State v. Holt , 2020 Ohio 6649 ( 2020 )

[Cite as State v. Holt, 2020-Ohio-6649.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LUCAS COUNTY
State of Ohio Court of Appeals No. L-19-1226
Appellee Trial Court No. CR0201901424
v.
Arron D. Holt DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Appellant Decided: December 11, 2020
*****
Julia R. Bates, Lucas County Prosecuting Attorney, and
Padraic A. McClure, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.
Laurel A. Kendall, for appellant.
*****
MAYLE, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Arron D. Holt, appeals the September 26, 2019
judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, convicting him of trafficking in
cocaine and receiving stolen property and sentencing him to prison terms of six years and
17 months, respectively. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court judgment.
I. Background
{¶ 2} Arron Holt was indicted on March 8, 2019 on one count of possession of
cocaine, a violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(4)(e), a first-degree felony (Count 1);
trafficking in cocaine, a violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(4)(f), a first-degree
felony (Count 2); receiving stolen property, a violation of R.C. 2913.51(A) and (C), a
fourth-degree felony, along with a firearm specification under R.C. 2941.141(A), (B),
(C), and (F) (Count 3); and having weapons while under disability, a violation of R.C.
2923.13(A)(3) and (B), a third-degree felony (Count 4).
{¶ 3} After filing unsuccessful motions to suppress evidence and to reveal the
identities of confidential informants, Holt entered a plea of no contest to the lesser-
included offense of Count 2, trafficking in cocaine, a violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and
(C)(4)(e), a second-degree felony, and Count 3. The court found Holt guilty and imposed
a term of six years in prison on Count 2 and 17 months on Count 3, to be served
consecutively. Holt was also sentenced to a mandatory three-year period of postrelease
control on Count 2 and up to three years’ discretionary postrelease control on Count 3,
and the court imposed the costs of supervision, confinement, assigned counsel,
prosecution, and costs assessed under R.C. 9.92(C), 2929.18, and 2951.021. Holt’s
sentence was memorialized in a judgment entry journalized on September 26, 2019.
{¶ 4} Holt appealed. He assigns the following errors for our review:
I. The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant when it denied
his Motion to Suppress without a hearing.
2.
II. The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant when it denied
his Motion to Reveal confidential Informant’s Identity and Disclose
Criminal Records and any Agreement Entered Into With the State without a
hearing.
II. Law and Analysis
{¶ 5} Holt’s assignments of error challenge the trial court’s decisions denying—
without a hearing—his motions to suppress evidence and to reveal confidential
informants’ identities. The evidence Holt sought to suppress was seized pursuant to a
search warrant. Before addressing Holt’s assignments of error, we summarize the
information contained in the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant.
A. The Search Warrant Affidavit
{¶ 6} According to the affidavit for search warrant, Detective Kenneth Heban, of
the Toledo Police Department, began receiving information from a confidential informant
on March 30, 2018, that Holt had been trafficking in cocaine and heroin for over ten
years and had engaged in multiple drug transactions in the informant’s presence
throughout the past six months. The confidential informant, Source One, witnessed drug-
related activity on several occasions:
 April 2, 2018: Source One observed Holt negotiate a drug transaction via
telephone from Holt’s home on Locust Street;
 April 3, 2018: Source One observed Holt with cocaine while driving his
Toyota truck;
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 April 5, 2018: Source One stated that Holt was acquiring large amounts of
black tar heroin from his drug supplier every two weeks, which he then
processed out of his home, using cutting agents;
 April 12, 2018: Source One observed heroin and a pistol inside Holt’s
residence;
 April 17, 2018: Source One observed Holt sell cocaine to an unknown
white male at the Sunoco gas station at Buckeye and Manhattan Streets,
which he had carried to the transaction in a baggie in his mouth. Holt was
driving his Toyota truck.
{¶ 7} Beginning on April 7, 2018, Heban began to receive information from a
second confidential informant, Source Two. Source Two told Heban that he had
observed heroin and cocaine on Holt’s person and in his residence over the past six
months. He warned Heban that Holt had a firearm in his home. Source Two reported
having witnessed the following drug-related activity:
 April 19, 2018: Source Two observed Holt remove cocaine from his
residence, which he then transported to 115th Street, where he sold a
portion of it to an unknown white male on the street. He was driving a
Dodge truck;
 April 28, 2018: Source Two observed heroin and cocaine inside Holt’s
residence and saw Holt leave in his Dodge truck with some of the cocaine;
4.
 May 4, 2018: Source Two observed Holt arrive on 115th Street, where he
sold cocaine to an unknown white male on the street while operating his
Dodge truck.
{¶ 8} As a result of the information that Sources One and Two were providing,
Heban conducted a records check and confirmed that Holt and his wife owned and
resided at the Locust Street address provided to him. He then began conducting
surveillance and observed conduct that was consistent with what Sources One and Two
had reported:
 April 9, 2018: Holt was seen leaving his residence in his Toyota truck,
making a hand-to-hand transaction with an unknown white male at
Manhattan and Hoffman Roads, driving to the Sunoco gas station at
Manhattan and Buckeye Streets, and making a hand-to-hand transaction
with another unknown white male;
 April 18, 2018: The “listed vehicles”1 were parked on the street. Several
individuals arrived at Holt’s home, knocked on the back door, went inside
for a short time, then left—activity that Heban described as consistent with
drug trafficking;
 April 21, 2018: Holt arrived at his Locust Street home in a Dodge truck;
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The search warrant affidavit lists a Toyota truck and a four-door Buick. The search
warrant lists the Toyota truck, Dodge truck, and the four-door Buick.
5.
 April 22, 2018: The “listed vehicles” were parked on the street. Again,
several individuals arrived at Holt’s home, knocked on the back door, went
inside for a short time, then left;
 April 30, 2018: The Toyota and Dodge trucks were parked on the street;
 May 1, 2018: Holt left his home in the Dodge truck. He met with an
unknown white male in a parking lot and conducted a hand-to-hand
transaction;
 May 2, 2018: Holt left his residence in the Dodge truck. He met an
unknown white male at a parking lot located at Bancroft and Franklin
streets. A hand-to-hand transaction took place;
 May 7, 2018: Holt left his house in the Dodge truck. He met with an
unknown white male on 115th Street and conducted a hand-to-hand
transaction.
{¶ 9} Detectives conducted a trash pull on May 8, 2018. They recovered several
torn baggies, one large torn baggie, and a marijuana pipe from the trash. Heban then
applied for a search warrant.
{¶ 10} In addition to describing the information received from Sources One and
Two, the observations made during surveillance of Holt, and the items discovered during
the trash pull, the affidavit for search warrant details Heban’s training and experience and
his relationship with the confidential informants. He averred that both Source One and
Source Two have provided information for over two years, leading to the seizure of
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cocaine, heroin, marijuana, firearms, U.S. currency associated with drug trafficking, and
materials utilized in drug trafficking. He indicated that the informants have “provided
information that has proven to be independently verified as credible and accurate by other
confidential source [sic], other law enforcement officers, and law enforcement and open
source databases,” and have assisted in the arrest and conviction of numerous drug
traffickers.
{¶ 11} The magistrate concluded that probable cause existed to believe that drug
trafficking was occurring on the premises. The search warrant was issued May 8, 2018,
and was executed on May 10, 2018.
B. Denial of Motion to Suppress
{¶ 12} Holt moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant.
He argued in the trial court that the affidavit for search warrant did not provide probable
cause to issue the warrant because (1) there had been no controlled drug buy; (2) the only
basis for the credibility or veracity of the confidential sources was boilerplate language
indicating that the informants had assisted Heban in previous cases for two years; (3) the
affidavit is not specific about how many people were let into Holt’s home and for how
long, and in any event, there are other possible explanations for those visits that do not
include drug trafficking; (4) there was only one trash pull conducted, and the items
recovered during the trash pull were not tested for the presence of drugs or tied to Holt;
and (5) the good faith exception does not preclude exclusion of the evidence seized here.
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{¶ 13} Holt requested a hearing on his motion to suppress. The trial court denied
Holt’s motion without a hearing. In his first assignment of error, Holt claims that this
was error.
{¶ 14} To begin with, Holt argues that he was entitled to a hearing. He argues that
under Crim.R. 47, a court must hold a hearing on a motion to suppress where the motion
states with particularity the legal and factual grounds upon which it is made. He
maintains that his motion stated such grounds, therefore, he should have been afforded a
hearing.
{¶ 15} The state maintains that absent an allegation that the search warrant was
procured by means of a deliberate or reckless falsehood in the search warrant affidavit—
accompanied by an offer of proof of such allegation—the trial court was limited to a
four-corners review of the search warrant affidavit and no hearing was required.
{¶ 16} We begin by acknowledging the well-established principle that affidavits
supporting search warrants carry a presumption of validity that is not easily overcome.
State v. Jordan, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060336, 2007-Ohio-3449, ¶ 9. We recently
recognized in State v. Long, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-19-021, 2020-Ohio-4090, that
where a search warrant is based only on information provided by affidavit, “review of the
issuing judge’s probable cause determination—both at the trial and appellate court
levels—is limited to the information found within the four corners of the affidavit.” Id. at
¶ 22, citing State v. Castagnola, 145 Ohio St. 3d 1, 2015-Ohio-1565, 46 N.E.3d 638, ¶ 39
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(“[T]he reviewing court is concerned exclusively with the statements contained within
the affidavit itself.” (Internal quotations omitted.)).
{¶ 17} A reviewing court may look outside of the four corners of the affidavit and
conduct an evidentiary hearing only if the defendant makes a “substantial preliminary
showing” that (1) the affidavit contains false statements that were necessary to the
finding of probable cause, and (2) the affiant made the statements knowingly and
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at fn. 1, citing Franks v.
Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-156, 98 S. Ct. 2674, 57 L. Ed. 2d 667 (1978). See also
Jordan at ¶ 9 (“A defendant who attempts to challenge the presumptive validity of a
warrant affidavit is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing unless he first makes ‘a
substantial preliminary showing of a knowing, intentional, or reckless falsity.’”); State v.
Rosengarten, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-80-13, 1981 WL 6715, *2 (Nov. 6, 1981) (“To
mandate an evidentiary hearing * * *, [t]here must be allegations of deliberate falsehood
or of reckless disregard for the truth, and those allegations must be accompanied by an
offer of proof.”).
{¶ 18} The standard cited by Holt—that a defendant is entitled to a hearing where
his or her motion states with particularity the legal and factual grounds upon which it is
made—applies where a defendant seeks to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a
warrantless search or seizure. See State v. Shindler, 70 Ohio St. 3d 54, 636 N.E.2d 319
(1994), citing Xenia v. Wallace, 37 Ohio St. 3d 216, 524 N.E.2d 889 (1988) (“To suppress
evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless search or seizure, the defendant must
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(1) demonstrate the lack of a warrant, and (2) raise the grounds upon which the validity
of the search or seizure is challenged in such a manner as to give the prosecutor notice of
the basis for the challenge.” (Emphasis added.)); State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio St. 3d 165,
2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 13 (involving motion to suppress evidence based on
officer’s alleged failure to conduct field sobriety tests in accordance with NHTSA
guidelines). Because the evidence here was seized pursuant to a warrant, this standard is
inapplicable.
{¶ 19} In reviewing defendants’ challenges to a trial court’s decision not to hold
an evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search
warrant, Ohio courts have grappled with whether to apply a clear error standard of review
or to review the challenge de novo. See State v. Corwin, 2d Dist. Montgomery No.
26690, 2016-Ohio-4718, ¶ 24 (observing that standard of review is unsettled, but
concluding that defendant’s challenge failed under either standard); State v. Smith, 4th
Dist. Highland No. 09CA29, 2010-Ohio-4507, ¶ 102 (recognizing the unsettled nature of
the standard of review and applying the standard more favorable to defendant—de novo);
State v. Marcellino, 2019-Ohio-4837, 149 N.E.3d 927, ¶ 9 (11th Dist.), appeal not
allowed, 158 Ohio St. 3d 1450, 2020-Ohio-1090 (acknowledging lack of consistency in
federal appellate circuits). At least two Ohio appellate districts have concluded that a
decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing should be reviewed for clear error. See id. at
¶ 10; State v. A.P., 2018-Ohio-3423, 117 N.E.3d 840, ¶ 60 (12th Dist.).
10.
{¶ 20} We conclude that under either standard, Holt’s claim fails. Holt’s motion
does not suggest that Detective Heban made any false statement in the search warrant
affidavit; he argues merely that the affidavit did not support the issuing judge’s
determination that probable cause existed to issue the warrant. Because he did not allege
that Heban knowingly or recklessly made false statements in the search warrant affidavit,
the trial court was not obligated to hold a hearing. See Jordan, 1st Dist. Hamilton No.
C-060336, 2007-Ohio-3449, at ¶ 13 (concluding that “[w]ithout an allegation of falsity in
the warrant affidavit supported by a proper offer of proof by way of affidavit or
otherwise, [appellant] was not entitled to a hearing on his motion to suppress.”); State v.
Abrams, 12th Dist. Preble No. 315, 1983 WL 4357, *2 (May 4, 1983) (concluding that
even if defendant’s motion met Crim.R. 47’s particularity requirement, hearing should
not have been allowed because motion did not allege a deliberate falsehood or reckless
disregard for the truth). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court properly denied
Holt’s request for an evidentiary hearing.
{¶ 21} Turning to the merits of the trial court judgment denying Holt’s motion to
suppress, the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures and provides that search warrants may be issued only upon
probable cause. State v. Jones, 143 Ohio St. 3d 266, 2015-Ohio-483, 37 N.E.3d 123, ¶ 11.
An affidavit for search warrant “must provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for
determining the existence of probable cause * * *.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239,
103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). Whether probable cause for a warrant
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exists is assessed under a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. Id. at 230. That is, the
magistrate must make a “practical, common-sense decision whether, given all of the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the veracity and basis of
knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” (Internal citations
and quotations omitted.) State v. Myers, 143 Ohio App. 3d 342, 350, 757 N.E.2d 1258
(2d Dist.2001).
{¶ 22} “‘In reviewing the sufficiency of probable cause in an affidavit submitted
in support of a search warrant issued by a magistrate, neither a trial court nor an appellate
court should substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate by conducting a de
novo determination as to whether the affidavit contains sufficient probable cause upon
which that court would issue the search warrant.’” Id., quoting State v. George, 45 Ohio
St.3d 325, 544 N.E.2d 640 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. “‘Rather, the duty of a
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed.’” Id. Great deference must be accorded to the
magistrate’s determination of probable cause, “‘and doubtful or marginal cases in this
area should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.’” Id.
{¶ 23} Here, the trial court found that based upon the information contained in the
search warrant affidavit, “the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed to issue the search warrant,” and it denied Holt’s motion to
suppress. Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and
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fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St. 3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. The
trial court acts as the trier of fact. We must accept any findings of fact that are supported
by competent, credible evidence, however, we conduct a de novo review to determine
whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. State v. Codeluppi, 139 Ohio
St.3d 165, 2014-Ohio-1574, 10 N.E.3d 691, ¶ 7, citing Burnside at ¶ 8; State v.
Jones-Bateman, 6th Dist. Wood Nos. WD-11-074 and WD-11-075, 2013-Ohio-4739, ¶ 9.
{¶ 24} As previously discussed, no evidentiary hearing was conducted here, thus
the trial court made no findings of fact; rather, it concluded as a matter of law that the
search warrant affidavit provided a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed. We must determine, therefore, whether the facts here satisfy the applicable legal
standard.
{¶ 25} Heban’s affidavit outlined information provided by two confidential
informants who claimed to have personally observed Holt engage in drug transactions.
The informants provided specific dates and locations of the activity they witnessed.
Surveillance was conducted based on this information and law enforcement documented
activity consistent with what the informants reported. Items recovered during a trash pull
provided further corroboration. Heban detailed his experience in investigating drug
trafficking operations and described behaviors that he has learned are indicative of
participation in such operations. He also attested to past experiences with Sources One
and Two—who in the past provided accurate information that assisted in the arrest and
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conviction of drug traffickers—providing a basis for his belief that the information they
offered was credible and reliable.
{¶ 26} In State v. Pillar, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 84566, 2005-Ohio-630, ¶ 7-8, the
defendant challenged a search warrant that was issued based on the following information
contained within the detective’s affidavit: (1) detectives conducted surveillance for six
weeks following various citizen complaints that defendant was trafficking drugs out of
his residence; (2) one of the complaints mentioned defendant by name and provided his
cell phone and home phone numbers; (3) during the course of the surveillance, the affiant
noticed moderate vehicle and pedestrian traffic entering the residence and staying for
only short periods of time, which, in his training and experience was indicative of drug
trafficking; (4) the affiant conducted a trash pull of the garbage at the residence and
found miscellaneous plastic bags with suspected cocaine residue, a piece of a cigarette
containing what appeared to be marijuana, and plastic bags with the corners torn out.
The court upheld the search warrant.
{¶ 27} In State v. Wade, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-04-1217, 2006-Ohio-5104, the
search warrant affidavit stated that the confidential source observed on a number of days
that marijuana and powder and crack cocaine were being stored at and sold from the
premises by Wade and others. We upheld the warrant, concluding that “under all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit, the issuing judge had a substantial basis for
concluding that probable cause existed to issue the search warrants.” Id. at ¶ 15. See also
State v. Taylor, 82 Ohio App. 3d 434, 441, 612 N.E.2d 728 (2d Dist.1992) (upholding
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warrant based on information from informant who had personally seen the cocaine in the
house in the preceding 24 hours and who had provided reliable information in the past
that led to felony arrests); State v. Brown, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105202, 2017-Ohio-
8315, ¶ 3 (upholding search warrant that was secured based on information from
“confidential informant with previous record of providing corroborated information” and
two trash pulls in which plastic bag “tear offs” and burnt marijuana cigarettes and
“debris” were found).
{¶ 28} “An affidavit which contains detailed information from informants
(permitting an inference that illegal activity was personally observed by the informants),
police corroboration of an informant’s intelligence through its own independent
investigation, or additional testimony by the affiant helps to bolster and substantiate
the facts contained within the affidavit.” State v. Harry, 12th Dist. Butler No.
CA2008-01-0013, 2008-Ohio-6380, ¶ 20. Here, two confidential informants provided
information detailing their personal observations of drug activity, and the surveillance
and trash pull conducted by Toledo Police corroborated that information. We find that
the search warrant affidavit provided a substantial basis for determining the existence of
probable cause.
{¶ 29} We find Holt’s first assignment of error not well-taken.
C. Denial of Motion to Reveal Identities of Confidential Informants
{¶ 30} Holt filed a motion to reveal confidential informants’ identities and to
disclose their criminal records and any agreements entered into with the state. The court
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denied Holt’s motion without holding a hearing. In his second assignment of error, Holt
argues that this was error.
{¶ 31} The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Williams, 4 Ohio St. 3d 74, 446 N.E.2d
779 (1983), syllabus, established the standard for determining when the identity of a
confidential informant must be revealed to the defense: “The identity of an informant
must be revealed to a criminal defendant when the testimony of the informant is vital to
establishing an element of the crime or would be helpful or beneficial to the accused in
preparing or making a defense to criminal charges.” This standard involves the balancing
of competing interests. Id. at 75. “Generally, when the degree of participation of the
informant is such that the informant virtually becomes a state’s witness, the balance
swings in favor of requiring disclosure of the informant’s identity. Conversely, where
disclosure would not be helpful or beneficial to the accused, the identity of the informant
need not be revealed.” Id. at 76. See also State v. Williams, 73 Ohio St. 3d 153, 172, 652
N.E.2d 721 (1995). We review a trial court’s denial of a motion to reveal the identity of
a confidential informant under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See State v. Burcell, 6th
Dist. Lucas No. L-97-1420, 1999 WL 76060, *3 (Feb. 19, 1999).
{¶ 32} Holt argues that the informants’ identities must be disclosed because “law
enforcement was not present, instead they were merely told by the informants of
particular acts.” The state responds that the detective utilized the information provided
by the informants to conduct his own investigation, the informants’ testimony is not vital
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to establishing an element of the crimes, and the informants were not active participants
in the criminal activity—they acted more like tipsters.
{¶ 33} The trial court explained its rationale for denying Holt’s motion. It relied
heavily on the fact that the detective performed his own surveillance and personally
witnessed two hand-to-hand transactions based on information supplied by the
informants; the informants themselves were not involved in those transactions.
Moreover, Holt failed to specify how the confidential informants would be helpful to his
case and never claimed that the informants were critical to proving his innocence.
{¶ 34} We agree with the trial court’s conclusions. While the information
obtained from Sources One and Two was helpful in establishing probable cause to obtain
the search warrant, it was not necessary to establish the elements of the offenses. See
Jordan, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-060336, 2007-Ohio-3449, at ¶ 21 (“While the
informant’s testimony was helpful in establishing probable cause for the issuance of the
search warrant, the testimony was not necessary to establish any of the elements of [the]
offenses.”). We also agree with the state that where—as here—the confidential
informant’s role is more akin to the role of a mere tipster, disclosure of his or her identity
is generally not required. See State v. Feltner, 87 Ohio App. 3d 279, 282, 622 N.E.2d 15
(12th Dist.1993) (“Generally, disclosure is not required where the informant’s role is that
of a mere tipster.”).
{¶ 35} As for Holt’s argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion
without a hearing, he cites no authority entitling him to a hearing. The standard he cites
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applies to the circumstances under which a hearing should be held on a motion to
suppress evidence seized pursuant to a warrantless search. It is, therefore, inapplicable.
{¶ 36} We find Holt’s second assignment of error not well-taken.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 37} The trial court properly denied Holt’s motion to suppress evidence without
a hearing. Holt was not entitled to a hearing on his motion because he did not allege that
the search warrant affidavit contained false information. The search warrant affidavit
provided a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause where two
confidential informants personally observed Holt engage in drug transactions, they
provided specific dates and locations of the activity they witnessed, police conducted
surveillance based on this information and documented activity consistent with what the
informants reported, items recovered during a trash pull provided further corroboration,
and the detective who completed the search warrant affidavit attested to past experiences
with the informants, providing a basis for his belief that the information they offered was
credible and reliable. We find Holt’s first assignment of error not well-taken.
{¶ 38} The trial court also properly denied Holt’s motion to reveal the identities of
the confidential informants without a hearing. Holt cited no authority requiring a hearing
on his motion and failed to specify how the confidential informants would be helpful to
his case. Furthermore, the confidential informants were not involved in the criminal
activity, their testimony was not necessary to establish the elements of the offenses, they
were not personally involved in the hand-to-hand transactions witnessed during
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surveillance, and they acted more as tipsters. We find Holt’s second assignment of error
not well-taken.
{¶ 39} We affirm the September 26, 2019 judgment of the Lucas County Court of
Common Pleas. Holt is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal under App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Arlene Singer, J. _______________________________
JUDGE
Thomas J. Osowik, J.
_______________________________
Christine E. Mayle, J. JUDGE
CONCUR.
_______________________________
JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
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