State v. Shaw , 2017 Ohio 1259 ( 2017 )

[Cite as State v. Shaw, 2017-Ohio-1259.]
STATE OF OHIO, BELMONT COUNTY
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO ) CASE NO. 15 BE 0065
)
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE )
)
VS. ) OPINION
)
JAMES ROBERT SHAW )
)
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT )
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Criminal Appeal from the Court of
Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio
Case No. 15 CR 174
JUDGMENT: Affirmed.
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee: Atty. Daniel P. Fry
Belmont County Prosecutor
Atty. Kevin Flanagan
Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
147-A West Main Street
St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950
No Brief Filed
For Defendant-Appellant: Atty. John M. Jurco
P.O. Box 783
St. Clairsville, Ohio 43950
JUDGES:
Hon. Cheryl L. Waite
Hon. Mary DeGenaro
Hon. Carol Ann Robb
Dated: March 31, 2017
[Cite as State v. Shaw, 2017-Ohio-1259.]
WAITE, J.
{¶1} Appellant James Robert Shaw appeals the conviction in Belmont
County Common Pleas Court for his third offense of domestic violence, in violation of
R.C. 2919.25(A). Appellant raises five issues on appeal dealing with his conviction
and sentence. Following a review of this record, Appellant’s assignments of error are
without merit and are overruled. The trial court’s decision is affirmed.
Factual and Procedural Background
{¶2} On August 5, 2015, the Belmont County Grand Jury indicted Appellant
on his third offense of domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A), a felony of
the third degree, for events transpiring on July 1, 2015. The indictment stated that
Appellant:
did knowingly cause or attempt to cause physical harm to a family or
household member, to-wit: [victim]. All in violation of Ohio Revised
Code Section 2919.25(A).
[APPELLANT] WAS PREVIOUSLY CONVICTED OF TWO (2) PRIOR
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OFFENSES AS FOLLOWS: 1) ON
SEPTEMBER 30, 2003, IN CASE NO. 03M1439, IN THE OHIO
COUNTY MAGISTRATE COURT – WHEELING, WEST VIRGINIA;
AND 2) ON JULY 29, 2005, IN CASE NO. 05M11, IN THE
MARSHALL COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT – MOUNDSVILLE, WEST
VIRGINIA.
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{¶3} On August 13, 2015, an arraignment was held where Appellant pleaded
not guilty and defense counsel was appointed. Pretrial conference was held on
August 24, 2015 and two days later the trial court issued a judgment entry denying
Appellant’s oral request for a recognizance bond. Appellant’s earlier request for
recognizance bond, sent to the court by letter, was also denied.
{¶4} A hearing was held on September 8, 2015, where the parties informed
the court that no plea agreement had been reached. At this hearing, the state
provided information about newly discovered evidence. Appellant had made
telephone calls to the victim while he was incarcerated, despite the existence of a
restraining order. Defense counsel objected to the use of the evidence. On
September 11, 2015, the state filed supplemental discovery.
{¶5} A jury trial was held on September 15, 2015. Appellant was found
guilty of third offense domestic violence, in violation of R.C. 2919.25(A). On October
5, 2015, Appellant was sentenced to thirty months in prison, with ninety-seven days
credit for time served.
{¶6} Appellant filed this timely appeal.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 1
The trial court erred in not declaring a mistrial.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 2
The trial court erred in introducing other acts evidence of allegedly
broken ribs.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 3
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The trial court erred in introducing the Wheeling, Ohio County, West
Virginia conviction to prove up [sic] third offense domestic violence.
{¶7} Appellant contends in his first three assignments of error that the trial
court erred in permitting the evidence of other bad acts and that a mistrial should
have been declared. Specifically, Appellant urges that the trial court permitted other
acts evidence to be put before the jury when the victim used the phrase “this time”
during her testimony, and when she referred to “broken ribs” during a telephone
conversation with Appellant while he was incarcerated awaiting trial. Appellant also
claims the jury panel was “poisoned” by the statements made to jurors concerning
Appellant’s prior domestic violence convictions. Finally Appellant contends the trial
court erred in permitting his Wheeling, West Virginia domestic violence conviction
into evidence.
{¶8} The admission of evidence is within the broad discretion of the trial
court and a reviewing court will not reverse its decision absent an abuse of discretion.
State v. Mays, 108 Ohio App.3d 598, 617, 671 N.E.2d 553 (8th Dist.1996). “An
abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it requires a finding that the
trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.” State v. Nuby,
7th Dist. No. 16 MA 0036, 2016-Ohio-8157, ¶ 10, citing State v. Adams, 62 Ohio
St.2d 151, 157, 404 N.E.2d 144 (1980).
{¶9} Evid.R. 404(B) reads:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
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may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident. In criminal cases, the proponent of
evidence to be offered under this rule shall provide reasonable notice in
advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on
good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial.
{¶10} During the victim’s direct testimony she recounted the conversation she
had with a local police department sergeant who was in the vicinity shortly after her
altercation with Appellant. The victim testified that she asked the sergeant, “did you
find him this time?” (09/14/15 Tr., p. 166.) Defense counsel objected that her use of
the phrase “this time” implied that Appellant had committed other acts, and that use
of this kind of testimony violated Evid.R. 404(B). On this basis, counsel also made
an oral motion for a mistrial. The trial court overruled the request for mistrial, but
instructed the jury that the phrase “this time” was being stricken from the record and
should not be considered in their deliberations.
{¶11} A mistrial can be declared only where there is a “manifest necessity” for
such an act. On appeal, a reviewing court must evaluate whether the trial court
abused its discretion. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505-506, 98 S.Ct. 824,
54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978). A motion for mistrial should be granted only if a defendant’s
right to a fair trial has been adversely affected by the misconduct or irregularity
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complained of in the motion. State v. Clark, 40 Ohio App.2d 365, 319 N.E.2d 605(8th Dist.1974).
{¶12} In Tingue v. State, 90 Ohio St. 368, 108 N.E. 222 (1914), paragraph
three of the syllabus, the Ohio Supreme Court held:
A mistrial should not be ordered in a cause simply because some error
has intervened. The error must prejudicially affect the merits of the
case and the substantial rights of one or both of the parties, and this is
as true of the temporary absence of the judge as any other departure
from due process of law during the trial of a cause.
{¶13} In reviewing the above testimony, it cannot be said that the state’s
questioning or the victim’s testimony prejudicially affected the merits of the case or
Appellant’s substantial rights, nor did it adversely affect his right to a fair trial. The
state did not ask a question about other incidents of abuse nor did it attempt in any
way to elicit such testimony from the victim. Appellant’s objection to the victim’s
volunteered and very brief comment was sustained and stricken from the record and
the jury was cautioned to disregard the comment. No evidence of “other acts” was
presented by the victim’s testimony beyond the unsolicited comment, and this was
properly addressed by the court following an objection.
{¶14} The trial court’s curative instruction to the jury is recognized as an
effective way to remedy errors which occur during trial. State v. Zuern, 32 Ohio St.3d
56, 61, 572 N.E.2d 585 (1987). Juries are presumed to follow such instructions.
State v. Henderson, 39 Ohio St.3d 24, 33, 528 N.E.2d 1237 (1988) citing Parker v.
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Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979). Here, the curative
instruction conveyed to the jury that it should disregard the victim’s statement.
Likewise, they were instructed to ignore any reference the victim made to broken ribs
in the recorded telephone call. This reference was not clearly linked to wrongdoing
by Appellant. A curative instruction was given. There was no indication that the jury
did not follow the court’s instruction.
{¶15} In his third assignment of error, Appellant contends the trial court erred
in permitting evidence of Appellant’s Wheeling, West Virginia domestic violence
conviction to be admitted in order to prove Appellant’s current offense was his third
offense of domestic violence. Essentially, Appellant claims he was never informed in
West Virginia that his guilty plea could be used to enhance a later domestic violence
charge to a felony level. In support of this contention, Appellant cites State v.
Clevenger, 11th Dist. No. 2001-L-160, 2002-Ohio-5515. Appellant provides no
argument in support of his contention other than this cite.
{¶16} R.C. 2919.25(A), (B), and (C) define the offense of domestic violence.
A first-time offense is either a misdemeanor of the fourth degree or a misdemeanor of
the first degree, depending upon the section of the statute under which the defendant
is charged. R.C. 2919.25(D)(2). A second offense is either a felony of the fourth
degree or a misdemeanor of the second degree. R.C. 2919.25(D)(3). If the offender
has “pleaded guilty to or been convicted of two or more offenses of domestic
violence,” a subsequent domestic violence offense is elevated to either a third degree
felony or a first-degree misdemeanor. R.C. 2919.25(D)(4). Because the state
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contended that Appellant had two prior convictions for domestic violence, he was
charged with a third-degree felony for the offense at issue.
{¶17} Where a prior conviction affects the degree of the offense and not just
the potential penalty upon conviction, it is an essential element of the offense. State
v. Allen, 29 Ohio St.3d 53, 54, 506 N.E.2d 199 (1987). Therefore, in the case sub
judice, the state was required to prove that Appellant had pleaded guilty to or had
been convicted of two or more domestic violence offenses. The statute allows the
state to offer evidence of a defendant’s guilty plea as proof of a prior offense.
Whether it involved a guilty plea or conviction, the state must prove this element
beyond a reasonable doubt before the level of the offense may be increased. State
v. Henderson, 58 Ohio St.2d 171, 173, 389 N.E.2d 494 (1979).
{¶18} In Appellant’s case, the state offered and the trial court admitted state’s
Exhibit 3. The exhibit contained the Wheeling, West Virginia judgment entry of
Appellant’s conviction in Ohio County West Virginia Magistrate’s Court, Case No.
037-M-1439. Although counsel objected to admission of the document for lack of
authentication at trial, which was overruled by the trial court, Appellant takes issue
here not with the exhibit, but instead that he was allegedly not informed at the time of
his guilty plea in West Virginia that it could be utilized later to elevate a future
domestic violence offense.
{¶19} Again, R.C. 2919.25(D)(4) requires the state to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that Appellant had previously pleaded guilty to or been convicted of
two or more offenses of domestic violence. If the state offers such proof by means of
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an earlier judgment entry, that entry must comply with Crim.R. 32(C). It must set
forth (1) the fact of a conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4)
the time-stamp indicating that the clerk entered the judgment on the journal.
{¶20} The state here offered a judgment entry from the Wheeling, West
Virginia court in order to prove one of Appellant’s prior convictions. It reflected the
conviction; sentencing; the signature of the judge; and contained an indication of
journalization by the clerk. At trial, defense counsel never raised any issue regarding
the substance of the West Virginia plea and whether Appellant was made aware of its
potential for use in elevating a future offense. This issue is waived. Moreover, the
issue of whether his West Virginia plea was entered knowingly or voluntarily is not
before us. Thus, Appellant’s assertions in his first three assignments of error that he
was prejudiced by evidence is not supported by the record. Neither the victim’s
statements nor the prior domestic violence conviction are tantamount to prior acts
evidence warranting a mistrial. The trial court properly provided a curative instruction
and did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s counsel’s oral motion for a
mistrial. Additionally, the inclusion of Appellant’s prior domestic violence conviction
was a required element of the offence. Therefore, Appellant’s first three assignments
of error are without merit and are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 4
Defense counsel committed ineffective assistance of counsel by not
having the appellant stipulate to his two (2) prior offenses of domestic
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battery and, as such, prevent the State from proving these facts to the
jury.
{¶21} In his fourth assignment of error, Appellant argues he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to have Appellant stipulate to
his prior domestic violence convictions.
{¶22} To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Appellant must
show not only that counsel’s performance was deficient, but also that he was
prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct.
2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also State v. Williams, 99 Ohio St.3d 493, 2003-
Ohio-4396, 794 N.E.2d 27, ¶ 107. “Deficient performance” is defined as performance
that falls below an objective standard of reasonable representation. Strickland at
687-688.
{¶23} Prejudice is shown when there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694.
Appellant’s burden in an ineffective assistance challenge is to demonstrate some
action or inaction by trial counsel that undermined or called into question the integrity
of the process that resulted in conviction. State v. Calhoun, 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 289,
714 N.E.2d 905 (1999).
{¶24} When evaluating conduct of trial counsel, courts, “must indulge a strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” State v. Wesson, 137 Ohio St.3d 309, 2013-Ohio-4575,
999 N.E.2d 557, ¶ 81.
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{¶25} Appellant cites State v. Gwen, 134 Ohio St.3d 284, 2012-Ohio-5046,
982 N.E.2d 626 for the contention that, when dealing with domestic violence
offenses, a defendant “may, and often does, stipulate to a prior conviction to avoid
the evidence being presented before a jury.” Id. at ¶ 14. While that certainly is a true
statement, there is no requirement that a defendant stipulate to prior offenses. In
fact, as the state is charged with proving those prior convictions beyond a reasonable
doubt, counsel may have legitimate reasons for advising a defendant not to stipulate.
Appellant admits as much in his appellate brief, when he contends that there was an
error with a prior conviction and, had Appellant stipulated to that conviction, he would
have been precluded from raising that argument. A decision not to stipulate to a prior
conviction utilized to elevate a domestic violence offense can be part of trial strategy,
and the record before us provides no indication that trial counsel undermined or
called into question his effectiveness or the fairness of the process in general. This
record, then, reveals no deficient performance nor prejudice to Appellant.
{¶26} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit and is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NO. 5
The trial court erred in sentencing the appellant, James Robert Shaw to
thirty (30) months in prison less credit for time served for a smack.
{¶27} In Appellant’s fifth assignment of error he contends his felony sentence
is contrary to law since he is guilty of inflicting merely “a smack” to the victim.
{¶28} In reviewing a felony sentence, “an appellate court may vacate or
modify a felony sentence on appeal only if it determines by clear and convincing
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evidence that the record does not support the trial court’s findings under relevant
statutes or that the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” State v. Marcum, 146
Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶ 1.
{¶29} Appellant asserts various reasons why his sentence is contrary to law,
including that no children, sex, weapons or gang-member activity were involved; the
offense was a “single strike or smack for which the alleged victim did not receive any
medical treatment” and the victim did not suffer serious harm because she did not
“have to put anything on the location where she was allegedly struck” (Appellant’s
Brf., p. 19). Appellant also states that he apologized and that the only aggravating
factor pursuant to R.C. 2929.12(B) was that he knew his victim. Finally, Appellant
argues that the victim touched Appellant first.
{¶30} After reciting this litany, Appellant goes no further in providing argument
in support of this assignment of error. Whether Appellant feels this list stands on its
own requiring no further explanation, or Appellant himself could find no supporting
authority in support of his contention is unclear.
{¶31} R.C. 2929.12 sets forth the discretion of the sentencing court to
determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of
sentencing. R.C. 2929.12(A). In exercising such discretion, the court must consider
the statutory seriousness and recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12(B), (C), (D), and (E)
and may consider any other relevant factors. Id.{¶32} The factors that indicate the offender's conduct is more serious than
conduct normally constituting the offense include: (1) a physical or mental injury was
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exacerbated due to the victim's physical or mental condition or age; (2) the victim
suffered serious physical, psychological, or economic harm; (3) the offender held a
public office or position of trust in the community; (4) the offender’s occupation, office,
or profession obliged the offender to prevent the offense or bring others committing it
to justice; (5) the offender’s professional reputation, occupation, office, or profession
was used to facilitate the offense or is likely to influence the conduct of others; (6) the
offender's relationship with the victim facilitated the offense; (7) the offense was
committed for hire or as part of organized criminal activity; (8) the offense was
motivated by prejudice; or (9) the offense is domestic violence (or assault involving a
family or household member), the offense was committed in the vicinity of a child
(who is not the victim), and the offender or victim is a parent or person in loco
parentis to the child. R.C. 2929.12(B)(1)-(9).
{¶33} The factors that indicate the offender's conduct is less serious than
conduct normally constituting the offense include: (1) the victim induced or facilitated
the offense; (2) the offender acted under strong provocation; (3) the offender did not
cause or expect to cause physical harm to any person or property; and (4) there are
substantial grounds to mitigate the offender's conduct, although the grounds are not
enough to constitute a defense. R.C. 2929.12(C)(1)-(4).
{¶34} The factors that indicate the offender is likely to commit future crimes
include: (1) at the time of the offense, the offender was under pretrial release,
community control, postrelease control or other sanctions for an earlier offense or
was unfavorably terminated from postrelease control or transitional control; (2) the
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offender has a history of criminal convictions or was previously adjudicated a
delinquent child; (3) the offender has not responded favorably to sanctions previously
imposed for criminal convictions or has not been rehabilitated to a satisfactory degree
after previously being adjudicated a delinquent child; (4) the offender has a pattern of
drug or alcohol abuse related to the offense and refuses to acknowledge that pattern
or refuses treatment; or (5) the offender shows no genuine remorse for the offense.
R.C. 2929.12(D)(1)-(5).
{¶35} The factors that indicate the offender is not likely to commit future
crimes include: (1) the offender was not previously adjudicated a delinquent child; (2)
the offender was not previously convicted of a criminal offense; (3) the offender
previously led a law-abiding life for a significant number of years; (4) the offense was
committed under circumstances not likely to recur; and (5) the offender shows
genuine remorse for the offense. R.C. 2929.12(E)(1)-(5).
{¶36} R.C. 2929.11 does not require the trial court to make any specific
findings as to the purposes and principles of sentencing. State v. Wilson, 129 Ohio
St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, ¶ 31. Similarly, R.C. 2929.12 does not
require the trial court to “use specific language or make specific findings on the
record in order to evince the requisite consideration of the applicable seriousness
and recidivism factors.” State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793(2000).
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{¶37} A silent record raises the rebuttable presumption that the sentencing
court considered the proper statutory items within R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.
State v. Grillon, 7th Dist. No. 10 CO 30, 2012-Ohio-893, ¶ 131.
{¶38} In the instant case, the trial court expressly stated at the sentencing
hearing that the court reviewed R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12 at length.
(Sentencing Hrg. Tr., pp. 6-9.) The court also stated it reviewed the file and PSI at
length. Id. at 6. The court quoted facts reported in the PSI and made statements
related to the seriousness of the offense. Id. at 6-8. Regarding recidivism, the court
read Appellant’s criminal record into the record and noted Appellant’s prior criminal
history included violence directed against women. Id. at pp. 7-8. The court stated, “I
don’t believe that you’ve shown any real remorse. Instead, * * * you try to explain
away your prior conduct, and your real concern is how you are going to be treated in
prison if you’re sent there, rather than how you have treated your victims, including
the victim in this case.” Id. at 8. The court also declared that the sentence was
based on his prior domestic violence offense, felony sex abuse convictions, and the
need for punishment. Id. at 7-8.
{¶39} Moreover, in the sentencing entry the trial court explicitly declared that it
was to consider: “the principles and purposes of sentencing set forth in Revised
Code §2929.11, consider the factors contained in Ohio Revised Code
§2929.12(B),(C),(D), and (E), and any other factors relevant to achieving those
purposes and principles.” (10/6/15 J.E., p. 2.) The judgment entry also stated the
court considered the record, including Appellant’s violation of the no-contact order
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while incarcerated, the oral statements, and the PSI. The sentencing entry set forth
findings that aligned with the statutory factors. For instance, the court reiterated that
Appellant has a criminal history, particularly of violent crimes against women, and
recited some of the offenses. In the entry the court expressly stated that Appellant
has not responded to sanctions previously imposed and that he has an established
pattern of violent criminal activity against women without any genuine remorse for his
conduct. The court found no mitigating factors suggesting that recidivism was
unlikely. The court added that community control would not adequately punish
Appellant or protect the public and would demean the seriousness of the offense.
{¶40} Regarding the factors in R.C. 2929.12(B) making the offense more
serious, Appellant’s relationship with the victim, who was his ex-girlfriend and mother
of his child, facilitated the offense. See R.C. 2929.12(B)(6). The victim suffered
physical and psychological harm. See R.C. 2929.12(A) (any other factor).
{¶41} Regarding evaluation of the factors in R.C. 2929.12(C) that can make
an offense less serious, the court found no factors in Appellant’s favor.
{¶42} As to the factors in R.C. 2929.12(D) indicating the offender is likely to
commit future crimes, this was Appellant’s third domestic violence conviction. He
also had two felony sex abuse convictions and two convictions for persistent
disorderly conduct and was on misdemeanor probation when he committed the
instant offense. See R.C. 2929.12(D)(1). Appellant has not responded favorably to
sanctions previously imposed. See R.C. 2929.12(D)(3).
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{¶43} There was no expression of genuine remorse, and he did not accept
responsibility for the offense. See R.C. 2929.12(D)(5). Compare R.C. 2929.12(E)(5)
(showing genuine remorse is a factor making recidivism less likely).
{¶44} As to the factors in R.C. 2929.12(E) that indicate an offender is not
likely to commit future crime, as a juvenile Appellant had three delinquency
adjudications. See R.C. 2929.12(E)(1). Appellant’s adult offenses, including those
similar to the one at issue, weigh heavily on the scale. See R.C. 2929.12(E)(2). His
record shows he did not lead a law-abiding life for a significant number of years prior
to this offense. See R.C. 2929.12(E)(3). The record reflects the offense was
committed under circumstances likely to recur. See R.C. 2929.12(E)(4).
{¶45} R.C. 2929.11(A) speaks of an “unnecessary” burden on government
resources, and even that concern must be weighed against the general purposes
and principles of sentencing. See also Grillon, supra, at ¶ 136 (costs should not
outweigh the benefit the people of the state derive from an offender’s incarceration).
The trial court exercised its discretion in weighing the factors and in determining that
a maximum sentence of 30 months was appropriate, and that any burden on
resources was not unnecessary or was outweighed by the need to protect the public,
deter the offender and others, and punish Appellant.
{¶46} As set forth in the record and in the trial court’s findings, Appellant has
demonstrated a pattern of violence against women. A long history of domestic
violence and felony sex convictions makes Appellant’s current contention that his
sentence was contrary to law because his offense consisted only of a “smack” ring
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even more hollow. The severity of the physical and psychological harm to the victim
is listed as a factor within the determination of whether the offender's conduct is more
serious than conduct normally constituting the offense. See R.C. 2929.12(B)(2).
Even here the court noted that, although the physical harm to the victim in this
instance was not substantial, the psychological impact of being slapped across the
face in the middle of the street along with Appellant’s long history of violence against
women demonstrates the necessity for incarceration. To present to this Court that
Appellant committed only “a single strike or smack” and that the victim “put her hand
on the appellant first, albeit non-violently” demonstrates a willfully myopic view of
Appellant’s long history of violence. (Appellant’s Brf., pp. 19-20.)
{¶47} Thus, this Court does not clearly and convincingly find that Appellant’s
sentence is contrary to law as required by the statute governing the appeal. For the
foregoing reasons, Appellant’s fifth assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
{¶48} Based on the foregoing, Appellant’s assignments of error are overruled
and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
DeGenaro, J., concurs.
Robb, P.J., concurs.