State v. Casshie , 2022 Ohio 4403 ( 2022 )

[Cite as State v. Casshie, 2022-Ohio-4403.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
STATE OF OHIO, :
Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 111270
v. :
ADAM CASSHIE, :
Defendant-Appellant. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: December 8, 2022
Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
Case No. CR-18-633548-A
Appearances:
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Callista Plemel, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for appellee.
Cullen Sweeney, Cuyahoga County Public Defender, and
Francis Cavallo, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J.:
Defendant-appellant Adam Casshie (“Casshie”) appeals his guilty
plea and the trial court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. He also
appeals the trial court’s failure to grant him jail-time credit. We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Casshie was indicted on eight counts, including charges for rape,
gross sexual imposition, and kidnapping against two minors, on November 6, 2018,
from incidences that took place on July 27, 2018. All charges included a sexually
violent predator specification. Casshie moved to California later that year, and a
capias was issued in November. According to the record, Casshie was arrested in
California in December 2018 for a theft that occurred in California in November
2018. He was arrested again in August 2019 in California on another charge. He
was given mental health evaluations and pleaded guilty to the charges in California.
He was given jail-time credit for his time served in California for the California
charges. Casshie was then extradited from California to Ohio on February 23, 2020.
Casshie was declared competent to stand trial and moved the trial court to allow him
to represent himself at trial. On July 22, 2021, Casshie signed a written waiver of
counsel where he stipulated to the court that his waiver was signed knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily. The trial court warned Casshie about the pitfalls and
shortcomings of representing himself. However, the trial court granted Casshie’s
motion to proceed pro se, but also assigned a stand-by attorney to assist him if
needed. Casshie participated in multiple pretrial hearings that were set to ensure
that Casshie received all discovery materials with ample time to review.
On September 1, 2021, the trial court set Casshie’s trial for
December 13, 2021. On October 25, 2021, Casshie requested a continuance of his
trial date so that he could hire a private investigator. The trial court denied his
request, reminding him that he had several weeks to prepare for his trial. On
November 16, 2021, Casshie again requested a continuance to allow his private
investigator to investigate his case. Casshie informed the court that his private
investigator had only began working for him the previous day. The trial court, again,
denied Casshie’s motion reminding him that he had been warned about the issues
with representing himself.
On December 9, 2021, four days before trial, Casshie pleaded guilty
to two counts of rape, first-degree felonies, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2). In
exchange for Casshie’s guilty plea, the state nolled the associated sexually violent
predator specifications and the remaining charges and specifications. At the plea
hearing, Casshie indicated to the court that he did not want to go to trial and instead
plead guilty. (Tr. 195.) After amending the charges, the trial court informed Casshie
that he had 655 days of jail-time credit.
During the plea hearing, the trial court asked Casshie if anyone
threatened or forced him to enter his plea of guilty. (Tr. 205.) Casshie replied “no,
your honor.” (Tr. 206.) The trial court asked Casshie if anyone had made promises
to him if he entered the plea of guilty or promised him a specific sentence. Casshie
replied, “no.” (Tr. 206.) The trial court then asked Casshie if he was satisfied with
his standby counsel, and Casshie replied, “yes.” Id. The trial court inquired as to
whether Casshie understood his constitutional right that he was presumed innocent
and that by entering a plea of guilty, was admitting the truth of the facts and his full
guilt. (Tr. 207.) Casshie replied, “no.” (Tr. 208.) The trial court then stated that
the case would go to trial. Casshie stated, “I’m willing to take a confession for my
own benefit.” (Tr. 208-209.) The trial court again asked Casshie if he understood
that by pleading guilty, he was admitting to the truth of the facts and his full guilt.
Casshie stated, “yes, your honor.” Id.The trial court repeated the same question again to ensure that
Casshie understood, and Casshie again replied in the affirmative. The trial court
asked Casshie if he understood his right to a jury trial or a bench trial and that by
entering a guilty plea, he was waiving that right. Casshie stated that he understood.
(Tr. 210.) The trial court continued to fully comply with Crim.R. 11, (Tr. 210-212.)
Casshie responded to each question that he understood and told the court that he
was satisfied that the trial court complied with the requirements of Crim.R. 11. The
trial court scheduled the sentencing hearing for January 24, 2022.
On December 15, 2021, Casshie filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. In Casshie’s motion, he argued that he felt that his plea was the result of
improper inducement by his original counsel, who was also his standby counsel.
Casshie did not state that counsel convinced him to enter the plea nor did he state
that counsel made any promises to him. However, he stated that counsel made
certain suggestions that persuaded Casshie to plead guilty.
The trial court conducted a hearing on Casshie’s motion. The trial
court asked Casshie to state clearly why he wanted to withdraw his guilty plea.
Casshie stated:
Okay. I felt that I should take a plea because I was led to believe —
wasn’t promised, you already asked me so I didn’t lie — I was never
promised, but I was led to believe something would happen. And
when I was led to believe this would happen, it came from a source
that also was against me like I said through e-mails.
I never — As representation I never gave permission to counteract a
counterplea. This was done without my authority. I never said I
wanted that plea given. And it was also said that I’m afraid this guy is
going to get an appeal — which I can’t — out of ineffective assistance
because I represented myself anyway. It seemed like it was just get
this guy to plea because I’m afraid of this. So it seemed like they were
working together so I felt like I was being worked together on every
angle.
And concerning the one — It has to do with the withdraw plea but it
has to be understood the State filed a motion to like for me to exclude
to mention prostitution. The angle only came from me and I only
spoke to one certain person. So this information was divulged.
(Tr. 225-226.)
Casshie also told the court that he believed he had 1,125 days in jail-
time credit and that, if he pleaded guilty, he would get the minimum sentence and
be able to go home with no jail time. The trial court asked Casshie if the trial court
stated any of those conditions to him. He replied, “no.” After asking the state for a
reply to his allegations, the trial court stated the standard for which Casshie would
be allowed to withdraw his plea. The trial court denied Casshie’s motion.
On January 24, 2021, the trial court sentenced Casshie to seven years
in prison, and he filed this appeal assigning four errors for our review:
I. The trial court erred in failing to grant appellant a reasonable
continuance to secure a full independent investigation while
acting in a pro se capacity, denying him fundamental due
process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as
the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 1,
Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution;
II. The trial court erred in accepting appellant’s plea as knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent when his plea was the result of a
denial of his rights combined with improper inducement;
III. The trial court abused its discretion and erred in denying
appellant’s timely motion to withdraw his plea; and
IV. The trial court erred in not granting appellant’s full jail-time
credit under R.C. 2967.191 from the date he was taken into
custody in California on an Ohio Warrant.
II. Granting of Continuances
A. Standard of Review
“The decision to grant or deny a continuance is a matter entrusted to
the broad discretion of the trial court.” R.J.L. v. K.R., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 108228, 2019-Ohio-3667, ¶ 19, citing State v. Unger, 67 Ohio St.2d 65, 67, 423
N.E.2d 1078 (1981).
“Thus, the decision to grant or deny a motion to continue a trial will
not be reversed on appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion.” Teffer v.
Hornbeck, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80477, 2002-Ohio-3788, ¶ 11.
An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in
an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has
discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427,
2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. Such an abuse “‘“implies that
the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”’”
State v. Montgomery, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2211, ¶ 135,
quoting Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d
1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 152, 157, 404
N.E.2d 144 (1980).
State v. Acosta, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111110, 2022-Ohio-3327, ¶ 43.
B. Law and Analysis
In Casshie’s first assignment of error, he argues that the trial court
erred by denying his motion for a continuance to hire a private investigator in
violation of his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and
his right to effective assistance of counsel under the United States and Ohio
Constitutions. The court considers the following objective factors when ruling on a
motion for a continuance:
“[T]he length of the delay requested; whether other continuances have
been requested and received; the inconvenience to litigants,
witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; whether the requested
delay is for legitimate reasons or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or
contrived; whether the [requesting party] contributed to the
circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; and
other relevant factors, depending on the unique facts of each case.”
State v. Hyche, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110709, 2022-Ohio-1587, ¶ 33, quoting
Unger at 67-68.
The trial court granted Casshie’s motion to represent himself on
July 22, 2021. This was more than four months prior to the trial date of
December 13, 2021. On October 25, 2021, three months after Casshie’s motion to
represent himself, Casshie requested a continuance of his trial date so that he could
hire a private investigator. The trial court denied his request, reminding him that
he had several weeks to prepare for his trial. Casshie argues that this denial is akin
to ineffective assistance of counsel. However, “[w]hen a defendant elects to
represent himself, he is forgoing any Sixth Amendment argument based on the idea
that counsel — standby or otherwise — provided insufficient aid.” State v. Hackett,
164 Ohio St.3d 74, 2020-Ohio-6699, 172 N.E.3d 75, ¶ 16. Thus, Casshie’s Sixth
Amendment argument is misplaced.
Additionally, we find that Casshie has not demonstrated how the trial
court abused its discretion by denying his motion in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court warned Casshie many times that
representing himself could have disastrous results. Casshie was also given ample
time to prepare for his case, having almost five months to prepare before trial.
Casshie elected to forgo his right to trial and entered a plea of guilty.
Therefore, Casshie’s first assignment is overruled.
III. Guilty Plea
A. Standard of Review
“‘An appellate court reviews de novo whether the trial court accepted
a plea in compliance with Crim.R. 11(C).’” State v. Jackson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 104108, 2016-Ohio-7891, ¶ 4, quoting State v. Hinton, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 102710, 2015-Ohio-4907, ¶ 20, citing State v. Schmick, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.
95210, 2011-Ohio-2263, ¶ 6. “‘“We are required to review the totality of the
circumstances and determine whether the plea hearing was in compliance with
Crim.R. 11(C).”’” Id. at ¶ 4, quoting Hinton at ¶ 20, quoting Schmick at ¶ 6.
‘“Crim.R. 11(C) governs the process by which a trial court must inform
a defendant of certain constitutional and nonconstitutional rights
before accepting a felony plea of guilty or no contest. The underlying
purpose of Crim.R. 11(C) is to convey certain information to a
defendant so that he can make a voluntary and intelligent decision
regarding whether to plead guilty.”’
Id. at ¶ 4, quoting Hinton at ¶ 20, quoting Schmick at ¶ 5.
Ohio’s Crim.R. 11 outlines the procedures that trial courts are to follow
when accepting pleas. We have explained that the rule “ensures an
adequate record on review by requiring the trial court to personally
inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of his plea
and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.”
State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168, 331 N.E.2d 411 (1975); see also
State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 107, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990).
State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 11.
B. Law and Analysis
In Casshie’s second assignment of error, he contends that the trial
court erred in accepting his guilty plea as knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently.
[O]ur focus in reviewing pleas has not been on whether the trial judge has
“[incanted] the precise verbiage” of the rule, State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d
86, 92, 364 N.E.2d 1163 (1977), but on whether the dialogue between the court
and the defendant demonstrates that the defendant understood the
consequences of his plea, State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176, 2008-Ohio-
5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, ¶ 15-16; [State v.] Clark [119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-
Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462], ¶ 26; State v. Miller, 159 Ohio St. 3d 447, 2020-
Ohio-1420, 151 N.E.3d 617, ¶ 19.
Id. at ¶ 12.
Crim.R. 11(C) states:
(1) Where in a felony case the defendant is unrepresented by counsel
the court shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest unless the
defendant, after being readvised that he or she has the right to be
represented by retained counsel, or pursuant to Crim.R. 44 by
appointed counsel, waives this right.
(2) In felony cases the court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or a
plea of no contest, and shall not accept a plea of guilty or no contest
without first addressing the defendant personally either in-person or
by remote contemporaneous video in conformity with Crim.R. 43(A)
and doing all of the following:
(a) Determining that the defendant is making the plea
voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and
of the maximum penalty involved, and, if applicable, that the
defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition of
community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.
(b) Informing the defendant of and determining that the
defendant understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no
contest, and that the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may
proceed with judgment and sentence.
(c) Informing the defendant and determining that the
defendant understands that by the plea the defendant is
waiving the rights to jury trial, to confront witnesses against
him or her, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in the defendant’s favor, and to require the state to prove the
defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a trial at which
the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself or
herself.
Id.
“When a criminal defendant seeks to have his conviction reversed on
appeal, the traditional rule is that he must establish that an error occurred in the
trial-court proceedings and that he was prejudiced by that error.” Dangler at ¶ 13.
However,
[w]hen a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights that a
defendant waives by pleading guilty or no contest, we presume that the
plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, and no showing of
prejudice is required. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-
3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, at ¶ 31; State v. Veney, 120 Ohio St.3d 176,
2008-Ohio-5200, 897 N.E.2d 621, at syllabus. We have identified these
constitutional rights as those set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c): the right
to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, the privilege against
self-incrimination, the right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses,
and the right to require the state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Veney at ¶ 19. But when a trial court fails to fully cover other
“nonconstitutional” aspects of the plea colloquy, a defendant must
affirmatively show prejudice to invalidate a plea. Id. at ¶ 17.
Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, at ¶ 14.
After review of the record, we determine that the trial court fully
complied with Crim.R. 11.
COURT: Do you understand that you are presumed innocent, and
that by entering a plea of guilty you admit to the truth of the
facts and your full guilt? That’s a yes or no. If it’s a no, we’re
going to trial.
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: I’ll ask the question again. Do you understand that you’re
presumed innocent, and that by entering a plea of guilty you
admit to the truth of the facts and your full guilt?
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Do you understand that you have the right to a trial by a jury,
but you can waive that right and have your case tried by a
Judge, without a jury?
DEFENDANT: I do understand that. And how would that go, the
process of serving?
COURT: You try it to the Court versus 12 people over here. Do you
understand that? That’s a choice that you had, and that
you’re waiving that? Do you understand that you have the
right to a trial by a jury, or you can waive that right and have
your case tried by a judge, without a jury? That’s a
constitutional right that you’re waiving by entering this plea?
Do you understand that?
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Do you understand that the State of Ohio, through the
Prosecutor, must prove your guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt as to each element, of each crime of which you were
charged? That’s their burden. Do you understand that? Do
you understand?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: The State of Ohio, through the Prosecutor, must prove your
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element, of each
crime of which you are charged.
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Do you understand that you have the right to compulsory
process, which means that you may compel, require,
demand the appearance of witnesses at trial by the issuance
of subpoenas to make sure they show up?
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Do you understand that you have the right to cross-examine
witnesses, as it relates to the matter that will be before the
Court?
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Do you understand that you have the right not to testify at
the time of trial, which means you cannot be forced to testify
against yourself?
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Do you understand that if you elect not to testify at trial, that
your silence could not be used against you in an attempt to
prove your guilt?
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Do you understand that this Court can proceed with
judgment and sentence you immediately after your plea?
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Do you understand? And, finally, do you understand that
you’re waiving all of these rights by entering a plea of guilty
today?
DEFENDANT: I understand, your Honor, yes.
COURT: I need one other thing. With regards to two counts, Count 2
and Count 5, the State nolled or dismissed the sexual violent
predator specification as relates to those. Do you waive any
defects with regards to those amendments?
DEFENDANT: Yes, I understand.
COURT: Do you understand? Okay. Thank you so much.
DEFENDANT: You’re welcome.
COURT: And you do so waive?
DEFENDANT: You’re welcome, I’m sorry.
COURT: Based upon the statements of the prosecuting attorney, and
what you’ve presented to this Court, I believe it is your
intention to plead guilty to Count 2, as amended. That is
rape, a felony of the first degree. Maximum penalty could be
11 years of incarceration, as well as up to a $20,000 fine. It
is further the Court’s understanding that it is your intention
to plead guilty to Count 5 as amended. That’s rape, a felony
of the first degree, punishable by a maximum of 11 years’
incarceration, and, again, up to a $20,000 fine. You would
be required to register as a Tier III registrant sex offender,
and as it relates to that, that would require you to register
every 90 days for the rest of your life. And you would later
execute a document with regard to that in this court that
would then be filed with the Sheriff’s Department. Do you
understand that, sir?
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Thank you. Also, as relates to this, this is mandatory time as
it relates to that. The minimum time has been — the Court
is going to indicate to you will be three years, and the Court
has already indicated the maximum time. Do you
understand the offense to which you are pleading guilty, sir?
DEFENDANT: Yes.
COURT: Do you understand the offenses to which you are pleading
guilty?
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Do you understand the possible penalties?
DEFENDANT: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: As it relates to these particular matters, and that it is
mandatory time, upon your release from prison you would
be subject to five years of mandatory PRC. When you’re
placed on Post Release Control and you violate, the Adult
Parole Authority would be authorized to return you to prison
for up to the max of one-half of the original sentence
imposed. If you’re convicted of a new felony while on Post
Release Control, in addition to being punished for the new
offense, the Judge could add an additional consecutive
prison term of one year, of what time remains on your Post
Release Control term, whichever is greater as a maximum.
And while you’re on Post Release Control, if you fail to report
to your parole officer, you could be charged with escape,
which is a felony. Mr. Casshie, do you have any questions
about your rights, the charges, the penalties or anything
that’s being done here today, sir?
DEFENDANT: No, your Honor.
COURT: Thank you. [State], are you satisfied that I’ve complied with
the requirements of Criminal Rule 11?
STATE: The State is, your Honor.
COURT: And, Mr. Casshie, the requirement of criminal Rule 11 is
everything that I’ve just gone over with you. Are you satisfied
that I’ve complied with the requirements of Criminal Rule
11?
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Thank you. Let the record reflect that the Court is satisfied
that Mr. Casshie has been informed of his constitutional
rights, he understands the nature of the charges, the effect of
a plea and the maximum penalties which may be imposed.
(Tr. 209–216.)
Casshie indicated to the trial court that he understood his
constitutional rights and the effect of his guilty plea. However, Casshie does not
argue that the trial court did not comply with Crim.R. 11, but rather, his plea was not
knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently made because he was led to believe that
pleading guilty would result in a certain outcome.
However, at the time the plea was taken by the trial court, the trial
court asked Casshie if anyone had made promises to him if he entered the plea of
guilty or promised him a specific sentenced. Casshie replied, “no.” (Tr. 206.) The
trial court also asked Casshie if he was satisfied with his standby counsel, and
Casshie replied, “yes.” Id. Casshie responded to each question that he understood
and told the court that he was satisfied that the trial court complied with the
requirements of Crim.R. 11. We find that Casshie has not demonstrated that the trial
court erred in accepting his guilty plea.
Therefore, Casshie’s second assignment of error is overruled.
IV. Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
A. Standard of Review
“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
for abuse of discretion.” State v. Hines, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108326, 2020-Ohio-
663, ¶ 7, citing State v. Xie, 62 Ohio St.3d 521, 526, 584 N.E.2d 715 (1992).
An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises its judgment in
an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has
discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 166 Ohio St.3d 427,
2021-Ohio-3304, 187 N.E.3d 463, ¶ 35. Such an abuse “‘“implies that
the court’s attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.”’”
State v. Montgomery, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-2211, ¶ 135,
quoting Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d
1140 (1983), quoting State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 152, 157, 404
N.E.2d 144 (1980).
Acosta, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111110, 2022-Ohio-3327, at ¶ 43.
B. Law and Analysis
In Casshie’s third assignment of error, he argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Crim.R. 32.1
states: “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest may be made only before
sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may
set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or
her plea.”
“A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a plea prior
to sentencing, but the ‘trial court must conduct a hearing to determine whether there
is a reasonable legitimate basis for the withdrawal of the plea.’” Hines at ¶ 8, quoting
Xie at 527. “At that hearing, a defendant must receive ‘full and fair consideration’ of
their motion.” Id. at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Peterseim, 68 Ohio App.2d 211, 428 N.E.2d
863 (8th Dist.1980). “Following the hearing, it is within the discretion of the trial
court to deny the motion; however, a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea
should be freely and liberally granted.” Id. at ¶ 8, citing Xie at 527.
This court has held that a trial court’s denial of a presentence motion
to withdraw is not an abuse of discretion when the record reflects (1) the defendant
is represented by highly competent counsel; (2) the accused was afforded a full
hearing, pursuant to Crim.R. 11, before he entered the plea; (3) after the motion to
withdraw is filed, the accused is given a complete and impartial hearing on the
motion; and (4) the court gives full and fair consideration to the plea withdrawal
request. Peterseim at 214.
“In addition to the Peterseim factors, Ohio courts have recognized a
nonexhaustive list of additional factors, which trial courts should also consider when
deciding a presentence motion to withdraw a plea.” Hines, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 108326, 2020-Ohio-663, at ¶ 10.
These factors include: 5) whether the motion was made timely; 6)
whether the motion states specific reasons for withdrawal; 7) whether
the defendant understood the nature of the charges and the possible
penalties; 8) whether the defendant was perhaps not guilty or had a
complete defense; and 9) whether the state would suffer prejudice if
the defendant is allowed to withdraw the plea.
Id., citing State v. Benson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 83718, 2004-Ohio-1677, ¶ 9.
Casshie represented himself, but the trial court provided him with
standby counsel. Casshie was afforded a full hearing pursuant to Crim.R. 11 before
he entered the plea, and he was given a complete and impartial hearing on the
motion. The trial court also gave full and fair consideration to the plea withdrawal
request. At the hearing, the trial court allowed Casshie to explain why he wanted to
withdraw his plea. Casshie explained that he thought he was entitled to more jail-
time credit and that he would receive a minimum sentence.
The trial court asked Casshie if he heard that from the court, and he
said no. At the plea hearing, the trial court explained to Casshie that his jail-time
credit was calculated to be 655 days. The trial court also did not make any promises
to Casshie regarding his sentencing. The trial court asked Casshie if any promises
were made to him about sentencing, to which he replied, “no.” He also stated at the
plea hearing and motion to withdraw hearing that no promises were made to him.
Casshie did not demonstrate that his standby counsel nor the state promised him a
reduced sentence in exchange for his guilty plea. “Nothing in the transcript
demonstrates that [Casshie’s] decision to withdraw his guilty pleas was based on
anything other than a mere change of heart which is not a sufficient basis upon
which a defendant can rely in order to successfully withdraw his guilty pleas.”
State v. Resto, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109109, 2020-Ohio-4299, ¶ 29.
Therefore, Casshie’s third assignment of error is overruled.
V. Jail-Time Credit
A. Standard of Review
“‘[W]e review the trial court’s failure to award jail-time credit for plain
error.’” State v. Lucas, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110421, 2022-Ohio-84, ¶ 10, quoting
Bratenahl v. Eldridge, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109520, 2021-Ohio-1083, ¶ 8.
In order for this court to decide that plain error has occurred, it
“requires a showing that there was ‘an error, that the error was plain
or obvious, that but for the error the outcome of the proceeding would
have been otherwise, and that reversal [is] necessary to correct a
manifest miscarriage of justice.’”
Id. at ¶ 11, quoting State v. Speights, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109733, 2021-Ohio-
1194, ¶ 13, quoting State v. Buttery, 162 Ohio St.3d 10, 2020-Ohio-2998, 164
N.E.3d 294, ¶ 7, citing State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St. 3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034,
19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 2.
“The party asserting plain error bears the burden of proof to
demonstrate plain error on the record.” Speights at ¶ 13, citing State v. Rogers, 143
Ohio St.3d 385, 2015-Ohio-2459, 38 N.E.3d 860, ¶ 22, quoting State v.
Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014-Ohio-4034, 19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 16.
“‘[A]ppellate courts are to notice plain error only in “exceptional circumstances” in
order to prevent “a manifest miscarriage of justice.”’” State v. Keslar, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 107088, 2019-Ohio-540, ¶ 21, quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d
91, 95, 372 N.E.2d 804 (1978).
B. Law and Analysis
In Casshie’s fourth assignment of error, he argues that the trial court
erred in not granting his full jail-time credit under R.C. 2967.191 from the date he
was taken into custody in California on the Ohio warrant. However, Casshie does
not offer what that date is. According to the record, Casshie was arrested in
California in December 2018 for a theft that occurred in California in November
2018. He was arrested again in August 2019 in California on another charge. He
was given mental-health evaluations and pleaded guilty to the charges in California.
He was given jail-time credit for his time served in California for the California
charges. Casshie was then extradited from California to Ohio on February 23, 2020.
Casshie pleaded guilty on December 9, 2021, and the trial court
correctly credited him with 665 days of jail-time credit, February 23, 2020, to
December 9, 2021. Casshie’s sentencing date was then set for January 24, 2022,
which is an additional 46 days. Therefore, Casshie’s total jail-time credit equals 701
days. However, Casshie contends that he should be given credit for the time he spent
incarcerated in California.
“R.C. 2967.191(A), governing jail-time credit, provides, in relevant
part:
The department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the
prison term of a prisoner, as described in division (B) of this section,
by the total number of days that the prisoner was confined for any
reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted
and sentenced, including confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting
trial.”
State v. Curry, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 110886, 2022-Ohio-697, ¶ 19.
Casshie was not confined in California for the offenses for which he
was convicted and sentenced in Ohio. Nothing in the record demonstrated that
Casshie was detained in California for the offenses in this instant case. Thus, Casshie
is not entitled to jail-time credit for the time he was confined in California.
Therefore, Casshie’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to
Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
_________________________________
ANITA LASTER MAYS, PRESIDING JUDGE
LISA B. FORBES, J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR