State v. Scofield , 2021 Ohio 569 ( 2021 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as State v. Scofield, 
    2021-Ohio-569
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    FAIRFIELD COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                   JUDGES:
    Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee                      Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
    Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    -vs-
    Case No. 2020 CA 00025
    DAVID SCOFIELD
    Defendant-Appellant                      O P I N IO N
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                       Appeal from the Fairfield County Court of
    Common Pleas, Case No. 16 CR 475
    JUDGMENT:                                       Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                         March 1, 2021
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                          For Defendant-Appellant
    R. KYLE WITT                                    THOMAS C. LOEPP, CO., LPA
    Fairfield County Prosecuting Attorney           3580 Darrow Road
    Stow, Ohio 44224
    MARK A. BALAZIK
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    239 East Main Street, Suite #101
    Lancaster, Ohio 43130
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                                   2
    Hoffman, J.
    {¶1}   Defendant-appellant David Scofield appeals the judgment entered by the
    Fairfield County Common Pleas Court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief
    (hereinafter “PCR”) without a hearing.    Plaintiff-appellee is the state of Ohio.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶2}   The facts of this case as set forth in our opinion on Appellant’s direct appeal
    are as follows:
    {¶3}   On November 4, 2016, shortly before 1:00 a.m., Pickerington Police Officer
    Mercedes Gavins was on patrol near Hill Road North when she observed the driver of a
    maroon Saturn, later identified as Appellant, weaving within his lane. As she followed, the
    vehicle drifted left of center, crossing the double yellow lane marking. Gavins notified
    dispatch she was going to initiate a traffic stop, and provided a description and plate
    number for the Saturn.
    {¶4}   Gavins activated the overhead lights on her cruiser signaling Appellant to
    pull over. Instead of immediately doing so, Appellant slammed on his brakes, nearly
    causing Gavins to collide with the back end of the Saturn. Appellant continued a bit further
    before pulling over on Diley Road. Diley Road is two lanes in each direction with a
    concrete median, raised curbs, and no shoulder. Before Gavins got out of her cruiser,
    dispatch advised the Saturn was registered to 85-year-old Dorothy Scofield.
    {¶5}   As Gavins approached the vehicle, she could see Appellant was the only
    occupant. Appellant was moving about the cabin area, at one point ducking below the
    front seat. Appellant had the window rolled hallway down as she approached. Gavins
    advised Appellant the reasons for the stop were a marked lanes violation and his abrupt
    stop. Appellant explained he was weaving due to his operation of the car's radio. Gavins
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                                  3
    asked Appellant for his license and proof of insurance. Appellant told Gavins his license
    was in his pocket, but made no move to retrieve it. Gavins asked Appellant for his license
    three times before he finally gave it to her. Gavins also had to ask Appellant for his proof
    of insurance three times before he finally gave it to her. In spite of Appellant's odd
    behavior, Gavins did not detect any signs of intoxication. She took his license and proof
    of insurance back to her cruiser, intending to issue a citation for the lanes of travel
    violation and send Appellant on his way.
    {¶6}   Once in her cruiser, Gavins relayed Appellant's information to dispatch.
    Dispatch advised Appellant had two arrest warrants in Akron and an extensive criminal
    history including impersonating an officer, obstruction, and resisting arrest. Gavins was
    further cautioned Appellant may be armed. Akron confirmed both warrants with dispatch.
    Gavins requested backup and Officer Smith arrived to assist.
    {¶7}   Gavins and Smith approached Appellant's car together and asked him to
    step out of the vehicle so they could place him under arrest on the warrants. Appellant
    responded the warrants were “bogus,” denied he had any warrant for his arrest, and
    further advised the officers he was a law enforcement officer with 20 years experience.
    Appellant refused to get out of the car. The officers again asked Appellant to get out of
    the car. He again refused and locked his doors. When Gavins reached in to unlock the
    door, Appellant slapped her hand away and rolled up the window, nearly catching Gavin's
    fingers. The officers pulled out batons and advised Appellant he could either get out of
    the car voluntarily or they would break the car window and remove him from the car. As
    Smith counted down from three, Appellant opened the door and got out. He was cuffed
    and placed in Gavins's cruiser without incident. Additional officers and Appellant's
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                               4
    girlfriend, who had been driving her car ahead of Appellant, arrived on the scene shortly
    thereafter.
    {¶8}   Because Gavins's dash camera was not functioning, the time between
    Gavin pulling Appellant over and Appellant's arrest was unclear. According to Gavins's
    testimony at the suppression hearing, it was mere minutes. At 1:27 a.m., dispatch
    indicated Akron would not extradite Appellant, but three minutes later dispatch indicated
    Akron had changed its stance and would extradite.
    {¶9}   Due to Appellant's arrest, the fact the Saturn was impeding traffic, and
    because the record owner of the Saturn lived 40 minutes away, Gavins called for a tow
    truck to impound the vehicle. In the meantime, officers conducted an inventory search of
    the car. During the search officers discovered a loaded Glock 23 handgun under the front
    seat and a polymer knife in a compartment below the steering wheel. Officers further
    discovered a police scanner below the dash tuned to the officer's frequency. Additional
    polymer knives, a SBR AR-15 automatic rifle with two magazines, additional assorted
    magazines and ammunition were discovered in the trunk of the car.
    {¶10} Appellant was transported to the Pickerington Police Station where he was
    provided with Miranda warnings. Appellant advised he possessed the concealed carry
    and manufacturer licenses required to possess the weapons. Further investigation
    revealed both licenses were void.
    {¶11} Appellant was issued a citation for the marked lanes violation. Gavins
    forwarded a report requesting further charges based on Appellant's possession of the
    weapons to the City of Lancaster Prosecutor's Office. The Fairfield County Grand Jury
    subsequently returned an indictment charging Appellant with one count of improper
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                                  5
    handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle, a felony of the fourth degree, and one count of
    unlawful possession of a dangerous ordinance, a felony of the fifth degree.
    {¶12} Appellant pled not guilty to the charges. On December 15, 2016, Appellant
    filed a motion to suppress arguing there was insufficient probable cause to stop his vehicle
    and further, any statements he made prior to receiving Miranda warnings should be
    suppressed. Appellant supplemented the motion on April 10, 2017, additionally arguing
    the Pickerington Police Department violated its own impound policies and procedures,
    and therefore any evidence recovered as a result of the inventory search must be
    suppressed.
    {¶13} A hearing was held on the suppression motion on April 10, 2017. On May
    9, 2017, the trial court overruled Appellant's motion with the exception of any pre-Miranda
    statements.
    {¶14} On January 29, 2018, Appellant entered a no contest plea to improper
    handling of a firearm in a motor vehicle. The trial court found appellant guilty and
    sentenced him to five years community control. The State dismissed the second count of
    the indictment.
    {¶15} Appellant filed an appeal to this Court from the judgment of conviction and
    sentence, assigning as error, “Because the mere arrest of a motor vehicle’s operator
    should not automatically trigger police impoundment of that car, a warrantless inventory
    search conducted in such a scenario violates the Fourth Amendment and Section 14,
    Article I of the Ohio Constitution.” This Court found the impoundment of the vehicle and
    subsequent inventory search to be lawful, and affirmed.        State v. Scofield, 5th Dist.
    Fairfield No. 18-CA-06, 
    2019-Ohio-375
    .
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                                    6
    {¶16} On March 21, 2019, Appellant filed a PCR petition, alleging counsel was
    ineffective for failing to present evidence police began the inventory search of his car prior
    to receiving confirmation of the warrants from Akron. He alleged counsel failed to present
    evidence of “radio chatter” via dash cam videos which would have demonstrated police
    began to search his car while dispatch waited for Akron police to confirm the validity of
    the warrants and to decide if they desired Pickerington police to hold Appellant for pickup.
    The State filed a response on May 2, 2019, arguing Appellant failed to support his petition
    with evidentiary support.
    {¶17} Appellant filed a motion for leave to file an amended petition on May 2, 2019.
    The amended petition was attached to his motion. Attached to the motion were three CD
    discs purporting to be dash cam video from the Pickerington police. Also attached to the
    motion was a timeline of unknown origin of events of the traffic stop, taken from videos
    on Disc 3 of the attached discs.
    {¶18} Appellant also attached his own affidavit to his petition. In his affidavit, he
    averred while confined to the back of the police cruiser, he could hear radio
    communication which made it clear Pickerington law enforcement could not readily verify
    the status of the Akron warrant. He averred he eventually heard Pickerington state they
    had confirmation of the warrant from Akron, but prior to such confirmation he observed
    Pickerington police officers enter and search his car. He stated he reviewed all video
    and/or audio recordings created on the night in question, and the timeline presented in
    the recordings verifies police searched his car prior to confirmation of the warrants.
    {¶19} As further evidentiary support for his petition, Appellant attached an affidavit
    of his girlfriend, Elena LaRue. She averred before she was told about the active warrants,
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                                   7
    she heard two officers state in reference to Appellant, “We will find something to hold him
    on.” Aff. LaRue, ¶5. She averred an officer told her they were waiting to verify the validity
    of the warrants out of Akron, she could pick Appellant up at the Pickerington Police
    Department if there was not a warrant, but if there was a warrant he would be taken to
    the Fairfield County Jail. She averred while she was communicating with police, other
    officers opened Appellant’s car doors and looked inside.
    {¶20} The State filed a response to Appellant’s motion to file an amended PCR
    petition on January 9, 2020. The trial court granted Appellant leave to file the amended
    petition on March 5, 2020. The amended petition was filed on March 5, 2020, and the
    State responded on March 27, 2020.
    {¶21} On May 14, 2020, the trial court dismissed Appellant’s petition without a
    hearing. The court found Appellant’s claims were barred by res judicata. The court further
    found Appellant had not demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel because even
    considering Appellant’s newly proffered evidence, the search was lawful pursuant to the
    inevitable discovery rule.
    {¶22} It is from the May 14, 2020 judgment of the Fairfield County Common Pleas
    Court Appellant prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error:
    I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
    DENYING SCOFIELD’S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
    WITHOUT FIRST GRANTING A HEARING AS TO SAME.
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                               8
    II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
    PERMITTING THE STATE TO FILE ITS RESPONSE TO SCOFIELD’S
    PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.
    III. SCOFIELD’S COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN NOT SEEKING
    TO STRIKE THE STATE’S UNTIMELY RESPONSE TO HIS PETITION
    FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.
    IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
    IN DENYING SCOFIELD’S PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
    ON THE BASIS OF RES JUDICATA.
    V. THE STATE COMMITTED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
    IN NOT TIMELY PRODUCING THE AUDIOS/VIDEOS FROM THE
    EVENING OF THE ARREST OF SCOFIELD, AND IN NOT CORRECTING
    THE RECORD.
    VI. SCOFIELD’S COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN NOT RAISING
    PROSECUTORIAL          MISCONDUCT          IN    THE   STATE’S   UNTIMELY
    PRODUCTION OF THE AUDIOS/VIDEOS FROM THE EVENING OF THE
    ARREST OF SCOFIELD, AND IN NOT CORRECTING THE RECORD.
    VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
    IN RELYING ON THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE DISCOVERY.
    I., IV., VII.
    {¶23} In his first, fourth, and seventh assignments of error, Appellant argues the
    trial court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing.
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                              9
    {¶24} R.C. 2953.21 governs petitions for post-conviction relief, and provides in
    pertinent part:
    (A)(1)(a) Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense
    or adjudicated a delinquent child and who claims that there was such a
    denial or infringement of the person's rights as to render the judgment void
    or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United
    States, any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense and
    sentenced to death and who claims that there was a denial or infringement
    of the person's rights under either of those Constitutions that creates a
    reasonable probability of an altered verdict, and any person who has been
    convicted of a criminal offense that is a felony and who is an offender for
    whom DNA testing that was performed under sections 2953.71 to 2953.81
    of the Revised Code or under former section 2953.82 of the Revised Code
    and analyzed in the context of and upon consideration of all available
    admissible evidence related to the person's case as described in division
    (D) of section 2953.74 of the Revised Code provided results that establish,
    by clear and convincing evidence, actual innocence of that felony offense
    or, if the person was sentenced to death, establish, by clear and convincing
    evidence,   actual   innocence   of   the   aggravating   circumstance   or
    circumstances the person was found guilty of committing and that is or are
    the basis of that sentence of death, may file a petition in the court that
    imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                                10
    court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence or to grant other
    appropriate relief. The petitioner may file a supporting affidavit and other
    documentary evidence in support of the claim for relief.
    {¶25} “In a petition for post-conviction relief, which asserts ineffective assistance
    of counsel, the petitioner bears the initial burden to submit evidentiary documents
    containing sufficient operative facts to demonstrate the lack of competent counsel and
    that the defense was prejudiced by counsel's ineffectiveness.” State v. Jackson, 
    64 Ohio St.2d 107
    , 
    413 N.E.2d 819
     (1980), syllabus.
    {¶26} A defendant may only seek post-conviction relief for violations of his State
    and Federal Constitutional rights. Both the United States Constitution and the Ohio
    Constitution provide for the right to assistance of counsel. Counsel's performance will not
    be deemed ineffective unless counsel's performance is proven to have fallen below an
    objective standard of reasonable representation and, in addition, prejudice arises from
    counsel's performance. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
     (1984). To show a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel's deficient
    performance, the defendant must demonstrate but for counsel's errors, the result of the
    trial would have been different. State v. Bradley, 
    42 Ohio St.3d 136
    , 
    538 N.E.2d 373
    (1989).
    {¶27} Further, before a hearing is granted in proceedings for post-conviction relief
    upon a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the petitioner bears the initial
    burden to submit evidentiary material containing sufficient operative facts which
    demonstrate a substantial violation of defense counsel's essential duties to his client and
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                                   11
    prejudice arising from counsel's ineffectiveness. State v. Calhoun, 
    86 Ohio St.3d 279
    ,
    289, 
    714 N.E.2d 905
     (1999); State v. Jackson, 
    64 Ohio St.2d 107
    , 
    413 N.E.2d 819
     (1980),
    syllabus; see, also Strickland v. Washington, 
    supra,
     
    466 U.S. at 687
    .
    {¶28} The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized, “In post-conviction cases, a trial
    court has a gatekeeping role as to whether a defendant will even receive a hearing.” State
    v. Gondor, 
    112 Ohio St.3d 377
    , 388, 
    860 N.E.2d 77
    , 2006–Ohio–6679, ¶ 51. A petition
    for post-conviction relief does not provide a petitioner a second opportunity to litigate his
    or her conviction, nor is the petitioner automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
    the petition. State v. Wilhelm, 5th Dist. Knox No. 05–CA–31, 2006–Ohio–2450, ¶ 10, citing
    State v. Jackson, 
    64 Ohio St.2d 107
    , 110, 
    413 N.E.2d 819
     (1980). As an appellate court
    reviewing a trial court's decision in regard to the “gatekeeping” function in this context, we
    apply an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Gondor, supra, at ¶ 52, citing State v.
    Calhoun, 
    86 Ohio St.3d 279
    , 
    714 N.E.2d 905
     (1999); accord State v. Scott, 5th Dist. Stark
    No.2006CA00090, 2006–Ohio–4694, ¶ 34. In order to find an abuse of discretion, we
    must determine the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable
    and not merely an error of law or judgment. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St.3d 217
    ,
    
    450 N.E.2d 1140
     (1983).
    {¶29} The trial court in the instant case dismissed Appellant’s petition without a
    hearing for two reasons: (1) the petition was banned by res judicata, and (2) based on
    the inevitable discovery rule, Appellant did not demonstrate a reasonable probability of a
    change in the outcome had counsel presented evidence police searched the car prior to
    confirmation of the Akron warrant.
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                              12
    {¶30} At the outset, we note the discs attached to Appellant’s petition containing
    what purports to be Pickerington Police Department dash cam video from the stop, as
    well as the timeline of the stop, bear no authentication. There are no accompanying
    affidavits averring where the discs came from, nor is there any indication who prepared
    the timeline from the videos on the discs.
    {¶31} “Evid.R. 901(A) requires, as a condition precedent to the admissibility of
    evidence, a showing that the matter in question is what it purports to be.” State v.
    Simmons, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 24009, 
    2011-Ohio-2068
    , 
    2011 WL 1646819
    , ¶ 12.
    {¶32} The threshold standard for authenticating evidence is low. State v. Wiley,
    2d Dist. Darke No. 2011 CA 8, 
    2012-Ohio-512
    , 
    2012 WL 443977
    , ¶ 11. The most
    commonly used method is testimony that a matter is what it is claimed to be under Evid.R.
    901(B)(1). State v. Renner, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 25514, 
    2013-Ohio-5463
    , 
    2013 WL 6576714
    , ¶ 30.
    {¶33} Appellant’s affidavit states as follows:
    4. While I was confined in the back of the cruiser, I could hear radio
    communication coming from the cruiser audio system.
    5. I could hear Pickerington law enforcement officials discussing the
    warrant situation.
    6. It was clear from this communication that the Pickerington Police
    Department could not readily verify the warrant status from Akron.
    7. I eventually heard Pickerington confirm that they had confirmation
    of the warrant.
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                                 13
    8. Prior to that confirmation, I was able to observe from the back of
    the cruiser the Pickerington police officers enter and search my car.
    9. I reviewed all video and/or audio recordings created on the night
    in question.
    10.     The timeline presented in the recordings verify that the
    Pickerington Police Department entered and searched my car prior to
    verification of the Akron warrant. The video confirms my observations.
    {¶34} Scofield Aff., ¶¶4-10.
    {¶35} Assuming arguendo Appellant’s affidavit is sufficient to authenticate the
    videos of the stop and the prepared timeline, nothing in the video or the affidavits
    contradicts Gavins’s testimony she learned about the existence of the Akron warrants
    prior to removing Appellant from his vehicle and placing him in the back of the police
    cruiser. Rather, the radio chatter indicates Pickerington police were waiting for direct
    communication from Akron to confirm the existence of the warrants which Gavins became
    aware of upon checking Appellant’s driver’s license, and were waiting to determine if
    Akron wanted to pick up Appellant on the warrants.
    {¶36} The dash cam videos with the accompanying background radio chatter, the
    affidavit of Elena LaRue, and Appellant’s affidavit demonstrate police began to remove
    items, specifically a gun, from Appellant’s vehicle prior to confirmation by Akron police of
    the existence of the warrant, and while awaiting a decision from Akron as to if they would
    pick Appellant up.    However, we find the trial judge did not err in finding the evidence
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                                 14
    would have been inevitably discovered during an inventory search subsequent to
    Appellant’s arrest for obstructing official business, or his arrest on the Akron warrants.
    {¶37} The inevitable-discovery rule allows the admission of illegally obtained
    evidence where “it is established that the evidence would have been ultimately or
    inevitably discovered during the course of a lawful investigation.” State v. Perkins, 
    18 Ohio St.3d 193
    , 
    480 N.E.2d 763
    , syllabus (1985). Although Appellant was not ultimately
    charged with obstructing official business or resisting arrest, in his supplemental motion
    to suppress, he set forth the facts as follows:
    After checking defendant’s information, the officer discovered that
    the defendant had a warrant out of Akron. Once backup arrived, the officer
    approached the vehicle a second time and defendant was asked to exit his
    vehicle. Defendant did not comply with the request by law enforcement and
    attempted to inform the officers that he was outside of the pickup radius for
    his Akron warrant. Eventually, defendant was removed from the vehicle,
    handcuffed and placed in the back of the cruiser. Later, dispatch radioed
    that Mr. Scofield was not going to be held on his Akron warrant. The officers
    and radio dispatch then relayed that Mr. Scofield was being arrested for
    obstructing official business/resisting arrest and would be held in Fairfield
    County jail. At this point in time, dispatch was informed that Akron would
    come down to pick him up from the jail on their warrant.
    While the Akron warrant issues were being resolved, several officers
    had arrived on the scene and they decided to conduct a search of the
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                                  15
    vehicle.   According to the officer’s narrative, during the administrative
    search, several pieces of evidence were located, including a handgun under
    the driver’s seat. Another firearm was located in the trunk of the vehicle.
    {¶38} Defendant’s Supplemental Motion to Suppress, April 10, 2017.
    {¶39} After a discussion of the Pickerington police impoundment policy,
    Appellant’s    motion   states,   “Defendant    was    arrested   for   obstructing   official
    business/resisting arrest.” While Appellant’s recitation of the facts in his motion appears
    to have been taken from the “officer’s narrative” of the stop which is not a part of the
    record before this Court, the dash cam video attached to Appellant’s PCR petition also
    demonstrates after initially being informed by dispatch Akron did not want Appellant to be
    held for pickup on the warrant, an officer can be heard saying to dispatch, “We’re going
    to have our own charges.” Defendant’s Ex. C, at 21:11.        In her affidavit, Elena LaRue
    stated an officer told her they were waiting to verify the validity of the warrants out of
    Akron, and she could pick Appellant up at the Pickerington Police Department if there
    was not a warrant, but if there was a warrant he would be taken to the Fairfield County
    Jail.   Thus, it is clear from the record Appellant was not going to be released from the
    scene regardless of the status of the Akron warrant. He would either be arrested on local
    charges or taken to the jail to await pickup by Akron. Therefore, the car would have been
    impounded and inventoried regardless of the status of the Akron warrant. This Court
    previously upheld the validity of the impoundment of the vehicle and the inventory search.
    {¶40} In addition, ultimately Akron police decided they would pick Appellant up on
    the warrant, merely three minutes after their first indication they would not pick Appellant
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                                   16
    up. Therefore, Appellant would have been held on the Akron warrants regardless of any
    arrest for obstructing official business or resisting arrest, the car would have been
    impounded and inventoried, and the weapons would have been discovered.
    {¶41} We find the trial court did not err in finding Appellant has not demonstrated
    a reasonable probability of a change in the outcome had counsel presented evidence of
    the timeline of the search of the vehicle, as the evidence would have been inevitably
    discovered.
    {¶42} Because we have concluded the trial court correctly dismissed Appellant’s
    petition without a hearing on the basis of the inevitable discovery rule, we need not
    discuss the propriety of the trial court’s conclusion the petition was barred by res judicata.
    {¶43} The first, fourth and seventh assignments of error are overruled.
    II., III.
    {¶44} In his second and third assignments of error, Appellant argues the trial court
    erred in allowing the State to file a response to his first PCR petition eight months after
    its filing, and erred in allowing the State to file a response to his amended petition more
    than three weeks after its filing. He also argues counsel was ineffective in failing to object
    to the State’s untimely filed responses.
    {¶45} R.C. 2953.21(E) provides:
    (E) Within ten days after the docketing of the petition, or within any
    further time that the court may fix for good cause shown, the prosecuting
    attorney shall respond by answer or motion. Division (A)(6) of this section
    applies with respect to the prosecuting attorney's response. Within twenty
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                                 17
    days from the date the issues are raised, either party may move for
    summary judgment. The right to summary judgment shall appear on the
    face of the record.
    {¶46} As to the State’s delayed response to Appellant’s first petition, we find the
    issue is moot. The trial court did not rule on the merits of Appellant’s first petition, but
    rather allowed Appellant to file an amended petition.
    {¶47} Regarding Appellant’s amended petition, the State’s response was not filed
    within ten days. The trial court scheduled a non-oral hearing on the petition on March 27,
    2020, stating the court would consider the pending motion and all of the parties’ written
    arguments on or after this date. While not expressly stated, the trial court’s entry implies
    the State’s response would be due on or before March 27, 2020, the date of the non-oral
    hearing.
    {¶48} Appellant has not demonstrated prejudice from the trial court’s decision to
    allow the State to file its response by March 27, 2020, nor has he demonstrated the result
    of the proceeding would have been otherwise had counsel objected to the State’s delayed
    filing. In the time period between Appellant’s first petition and his amended petition, the
    record demonstrates a plethora of activity surrounding a motion to revoke Appellant’s
    community control, which may have delayed consideration of the PCR petition. We also
    note the State presented no evidence in response to Appellant’s petition, but merely made
    legal argument in response. We found in our discussion of Appellant’s first, fourth, and
    seventh assignments of error above the trial court did not err in denying Appellant’s
    petition without a hearing based on the inevitable discovery doctrine. Nothing in the
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                               18
    record suggests the trial court and this Court would not have reached the same decision
    in the absence of the March 27, 2020 response filed by the State.
    {¶49} Appellant’s second and third assignments of error are overruled.
    V., VI.
    {¶50} In his fifth and sixth assignments of error, Appellant argues the prosecutor
    committed misconduct in failing to produce the dash cam videos in a timely manner, and
    further his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue of prosecutorial
    misconduct.
    {¶51} Appellant failed to raise this claim in his PCR petition. A party who fails to
    raise an argument in the trial court waives the right to raise it on appeal. Niskanen v.
    Giant Eagle, Inc., 
    122 Ohio St.3d 486
    , 
    2009-Ohio-3626
    , 
    912 N.E.2d 595
    , ¶ 34, citing
    State ex rel. Zollner v. Indus. Comm., 
    66 Ohio St.3d 276
    , 278, 
    611 N.E.2d 830
     (1993).
    {¶52} Further, the record demonstrates Appellant’s claim he was not given the
    recordings in a timely manner is without merit. On March 2, 2017, the State provided a
    supplemental discovery response which indicated Appellant was given two DVDs, one of
    the cruiser video from Unit 416 and one from Unit 421.        DVD numbers one and two
    attached to Appellant’s PCR petition reflect they were recorded from cruiser Units 416
    and 421. The third DVD attached to the petition includes two video clips which appear to
    have been excerpted from the dash cam videos provided in discovery.
    {¶53} Therefore, it appears from the record Appellant received the videos more
    than a month prior to the suppression hearing in this case.
    Fairfield County, Case No. 2020 CA 00025                                           19
    {¶54} The fifth and sixth assignments of error are overruled.
    {¶55} The judgment of the Fairfield County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
    By: Hoffman, J.
    Gwin, P.J. and
    Delaney, J. concur
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2020 CA 00025

Citation Numbers: 2021 Ohio 569

Judges: Hoffman

Filed Date: 3/1/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/3/2021