Martinez v. Martinez , 2014 Ohio 4141 ( 2014 )

[Cite as Martinez v. Martinez, 2014-Ohio-4141.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
SENECA COUNTY
RAY H. MARTINEZ, JR.,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 13-14-07
v.
TRACY L. MARTINEZ, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Seneca County Common Pleas Court
Domestic Relations Division
Trial Court No. 13-DR-0154
Appeal Dismissed
Date of Decision: September 22, 2014
APPEARANCES:
Gene P. Murray for Appellant
James W. Fruth for Appellee
Case No. 13-14-07
ROGERS, J.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, Tracy Martinez (“Tracy”), appeals the judgment
of the Court of Common Pleas of Seneca County, Domestic Relations Division,
overruling her objections to the magistrate’s order that divided her military
pension equally with Plaintiff-Appellee, Ray Martinez, Jr. (“Ray”) as part of a
divorce decree. On appeal, Tracy argues that the trial court failed to adequately
explain the division. For the reasons that follow, we dismiss the appeal for lack of
a final appealable order.
{¶2} On August 31, 1987, Tracy joined the United States Air Force. She
married Ray on February 2, 1988, and retired from the Air Force on September 1,
2007. On July 16, 2013, Ray filed a complaint for divorce. At a November 26,
2013 hearing, the parties submitted a settlement agreement that resolved all issues
regarding the divorce, except the division of Tracy’s military pension, for which a
separate decision was requested of the magistrate. Ray testified at the hearing,
requesting half of the military pension. Tracy also testified, but did not dispute
that Ray was entitled to half. That same day, the magistrate issued a decision,
finding that the military pension was marital property and should be divided
equally between the parties for the portion that was acquired during the marriage.
{¶3} Tracy filed three objections on December 9, 2013. The first objected
to the “Magistrate’s findings of fact and conclusions of law that [Ray] is entitled to
a one-half portion of the military retirement benefits of the military pension of
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[Tracy].” (Docket No. 24, p. 1). The second objection stated “Accordingly,
Defendant objects to the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
recommendations pursuant to same, as contained in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of the
Magistrate’s decision.” Id. The third objected to any award of survivorship
benefits as part of a division of the military pension.
{¶4} In a February 3, 2014 entry, erroneously captioned “Judgment Entry”
(“ruling on objections”) the trial court overruled Tracy’s first objection, finding
that “the military pension accrued from the date of the marriage of the parties
through the date of the final hearing on their divorce was marital property, and
[Ray] was entitled to half of that property. This finding and decision was in
accordance with Ohio law.” (Docket No. 30, p. 2). The trial court did not
specifically address Tracy’s second objection. The court went on to sustain what
it considered Tracy’s second objection, but which had been filed as her third,
regarding the survivorship benefits, finding that “the Magistrate erred in finding
that [Ray] was entitled to a survivor benefit with regard to [Tracy’s] military
pension.” (Id. at p. 2-3). The entry went on to list a series of orders, including the
preparation of a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”) which “should
provide a half-interest in the pension to Ray H. Martinez, Jr. based upon the dates
above.” (Id. at p. 3). However, none of these orders specified that the QDRO
should not include survivorship benefits for Ray.
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Case No. 13-14-07
{¶5} Another entry, captioned “Judgment Entry – Decree of Divorce”
(“divorce decree”), was also filed on February 3, 2014. This entry found that
grounds for divorce were established and accepted the proposed settlement
agreement that divided the property that was offered by the parties. However, the
orders regarding the division of the military pension were neither repeated nor
referenced.
{¶6} Tracy timely appealed, presenting the following assignment of error
for our review.
Assignment of Error
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
OVERRULING THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S
OBJECTION TO THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE BEING
ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF OF THE MILITARY PENSION
OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, WHEN THE
PLAINTIFF-APELLEE, WITH THE BURDEN OF PROOF,
DID NOT SHOW OR OTHERWISE OFFER SUBSTANTIVE
PROOF THAT THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE WAS
ENTITLTED TO THE MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF ONE-HALF
OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT’S MILITARY
PENSION.
{¶7} Before we can reach the merits of Tracy’s assignment of error, we
must preliminarily determine whether we have subject matter jurisdiction to
address the issues raised on appeal. The Ohio Court of Appeals is only vested
with subject matter jurisdiction over final and appealable orders. Ohio
Constitution, Article IV, Section 3(B)(2). “If a judgment appealed from is not a
final order, an appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider it and the appeal must
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be dismissed.” State v. O’Black, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-09-46, 2010-Ohio-192, ¶ 4.
Moreover, this court is “bound to raise any jurisdictional questions not raised by
the parties.” Levinsky v. Boardman Twp. Civ. Serv. Comm., 7th Dist. Mahoning
No. 04 MA 36, 2004-Ohio-5931, ¶ 26.
{¶8} A judgment entry in a divorce is only a final appealable order where it
divides all of the property between the parties. Civ.R. 75(F); see also Johnson v.
Johnson, 194 Ohio App. 3d 664, 2011-Ohio-3001, ¶ 13 (3d Dist.). “Civil Rule
75(F) provides, in relevant part, that a trial court shall not enter final judgment as
to a claim for divorce unless: (1) the judgment also divides the property of the
parties * * *; or (2) the judgment incorporates the court’s previous orders
regarding property division * * *.” (Emphasis added). Garvin v. Garvin, 4th Dist.
Jackson No. 02CA23, 2004-Ohio-3626, ¶ 9.
{¶9} The divorce decree, filed February 3, 2014, accepts the settlement
agreement proposed by the parties, but fails to effectuate or reference the orders
announced in the ruling on objections. Indeed, there is no mention whatsoever of
the military pension at all. Without either effectuating the orders or at least
referencing the ruling on objections, the divorce decree fails to divide all of the
property of the parties, rendering it less than a final order under Civ.R. 75(F).
{¶10} Further, even if the divorce decree did reference the ruling on
objections, it would not change the result. “If objections to the magistrate’s
decision are timely filed, the trial court is required to rule on those objections.”
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Erwin v. Erwin, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-05-45, 2006-Ohio-2661, ¶ 31; Civ.R.
53(D)(4)(d). Further, “[i]t is well-established that an appellate court may not
address an appeal of a trial court’s judgment when the trial court has failed to rule
on properly filed objections.” Ludwick v. Ludwick, 12th Dist. Fayette No.
CA2002-08-017, 2003-Ohio-2925, ¶ 5. Here, the ruling on objections fails to
specifically rule on the second objection to the Magistrate’s Decision.
{¶11} Even were we to find that the entry sufficiently addressed the second
objection, the entry contains no order regarding the remedy that resulted from the
trial court’s sustaining of the third objection. The divorce decree cannot reference
a prior order to become final, as required by Civ.R. 75(F), where no such order
exists. As a result, even a reference to the ruling on objections would not have
rendered the divorce decree a final order. Consequently, we lack jurisdiction.
{¶12} Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, this appeal is dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction.
Appeal Dismissed
WILLAMOWSKI, P.J. and PRESTON, J., concur.
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