Uphouse v. Uphouse , 2014 Ohio 2514 ( 2014 )

[Cite as Uphouse v. Uphouse, 2014-Ohio-2514.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
ALBERT K. UPHOUSE C.A. No. 27057
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
DENISE R. UPHOUSE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 2012-03-0647
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: June 11, 2014
CARR, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant Denise Uphouse appeals the judgment of the Summit County Court of
Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. This Court reverses and remands.
I.
{¶2} Albert Uphouse (“Husband”) filed a complaint against Denise Uphouse (“Wife”)
after a 19-year marriage. Wife filed an answer and counterclaim for divorce. The parties had
two unemancipated children at that time. The magistrate issued temporary orders, ordering
Husband to pay both temporary spousal and child support to Wife.
{¶3} The matter proceeded to trial on a contested divorce, although the parties had
reached an agreement as to some issues. Counsel for the parties read certain stipulations into the
record, including the parties’ agreement regarding the disposition of the marital home. After
issuing some nonfinal judgments, the domestic relations court issued a decree of divorce. Wife
filed a timely appeal in which she raises three assignments of error for review.
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II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FOLLOW THE STIPULATION
OF THE PARTIES REGARDING THE DISPOSITION OF THE MARITAL
RESIDENCE AND THE REIMBURSEMENTS WIFE WAS TO RECEIVE
UPON THE EVENTUAL SALE OF THE PROPERTY.
{¶4} Wife argues that the domestic relations court erred by failing to fully incorporate
the parties’ stipulations regarding the disposition of the marital home into the final decree. This
Court agrees.
{¶5} This Court has repeatedly recognized that “‘[a] stipulation is defined as a
voluntary agreement, admission, or concession, made in a judicial proceeding by the parties or
their attorneys concerning disposition of some relevant point so as to eliminate the need for proof
or to narrow the range of issues to be litigated.’” Vengrow v. Vengrow, 9th Dist. Summit No.
24907, 2010-Ohio-2568, ¶ 10, quoting Baum v. Baum, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 97CA0022, 1997
WL 775770 (Nov. 26, 1997). Moreover,
“A stipulation between contesting parties evidences an agreement between them *
* *. To the extent that a stipulation jointly made represents an agreed statement
of the facts material to the case, it is a substitute for the evidence which would
otherwise have to be adduced in open court. Resultantly, when a stipulation of
facts is handed up by the adversaries in a case, the trier of facts must accept what
is set forth as a statement of settled fact that is undisputed and binding upon the
parties to the agreement.”
Vengrow at ¶ 10, quoting Newhouse v. Sumner, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-850665, 1986 WL
8516 (Aug. 6, 1986), citing 50 Ohio Jurisprudence 2d (1961), stipulations, Sections 9-11.
{¶6} In this case, Husband and Wife stipulated on the record as to the disposition of the
marital home as part of the division of marital property. After agreeing that the property was
titled and mortgaged in both spouses’ names, the parties agreed that Wife, who was living in the
home with the children, had until the younger child emancipated in which to either refinance the
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mortgage solely in her name, or pay the mortgage off in full. In the event that she was unable to
do either of those things, the parties agreed that the house would be sold and the proceeds would
be divided equally between Husband and Wife, except that Wife would additionally receive
reimbursement for (1) any improvements she made to the home outside of repairs made from a
recent insurance payment, and (2) any increased equity in the home due to her payment of the
mortgage as of the date of trial. The trial court’s decree, however, while holding Wife
responsible for the payment of the mortgage until the property was sold, ordered that all sale
proceeds from the home would be divided equally. The decree did not make any provision for
reimbursement to Wife of increased value due to improvements she made to the home or due to
her pay down of the mortgage. Accordingly, the trial court’s decree did not accurately reflect the
parties’ stipulation regarding the division of marital property, specifically as it related to the
marital home.
{¶7} The trial court omitted several terms of the parties’ stipulation. As we held in
Vengrow at ¶ 14, “[t]o the extent that the trial court’s order does not reflect the stipulated
agreement of the parties, the case must be remanded.” As the trial court erred by failing to
incorporate the parties’ complete stipulation regarding the disposition of the marital home into
the decree, Wife’s first assignment of error is sustained.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE
DURATION OF THE SPOUSAL SUPPORT AWARD.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS OF THE HUSBAND’S EXPENSES WAS
AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE TRIAL
COURT’S DETERMINATION OF THE AMOUNT OF REASONABLE AND
APPROPRIATE SPOUSAL SUPPORT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
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{¶8} Wife argues that the domestic relations court erred in its determination of the
amount and duration of the spousal support award.
{¶9} R.C. 3105.171(C)(3) dictates that the domestic relations court “shall provide for
an equitable division of marital property under this section prior to making any award of spousal
support * * *.” In addition, the trial court “may award reasonable spousal support to either party
* * * upon the request of either party and after the court determines the division or disbursement
of property under section 3105.171 of the Revised Code[.]” R.C. 3105.18(B). Applying these
statutory provisions, this Court has written: “Thus, the trial court was required to make an
equitable division of the marital property under R.C. 3105.171 before it could make an award of
spousal support.” Wells v. Wells, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25557, 2012-Ohio-1392, ¶ 24.
{¶10} Based on our resolution of Wife’s first assignment of error, the domestic relations
court must revisit its determination regarding the equitable division of marital property. Only
thereafter may it determine the issue of spousal support. Accordingly, Wife’s second and third
assignments of error are not ripe for consideration by this Court, and we decline to address them.
III.
{¶11} Wife’s first assignment of error is sustained. This Court declines to address the
second and third assignments of error as they are not ripe for review. The judgment of the
Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is reversed and the cause
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed,
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
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We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the
period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is
instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the
mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
DONNA J. CARR
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P., J.
WHITMORE, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
SHARYL W. GINTHER and KENNETH L. GIBSON, Attorneys at Law, for Appellant.
SHUBHRA N. AGARWAL, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.