. testified that J.D. and other protesters “were walking through
saying that they’re — going like in front of me and they said that they know where I
live or we know where you live. We’re going to catch you while you’re sleeping.
That’s how you get them. You catch them while they sleep.” J.B. further testified
that the protestors said “they’ll * * * take us out. And that they knew where we lived
and that they were going to go there later that night.” J.B. further testified that J.D.
and another protester “talked about going to [George’s] later that night.” Another
protester stated to J.D. that “[w]e’re going to find out where he lives.” J.B. testified
that J.D. and the other protester were talking about George.
J.B. testified that the protesters “constantly blew” their blowhorns
and she viewed this “as an escalation in their protest.” The protesters were doing
this “within four feet, within three feet” of where she was standing. According to
J.B., J.D. “had the blowhorn” at the July 12, 2020 protest.
According to J.B., she went to the emergency room “the night after
the protest because [her] ears were ringing and [she] had a migraine that [she] still
[has] all the time.” J.B. testified that her ear injury was the result of “a megaphone
being blown at me. * * * From two megaphones being blown at me for I don’t know
how long but it was what felt like forever.”
4. The Protests in General
On cross-examination, J.B. was asked if she could identify which
statements J.D., as opposed to any of the other protesters, made. J.B. answered,
“No. He was involved in them.” Asked again if she could remember specific
statements that J.D. made, J.B. answered as follows:
Yes, I do remember him threatening [George]. I do remember them
calling us terrorists. I do remember them telling me to come over the
fence and that they’ll whoop my a**. It was a group of them collectively.
It wasn’t just one of them fighting with me, arguing with me, getting in
my face. It was multiple. So do I know the rest of their names? No.
* * * They were all together screaming at us.
J.B. testified that she has had no interaction with J.D. or any of the
other protesters since July 12, 2020.
According to J.B., there were police officers at the June 19, 2020, and
July 12, 2020 protests, but not at the June 27, 2020 protest. J.B. testified that “as
long as it’s not [J.D.] and a few others, I don’t have any issues with them protesting.
They have a right to their opinion.” According to J.B., she feels this way because
J.D. “has been consistently aggressive.”
Asked who said the comment about “going to whoop you’re a**,” J.B.
answered, “I think the girl said she would whoop my a**.” According to J.B., J.D.
“said he’ll show me like how he’s going to enter my personal space because * * * I
asked him to please stop hassling the customers.”
J.B. testified that she “thought” J.D. was angry at the protests. J.B.,
on the other hand, was not angry. “In fact I’ve ignored them almost every time that
they’ve been there. They haven’t made me angry once.”
According to J.B., approximately 10-25 people participated in each
protest. J.B. testified that all of the protests at issue were announced in advance,
and she was “not unaware” of them prior to them occurring.
Asked why she filed “this protective order,” J.B. testified as follows:
“the threatening comments that [O.S.Y. and J.D.] made, not just about me, but also
about [George], but then they literally weaponized blow horns on purpose. * * *
[T]hey clearly want to do harm to me and most likely [George] as well.” J.B. also
testified that “I just wanted them to leave me alone. I just wanted to know that they
had to leave me alone * * *.”
J.B. first testified that she “authored” the CSPO “alone” and next
testified that a “justice system advocate” helped her fill out and file the CSPO. While
filing the CSPO, this advocate told J.B. that J.D. had a “violent history,” and she was
“much more scared * * * that he would retaliate” after finding this out. J.B. and her
young son stayed with J.B.’s mother while an alarm system was installed in J.B.’s
home. Asked again why she wanted the CSPO, J.B. testified as follows:
I have zero desire or any interest in living in fear and/or thinking that
— like last night I woke up at 4:00 a.m. and I couldn’t sleep. I thought
somebody was opening the garage door. * * * And I have a two-year old
and I also want to be able to go to work and feel good about going to
work and not just like constant living in fear of if he’s going to follow
me out to my car and do something to me.
B. Joseph Orvec
Joseph Orvec [“Orvec”], who testified on behalf of J.B., stated that he
works for George, and he was at TownHall on June 19, 2020, “anywhere from 4:00
to 6:00” p.m. because “there was a major alarm with all of us because of the protests
that was [sic] scheduled.” He went to TownHall to “make sure that people kind of
feel at ease, make sure everything goes smooth.” Orvec heard J.D. say to George,
“You’re a f****** p***y, I’m going to kill you.” Orvec testified that, based on what
he heard J.D. say to George, he believed that J.D. was a threat to J.B.
The protestors were directing their “words” to J.B., who was one of
the few nonprotesters there. Police officers were also there.
C. Christopher Piazza
Christopher Piazza (“Piazza”), who testified on behalf of J.D., stated
that he is a founding member of WPWP and he has known J.D. since the beginning
of June 2020. Piazza was present for all the protests at issue in the case at hand.
According to Piazza, as part of the protests, he was “yelling” and “attempting to
educate individuals who were entering * * * George’s establishments” about
“George’s behaviors and the behaviors in his business, the racism, xenophobia,
sexism, transphobia that we’ve noticed among Mr. George and other people in his
establishment.” Piazza’s role within WPWP was to monitor and inform the
protesters if they “were getting off message or anything, * * * pull them off to the
side and stop them.”
Piazza testified that he never heard J.D. make any threats against J.B.
or anyone else at the protests. He also never saw J.D. do anything at the protests
“that would have caused a reasonable person to fear for their safety.”
Piazza testified that he never told J.B. that J.D. had “ever behaved
with actual violence toward anyone.” Piazza further testified that he
didn’t apologize [to J.B.] for [J.D.’s] behavior. * * * And I was
apologizing to her as a victim of Bobby George also having to deal with
us being annoying but in no way was I apologizing for the actions of one
person. * * * Exactly the same way I would have apologized to any
employee that was there that day. * * * I did not know that she was part
of the George family at that time and I just thought she was another
employee and another victim of Mr. George.
Asked if he saw J.D. “weaponizing a megaphone to attack * * * J.B. or
anyone else at these protests,” Piazza answered, “Absolutely not. They got annoying
with them sometimes. As I said, that’s part of protesting. Never once did it look like
a weapon or aggression.” Piazza testified that the protesters did not use the
megaphone “up in [J.B.’s] ear. They went up to the fence and did it so that the
customers could hear the message or could hear the disruption but I never saw them
go right up into her face.”
Asked if J.B. ever told him she feared for her safety, Piazza answered,
“No. She went and told multiple police something that day and never once did the
police take any actions which led me to believe the police also didn’t think that there
was any credible threats of violence or aggression.”
Piazza testified about a comment one of the protesters made that was
heard on a video of the July 12, 2020 protests that was shown to the court: “We’re
going to need to find out where [George] lives.” According to Piazza, the comment
was made so “we can protest outside his house if it gets to that.”1 Piazza was standing
with J.D. when J.D. interacted with George. According to Piazza, J.D. “absolutely
one hundred percent did not say that” he was going to kill George.
D. Christopher Martin
Christopher Martin (“Martin”), who testified on behalf of J.D., stated
that he attended the protests as a neutral observer from the National Lawyers Guild.
In this role, he was there to observe the police for “unjust action.” He attended all
the protests in their entirety, and there was “police presence” at all the protests.
Martin did not hear J.D. make any threats to J.B. or “do anything that would have
caused a reasonable person to fear for their safety” at any of the protests at issue.
1 It was established during the CSPO hearings that George was not present at
TownHall for the July 12, 2020 protest. In this video, the protesters suggested that
because George was not present at TownHall, they protest outside of George’s house.
E. George
George, who was called to testify by J.D., stated that he was not scared
of nor threatened by J.D. because J.D. “only attacks women.” However, George also
testified that J.D. threatened George’s life “several times.” George “feared for the
safety of [his] employees * * *.” George then testified that he feared for his own
safety because J.D. said he was going to kill George.
Asked why J.B. worked outside across from the protesters if George
feared for her safety, George answered as follows: “Because my cousin [J.B.] is
second in line. She’s an important part of our organization, and she has to be around
when incidents happen. She had security with her. We had the cops there.” Asked
if he “had to have [J.B.] sitting right by the door across from the protestors,” George
answered, “I didn’t have to have anything. She chose to be.”
F. J.D.
J.D. testified that he executed an affidavit on June 23, 2020,
associated with another proceeding, in which he explained why WPWP organized
the protests at issue in the case at hand. “A few of those reasons being, one, Mr.
George practices unethical business practices, i.e., being transphobic remarks, * * *
racial remarks * * *.”
Asked if he has ever “threatened * * * J.B. or done anything that would
have reasonably caused her to fear for her safety,” J.D. answered, “Never.”
G. Sydney Allen
Sydney Allen (“Allen”), who testified on behalf of J.D., stated that she
was a protester with WPWP at all the protests at issue in the case at hand. Allen
testified that she did not hear J.D. “make any threats to * * * J.B. * * * at any of these
protests in a way that would have caused a reasonable person to fear for their safety.”
H. O.S.Y.
O.S.Y. testified that she attended the July 12, 2020 protest as part of
WPWP. O.S.Y. testified that she did not make any threats that would have caused a
reasonable person to fear for their safety. According to O.S.Y., “No threats were
made” at this protest.
III. The Video Evidence
During J.B.’s cross-examination, two2 videos of the July 12, 2020
protest at TownHall were played. These videos, which run for 31 minutes and 57
seconds, and 19 minutes and 37 seconds, respectively, were recorded by J.D. on his
cell phone. The videos show that protesters were standing across the brick alley
from the back entrance to TownHall. For much of the time, J.B. is sitting on a chair
or standing at the gated entrance to TownHall’s patio, which is located at the back
of the restaurant along the brick alley.
The main focus of the protest early in the videos concerned TownHall
employees and patrons not wearing face masks during the Covid-19 pandemic.
2 A third video of the protests was also played at the hearing; however, nothing
relevant to the CSPO was shown on that video.
Some of the protesters also commented on George’s “sexist hiring practices.” The
videos depict J.B. and Piazza having a “civil” conversation at the back entrance to
TownHall, where J.B. was sitting. After Piazza talked to J.B., he walked back across
the brick alley to the protest.
Audio, recorded on J.D.’s cell phone footage, reveals that the
protesters were frustrated that J.B., rather than George himself, was stationed at
TownHall’s back gate. Off camera, one of the protesters said about George, “We
gotta find out where he lives and go to his f****** house.” Another protester said,
“Find out where he lives.”
The videos show that when J.B. left her station at the back gate of
TownHall on a few occasions, J.D. and his cell phone did not follow her. Rather, he
continued to protest and record video.
IV. The CSPO
Pertinent to this appeal, the CSPO lists J.B. as the petitioner and J.B.
and her minor son as the protected persons. J.D. is listed as the respondent. His
relationship to the petitioner is listed as “Stalker.” The provisions of the CSPO
require that J.D. stay at least 500 feet away from the protected persons and forbid
him from entering “the residence, school, business, place of employment, day care
centers, or child care providers of the protected persons * * *.” Further, J.D. “shall
* * * not be present within 500 feet * * * of [J.B.] wherever [J.B.] may be found, or
any place [J.D.] knows or should know [J.B. is] likely to be * * *.” The magistrate’s
decision ordered that the terms of the CSPO “shall be effective until 07/14/2025.”
The CSPO states as follows:
The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that 1) [J.D.] has
knowingly engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused [J.B.] to believe
that [J.D.] will cause physical harm or cause or has caused mental
distress; and 2) the following orders are equitable, fair, and necessary
to protect the persons named in this Order from stalking offenses.
V. The Trial Court’s Journal Entry
Pertinent to this appeal, the trial court’s journal entry finds
“numerous statements regarding J.B.’s observations of J.D. that demonstrate why
she perceived him to be a physical threat and why his behavior caused her to
experience mental distress.” For example, the trial court noted that J.B. “witnessed”
J.D. follow George across the street from TownHall to the Family Dollar store. The
trial court also noted J.B.’s testimony that “they” wanted her to come to the fence so
“they” could “whoop [her] a**.” Furthermore, the trial court noted J.B.’s testimony
that “they said that they know where I live * * *. We’re going to catch you while
you’re sleeping.”
The trial court also found that the “record is littered with comments
insinuating that J.D. was laughing during the testimony of the petitioner and her
witnesses and otherwise dismissing their concerns, while minimizing his own
criminal and civil litigation history.”3 While recognizing three incidents where J.D.
laughed during the three-day hearing, the record is not “littered” with “comments
insinuating” the same.
3 J.D.’s “criminal and civil litigation history” is not relevant to establishing the
elements of menacing by stalking.
The trial court found that “J.D. also testified to matters that were
directly contradicted by the video evidence played before the court.” The trial court
did not elaborate upon this finding, and it is unclear what testimony is at issue as
the review of the record did not reveal such contradictions.
The trial court noted that the magistrate, who observed the testifying
witnesses and weighed their credibility, “finds that * * * J.B.’s testimony was more
credible.”
The trial court provided the following analysis in issuing the CSPO:
J.B. testified that she personally witnessed J.D. follow other
individuals4 in an aggressive manner, make aggressive and threatening
remarks against J.B.’s physical well-being, and J.B. believed J.D. would
follow through on his threats.5 This threatened danger caused J.B.
emotional and mental distress. Because J.B. saw J.D. follow other
individuals, she believed his threats when he said he would come to her
home. J.D.’s taunting, yelling, and sexually aggressive remarks to J.B.
caused her mental distress.
The trial court further found that
[t]he CSPO will remain effective until July 14, 2025. The CSPO
prohibits J.D. from entering the residence, school, business, place of
employment, day care centers, or child care providers of J.B., including
the buildings, grounds, and parking lots at those locations. It further
prohibits J.D. from coming within 500 feet of J.B., or any place that he
believes she may be found or where J.D. believes she will be. Finally,
the order prohibits J.D. from encouraging any other person from
taking any action that he is prohibited from taking.
4 Our review of the record shows that J.B. testified that she saw J.D. follow one
individual — George — from TownHall across the street to the Dollar Store.
5 Our review of the record shows that J.B. did not testify that she “believed J.D.
would follow through on his threats.”
VI. Law and Analysis
On appeal, J.D. assigns one error for our review: “The trial court
erred in affirming the magistrate’s order granting a [CSPO] against * * * J.D.”
Within this assignment of error, J.D. presents two issues. First, whether the
judgment entry granting the CSPO is supported by competent and credible evidence
in the record. Second, “whether the trial court’s chilling misapplication of the
menacing-by-stalking statute to [J.D.’s] First-Amendment protected protest
activity” should be reversed.
A. Competent and Credible Evidence to Support the CSPO
1. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s issuance of a CSPO under an abuse of
discretion standard. M.J.W. v. T.S., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108014, 2019-Ohio-
3573, ¶ 26. A trial court acts within its discretion when ruling on a CSPO if there is
“some competent, credible evidence to support” its decision. Strausser v. White,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92091, 2009-Ohio-3597, ¶ 33.
2. CSPO R.C. 2903.214
To issue a CSPO under R.C. 2903.214, a trial court must find, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the respondent engaged in “menacing by
stalking” in violation of R.C. 2903.211. Delaine v. Smith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 103860, 2016-Ohio-5250, ¶ 17.
3. Menacing by Stalking R.C. 2903.211
Pursuant to R.C. 2903.211(A)(1), menacing by stalking is defined as
follows in part pertinent to this appeal: “No person by engaging in a pattern of
conduct shall knowingly cause another person to believe that the offender will cause
physical harm to the other person or a family * * * member * * * or cause mental
distress to the other person or a family * * * member * * *.”
A pattern of conduct means “two or more actions or incidents closely
related in time * * *.” R.C. 2903.211(D)(1).
“A person acts knowingly, regardless of his purpose, when he is aware
that his conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain
nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
“[T]o show that a [respondent] violated R.C. 2903.11 and is subject to
a civil protection order under R.C. 2903.214, it must be shown that the respondent
engaged in conduct that [the respondent] knew would probably cause the
complainant to believe that [the respondent] would cause [the complainant]
physical harm or cause [the complainant] to suffer mental distress.” Rufener v.
Hutson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 97635, 2012-Ohio-5061, ¶ 15.
4. Analysis
A review of J.B.’s testimony shows that nothing amounting to J.D.
engaging in menacing by stalking J.B. occurred at the June 19, 2020, and June 27,
2020 protests. J.B. testified that her “personal first interaction” with J.D. was at the
July 12, 2020 protest. Furthermore, J.B. testified that no threats were made against
her on June 19, 2020, and that nothing of note happened on June 27, 2020, at Barley
House and TownHall.
First, it is noted that on June 19, 2020, J.B. witnessed J.D. following
George across the street from TownHall to the Family Dollar store. Nothing in the
record suggests that J.D. knew that his conduct of following George would (a) cause
J.B. to believe that J.D. will harm her physically, or (b) cause her mental distress. In
fact nothing in the record suggests that J.D. knew J.B. witnessed him following
George.
Additionally, J.B. testified that at Harry Buffalo on June 27, 2020,
J.D. made comments to her about being “a stupid f****** b****,” about how her
“p***y smells,” and that he “wouldn’t f*** her.” However, not only did J.B. testify
that these comments were nonthreatening, Ohio courts have held that R.C. 2903.211
was “not enacted for the purpose of alleviating uncomfortable situations, but to
prevent the type of persistent and threatening harassment that leaves victims in
constant fear of physical danger.” Kramer ex rel. Kramer v. Kramer, 3d Dist.
Seneca No. 13-02-03, 2002-Ohio-4383, ¶ 17.
In State v. Beckwith, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98497, 2013-Ohio-492,
this court applied Kramer to reverse a defendant’s conviction for menacing by
stalking. In Beckwith, the defendant repeatedly followed a woman around the
library where she worked. This occurred “about three times a week,” and Beckwith
made “grunting noises at her every time she walked by him.” Id. at ¶ 4. The woman
believed Beckwith was recording her with his cell phone camera. Id. at ¶ 5.
Ultimately, Beckwith was banned from the library. Id. at ¶ 6. Subsequently,
Beckwith followed this woman twice in the downtown Cleveland area outside of the
library. Id.
This court held that “[w]hile [the defendant’s] presence made [the
woman] uncomfortable, we cannot conclude from the evidence in the record that he
knowingly caused [this woman] mental distress or [the fear of] physical harm as
required by R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).” Id. at ¶ 17.
Applying the Kramer and Beckwith line of analysis, the comments
J.D. made to J.B. at Harry Buffalo on June 27, 2020, do not constitute menacing by
stalking because they are nothing more than uncomfortable statements.
Having found that the evidence in the record regarding J.D.’s conduct
at the June protests does not amount to menacing by stalking, this author turns to
the evidence in the record concerning the July 12, 2020 protest at TownHall.
J.B. testified that she was present at TownHall on July 12, 2020, “to
provide people masks if they needed one, check IDs, and help people get to their
seats.” Our review of approximately 50 minutes of video footage from that protest
shows J.B. doing none of those things, despite many people entering TownHall from
that back gate, some of whom were not wearing masks.
J.B. testified that she was fearful of the protesters, including J.D.,
particularly because this was the first protest without barricades. According to J.B.,
the protesters, including J.D., “constantly blew” their blowhorns “within four feet,
within three feet” of where she was located. J.B. further testified that the protesters,
including J.D., said they knew where she lived, and they would “catch” her while she
was sleeping.
Asked on cross-examination if she could identify any specific
statements that J.D., as distinct from the other protesters, made, J.B. answered,
“No.” She elaborated that she recalled J.D. threatening George. She attributed all
other statements to the protesters in general.
J.B. testified that the protesters did not make her angry. “In fact I’ve
ignored them almost every time that they’ve been here.”
J.B. testified that she filed the CSPO because of “the threatening
comments that they made,” and the weaponization of the blowhorns “clearly”
showed that “they” wanted to harm her. She further testified that she “just wanted
them to leave me alone.”
Finally, J.B. testified that she became “much more scared” when she
learned, at the time she filed the CSPO, about J.D.’s alleged violent criminal history.
It is worth noting that nothing in the record supports the assertion that J.D. has a
“violent criminal history.” In fact, the following colloquy occurred during J.D.’s
testimony:
Q: Have you ever been convicted of any crime involving violence?
A: No.
George testified that J.B. voluntarily positioned herself at TownHall’s
back entrance during the July 12, 2020 protest.
It is undisputed that the police were present at the July 12, 2020
protest and did not get involved in the protest or arrest anyone at the protest.6
The video evidence of the July 12, 2020 protest neither necessarily
contradicts nor supports J.B.’s testimony. The pertinent videos, which run just over
50 minutes, do not show any interaction between J.D. and J.B., and do not show
J.D. making any threats or acting aggressively. This does not mean, of course, that
these things did not happen. The videos recorded activity only at TownHall on July
12, 2020, but protests occurred at Harry Buffalo, Barley House, and TownHall on
July 12, 2020. No testimony was elicited about whether these videos captured all
the protesting activity that occurred at TownHall that day. Nonetheless, the video
did not capture any conduct by J.D. that amounted to a violation of the menacing by
stalking statute.
In Tumblin v. Jackson, 5th Dist. Coshocton No. 06CA002, 2006-
Ohio-3270, ¶ 19, the court found that, although “[o]ne incident is insufficient to
establish a ‘pattern of conduct’” under R.C. 2903.211, the statute “does not require
that a pattern of conduct be proved by events from at least two different days.
6 On January 20, 2021, J.D. and O.S.Y. were charged with felonious assault in
relation to J.B.’s alleged injury from the megaphones at the July 12, 2020 protest. The
state elected not to proceed on the indictment against J.D., and the court dismissed the
case on February 9, 2021. As to the case against O.S.Y., an expert report concluded that
“it cannot be said to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Ms. [J.B.’s] hearing was
damaged at the 7.12.20 protest, whether as a result of anyone’s megaphone use or
otherwise.” Based on this report, the court granted the state’s motion to dismiss the
charges against O.S.Y. on October 28, 2021.
Arguably, a pattern of conduct could arise out of two or more events occurring on
the same day, provided that there are sufficient intervals between them.”
In Tumblin, the court found insufficient evidence to show a pattern
of conduct based on a “one-time incident caused by a heated argument over a
misunderstanding regarding the caretaking of Appellant’s children.” Id. at ¶ 25. The
Fifth District Court of Appeals stated that “the record does not support, that the
Appellant has, on more than one occasion, * * * threatened to cause [Appellee]
physical harm or caused Appellee mental distress.” Id. The Tumblin Court reversed
the trial court’s granting a CSPO against the appellant. Id. at ¶ 26.
In State v. Erker, 2019-Ohio-3185, 141 N.E.3d 543, ¶ 74 (8th Dist.),
this court held that “two incidents are enough to establish a pattern of conduct for
purposes of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).” In State v. Spaulding, 151 Ohio St.3d 378, 2016-
Ohio-8126, 89 N.E.3d 554, ¶ 72, the Ohio Supreme Court held that, in relation to
proving menacing by stalking, the parties’ history “would be relevant to establish
both a pattern of conduct and that [the respondent] knew that the [petitioner’s]
conduct would cause [the petitioner] to believe that [the respondent] was going to
harm [the petitioner].”
Viewing the totality of the evidence, the record does not support that
J.D. has, on more than one occasion, knowingly caused J.B. to believe that he will
cause her physical harm or caused her mental distress. Taking as true J.B.’s
testimony that she heard J.D. say he knew where she lived and he would “catch” her
while she was sleeping, this conduct alone does not establish a pattern. The record
is devoid of any evidence that J.D. knowingly engaged in any other conduct that
caused J.B. to believe that he would cause her physical harm or that he did cause her
mental distress.
In applying the Ohio Supreme Court’s holding in Spaulding that the
parties’ history is relevant to a menacing-by-stalking analysis, it is noted that J.D.
and J.B. have no history outside of this case. J.B. works for the restaurant group
that J.D. was protesting. J.B. voluntarily worked at the restaurants during all five of
the protests at issue in this case. Nothing in the record suggests that J.D. was
knowingly targeting J.B. or seeking her out. All of their interactions were in public
places during the protests. Mindful that conduct constituting menacing by stalking
is not acceptable at protests, nothing in the record suggests that J.D. knowingly
engaged in conduct that would cause J.B. to reasonably believe that J.D. would harm
her or cause her mental distress.
In Krzystan v. Bauer, 6th Dist. Ottawa No. OT-15-039, 2017-Ohio-
858, ¶ 21, the court reversed the trial court’s granting a CSPO, concluding that
“[t]here are simply no facts to suggest that * * * appellant knowingly caused appellee
to believe that he would cause her physical harm.” In Krzystan, the appellant
landlord was in the process of evicting the appellee tenant. Id. at ¶ 3, 22. The court
held the following:
Appellant’s comment that “you are going to get what you deserve”
alleges, at most, an implied or veiled threat. We note, however, that
even under a most generous reading of the transcript, there are no
other facts, such as physical gestures, body language or tone of voice,
to suggest that appellant intended for his statement to be taken as a
physical threat. * * *
The same is true for the alleged “hell to pay” [comment] that appellant
allegedly made * * *. There are no facts to suggest what appellant meant
by that, other than his stated intention to shut off the water to appellee’s
unit. In a similar case, where the respondent left a message that he
would be “taking action” against the petitioner, but there was no
indication of what was meant by “taking action,” the Seventh District
found that the remark could not support the trial court’s decision to
issue the CSPO. Masucci v. Burnbrier, 7th Dist. Mahoning
No. 14MA78, 2015-Ohio-4102, ¶ 17. We find that appellant’s alleged
comment does not constitute an incident under R.C. 2903.211(D)(1).
Id. at ¶ 22-23.
Upon review, the trial court abused its discretion because there is not
competent, credible evidence in the record to support the trial court’s issuance of a
CSPO against J.D. Specifically, there is no evidence that J.D. engaged in a pattern
of conduct sufficient to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the elements of
menacing by stalking.
B. Menacing by Stalking is Not Protected by the First Amendment
Next, this opinion turns to the second issue set forth by J.D. on
appeal: “whether the trial court’s chilling misapplication of the menacing-by-
stalking statute to [J.D.’s] First-Amendment protected protest activity” should be
reversed.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in
part that “Congress shall make no law * * * abridging the freedom of speech, * * * or
the right of the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.” The United States Supreme Court has “held that a peaceful
march and demonstration was protected by the rights of free speech, free assembly,
and freedom to petition for a redress of grievances.” NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware, 458 U.S. 886, 909, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982), citing
Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 83 S.Ct. 680, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963).
The First Amendment’s protections are not absolute. Certain classes
of speech, such as “threatening words, obscene speech, fighting words, speech that
interferes with the rights of others, speech that creates a clear and present danger,
and defamatory speech,” are unprotected by the First Amendment. State v. Plants,
5th Dist. Tuscarawas No. 2009 AP 10 0054, 2010-Ohio-2930, ¶ 46.
Nonetheless, Ohio courts have held that R.C. 2903.211 does not chill
constitutionally protected speech or conduct. State v. Smith, 126 Ohio App.3d 193,
210, 709 N.E.2d 1245 (7th Dist.1998). “Appellant was not prosecuted because he
picketed an abortion clinic, he was prosecuted because he engaged in a pattern of
conduct which caused the complainant mental distress and caused him to believe
that appellant would cause him physical harm.” Id. See also Kreuzer v. Kreuzer,
144 Ohio App.3d 610, 614, 761 N.E.2d 77 (2d Dist.2001) (“We do not believe it is
fairly within the protection of the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech to
knowingly cause another to believe one will cause physical harm or mental distress
to him or her by engaging in two or more actions or incidents closely related in time.”
(Emphasis omitted.)).
Upon review, this author finds that the trial court issued the CSPO
against J.D. not because he exercised his First Amendment right to protest, but
because it found that he engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused J.B. to believe
J.D. would harm her or caused J.B. mental distress. This conduct is not within the
protection of the First Amendment’s guarantees.
Accordingly, J.D.’s sole assignment of error is sustained.
Judgment reversed.
It is ordered that respondent-appellant recover from petitioner-appellee costs
herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
LISA B. FORBES, JUDGE
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY (WITH
ATTACHED SEPARATE OPINION);
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, A.J., DISSENTS (WITH ATTACHED SEPARATE
OPINION)
MICHELLE J. SHEEHAN, J., CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY:
I agree with the lead opinion that the evidence presented does not
warrant a CSPO but write separately to offer an alternative analysis of the evidence
presented. I recognize that credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trier of facts
and we review the trial court’s decision regarding CSPO for an abuse of discretion.
The trial court here, however, generalized the petitioner’s testimony and drew
conclusions without support from the specific testimony provided by her. The trial
court also failed to ascertain if the petitioner’s testimony established two or more
menacing actions or incidents required by the statute. Based on my review, I agree
with the lead opinion that the CSPO is not warranted by the evidence presented, but
for the following reasons.
In this case, all the interactions and encounters of the petitioner and
respondent occurred in the context of group protests against the establishments in
which the petitioner was employed. The testimony reveals the group’s animosity
towards the owner of the establishments due to his alleged display of racism and
sexism, and the group staged various protests in front of these establishment. Even
by petitioner J.B.’s own testimony, the conduct of respondent J.D. and his fellow
protesters did not seem to target J.B. in particular for the most part.
R.C. 2903.211 criminalizes “specific conduct directed toward another
person when done for an illegitimate purpose.” Bey v. Rasawehr, 3d Dist. Mercer
Nos. 10-18-02 and 10-18-03, 2019-Ohio-57, ¶ 42, rev’d in part on other grounds,
Bey v. Rasawehr, 161 Ohio St.3d 79, 2020-Ohio-3301, 161 N.E.3d 529. J.B. testified
she had her “personal first interaction” with J.D. at the July 12, 2020 protest at
TownHall. Even if we ignore her testimony that July 12, 2020, was her first personal
interaction with J.D., which appears to be inconsistent with her testimony regarding
certain remarks J.D. made to her on June 19 and June 27, J.B. specifically testified
no threats were made against her on June 19, 2020; and, regarding the events on
June 27, 2020, when asked if J.D. threatened her personally, she referred to an
insulting remark from J.D. but testified that she was not upset by it. As such, the
events of June 19 and June 27, testified to by J.B. cannot be the basis of menacing
by stalking warranting a CSPO. Consequently, J.B. must prove the events on July
12, 2020 — the final protest — demonstrated a pattern of conduct J.D. engaged in
by which he knowingly caused J.B. to believe J.D. will cause her mental distress or
physical harm.
The video depicting the July 12, 2020 protest shows J.B. sat on a stool
at the entrance to the patio area of TownHall. She testified she was “fearful” of the
protestors because the police failed to provide the barricades, which allowed the
protesters to get closer to the establishment. There was no testimony, however, that
she was fearful of J.D. in particular in this protest.
J.B. also testified that the protesters, including J.D., were walking
through in front of her and said to her they knew where she lived and “[w]e are going
to catch you while you’re sleeping. That’s how you get them. You catch them while
they sleep.” On cross-examination, however, when asked if J.D. made specific
remarks at her during the protests, J.B. acknowledged the statements were made by
“a group of them collectively,” stating “they were all together screaming at us.”
Regarding the July 12, 2020 protest, J.B. also testified the protestors constantly blew
their blowhorns as part of their protest activities, which caused injuries to her ears.
Again, her testimony did not show J.D. targeted horn-blowing at her.
Even if we were to construe the testimony as depicting J.D.’s conduct
directed at J.B. personally, the testimony did not support the requisite “pattern of
conduct.” The case law indicates that the statute does not require a pattern of
conduct to be proven by events from different days and arguably “a pattern of
conduct could arise out of two or more events occurring on the same date, provided
that there was a sufficient interval between them.” State v. Scruggs, 136 Ohio
App.3d 631, 634, 737 N.E.2d 574 (2d Dist.2000). Here, however, J.B.’s own
testimony reflects J.D.’s conduct (the “catch them” remark and horn blowing) was
all part of the protesting activity at TownHall on July 12, 2020. Appellee did not
contend there were two separate incidents for the purposes of the statute on this
date, and there was no testimony to evince a sufficient interval.
My review therefore indicates that J.D.’s behaviors, as testified to by
J.B., did not reflect a pattern of conduct specifically directed at J.B. and, therefore,
there was insufficient evidence to support menacing by stalking as alleged by J.B.
In granting the CSPO, the trial court generalized J.B.’s testimony and drew
conclusions unsupported by the evidence.
While the granting of a CSPO is reviewed only for an abuse of
discretion, the trial court’s findings in support of the CSPO are not borne out by a
detailed review of the petitioner’s testimony. Therefore, I concur with the lead
opinion in reversing the trial court’s judgment.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, A.J., DISSENTING:
I respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a civil protection order under
R.C. 2903.214 in this case. Contrary to the determinations of the other panel judges,
the victim in this case met her burden and presented sufficient evidence to
demonstrate J.D. committed menacing by stalking as alleged by J.B.
In overruling the objections to the magistrate’s decision, the trial
court conducted an independent review, reviewed the testimony provided,
examined the evidence presented, and considered the credibility of the witnesses.
The trial court engaged in a proper application of the law and determined that
“[e]ven when viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of [J.D.], * * * [J.B.]
properly met all requirements for issuance of a protection order against [J.D.] * * *”
and established that J.D. engaged in menacing by stalking. (Emphasis added.)
A person may seek a protection order under R.C. 2903.214(C) by
filing a petition with the court alleging that the respondent engaged in a violation of
R.C. 2903.211, menacing by stalking, against the person to be protected by the order.
The menacing by stalking statute, R.C. 2903.211, prohibits the offender from
engaging “a pattern of conduct” that knowingly causes another person “to believe
that the offender will cause physical harm to the other person * * * or cause mental
distress to the other person * * *.” R.C. 2903.211(A)(1).7
7 “The petitioner has the burden to prove the elements of menacing by stalking by
a preponderance of the evidence.” R.G. v. R.M., 2017-Ohio-8918, 88 N.E.3d 1027, ¶ 11
(7th Dist.), citing Felton v. Felton, 79 Ohio St.3d 34, 41-42, 679 N.E.2d 672 (1997)
Pursuant to R.C. 2903.211(D)(1), a pattern of conduct is defined to
include “two or more actions or incidents closely related in time * * *” or “two or
more actions or incidents closely related in time * * * directed at one or more persons
employed by or belonging to the same corporation, association, or other
organization.” R.C. 2903.211(A)(1) provides that in addition to any other basis, “the
other person’s belief or mental distress may be based on words or conduct of the
offender that are directed at or identify a corporation, association, or other
organization that employs the other person or to which the other person belongs.”
Id.In this matter, sufficient evidence was presented to prove J.D.
engaged in a pattern of conduct that caused J.B. to believe he would cause her
physical harm or caused her mental distress. Briefly, the record reflects that over
the course of one month, J.D. took part in a series of protests held at three affiliated
restaurants at which two or more actions or incidents occurred. J.B., an employee
of the restaurant group, encountered and interacted with J.D. “[t]wo or more times
at TownHall, one time at Harry Buffalo and one time at Barley House.” J.B. testified
that J.D. engaged in threatening and consistently aggressive behavior, which
escalated over the course of the protests. At one protest, J.B. witnessed J.D.
threatening Robert George, who owns the restaurants, and following him across a
street and into a store. Also, J.D. and another protestor said to J.B., “you should
(General Assembly intended to apply the usual preponderance of the evidence standard
to civil domestic violence protection order where it failed to specify another standard.).
come over this gate and we’ll f***ing show you” so “they could whoop my a**.” At
another protest, J.D. screamed vulgarities and made obscene remarks to J.B. At the
last protest, J.B. was fearful when she saw J.D. approach without having any
barricades set up. While walking in front of J.B., J.D. and other protesters stated
that “we know where you live” and “we’re going to catch you while you’re sleeping.”
Additionally, they were constantly using blowhorns within feet of where she was
standing, resulting in her later going to the emergency room because of her ears
ringing and a migraine. The record further establishes that by engaging in this
pattern of conduct, J.D. knowingly caused J.B. to believe that J.D. would cause her
physical harm or caused her mental distress. J.B. testified that she was “living in
[constant] fear.” J.B. began staying at her mother’s home while waiting for the
installation of a home alarm system in her own home.
After reviewing evidence from the hearing, quoting portions of
J.B.’s testimony, and commenting upon J.D.’s testimony, the trial court determined
sufficient evidence was presented to support granting the civil protection order,
stating as follows:
[J.B.] testified that she personally witnessed [J.D.] follow other
individuals in an aggressive manner, make aggressive and threatening
remarks against [J.B.’s] physical well-being, and [J.B] believed [J.D.]
would follow through on his threats. This threatened danger caused
[J.B.] emotional and mental distress. Because [J.B.] saw [J.D.] follow
other individuals, she believed his threats when he said he would come
to her home. [J.D.’s] taunting, yelling, and sexually aggressive remarks
to [J.B.] caused her mental distress. Additionally, [J.B.] testified that
she experienced hearing loss and headaches—actual physical harm—
after being subjected to respondents blowing white noise and an
amplified air horn over a long period of time, behavior in which [J.D.]
participated. These threats and abuses took place over three days
spanning almost a month. [J.B.] has proved by clear and convincing
evidence that [J.D.] caused [J.B.] physical harm, caused her to fear
further physical harm, and caused her mental distress.
Contrary to the lead opinion’s view, the record is not devoid of
evidence to establish a menacing pattern of conduct. “[I]n determining whether a
defendant’s conduct constitutes a pattern of conduct, a court must take everything
into consideration, ‘even if some of the person’s actions may not, in isolation, seem
particularly threatening.’” State v. Daylong, 2021-Ohio-4192, 181 N.E.3d 1245, ¶ 45
(10th Dist.), quoting State v. Dillard, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-178, 2018-Ohio-
4842, ¶ 17; E.J.V. v. S.R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108615, 2020-Ohio-1612, ¶ 11 (a
pattern of conduct was shown by conduct including verbally accosting and
intimidating the petitioner, yelling and spitting at petitioner’s family members, and
other unsettling behavior that caused stress to the family), citing Guthrie v. Long,
10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-913, 2005-Ohio-1541, ¶ 12; see also State v.
Rowbotham, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 19 MA 0066, 2022-Ohio-926, ¶ 49 (“A person
of ordinary intelligence could believe that this particular conduct, which was
repeated over the course of about a month, would likely cause another person to
suffer mental distress.”).
Furthermore, “[e]xplicit threats are not necessary to establish
menacing by stalking under R.C. 2903.211.” Harnar v. Becker, 12th Dist. Warren
No. CA2020-10-068, 2021-Ohio-784, ¶ 8 (a pattern of conduct was shown by a
respondent’s continued presence in former neighborhood and repeated driving past
petitioner’s home that increased anxiety), citing Bartells v. Bertel, 12th Dist. Butler
No. CA2016-11-216, 2018-Ohio-21, ¶ 56. As found in a similar action, “if appellant
had just been picketing * * *, his actions would have been protected. However, his
conduct crossed the line in that he repeatedly followed the complainant and
eventually shouted threatening words at the complainant, all causing him to fear for
his physical and mental well-being.” State v. Smith, 126 Ohio App.3d 193, 210, 709
N.E.2d 1245 (7th Dist.1998). Here, sufficient credible evidence was presented to
show J.D. engaged in a pattern of conduct that knowingly caused J.B. to believe he
would cause her physical harm or cause her mental distress.
Finally, I agree with the lead opinion’s determination that J.D.’s
conduct is not within the protection of the First Amendment’s guarantees. “It is not
within the protection of the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech to
knowingly cause another to believe that one will cause physical harm or mental
distress to him such as is contemplated by R.C. 2903.211.” Smith at 210 (citation
omitted) (“Appellant was not prosecuted because he picketed an abortion clinic, he
was prosecuted because he engaged in a pattern of conduct which caused the
complainant mental distress and caused him to believe appellant would cause him
physical harm.”); Coleman v. Razete, 2019-Ohio-2106, 137 N.E.3d 639, ¶ 25 (1st
Dist.) (citations omitted).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the civil
protection order. Accordingly, I dissent.