Brandon v. Brandon , 2009 Ohio 3818 ( 2009 )

[Cite as Brandon v. Brandon, 2009-Ohio-3818.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
MERCER COUNTY
JODI LYNN BRANDON,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 10-08-13
v.
STEVEN HERBERT BRANDON,
OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
Appeal from Mercer County Common Pleas Court
Domestic Relations Division
Trial Court No. 07-DIV-045
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: August 3, 2009
APPEARANCES:
John A. Poppe for Appellant
Thomas E. Luth for Appellee
Case No. 10-08-13
SHAW, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Jodi Lynn Brandon (“Jodi”) appeals from the
October 22, 2008 Judgment Entry of the Court of Common Pleas, Mercer County,
Ohio, Domestic Relations Division granting a divorce between Jodi and Steven
Herbert Brandon (“Steven”) and articulating the terms of the divorce.
{¶2} Jodi and Steven married on October 21, 2000. There was one minor
child born of the marriage, Garret Brandon, DOB 10/30/2002. Taylor Brandon,
DOB 6/10/1992 was Jodi’s daughter, who was adopted by Steven and treated as
Steven’s own.
{¶3} After Jodi and Steven married, they lived in a house on Steven’s
mother’s farm property, which they rented for a small payment each month.
During this time, Steven was employed by Crown Equipment, Inc. and as a
farmer. Jodi worked part-time as an educational aide for the local school. Both
parties had pensions from their employment.
{¶4} Steven farmed several plots of land during the course of the
marriage, including two forty acre parcels that he owned prior to the marriage and
a twenty acre parcel that was sold during the course of the marriage.
{¶5} The twenty acre parcel of land was sold to acquire a down payment
for a new house, away from Steven’s mother’s farm. The sale of the parcel
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resulted in a profit of $110,000; $90,890 of that profit was used as a down
payment on a home located on Fleetfoot Road.
{¶6} It appears that in July 2007, Jodi, Steven, and their children moved
into the Fleetfoot Road home. Approximately a week after moving in, Steven
moved out of the residence. After moving out of the Fleetfoot Road home, Steven
moved back into the home that they had been renting from his mother. Steven
never returned to the Fleetfoot Road home.
{¶7} On July 20, 2007 Jodi filed a complaint for divorce. A hearing was
held on the matter on April 14-15, 2008. A magistrate’s decision was issued on
June 3, 2008. On June 16, 2008 both Jodi and Steven filed objections to the
magistrate’s decision. On June 24, 2008 an amended magistrate’s decision was
entered which modified the parenting time allocation due to confusion in the
original decision. On August 18, 2008 Jodi filed supplemental objections to the
magistrate’s decision.
{¶8} On October 9, 2008 the trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision
of June 3, 2008 with the June 24, 2008 amendment. The trial court then entered
the October 20, 2008 Judgment Entry which essentially reiterated the orders of the
magistrate’s decision.
{¶9} Jodi now appeals, asserting three assignments of error.
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ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THAT THE SEPARATE PROPERTY, REAL ESTATE AND
FARM EQUIPMENT HAD BECOME MARITAL PROPERTY
AND MIXED MARITAL AND SEPARATE PROPERTY.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT UNDERTAKING TO
DO AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW AS TO THE OBJECTED
MATTER TO ASCERTAIN THAT THE MAGISTRATE HAD
PROPERLY DETERMINED THE FACTUAL ISSUES.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOCATING
BETWEEN THE PARTIES THE DEFENDANT’S DEFINED
BENEFIT PENSION FROM HIS EMPLOYER.
First Assignment of Error
{¶10} In her first assignment of error, Jodi argues that the trial court erred
in allocating certain property. Specifically, Jodi argues that some of the property
identified by the trial court as separate property is actually marital property.
{¶11} In a divorce proceeding, the trial court must determine whether
property is marital or separate property. Gibson v. Gibson, 3rd Dist. No. 9-07-06,
2007-Ohio-6965, ¶ 29 citing R.C. 3105.171(B), (D). This court reviews the trial
court’s classification of property as marital or separate property under a manifest
weight of the evidence standard. Gibson, 3rd Dist. No. 9-07-06, at ¶26, quoting
Eggeman v. Eggeman, 3rd Dist. No. 2-04-06, 2004-Ohio-6050, ¶14, citing
Henderson v. Henderson, 3rd Dist. No. 10-01-17, 2002-Ohio-2720, ¶28.
Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment will not be reversed if the decision is
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supported by some competent, credible evidence. Eggeman, 2004-Ohio-6050, at
¶14 citing DeWitt v. DeWitt, 3rd Dist. No. 9-02-42, 2003-Ohio-851, ¶10.
{¶12} In determining whether competent, credible evidence exists, “[a]
reviewing court should be guided by a presumption that the findings of a trial
court are correct, since the trial judge is best able to view the witnesses and
observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice inflections, and use those observations
in weighing the credibility of the testimony.” Barkley v. Barkley (1997), 119 Ohio
App.3d 155, 159, 694 N.E.2d 989 citing In re Jane Doe I (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d
135, 566 N.E.2d 1181.
{¶13} Marital property is defined by R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a) as follows:
(i) All real and personal property that currently is owned by
either or both of the spouses, including, but not limited to, the
retirement benefits of the spouses, and that was acquired by
either or both of the spouses during the marriage;
(ii) All interest that either or both of the spouses currently has
in any real or personal property, including, but not limited to,
the retirement benefits of the spouses, and that was acquired by
either or both of the spouses during the marriage;
(iii) Except as otherwise provided in this section, all income and
appreciation on separate property, due to the labor, monetary,
or in-kind contribution of either or both of the spouses that
occurred during the marriage;
(iv) A participant account, as defined in section 148.01 of the
Revised Code, of either of the spouses, to the extent of the
following: the moneys that have been deferred by a continuing
member or participating employee, as defined in that section,
and that have been transmitted to the Ohio public employees
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deferred compensation board during the marriage and any
income that is derived from the investment of those moneys
during the marriage; the moneys that have been deferred by an
officer or employee of a municipal corporation and that have
been transmitted to the governing board, administrator,
depository, or trustee of the deferred compensation program of
the municipal corporation during the marriage and any income
that is derived from the investment of those moneys during the
marriage; or the moneys that have been deferred by an officer
or employee of a government unit, as defined in section 148.06 of
the Revised Code, and that have been transmitted to the
governing board, as defined in that section, during the marriage
and any income that is derived from the investment of those
moneys during the marriage.
{¶14} However, marital property does not include any separate property.
R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(b). Separate property is defined by R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)
which provides in pertinent part as follows:
(i) An inheritance by one spouse by bequest, devise, or descent
during the course of the marriage;
(ii) Any real or personal property or interest in real or personal
property that was acquired by one spouse prior to the date of
the marriage;
(iii) Passive income and appreciation acquired from separate
property by one spouse during the marriage;
(iv) Any real or personal property or interest in real or personal
property acquired by one spouse after a decree of legal
separation issued under section 3105.17 of the Revised Code;
(v) Any real or personal property or interest in real or personal
property that is excluded by a valid antenuptial agreement;
(vi) Compensation to a spouse for the spouse's personal injury,
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except for loss of marital earnings and compensation for
expenses paid from marital assets;
(vii) Any gift of any real or personal property or of an interest in
real or personal property that is made after the date of the
marriage and that is proven by clear and convincing evidence to
have been given to only one spouse.
{¶15} In addition to the statutory definitions of marital and separate
property, we note that “[t]he commingling of separate property with other property
of any type does not destroy the identity of the separate property as separate
property, except when the separate property is not traceable.” R.C.
3105.171(A)(6)(b). Therefore, traceability is the main issue in determining whether
separate property has become marital property due to commingling. Earnest v.
Earnest, 151 Ohio App.3d 682, 785 N.E.2d 766, 2003-Ohio-704, ¶38, citing Peck
v. Peck (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 731, 734, 645 N.E.2d 1300. Further, “the party
seeking to establish an asset as separate property * * * has the burden of proof, by
a preponderance of the evidence, to trace the asset to separate property.” Id.{¶16} It appears that Jodi’s argument concerns three separate pieces of
property that the trial court determined to be separate property belonging to
Steven: two forty acre parcels of farmland that belonged to Steven prior to the
marriage; the down payment on a home that resulted from the sale of twenty acres
of farmland belonging to Seven before the marriage; and a grain bin and grain drill
acquired during the marriage.
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{¶17} The two forty acre parcels of land belonged to Steven prior to the
marriage. At the time the parties were married, it appears that Steven owned one
forty acre parcel of land free and clear of any mortgages or other encumbrances.
The second forty acre parcel was encumbered by a mortgage at the time Jodi and
Steven were married. It appears that on August 5, 2004 the mortgage on the
encumbered forty acres was refinanced in the amount of $91,225.00 in both Jodi
and Steven’s names. The record indicates that the refinancing occurred to remove
Steven’s ex-wife’s name from the mortgage.
{¶18} The balance on the mortgage at the time of the divorce was
approximately $84,000.00. It further appears that both the forty acre properties
were used to secure a $35,000 equity line of credit. It appears that during the
course of the marriage, the equity line of credit was maxed out. However, Steven
testified that he never spent anything using the equity line of credit.
{¶19} The trial court concluded that both forty acre parcels of land were
separate property belonging to Steven, as he owned the property prior to the
marriage and it appears that the mortgage was paid out of the farm account. The
trial court also concluded that “[Steven] shall be responsible to pay the equity line
of credit on said real estate of approximately $35,000 and hold Plaintiff harmless
in regard thereto. Further [Steven] shall pay the $84,000 mortgage on the real
estate, and he shall hold Plaintiff harmless in regard thereto.”
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{¶20} Jodi argues that because the mortgage on the property was paid with
marital funds she is entitled to receive appreciation on the property or the value of
mortgage payments made. In support of her argument, Jodi relies on Middendorf
v. Middendorf, 82 Ohio St.3d 397, 696 N.E.2d 575, 1998-Ohio-403. In
Middendorf, the Ohio Supreme Court considered whether the appreciation in value
on a stockyard that occurred during a marriage, was separate or marital property.
The Court noted that the stockyard itself was separate property, but then
considered the classification of the appreciation that occurred during the marriage.
The court concluded that the appreciation was marital property. In reaching this
conclusion, the Middendorf Court relied on a finding that the increase in the value
of the stockyard was due to the labor, money, or in-kind contributions. See R.C.
R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(iii). Specifically, the court in Middendorf found that the
husband’s labor made the appreciation that occurred during the marriage marital
property. However, the Middendorf Court specifically noted that appreciation due
to labor, money, or in-kind contributions of either spouse was to be distinguished
from passive appreciation. Passive appreciation value remains separate property.
See, R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(iii). In Middendorf, the wife was not entitled to a
part of the pre-marital business, nor the income in the business. Instead the wife
was entitled to part of the appreciation of the business.
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{¶21} In the present case, it appears that the property is under greater
mortgage encumbrance now, than at the start of the marriage. Therefore, it
appears that there was no increase in the value of the property due to mortgage
payments. Moreover, we note that the mortgage payments on the land came from
a separate farm account, not the family account.
{¶22} Here, contrary to Jodi’s assertions, all of the farm income was not
marital income, only farm income transferred into the family account was marital
income. Moreover, no testimony was given at trial that would indicate that Jodi
was entitled to any Middendorf appreciation on the property, as there was no
evidence introduced of any increase in value to the properties “due to the labor,
money, or in-kind contributions,” and any appreciation on the property over time
would be passive. Therefore, we find that the trial court correctly determined that
the two forty acre parcels were separate property belonging to Steven.
{¶23} Jodi also argues that the down payment for the house was marital
property. Specifically, although Jodi appears to concede that the down payment
amount was gained through the sale of separate property she argues that it was
converted to marital property through a gift and also argues that she is entitled to
equity in the home. Relying on Deitrich v. Dietrich, 8th Dist. No. 90565, 2008-
Ohio-5740, Jodi argues that the equity in the property is subject to equal division.
However, although the down payment on the home, made from Steven’s separate
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property was $90,890.04, the current equity in the home is $85,195. The only
equity in the home was the result of the down payment, which was Steven’s
separate property. Therefore, there was no equity which was the result of the
expense of marital property to be divided.
{¶24} Jodi also argues that once the down payment was made on a house
titled in the names of both parties, with a right of survivorship, the property was
converted to marital property by inter vivos gift. R.C. 3105.171(H) specifically
provides that “(e)xcept as otherwise provided in this section, the holding of title to
property by one spouse individually or by both spouses in a form of co-ownership
does not determine whether the property is marital property or separate property.”
Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the deed itself is not wholly
determinative of whether the down payment remains separate property.
{¶25} Separate property may be converted to marital property by inter
vivos gift. Helton v. Helton (1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 683, 685, 683 N.E.2d 1157.
The elements of an inter vivos gift are “‘(1) an intention on the part of the donor to
transfer the title and right of possession of the particular property to the donee then
and there and (2), in pursuance of such intention, a delivery by the donor to the
donee of the subject-matter of the gift to the extent practicable or possible,
considering its nature, with relinquishment of ownership, dominion and control
over it.’” Helton, 114 Ohio App.3d at 685-686, quoting Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co.
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(1936), 132 Ohio St. 21, 4 N.E.2d 917 at syllabus. Additionally, “‘[a]n inter vivos
gift is an immediate, voluntary, gratuitous and irrevocable transfer of property by a
competent donor to another.’” Helton, 114 Ohio App.3d at 685-686, quoting Smith
v. Shafer (1993), 89 Ohio App.3d 181, 183, 623 N.E.2d 1261.
{¶26} The party claiming an inter vivos gift bears the burden of showing by
clear and convincing evidence that such a gift was made. Id. Moreover, the
existence of a deed in the names of both parties does not shift the burden away
from the donee spouse to prove that an inter vivos gift occurred. See Jones v.
Jones 4th Dist. No. 07CA25, 2008-Ohio-2476; Brady v. Brady, 11th Dist. No. 2007-
P-0059, 2008-Ohio-1657; Gibson v. Gibson 5th Dist No. 2006 AP 01 0009, 2007-
Ohio-2087; Ardrey v. Ardrey, 3rd Dist. No. 14-03-41, 2004-Ohio-2471.
{¶27} In the present case, although Jodi’s name was on the deed, no
evidence was adduced at trial that would indicate that Steven intended the down
payment to be a gift. Steven did not testify that he intended the down payment to
be a gift. Moreover, Jodi was unable to point to any evidence that the down
payment was a gift. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court finding
of no donative intent was against the weight of the evidence.
{¶28} Finally, Jodi argues that a grain drill and grain bin purchased during
the course of the marriage were marital property. The trial court found that
[w]ith regards to farm equipment, there are two items that were
purchased during the marriage. However, the same shall be
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considered separate property of the Defendant since the
equipment purchases were from the farm account which is
separate property belonging to the Defendant. Further, they
were purchased for the farm. This is clearly traceable. There
are mortgage balances on each of them and Defendant will also
be responsible for any monies due and owing. This is a separate
obligation of the Defendant for which Plaintiff has no
responsibility.
{¶29} The grain bin and drill were purchased with farm funds. As the trial
court determined, the farm funds were not marital property as the farm funds were
kept in a separate checking account, which had been established prior to the
marriage and were used to fund the farm business. Moreover, Jodi did not
contribute to the farming business, through labor or monetary contributions,
during the course of the marriage. Farm funds were not converted to marital
property until transferred to the family checking account. Therefore, although
some farm income was converted to marital property when Steven treated it as
income from the farm and transferred it to the family checking account, all farm
income was not automatically marital property and the grain drill and grain bin
were purchased with separate property and remain separate property.
Accordingly, Jodi’s first assignment of error is overruled.
Second Assignment of Error
{¶30} In her second assignment of error, Jodi argues that the trial court
erred by not thoroughly reviewing the magistrate’s decision. Specifically, Jodi
argues that the trial court erred by not specifically addressing each one of her
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objections to the magistrate’s decision. Civil R. 53(4)(d) provides the procedure
for the trial court when ruling on objections to a magistrate’s decision as follows:
(d) Action on objections. If one or more objections to a
magistrate's decision are timely filed, the court shall rule on
those objections. In ruling on objections, the court shall
undertake an independent review as to the objected matters to
ascertain that the magistrate has properly determined the
factual issues and appropriately applied the law. Before so
ruling, the court may hear additional evidence but may refuse to
do so unless the objecting party demonstrates that the party
could not, with reasonable diligence, have produced that
evidence for consideration by the magistrate.
{¶31} In ruling on a magistrate’s decision, a trial court is free to adopt or
reject a magistrate's decision in whole or in part, with or without modification.
Civ. R. 53(4)(b). However, this Court has previously held that “Civ.R.53 still
requires a trial court to conduct an independent review when a party files
objections to the decision of the magistrate.” Reese v. Reese, 3rd Dist. No. 14-03-
42, 2004-Ohio-1395. On appellate review, an appellate court will not reverse the
trial court's decision if it is supported by some competent, credible evidence.
Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 461 N.E.2d 1273.
We recognize, moreover, that a trial court has broad discretion in determining an
equitable distribution of property in divorce cases. Lust v. Lust, Wyandot App. No.
16-02-04, 2002-Ohio-3629, at ¶ 25, quoting Bisker v. Bisker (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d
608, 609, 635 N.E.2d 308, 1994-Ohio-307.
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{¶32} In the present case, Jodi filed a lengthy objection to the magistrate’s
decision, as well as a set of supplemental objections to the magistrate’s decision.
However, we recognize that many of those objections did not concern the
magistrate’s recommended orders, but instead concerned Jodi’s objections to
“characterizations” made by the magistrate. The trial court made a similar
observation when it reviewed the magistrate’s decision as follows:
The court does not deem it appropriate or necessary to address
each of the objections of the plaintiff contained in her Objection
to the Magistrate’s Decision or her supplement thereto. Rather,
the court concludes that plaintiff’s objections state her
disagreement with the Magistrate’s interpretation of the
evidence.
As the finder of fact, it is the Magistrate’s responsibility to
weigh the evidence which requires the Magistrate to determine
the credibility of the witnesses. The court finds and concludes
that the Magistrate has done so and that the transcript of the
evidence supports the findings of fact made by the Magistrate in
her decision filed June 6, 2008, as amended June 24, 2008.
Further, the court finds and concludes that the Magistrate has
addressed the specific findings of fact the court must consider
concerning the allocation of parental rights and responsibilities
and parenting time for the care of the children, child support,
income tax exemptions, spousal support and division of property
and debt, both marital and non-marital, and that the Magistrate
properly applied the law.
{¶33} Moreover, although Jodi contends that the trial court has not
conducted an independent review of the record, she is unable to point to any
evidence contradicting the trial court’s assertion that it did undertake an
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independent review of the evidence, other than her dissatisfaction with both the
magistrate’s and trial court’s conclusions.
{¶34} As this Court found in the first assignment of error, many of Jodi’s
objections that she argues were not properly reviewed were based on incorrect
assertions of law or were merely disagreements with the magistrate’s
characterizations of the evidence. For example, Jodi made the following
objections:
In the Magistrate’s Findings of Fact Two and Three, the
inference of the Magistrate is that the Plaintiff has somehow or
another been negligent in her earning when the testimony
indicated that she had been totally involved in raising the
children and maintaining the household. The testimony
indicated that Plaintiff’s limited employment was not due to
lack of interest, but rather recognizing priorities which were
important to the Father and Mother of these two children.
***
The Magistrate in paragraph Five of her Findings of Fact
inserts part of the blame on the Plaintiff because at the time that
the Defendant was acting very strangely and totally irrationally
as previously indicated, Taylor was needing to be away from
him as most teenage girls would be afraid of a Father who is
acting irrational and abnormal.
{¶35} Although this Court might have preferred to see the trial court
undertake a more itemized review of Jodi’s objections, objections based on
characterizations of evidence, such as those set forth above, do not require more
analysis by the trial court. Accordingly, we cannot find that the trial court did not
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conduct an independent review simply because it failed to analyze each meritless
objection in detail or discuss every conceivable characterization of the evidence.
Therefore, Jodi’s second assignment of error is overruled.
Third Assignment of Error
{¶36} In her third assignment of error, Jodi argues that the trial court erred
by not allocating, to her, a portion of Steven’s “defined benefit pension.” As an
initial matter, we note that the division of the defined benefit pension was not
raised in Jodi’s objections to the magistrate’s decision. Civil Rule 53(D)(3)(b)(iv)
provides that if a party fails to file a timely objection to the magistrate’s decision,
“[e]xcept for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the
court’s adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not
specifically designated as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R.
53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has objected to that finding or conclusion as
required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).”
{¶37} The Ohio Supreme Court has discussed the application of the plain
error doctrine in civil cases, finding that, “[i]n appeals of civil cases, the plain
error doctrine is not favored and may be applied only in the extremely rare case
involving exceptional circumstances where error, to which no objection was made
at the trial court, seriously affects the basic fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of the judicial process, thereby challenging the legitimacy of the underlying
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judicial process itself.” Goldfuss v. Davidson (1997), 79 Ohio St.3d 116, 679
N.E.2d 1099, 1997-Ohio-401, at syllabus.
{¶38} “A ‘plain error’ is obvious and prejudicial although neither objected
to nor affirmatively waived which, if permitted, would have a material adverse
affect on the character and public confidence in judicial proceedings.” Schade v.
Carnegie Body Co. (1982), 70 Ohio St.2d 207, 209, 436 N.E.2d 1001. A trial
court may adopt a magistrate’s decision in the absence of objections, “unless it
determines that there is an error of law or other defect on [its] face.” Civ.R.
53(E)(4)(a). Review under the plain error standard is limited on appeal to review
of “the trial court's adoption for failure to correct an obvious error of law or other
such defect in the decision.” Timbercreek Village Apts. v. Myles (May 28, 1999),
Montgomery App. No. 17422 citing Divens v. Divens (Oct. 2, 1998), Clark App.
No. 97 CA 0112.
{¶39} Although not specifically articulated in Jodi’s brief, it appears that
her argument concerns Steven’s Corporate Retirement Plan from his employment
with Crown Equipment. In an exhibit dated September 21, 2007, the value of this
plan is stated to be $14,700.00. It appears, however, from our review of the
allocation of the assets, that Jodi suffered no prejudice from the trial court’s
allocation of the assets. Even if we were to conclude that the trial court considered
the pension, allocated it to Steven, and simply failed to mention it, it is apparent
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that, when balanced against the marital debts, Jodi still received more than half of
the marital assets. As a result, we cannot find that the trial court’s failure to
specifically mention the pension in its allocation effects the “basic fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial process” as required under a plain
error analysis. Accordingly, Jodi’s third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶40} Based on the foregoing, the October 22, 2008 Judgment Entry of the
Court of Common Pleas, Mercer County, Ohio, Domestic Relations Division is
affirmed.
Judgment Affirmed
PRESTON, P.J., concurs.
/jlr
ROGERS, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.
{¶41} I concur in the majority’s disposition of the second and third
assignments of error; however, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s finding in
the first assignment of error that the home was Steven’s separate property for the
reasons set forth in Neville v. Neville, 3d Dist. No. 9-08-37.
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