State v. Jackson , 2022 Ohio 4316 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Jackson, 2022-Ohio-4316.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Appellee : Appellate Case No. 29452
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2021-CR-03112
:
STEVEN A. JACKSON, II : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 2nd day of December, 2022.
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MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by MICHAEL P. ALLEN, Atty. Reg. No. 0095826, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division,
Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Appellee
KAREN B. GROSETH, Atty. Reg. No. 0090201, 130 West Second Street, Suite 1818,
Dayton, Ohio 45402
Attorney for Appellant
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TUCKER, P.J.
{¶ 1} Steven A. Jackson II appeals from his conviction on one count of child
endangering in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1).
{¶ 2} Jackson contends the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction. He reasons that the juvenile court, rather than the general
division of the common pleas court, had exclusive original jurisdiction over the charge at
issue. He also argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case based on a
statutory speedy-trial violation.
{¶ 3} We conclude that the general division of the common pleas court possessed
subject-matter jurisdiction over the felony child-endangering charge. We also find no
violation of Jackson’s statutory right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, the trial court’s
judgment will be affirmed.
I. Background
{¶ 4} A grand jury indicted Jackson on one count of child endangering, a second-
degree felony violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1). He moved to dismiss the indictment,
arguing that R.C. 2151.23(A)(6) granted the juvenile court exclusive original jurisdiction.
Following a hearing, the trial court overruled Jackson’s motion. It held that R.C.
2151.23(A)(6) explicitly excluded a felony indictment from the juvenile court’s exclusive
jurisdiction.
{¶ 5} Jackson then filed an original action seeking a writ of prohibition and a
peremptory writ in this court. He argued that the trial court patently and unambiguously
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lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed in the criminal case. We declined to issue a
peremptory writ and later dismissed the petition for a writ of prohibition. We reasoned that
multiple plausible interpretations of R.C. 2151.23(A)(6) existed and, therefore, that the
trial court did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction. We noted that the trial
court was free to determine its own jurisdiction and that Jackson had an adequate remedy
by means of an appeal.
{¶ 6} The month after our rejection of his original action, Jackson filed a motion to
dismiss the charge against him on statutory speedy-trial grounds. Resolution of the
motion turned on whether speedy-trial time ran while the original action was pending in
this court. The trial court held that Jackson’s petition for a writ of prohibition was a tolling
event under R.C. 2945.72(E) and that no speedy-trial violation had occurred.
{¶ 7} Following the trial court’s ruling, Jackson pled no contest to the charge
against him. The trial court found him guilty and later imposed a sentence of three to four
and one-half years in prison. This appeal followed.
II. Analysis
{¶ 8} In the first of two assignments of error, Jackson challenges the trial court’s
jurisdictional ruling. He cites R.C. 2151.23(A)(6), which grants the juvenile court exclusive
jurisdiction:
(6) To hear and determine all criminal cases in which an adult is charged
with a violation of division (C) of section 2919.21, division (B)(1) of section
2919.22, section 2919.222, division (B) of section 2919.23, or section
2919.24 of the Revised Code, provided the charge is not included in an
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indictment that also charges the alleged adult offender with the commission
of a felony arising out of the same actions that are the basis of the alleged
violation of division (C) of section 2919.21, division (B)(1) of section
2919.22, section 2919.222, division (B) of section 2919.23, or section
2919.24 of the Revised Code[.]
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 9} The statute first establishes a general rule that a juvenile court has exclusive
jurisdiction over an adult charged with certain enumerated offenses. The second part of
the statute creates an exception. A juvenile court lacks exclusive jurisdiction if the charge
is included in an indictment that also charges the adult with committing a felony arising
out of the same actions that are the basis of the enumerated charge.
{¶ 10} Jackson reads R.C. 2151.23(A)(6) to mean a juvenile court does not lose
exclusive jurisdiction unless an indictment includes one of the enumerated offenses and
also includes a second charge that is a felony arising out of the same incident. The trial
court disagreed. It reasoned:
Here, Defendant was charged in the indictment with a felony of the
second degree as a result of serious physical harm to the child. The court
agrees with the State of Ohio that Defendant was charged in a single count
felony indictment, as Defendant’s charge was included in an indictment that
also charged him with the commission of a felony arising out of the same
actions that are the basis of the violation in division (B)(1) of section
2919.22. The court finds that the plain language of R.C. 2151.23(A)(6)
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exempts Defendant’s felony indictment from the juvenile court’s exclusive
jurisdiction, and, thus, this court has jurisdiction over this matter. Therefore,
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is OVERRULED.
October 27, 2021 Decision and Entry at 3.
{¶ 11} In essence, Jackson reads the statute as requiring at least two charges for
a juvenile court to lose exclusive jurisdiction. As applied to the present case, he contends
the statute requires the presence of at least two felony charges. Because his indictment
contained a single felony charge, he argues that the general division of the Montgomery
County Common Pleas Court lacked jurisdiction. Conversely, the trial court reasoned that
the existence of any felony charge was enough to deprive the juvenile court of exclusive
jurisdiction.
{¶ 12} We begin our analysis by recognizing that “Article IV, Section 4(B) of the
Ohio Constitution grants exclusive authority to the General Assembly to allocate certain
subject matters to the exclusive original jurisdiction of specified divisions of the courts of
common pleas.” State v. Aalim, 150 Ohio St.3d 489, 2017-Ohio-2956, 83 N.E.3d 883, ¶ 2.
We note too that “ ‘[j]urisdiction over all crimes and offenses is vested in the court of
common pleas, general division, unless such jurisdiction specifically and exclusively is
vested in other divisions of the court of common pleas or in the lower courts.’ ” State v.
Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 25, quoting State ex rel.
McMinn v. Whitfield, 27 Ohio St.3d 4, 5, 500 N.E.2d 875 (1986).
{¶ 13} The statute at issue here, R.C. 2151.23(A)(6), grants a juvenile court
exclusive jurisdiction over one of the enumerated charges identified therein provided it is
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not included in an indictment that also charges a felony arising out of the same actions.
For a juvenile court to lose exclusive jurisdiction, this language may be read to require
the existence of one of the enumerated charges and “also” a separate but related felony
charge. On the other hand, the felony child-endangering charge against Jackson
technically satisfied the conditions that deprive a juvenile court of exclusive jurisdiction.
The charge against him was included in an indictment that charged the commission of a
felony arising out of the same actions that were the basis for the charge. This reading of
the statute admittedly is awkward. It is cumbersome to say Jackson’s felony child-
endangering charge arose out of the same actions that were the basis for his felony child-
endangering charge. At first blush, we might be inclined to find Jackson’s reading of the
statute to be appropriate. Upon closer examination, however, we are persuaded that the
trial court read the statute correctly and reached the right result.
{¶ 14} The explanation for the awkward wording is traceable to the nature of the
offenses enumerated in R.C. 2151.23(A)(6). The statute begins by giving a juvenile court
exclusive jurisdiction over adults charged with violating R.C. 2919.21(C), R.C.
2919.22(B)(1), R.C. 2919.222, R.C. 2919.23(B), or R.C. 2919.24. With one exception, the
foregoing crimes exclusively are misdemeanor offenses. The exception involves child
endangering in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), which may be a misdemeanor or a felony
depending on the circumstances. Therefore, in all but one of the scenarios covered by
R.C. 2151.23(A)(6), the enumerated charge over which a juvenile court has exclusive
jurisdiction will be a misdemeanor offense. In the usual case, then, the existence of an
additional related felony charge “also” is necessary for a juvenile court to lose exclusive
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jurisdiction. To that extent, we do not dispute Jackson’s reading of the statute.
{¶ 15} Indeed, if the statue is read as applying to an enumerated offense that is a
misdemeanor, its interpretation involves no difficulty. In such a case, a juvenile court has
exclusive jurisdiction over the misdemeanor charge “provided the charge is not included
in an indictment that also charges the alleged adult offender with the commission of a
felony arising out of the same actions that are the basis of the alleged violation[.]” This
language only becomes awkward in the singular instance where the enumerated charge
is a felony violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1). On its face, the statute applies in such a
situation, but the language of R.C. 2151.23(A)(6) suggests that this scenario was not the
legislature’s primary focus when it enacted the statute. The result is an awkwardly worded
provision when applied to a felony violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1). Nevertheless, as the
trial court recognized, the fact remains that Jackson’s situation technically satisfied the
conditions depriving the juvenile court of exclusive jurisdiction.
{¶ 16} In short, based on our reading of R.C. 2151.23(A)(6), we conclude that an
enumerated misdemeanor charge must be accompanied by a related felony charge for a
juvenile court to lose exclusive jurisdiction. However, the key to a juvenile court losing
exclusive jurisdiction is the existence of an indictment charging a felony, not necessarily
the existence of multiple charges. As explained above, in all but one of the charging
scenarios envisioned by R.C. 2151.23(A)(6), multiple charges in fact will be necessary
because the enumerated charge is a misdemeanor. However, where the enumerated
charge itself is felony child endangering in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), we do not read
R.C. 2151.23(A)(6) as requiring the existence of a second felony charge arising out of the
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same incident.
{¶ 17} In reaching our conclusion, we find Jackson’s reliance on State v. Kohr, 5th
Dist. Licking No. 2008 CA 00147, 2009-Ohio-5297, to be unpersuasive. In Kohr, the
appellant was charged with felony child-endangering violations of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) and
with felony violations of R.C. 2919.22(A), another child-endangering provision. Noting that
the appellant had been charged with these other felonies, which arose out of the same
actions that were the basis of the R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) charges, the Fifth District held that
the juvenile court did not have exclusive jurisdiction.1
{¶ 18} Although we agree with Kohr, it does not address the scenario before us.
The fact that the appellant in Kohr had been charged with felony violations of R.C.
2919.22(B)(1) and with felony violations of R.C. 2919.22(A) perhaps made it easier to
resolve than Jackson’s case. But Kohr does not stand for the proposition that the
existence of felony charges under two different statutes is required where the enumerated
charge is felony child endangering in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1). Kohr cannot stand
1 By the same token, we are equally unpersuaded by the State’s reference to State v.
Middleton, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2019-CA-22, 2020-Ohio-1308. In Middleton, we cited R.C.
2151.23(A)(6) and held that the juvenile court, rather than the municipal court, had
exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction where child endangering in violation of R.C.
2919.22(B)(1) and other charges against the appellant all were misdemeanors. In the
course of our ruling, we characterized R.C. 2151.23(A)(6) as “exempting a felony
indictment from the juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction.” Id. at ¶ 29. Although the State
cites this language, Middleton did not involve a felony indictment and contained no
analysis of that issue. The State also cites language in State v. Hale, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA93-04-065, 1993 WL 471492, *1 (Nov. 15, 1993), recognizing that a “juvenile court
does not have jurisdiction over felony child endangering charges brought under R.C.
2919.22(B)(3).” But R.C. 2919.22(B)(3) is not one of the enumerated offenses identified
in R.C. 2151.23(A)(6) over which a juvenile court ever may have jurisdiction. Therefore,
the Twelfth District’s observation that a juvenile court lacks jurisdiction over a felony
charge alleging a violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(3) is unremarkable and adds nothing to our
analysis.
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for that proposition because the Fifth District was not confronted with a case involving a
single charge of felony child endangering in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1).
{¶ 19} Finally, we do not dispute Jackson’s argument that R.C. 2151.23(A)(6) must
be construed strictly against the State. See R.C. 2151.01(A) (recognizing that sections of
Revised Code Chapter 2151 “providing for the criminal prosecution of adults” are not
subject to liberal interpretation and construction). We also do not dispute his axiomatic
assertion that legislation means what it says and that we cannot alter a statute to reach
what we believe is a more logical result. But our reading of the statute gives meaning to
every word and also gives effect to what we believe is the legislative intent. Accordingly,
we overrule the first assignment of error.
{¶ 20} In his second assignment of error, Jackson contends the trial court erred in
failing to dismiss his case based on a statutory speedy-trial violation.2 The narrow issue
presented is whether his petition for a writ of prohibition in this court tolled speedy-trial
time in his criminal case. If speedy-trial time was tolled while the petition was pending,
then there was no violation. If the pendency of the petition did not toll speedy-trial time,
then a statutory violation occurred.
{¶ 21} The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 10, Article I of the Ohio
2 In his appellate brief, Jackson argues a violation of his statutory speedy-trial right and
his constitutional right to a speedy trial. We note, however, that his March 21, 2022 motion
to dismiss based on a speedy-trial violation was predicated solely on a statutory speedy-
trial violation. Jackson did not allege a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy-trial
below, and the trial court did not address that issue in its March 25, 2022 ruling.
Accordingly, we will limit our analysis to whether the trial court erred in finding no violation
of Jackson’s statutory right to a speedy trial.
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Constitution. This constitutional mandate has been codified in R.C. 2945.71, which
designates specific time limits for bringing a defendant to trial. As relevant here, a
defendant charged with a felony must be brought to trial within 270 days of arrest. R.C.
2945.71(C)(2). Each day that a defendant is held in jail in lieu of bail counts as three days
when computing this time. R.C. 2945.71(E). This means a defendant held in jail must be
brought to trial within 90 days of arrest. Speedy-trial time may be tolled by certain events
delineated in R.C. 2945.72. Compliance with the speedy-trial statutes is mandatory, and
they “must be strictly construed against the state.” State v. Cox, 12th Dist. Clermont No.
CA2008-03-028, 2009-Ohio-928, ¶ 12. “The rationale supporting speedy-trial legislation
is to prevent inexcusable delays caused by indolence within the judicial system.” State v.
Sanchez, 110 Ohio St.3d 274, 2006-Ohio-4478, 853 N.E.2d 283, ¶ 8. “Review of a
speedy-trial claim involves a mixed question of law and fact. Therefore, we defer to the
trial court's factual findings if they are supported by competent, credible evidence, but we
review the application of the law to those facts de novo.” State v. Long, 163 Ohio St.3d
179, 2020-Ohio-5363, 168 N.E.3d 1163, ¶ 15.
{¶ 22} In the present case, Jackson was held in jail upon his arrest. He did not
waive his right to a speedy trial. Therefore, he was required to be brought to trial within
90 days unless tolling events occurred. Although the 90-day requirement was exceeded,
the trial court found that speedy-trial time was tolled during the pendency of Jackson’s
motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, his petition for a writ of prohibition
in this court, and his motion to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds. Jackson does not dispute
that his two motions to dismiss in the trial court tolled speedy-trial time. The issue on
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appeal is whether his petition in this court tolled speedy-trial time.
{¶ 23} The trial court found speedy-trial time tolled on November 5, 2022, the date
Jackson filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in this court arguing that the trial court
patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed on his criminal indictment. The
trial court held that speedy-trial time resumed running on February 7, 2022, when this
court dismissed the petition.3 Excluding the foregoing time period, the trial court found
that only 72 days of speedy-trial time had elapsed when Jackson filed his motion alleging
a speedy-trial violation.4
{¶ 24} Upon review, we see no error in the trial court’s resolution of the issue. In
finding speedy-trial time tolled by the petition for a writ of prohibition, the trial court cited
R.C. 2945.72(E), which extends the time within which an accused must be brought to trial
by “[a]ny period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or abatement, motion,
proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused.” Jackson’s petition for a writ of
prohibition to compel the trial court not to proceed on his criminal indictment qualified as
a “proceeding” or “action” instituted by the accused. Jackson stresses that the petition
was a separate civil matter and not part of his criminal case. The fact remains, however,
3 We note that the trial court held a scheduled pretrial conference with the parties on
February 2, 2022. During that conference, it orally continued the scheduled trial date on
its own motion due to the pending petition for a writ of prohibition. See February 2, 2022
Transcript at p. 3-4. By that date, however, speedy-trial time already would have expired
if the filing of Jackson’s petition itself did not toll the time.
4 The trial court counted 20 days of speedy-trial time from Jackson’s arrest through the
filing of his motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, nine days from its
ruling on his motion to dismiss through the filing of his petition for a writ of prohibition, and
43 days from our dismissal of his petition through the filing of his motion to dismiss on
speedy-trial grounds, for a total of 72 speedy-trial days elapsed. Jackson then entered
his no-contest plea on March 28, 2022, three days after the trial court overruled his motion
to dismiss on speedy-trial grounds.
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that it was an original “action” he instituted against the trial court. Notably, R.C. 2945.72(E)
does not specify that the motion, proceeding, or action must be filed in an accused’s
criminal case. It simply refers to a motion, proceeding, or action instituted by an accused.
If anything, the unqualified reference to an accused instituting an “action” or “proceeding”
implicitly suggests the existence of something external to the criminal case itself.
{¶ 25} In our view, the only real question is whether there was a period of delay
“necessitated” by Jackson’s petition. Jackson correctly points out that we did not order a
stay of his criminal case pending our disposition of his petition and that, technically
speaking, nothing prohibited the trial court from exercising its jurisdiction while he
simultaneously challenged its existence. Nevertheless, Ohio courts have taken a broad
view of actions by an accused that “necessitate” a delay in criminal proceedings. In
Sanchez, 110 Ohio St.3d 274, 2006-Ohio-4478, 853 N.E.2d 283, for example, the Ohio
Supreme Court held that a defendant’s motion in limine necessitated a delay without
requiring any real showing that the motion “diverted the prosecutor’s attention” or “caused
a delay in the proceedings.” Id. at ¶ 26. In fact, the Ohio Supreme Court opined that R.C.
2945.72(E) “does not require a showing that a motion caused delay before the running of
speedy-trial time may be suspended.” Id. at ¶ 24. Other Ohio appellate districts have
accepted without analysis that a petition for a writ of prohibition tolls speedy-trial time in
a defendant’s criminal case. See State v. Brown, 6th Dist. Erie No. E-88-13, 1989 WL
25542, *7 (Mar. 17, 1989); State v. Murphy, 12th Dist. Clinton No. 2006-02-005, 2007-
Ohio-2068, ¶ 17; see also State v. Williams, 38 Ohio St.3d 346, 355, 528 N.E.2d 910(1988) (holding that a criminal defendant’s successful motion to waive a special venire
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“was the action made by the accused which necessitated the period of delay, during which
the state sought a writ of mandamus reversing the trial court’s decision granting that
motion”).5
{¶ 26} Here we agree with the trial court that Jackson’s original action seeking a
writ of prohibition necessitated a delay in his criminal case within the meaning of R.C.
2945.72(E). After unsuccessfully seeking dismissal of the felony charge against him for
lack of jurisdiction, Jackson haled the trial court judge into this court, insisting that the trial
court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to proceed on the indictment.
Although the Ohio Supreme Court made clear in Sanchez that a motion or action instituted
by an accused need not actually divert a prosecutor’s or a trial court’s attention away from
a criminal case to necessitate a delay, Jackson scarcely could have been surprised that
compelling the trial court to defend its own jurisdiction in this court would divert judicial
attention away from his criminal case.
{¶ 27} Jackson’s petition in this court also made evident that he did not want the
trial court to proceed in the criminal case and, in fact, that he believed the trial court
unambiguously lacked authority to do so. Having adopted that posture in his original
action, it seems disingenuous for him to complain that the trial court did not proceed
expeditiously with his criminal case while he actively opposed its power to do so. As noted
above, the speedy-trial statute’s purpose is “to prevent inexcusable delays caused by
indolence within the judicial system.” Sanchez at ¶ 8. “Indolence” has been defined as an
5 We note that the U.S. Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals later affirmed a grant of habeas
corpus relief on other grounds and vacated the defendant’s death sentence in Williams v.
Anderson, 460 F.3d 789 (2006). The Sixth Circuit’s habeas decision had nothing to do
with the Ohio Supreme Court’s speedy-trial analysis.
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“inclination to laziness” or “sloth.” See Merriam-Webster online dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indolence. We see no basis for attributing
the delay occasioned by Jackson’s unsuccessful petition to laziness or slothfulness by
the trial court. Even stating the proposition demonstrates its absurdity. Accordingly, the
second assignment of error is overruled.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 28} Having overruled Jackson’s two assignments of error, we affirm the
judgment of the Montgomery County Common Pleas Court.
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WELBAUM, J. and LEWIS, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
Michael P. Allen
Karen B. Groseth
Hon. Mary Katherine Huffman