State v. Fisher , 2023 Ohio 1131 ( 2023 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Fisher, 
    2023-Ohio-1131
    .]
    COURT OF APPEALS
    MUSKINGUM COUNTY, OHIO
    FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    STATE OF OHIO                                  JUDGES:
    Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J.
    Plaintiff-Appellee                     Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
    Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
    -vs-
    Case No. CT2022-0024
    CHASE FISHER
    Defendant-Appellant                   OPINION
    CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                      Appeal from the Muskingum County Court
    of Common Pleas, Case No. CR2021-
    0601
    JUDGMENT:                                      Affirmed
    DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                        April 3, 2023
    APPEARANCES:
    For Plaintiff-Appellee                         For Defendant-Appellant
    RONALD WELCH                                   APRIL F. CAMPBELL
    Prosecuting Attorney                           Campbell Law, LLC
    Muskingum County, Ohio                         545 Metro Place South – Suite #100
    Dublin, Ohio 43-17
    JOHN CONNOR DEVER
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    Muskingum County, Ohio
    27 North Fifth Street
    P.O. Box 189
    Zanesville, Ohio 43702
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0024                                                    2
    Hoffman, J.
    {¶1}    Defendant-appellant Chase Fisher appeals the judgment entered by the
    Muskingum County Common Pleas Court convicting him following his pleas of guilty to
    one count of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance (R.C.
    2907.323(A)(1)) and one count of disseminating matter harmful to juveniles (R.C.
    2907.31(A)(1)), and sentencing him to an aggregate prison term of four to six years
    incarceration. Plaintiff-appellee is the state of Ohio.
    STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
    {¶2}    Appellant was employed as a sports broadcaster by a local news station,
    WHIZ. Through his employment, he interacted with female high school students while
    covering sporting events. Appellant began interacting with the female victim in this case
    on social media when she was fifteen years old. Appellant eventually asked the victim to
    be his “sugar baby.” Tr. (plea) 14. The victim began to send Appellant nude photographs
    of herself showing her vagina, breasts, and buttocks.        Appellant sent the victim a
    photograph of his penis. Appellant sent ten payments to the victim through Venmo,
    totaling $431.70. Appellant discussed the victim’s mental health issues with her, and
    when she tried to cut off communication with Appellant, he told the victim he was going
    to kill himself.
    {¶3}    Appellant was indicted by the Muskingum County Grand Jury with two
    counts of illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material and two counts of disseminating
    matter harmful to juveniles. Appellant entered guilty pleas to one count of illegal use of a
    minor in nudity-oriented material and one count of disseminating matter harmful to
    juveniles, and the State entered a nolle prosequi of the remaining two charges. The trial
    court convicted Appellant following his pleas of guilty, and sentenced Appellant to four to
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0024                                                    3
    six years incarceration for illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material and to twelve
    months incarceration for disseminating matter harmful to juveniles, to be served
    concurrently for an aggregate term of four to six years incarceration. It is from the March
    23, 2022 judgment of the trial court Appellant prosecutes his appeal, assigning as error:
    I. FISHER’S SENTENCES SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE
    TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE BECAUSE HE FAILED TO
    OBJECT      TO     FISHER’S       INDETERMINATE         SENTENCES         AS
    UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
    II. FISHER’S SENTENCE SHOULD BE REVERSED, BECAUSE IT
    WAS GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO ANOTHER SIMILARLY
    SITUATED OFFENDER, AND BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO
    CONSIDER HIS REHABILITATION.
    III. FISHER’S SENTENCE UNDER THE REAGAN TOKES ACT IS
    UNCONSTITUTIONAL.          THUS, HIS SENTENCE FOR THE SECOND-
    DEGREE FELONY OFFENSE SHOULD BE REVERSED.
    I.
    {¶4}   In his first assignment of error, Appellant argues his trial counsel was
    ineffective for failing to object to the constitutionality of the Reagan Tokes Act, under
    which he was sentenced.
    {¶5}   A properly licensed attorney is presumed competent. State v. Hamblin, 
    37 Ohio St.3d 153
    , 
    524 N.E.2d 476
     (1988). Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim of
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0024                                                    4
    ineffective assistance of counsel, Appellant must show counsel's performance fell below
    an objective standard of reasonable representation and but for counsel’s error, the result
    of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    ,
    
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
    (1984); State v. Bradley, 
    42 Ohio St.3d 136
    , 
    538 N.E.2d 373
     (1989). In other words, Appellant must show counsel’s conduct so undermined the
    proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having
    produced a just result. 
    Id.
    {¶6}   Because this Court has previously found the Reagan Tokes Act is
    constitutional, Appellant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability of a change in
    the outcome had counsel raised the issue in the trial court.           See, e.g., State v.
    Householder, 5th Dist. Muskingum No. CT2021-0026, 
    2022-Ohio-1542
    , 
    2022 WL 1439978
    .
    {¶7}   The first assignment of error is overruled.
    II.
    {¶8}   In his second assignment of error, Appellant argues his sentence was
    grossly disproportionate to another similarly situated offender in violation of R.C.
    2929.11(B), and the trial court failed to consider the concept of rehabilitation in imposing
    sentence in violation of R.C. 2929.11(A).
    {¶9}   We review felony sentences using the standard of review set forth in R.C.
    2953.08. State v. Roberts, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA 0030, 
    2020-Ohio-6722
    , ¶13,
    citing State v. Marcum, 
    146 Ohio St.3d 516
    , 
    2016-Ohio-1002
    , 
    59 N.E.3d 1231
    . R.C.
    2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or vacate a sentence
    and remand for sentencing where we clearly and convincingly find either the record does
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0024                                                     5
    not support the sentencing court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(B) or (D),
    2929.14(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(l), or the sentence is otherwise contrary to law. 
    Id.,
    citing State v. Bonnell, 
    140 Ohio St.3d 209
    , 
    2014-Ohio-3177
    , 
    16 N.E.3d 659
    .
    {¶10} When sentencing a defendant, the trial court must consider the purposes
    and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 and the seriousness and
    recidivism factors in R.C. 2929.12. State v. Hodges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99511, 2013-
    Ohio-5025, ¶ 7.
    {¶11} “The overriding purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from
    future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender, and to promote the
    effective rehabilitation of the offender using the minimum sanctions that the court
    determines accomplish those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on state
    or local government resources.” R.C. 2929.11(A). To achieve these purposes, the
    sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the
    offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution
    to the victim of the offense, the public, or both. 
    Id.
     Further, the sentence imposed shall be
    “commensurate with and not demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and
    its impact on the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes by
    similar offenders.” R.C. 2929.11(B).
    {¶12} Nothing in R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) permits this Court to independently weigh
    the evidence in the record and substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court to
    determine a sentence which best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and R.C.
    2929.12. State v. Jones, 
    1163 Ohio St.3d 242
    , 
    69 N.E.3d 649
    , 
    2020-Ohio-6729
    , ¶ 42.
    Instead, we may only determine if the sentence is contrary to law.
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0024                                                     6
    {¶13} A sentence is not clearly and convincingly contrary to law where the trial
    court “considers the principles and purposes of R.C. 2929.11, as well as the factors listed
    in R.C. 2929.12, properly imposes post release control, and sentences the defendant
    within the permissible statutory range.” State v. Pettorini, 5th Dist. Licking No. 2020 CA
    00057, 
    2021-Ohio-1512
    , 
    2021 WL 1714216
    , ¶¶ 14-16 quoting State v. Dinka, 12th Dist.
    Warren Nos. CA2019-03-022 & CA2019-03-026, 
    2019-Ohio-4209
    , ¶ 36.
    {¶14} Appellant argues he was a first-time offender who was seeking counseling
    on his own prior to sentencing, and the trial court did not consider the need for
    rehabilitating him in imposing the sentence in the instant case. The trial court stated in
    the sentencing entry it had considered the principles and purposes of sentencing pursuant
    to R.C. 2929.11. Appellant does not dispute the sentence was within the statutory range
    and post release control was properly imposed. Pursuant to Jones, 
    supra,
     we may not
    independently weigh the record and substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court
    to determine a sentence which best reflects the purpose of rehabilitation.
    {¶15} Appellant also argues his sentence is grossly disproportionate to a two-year
    sentence imposed in a case in which a female teacher engaged in a sexual relationship
    with a 17-year-old male student.       R.C. 2929.11(B) provides the sentence shall be
    consistent with sentences imposed for similar crimes on similar offenders. We find
    Appellant’s comparison to the case involving the teacher is not a comparison to a similar
    crime on a similar offender, as the offenses involved are not the same, and are
    criminalized in different ways by the legislature, with different applicable sentences. The
    record does not demonstrate any of the specific facts underlying the teacher’s case other
    than the age of the victim, and does not reflect the identity of the exact crime of which she
    Muskingum County, Case No. CT2022-0024                                                 7
    was convicted. Appellant argued to the trial court he believed a teacher having sexual
    relations with a student was a “worse offense” than receiving nude pictures from a minor;
    however, he did not demonstrate the offenses were legally similar.
    {¶16} The second assignment of error is overruled.
    III.
    {¶17} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues the Reagan Tokes Act,
    under which he was sentenced, is unconstitutional. For the reasons stated in this Court's
    opinion in Householder, 
    supra,
     we find the Reagan Tokes Act is constitutional.
    {¶18} The third assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Muskingum
    County Common Pleas Court is affirmed.
    By: Hoffman, J.
    Gwin, P.J. and
    Delaney, J. concur